The court is not called upon to consider state statutes passed
for the enforcement of a provision in the state constitution, when
the latter, as construed and applied in the case by the state
supreme court is self-executing and covers the judgment in
question.
As applied to a company engaged in both interstate and
intrastate traffic, a state regulation, in respect of the latter
only, which forbids any railroad company in general terms from
charging more for a shorter haul than for a longer haul for the
same class of freight over
Page 244 U. S. 192
any portion of it line within the state without regard to
direction, circumstances, or condition, and which allows the
shipper an absolute right to recover any overcharge collected from
him in violation of the prohibition, is consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Interstate
Commerce Act, in the absence of special facts and circumstances
warranting a different conclusion in the particular ease.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Kentucky,
183 U. S. 503.
To claim exemption from such regulations under the Contract
Clause, the existence of a special protecting contract must be
shown by the record.
178 S.W. 1179 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant in error filed a petition containing forty-seven
counts in the Lafayette Circuit Court, seeking to recover what it
paid in excess of alleged lawful freight rates upon as many
shipments of coal from Myrick, Missouri, to other points in that
state. The first count follows. It is identical in substance with
all others except as to dates, amount of coal shipped, charges
paid, destination, and comparative rates.
"Plaintiff avers that, on April, 1908, it was and still is a
coal mining company incorporated under the law of the State of
Missouri."
"Plaintiff, for first cause of action, avers that, on
October,
Page 244 U. S. 193
1879, the defendant was and has been ever since a railroad
corporation duly organized under the law of said state and a common
carrier for hire of freight and passengers between its stations,
hereinafter named, in said state."
"That, within five years last past and on the dates hereinafter
named, plaintiff produced and sold bituminous coal from its own
mines near Myrick, one of defendant's stations in said county, and
that, on the various dates named in exhibit No. 1, and in the cars
therein described by number and initial, it shipped by defendant's
road from said Myrick in the aggregate 867,000 pounds of its said
coal in carload lots to the consignee named in said exhibit at
Strasburg, Missouri, another station on defendant's road."
"Plaintiff avers that, for the said carriage of the said coal,
defendant fixed, charged, and demanded and received of the
plaintiff 80 cents per ton, an illegal freight rate, being 30 cents
per ton more than defendant was by law entitled to fix, demand,
charge, and receive, in this, that, during all said times and dates
herein named, defendant had fixed, charged, demanded, and received
for the carriage for the same class of coal over its said line and
over another part of said road from its station of Liberal,
Missouri, and to another of its said stations,
viz.,
Granby, in said state, a distance of 77.14 miles, 50 cents per ton
by the carload, while the distance from said Myrick to said
Strasburg was only 61.95 miles, for which said rate of 80 cents per
ton for said carriage fixed, charged, demanded, and received of
plaintiff as aforesaid, and the same was illegal and exceeded the
amount the defendant was entitled to fix, charge, demand, and
receive for said shipments by the sum of $130.05."
"And the plaintiff avers that it is damaged and aggrieved by
reason of said illegal freight charge in the sum of $130.05;
wherefore it prays judgment for the same and for damages not
exceeding $1,000, and for all other and general relief, according
to the statutes in such case made and provided. "
Page 244 U. S. 194
The answer to count one, identical in effect with answers to all
others, formal and some presently unimportant parts being omitted,
follows:
"Comes now the defendant and for answer to the first count of
plaintiff's petition states that the same is founded upon the
Session Laws of Missouri 1872, page 69, now Sections 3173 and 3211
of the Revised Statutes of Missouri 1909, and section 12 of Article
12 of the Constitution of Missouri 1875, and that said sections are
null and void and of no legal force and effect for the following
reasons:"
"(a) Because said Sections 3173 and 3211 of the Revised Statutes
of Missouri 1909, when enacted by the legislature, were passed in
violation of Section 32 of Article 4 of the Constitution of
Missouri 1865, in this: . . ."
"(b) Because said Sections 3173 and 3211 are repugnant to and in
violation of Section 14 of Article 12 of the Constitution of
Missouri 1875, in this: . . ."
"(c) Because said Sections 3173 and 3211, Revised Statutes of
Missouri 1909, when reenacted by the legislature in 1879, were not
legally reenacted, but were enacted in violation of Section 28 of
Article 4 of the Constitution of Missouri 1875, in this: . . ."
"(d) Because said Sections 3173 and 3211 of the Revised Statutes
of Missouri 1909 were repealed by an act of the legislature passed
in 1887, entitled, 'An Act to Regulate Railroad Corporations,'
passed at the extra session of 1887, same being found in the
Session Laws of 1887 at 15, now Sections 3185 and 3193 of the
Revised Statutes 1909."
