The Act of August 13, 1894, c. 280, 28 Stat. 278, and the bond
given under it, must be construed liberally for the protection of
the who furnish labor or materials in the prosecution of public
work.
The act is not limited in application to labor and materials
directly incorporated into the public work. The amendment of
February 24, 1905, c. 778, 33 Stat. 811, does not change it in this
respect.
Page 246 U. S. 258
Where, because of special circumstances, it was clearly
indispensable to the prosecution of a public work that the
contractor supply board to the laborers, and board was so supplied,
exclusively in the work, the price being deducted monthly from
their wages,
held that groceries and provisions furnished
the contractor and so consumed by the laborers were materials used
"in the prosecution" of the work within the meaning of the
aforesaid acts and the bond given to secure the contract.
In the absence of special circumstances making the boarding of
the men a necessary and integral part of the work, as where a
contractor runs a boarding house as an independent enterprise, for
profit, the case would be outside the statute.
228 F. 577 reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 246 U. S. 259
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action against the surety on a bond given under the
Act of August 13, 1894, c. 280, 28 Stat. 278, as amended by the Act
of February 24, 1905, c. 778, 33 Stat. 811. The claim of Brogan, an
intervening petitioner, was allowed by the district court, but the
judgment was reversed by the circuit court of appeals and judgment
entered against him upon the undisputed facts (228 F. 577). The
case comes here on writ of error under § 241 of the Judicial
Code.
Page 246 U. S. 260
The facts, undisputed or as found by the lower court and
accepted by the court of appeals, were these: the Standard
Contracting Company undertook to deepen the channel in a portion of
St. Mary's River, Michigan, located "in a comparative wilderness at
some distance from any settlement. There were no hotels or boarding
houses," and the contractor "was compelled to provide board and
lodging for its laborers." Groceries and provisions of the value of
$4,613.87, furnished it by Brogan, were used by the contractor in
its boarding house, and were supplied
"in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract and
the bond upon which this suit is based. They were necessary to and
wholly consumed in such work."
The number of men employed averaged 80. They were "boarded"
partly on the dredges, partly in tents supplied by the contractor,
all under an arrangement made with the labor unions by which the
contractor was to board the men and deduct therefor $22.50 a month
from their wages. The contract and the bond executed by the
National Surety Company bound the contractor to "make full payment
to all persons supplying him with labor or materials in the
prosecution of the work provided for in" the contract.
The supplies furnished by Brogan under these circumstances were
clearly used in the prosecution of the work, just as supplies
furnished for the soldiers' mess are used in the prosecution of
war. In each case, the relation of food to the work in hand is
proximate. But the surety contends that the words "in the
prosecution of" the work are not used in the bond and the act in
their natural sense, but should be given a conventional meaning so
as to exclude labor and materials which contribute to construction
only indirectly, as do the supplies consumed by a contractor in
operating his plant. In support of this position, attention is
called to the fact that, while the Act of 1894 provided that the
bond should have
"the additional
Page 246 U. S. 261
obligation that such contractor or contractors shall promptly
make payments to all persons supplying him or them labor and
materials in the prosecution of the work,"
and that suit might be brought and recovery had upon this bond
by any person who had supplied "labor or materials for the
prosecution of such work," the Act of 1905 specified that recovery
could be had by the persons who had "furnished labor or materials
used in the construction or repair" of the work. But the change in
phraseology is not significant. The purpose of the amendment was
merely to secure to the United States preference over others in the
satisfaction of its claim against the contractor.
Illinois
Surety Co. v. Peeler, 240 U. S. 214,
240 U. S. 218.
See Report of Committee on H R. 13,626, 58th Congress,
Second Session, No. 2360. It was pointed out in
Mankin v.
Ludowici-Celadon Co., 215 U. S. 533,
215 U. S. 538,
that,
"in respect to the condition of the bond required to be given,
the language of the amended act is precisely the same as that
contained in the Act of August 13, 1894,"
and in
Hill v. American Surety Co., 200 U.
S. 197,
200 U. S. 201,
that, "in respect to the persons entitled to the benefit of the
bond, there has been no material change in the act."
Illinois
Surety Co. v. Peeler, supra, p.
240 U. S.
224.
This Court has repeatedly refused to limit the application of
the act to labor and materials directly incorporated into the
public work. Thus, in
Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Crane
Co., 219 U. S. 24,
219 U. S. 34,
the claims for which recovery was allowed under the bond included
not only cartage and towage of material, but also claims for
drawings and patterns used by the contractor in making molds for
castings which entered into the construction of the ship. In
United States Fidelity Co. v. Bartlett, 231 U.
S. 237, where the work contracted for was building a
breakwater, recovery was allowed for all the labor at a quarry
opened fifty miles away. This included, as the record shows, the
labor not only of men who stripped the earth
Page 246 U. S. 262
to get at the stone and who removed the debris, but carpenters
and blacksmiths who repaired the cars in which the stone was
carried to the quarry dock for shipment, and who repaired the
tracks upon which the cars moved. And the claims allowed included
also the wages of stablemen who fed and drove the horses which
moved the cars on those tracks. In
Illinois Surety Co. v. John
Davis Co., 244 U. S. 376,
recovery was allowed not only for the rental of cars, track and
other equipment used by the contractor in facilitating his work,
but also the expense of loading this equipment and the freight paid
thereon to transport it to the place where it was used. As shown by
these cases, the act and the bonds given under it must be construed
liberally for the protection of those who furnish labor or
materials in the prosecution of public work.
The circuit court of appeals deemed immaterial the special
circumstances under which the supplies were furnished and the
findings of fact by the trial court that they were necessary to and
wholly consumed in the prosecution of the work provided for in the
contract and bond. In our opinion, these facts are not only
material, but decisive. They establish the conditions essential to
liability on the bond. The bare fact that the supplies were
furnished to the contractor and were consumed by workmen in its
employ would have been immaterial. A boarding house might be
conducted by the contractor (like some company stores concerning
which states have legislated,
Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor,
234 U. S. 224) as
an independent enterprise undertaken solely in order to utilize the
opportunity for separate and additional profit afforded by the
congregation of many laborers in the particular locality where the
public work is being performed. The laborers might resort to such a
boarding house in the exercise of individual choice in the
selection of an eating place. Under such circumstances, the
furnishing of supplies would clearly be a matter independent of the
work provided for in the
Page 246 U. S. 263
contract, and would not entitle him who had furnished the
groceries used in the boarding house to recover on the bond. But
here, according to the undisputed facts and the findings of the
trial court, the furnishing of board by the contractor was an
integral part of the work, and necessarily involved in it. Like the
supplying of coal to operate engines on the dredges, it was
indispensable to the prosecution of the work, and it was used
exclusively in the performance of the work. Groceries furnished to
a contractor under such circumstances and consumed by the laborers
are materials supplied and used in the prosecution of the public
work. The judgment of the circuit court of appeals is therefore
reversed, and that of the district court affirmed.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, MR. JUSTICE PITNEY, and MR. JUSTICE
McREYNOLDS, dissent.