Where, in regular course, a passenger train is moved by one
company from one state to a point in another and is there taken
charge of and carried to destination by a second company, local to
the second state, it is manifestly erroneous to hold that its
interstate character is lost because the second company employs new
crews and engines and cannot go beyond the state line.
An order of the Texas Railroad Commission requiring passenger
trains in the state to leave stations on advertised schedule time,
and allowing them no more than 30 minutes at origin or points of
junction to make connection with trains of other lines, or 10
minute more if at the end of the 30 minutes the connecting trains
are in sight, is an unjustifiable interference with interstate
commerce as applied to a local railroad company in respect of an
interstate train which, under contract, the company receives at a
point within the state line from a connecting company, and forwards
(in sections) to its destinations within the state. The infliction
of penalties upon the local corporation, under the local law, for
failure to comply with the order is beyond the power of the state
courts in such a case. So
held where, though the trial
court found otherwise, the decisions of the intermediate and
supreme courts of the state assumed that there was sufficient
accommodation for local traffic independent of the through train in
question -- an assumption which this Court adopts, and where the
train was received too late to comply.
The suggestion that the order could have been complied with by
running an extra train locally, if the interstate train was not on
time, is impractical, and also inadequate in form, since, having
exercised its right to advertise the latter train, the company
could not escape liability for delay of that train by operating
another.
The powers of a state over the local business of a local
railroad company do not authorize the imposition of serious,
unwarranted and unjust burdens in respect of its interstate
trains.
167 S.W. 822 reversed.
Page 245 U. S. 485
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 245 U. S. 487
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a suit brought by the State of Texas to recover
penalties for violation of an order of the State Railroad
Commission. This order required passenger trains in Texas to start
from their point of origin and from stations on the line in
accordance with advertised schedule, allowing them not exceeding
thirty minutes at origin or points of junction with other lines to
make connection with trains on such other lines, and not exceeding
ten minutes more if at the end of the thirty minutes the connecting
trains were in sight. There were some other qualifications not
necessary to be stated. The defendant's passenger trains concerned
were numbers 9 and 209, and were parts of a train, also numbered 9,
of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway, a different
corporation, taken charge of by the defendant at Denison, Texas,
about five miles south of the Texas and Oklahoma state line, under
a contract with the Missouri, Kansas & Texas. In pursuance of
this contract, they were forwarded via Dallas and Fort Worth to
Hillsboro, thence as one train to Granger, and there again divided,
the two parts going respectively to Galveston and San Antonio.
There were similar arrangements for trains to the north. The cars
received by the defendant came from St. Louis and Kansas City,
Missouri, uniting at Parsons, Kansas, and thence proceeding south
to Denison. The court of civil Appeals at first held that the
movement must be regarded as a continuous one from Kansas City and
St. Louis, and that the order did not apply to the train; but, on a
rehearing, decided that, as the defendant took control at Denison
with new crews and engines, and as the defendant could not go
beyond the state line, the movement, so far as the defendant was
concerned, was wholly within the state. Breaches of the order
having been proved, it affirmed a judgment imposing
Page 245 U. S. 488
a fine. A writ of error was refused by the supreme court of the
state.
The supreme court gave up the manifestly untenable ground taken
by the court of civil Appeals and recognized that the defendant's
trains were instruments of commerce among the states, but it
construed the order as applying to them nonetheless, and held it
valid as so applied. The only question with which we have to deal
is whether the State Commission could intermeddle in this way,
especially when there was sufficient accommodation for local
traffic independent of the through trains. The defendant in error
attempts to open this last matter, because the opinion of the court
of civil appeals in which the fact was stated was reversed by it
for a different reason, and that of the court of first instance was
the other way. But we regard the decision of the intermediate and
the supreme court as proceeding upon the assumption that we have
stated, and that we see no reason to disturb. Again, the question
is not what the State Commission might require of a road deriving
its powers from the state, with regard to local business,
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.
S. 262,
216 U. S. 283,
but whether the order, if applied to this case, would not
unlawfully interfere with commerce among the states.
On its face, the order as applied was an interference with such
commerce. It undertook to fix the time allowed for stops in the
course of interstate transit. It was a serious interference, for it
made the defendant liable for an interstate train not starting on
schedule time, when the train did not come into the defendant's
hands, from another company in another state, until too late. This,
as we understand the facts, was the train to which the advertised
schedule applied, and if so, the mere statement of the result is
enough to show that the burden imposed not only was serious, but
was unwarranted as well as unjust. The suggestion that compliance
with the order
Page 245 U. S. 489
could have been secured by having an extra train ready to run if
the regular one was not on time hardly is practical, and is not an
adequate answer, even in form. For the defendant advertised, or at
least had the right to advertise, the interstate train, and, if it
did so, would not free itself from liability for a delay on the
part of that train by offering another. We think it plain that this
order was applied in a way that was beyond the power of the
Commission and courts of the state.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Blackwell, 244 U. S. 310;
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Railroad Commission
of Wisconsin, 237 U. S. 220,
237 U. S. 226;
South Covington & Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v.
Covington, 235 U. S. 537,
235 U. S.
548.
Judgment reversed.