"For further answer to said count, the defendant says that
Section 12 of Article 12 of the Constitution of Missouri 1875, and
Sections 3173 and 3211 and Sections 3185 and 3193 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri 1909, are in violation of Section 1 of Article
XIV of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States in
this, that said
Page 244 U. S. 195
sections of the Constitution of Missouri and of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri deprive defendant of its property without due
process of law and deny to it the equal protection of the
laws."
". . . Sections 3173 and 3211 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri 1909 are repugnant to and in violation of Article V of the
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States in this, that
said sections deprive the defendant of its property without due
process of law."
". . . Sections 3173 and 3211 and Sections 3185 and 3193 of the
Revised Statutes of Missouri 1909, and Section 12 of Article 12 of
the Constitution of Missouri 1875, are in conflict with Section 8
of Article I of the Constitution of the United States and the
various laws passed by Congress thereunder in this, that the said
defendant is engaged in interstate commerce, and owns and operates
various lines of railroad as a part of its system which run into
other states than Missouri, and into the states of Kansas,
Colorado, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Illinois, Arkansas, and Louisiana,
and that the train in which the plaintiff's property described in
said count was being transported was at the time engaged in
interstate commerce and contained carload lots and shipments of
merchandise consigned and being carried from points without the
State of Missouri to points within this state, and from points
within this state to points without the same, and from points
without this state across the State of Missouri and to points in
other states, and that, by reason of the premises, this state is
without jurisdiction to adopt and pass the sections named and to
enforce the provisions of the same against this defendant while so
engaged in interstate commerce."
". . . Sections 3173 and 3211 and Sections 3185 and 3193 of the
Revised Statutes of Missouri 1909, and Section 12 of Article 12 of
the Constitution of Missouri 1875, are in conflict with Section 8
of Article I of the Constitution
Page 244 U. S. 196
of the United States and the various laws passed by Congress
thereunder in this, that the defendant's railroad is an interstate
road and its lines extend over and through the states of Missouri,
Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, Illinois, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and
Louisiana, and that it is engaged in interstate commerce over its
said lines through all of said states, and operates trains over the
same in transporting freight and passengers through said states;
that said section of the Constitution of Missouri and sections of
the Revised Statutes seek to compel the defendant arbitrarily to
fix its rates in this state and in all of said states, and in
comparison with rates existing in all such states, without regard
to the laws passed by Congress regulating interstate commerce."
". . . Defendant denies each and every allegation therein
contained. . . ."
Upon motion, the trial court struck from the answer "all alleged
defenses pleaded to each of the counts in the petition except the
traverses." No evidence was offered except the stipulation quoted
below:
"It is hereby stipulated between the parties that the
defendant's stations, the rates charged by the defendant, including
those paid by the plaintiff, the amount of coal transported, and
the distance set out in the several counts of the petition, are
correctly stated therein. It is further stipulated that such coal
was delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant for shipment in the
usual and ordinary way, without any direction or request by
plaintiff as to what particular trains the same was to be
transported in, and that the defendant received and transported the
same in the usual and ordinary course of business, on the usual
trains passing over its road. It is further agreed that the trains
in which the defendant hauled said cars of coal contained other
cars and shipments consigned from points within this state to
points without the same, from points without the same to points
within this state, and from
Page 244 U. S. 197
points without this state through this state and to points in
other states."
A jury being waived, the court rendered judgment upon each count
for alleged overcharge, without penalty -- on the first count
$130.05, total upon all, $16,504.19, and this action the state
supreme court affirmed. 178 S.W. 1179.
The insistence here is that, as construed and applied, §
12, Article 12, Missouri Constitution 1875, and also §§
3173 and 3211, Revised Statutes 1909, deprive plaintiff in error of
property without due process of law and deny it equal protection,
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, and also conflict with §
8, Article I, federal Constitution.
Sections 3173 and 3211 originated in the Act of 1872. The first
provides that no railroad corporation organized or doing business
within the state shall
"charge or collect for the transportation of goods, merchandise,
or property over any portion of its road a greater amount as toll
or compensation than shall be charged or collected by it for the
transportation of similar quantities of the same class of goods,
merchandise or property over any other portion of its road of equal
distance."
And the second prescribes a penalty for violating the first, not
exceeding $1,000, with costs, etc., to be recovered by aggrieved
party.
The supreme court declared:
"Each count of the petition is in legal effect identical with
the counts of the petition in
McGrew v. Railroad, 258 Mo.
23, and with those in the cases between the same parties, cited in
the opinion in that case, differing only in amounts, dates, and
destination of shipments, and in distances used for purposes of
comparison. . . . The assignments of error in this case, in legal
effect, and the points and authorities, verbatim, are identical
with those in that case. The authorities cited are exactly the
same."
And, upon the
Page 244 U. S. 198
opinion in the cause referred to, it affirmed the trial
court.
In
McGrew v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. supra, the court
followed
James C.McGrew v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 230
Mo. 496, where (the issues being the same as those here presented),
after considering the whole subject, it was held that plaintiff's
judgment could be sustained under § 12, Article XII,
Constitution of Missouri 1875, without reliance upon any statute.
The court said (230 Mo. 546):
"The petition was framed upon the Act of 1872, but in view of
the fact that the trial court denied the penalties asked, and
allowed only the difference between the higher rates charged
plaintiff and the lower rates charged by defendant for the longer
distances, the judgment could be sustained upon § 12 of
article 12 of the Constitution, without the aid of the Act of 1872,
provided that said section of the Constitution is self-enforcing.
Because, if said section is self-enforcing, that is to say, if it,
without the aid of any statutory enactment, makes it unlawful for a
railroad company to charge more for a shorter haul than a longer
one of the same class of property in any direction, the same or
not, and under any or all circumstances and conditions, then
clearly the measure of damages for doing the unlawful thing, in the
absence of any statute upon the subject, is the amount of the
excess charged for the shorter distance over that charged for the
longer distance."
P. 561:
"Section 12 of article 12 of our constitution clearly
establishes an unconditional short-haul rule, without regard to
direction or to circumstances and conditions. Said section declares
that it
shall be unlawful for any railroad company to
charge for the transportation of freight or passengers a greater
amount for a less distance than 'the amount charged for any greater
distance.' That declaration establishes a rule, and creates a right
in every passenger and shipper to a compliance with, and an
Page 244 U. S. 199
obedience to, its terms. . . . Said section has the same force
and effect as if it read:"
"It shall not be lawful in this state for any railroad company
to charge, under penalties which the general assembly shall
prescribe, for freight or passengers, a greater amount for the
transportation of the same for a less distance than the amount
charged for any greater distance."
"Had said section read that way, its effect as an operative law
would have been too clear for controversy. To my mind, it is
equally clear under the present reading."
In view of this ruling, it is unnecessary for us to consider
either terms, validity, or possible application of sections of
Revised Statutes mentioned in the answer.
Section 12, Article XII, Constitution of Missouri provides:
"It shall not be lawful in this state for any railway company to
charge for freight or passengers a greater amount, for the
transportation of the same, for a less distance than the amount
charged for any greater distance, and suitable laws shall be passed
by the general assembly to enforce this provision; but excursion
and commutation tickets may be issued at special rates."
As construed and applied in the present cause, this section
prohibits the carrier from charging in respect of intrastate
commerce more for a shorter haul than for a longer one over any
portion of its line within the state, without regard to direction,
circumstance, or condition, and if this inhibition is disobeyed,
the shipper acquires an absolute right to recover any overcharge
paid by him.
The record does not disclose when plaintiff in error was
incorporated, or what provisions its charter contains. There is no
suggestion of anything therein amounting to a contract exempting it
from legislation commonly within the police power. No claim is made
that the cost of moving freight over its lines in Missouri is
without substantial relation to distance, and no facts are alleged
which indicate material differences between conditions and
circumstances
Page 244 U. S. 200
under which the hauls from mines at Myrick were made and those
surrounding the longer shipments for less charges over other
portions of the road.
Arguments identical in principle with those now presented to
show invalidity of the inhibition under consideration, because of
conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment and interference with
interstate commerce, were considered and rejected in
Louisville
& Nashville R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.
S. 503, approved in
Intermountain Rate Cases,
234 U. S. 476,
234 U. S. 489.
And we think it must be accepted as settled that, unless some
controlling circumstance of a character not here disclosed is
established, or a special protecting contract exists, there is
nothing in the provisions of the federal Constitution or laws
presently relied on which necessarily restricts the power of a
state by general rule to prohibit railway companies from receiving
higher charges for shorter hauls than for longer ones when both are
wholly within its borders. Such a prohibition is not necessarily an
arbitrary, unreasonable, or grossly oppressive measure for
preventing discriminations and insuring equal and just treatment to
all shippers.
We find no error in the judgment below, and it is
Affirmed.
* No. 223.
Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. McGrew et
al., Executors of McGrew. Error to the Supreme Court of the
State of Missouri. May 21, 1917. McREYNOLDS, J. A stipulation of
counsel for the respective parties that this cause abide the
decision in case No. 222 having filed, the judgment in this case is
affirmed.