A suit brought by a trustee in bankruptcy under § 60b of
the Bankruptcy Act to set aside an unlawful preference is a
controversy arising in a bankruptcy proceeding.
In such controversies, judgments and decrees of the circuit
courts of appeals which might otherwise have come within the
general appellate powers of this Court as defined by the Judicial
Code are, by the Act of January 28, 1915, 38 Stat. 804, made final,
and this Court may review them only by certiorari.
Appeal to review 233 F. 514 dismissed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 243 U. S. 122
Memorandum opinion, by direction of the court, by MR. JUSTICE
DAY:
This is a motion to dismiss the appeal in a suit brought
originally in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California by the Security Trust & Savings Bank, as
trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of Fielding J. Stilson Company,
against William R. Staats Company and Title Insurance & Trust
Company, the complaint alleging that the Stilson Company was
adjudged a bankrupt on October 24th, 1912; that the Stilson Company
made and delivered to the Title Insurance & Trust Company a
deed of trust for certain realty, situated in the City of Los
Angeles, to secure an indebtedness in the sum of $3,870, due by the
Stilson Company to the Staats Company; that the effect of this
conveyance was to enable the Staats Company to receive a greater
percentage of its indebtedness than other creditors of the same
class, and that the conveyance was made with a view to giving a
preference, in violation of the Bankruptcy Act, and a decree was
prayed declaring the conveyance void and of no effect.
The suit was brought by authority of § 60b of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. On issues made, the case was referred to a
special master, who found the conveyance by the Stilson Company to
the Title Insurance & Trust Company to have been made and
received as security for an indebtedness in the sum of $3,870, then
due by the Stilson Company to the Staats Company, and that the same
was an unlawful preference within the meaning
Page 243 U. S. 123
of the Bankruptcy Act. Upon exceptions to the master's report,
the district court overruled some exceptions and sustained others,
and dismissed the complaint. An appeal was taken to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which court reached the
conclusion that the conveyance in question was a preference within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, reversed the decree of the
district court, and remanded the case to that court with directions
to enter a judgment in favor of the complainant. 233 F. 514.
Afterwards, an appeal from this decree of the circuit court of
appeals was allowed to this Court.
We think it is plain that this appeal must be dismissed. The
decree of the circuit court of appeals was made final by the Act of
Congress of January 28, 1915, 38 Stat. 804, and the only right of
review in this Court is by writ of certiorari. This act
provides:
"That the judgments and decrees of the circuit courts of appeals
in all proceedings and cases arising under the Bankruptcy Act and
in all controversies arising in such proceedings and cases shall be
final, save only that it shall be competent for the Supreme Court
to require by certiorari, upon the petition of any party thereto,
that the proceeding, case, or controversy be certified to it for
review and determination, with the same power and authority as if
taken to that court by appeal or writ of error; but certiorari
shall not be allowed in any such proceeding, case, or controversy
unless the petition therefor is presented to the Supreme Court
within three months from the date of such judgment or decree."
The language of this act is very comprehensive, and embraces
proceedings and cases arising under the Bankruptcy Act and
controversies arising in such proceedings, and provides that the
judgments and decrees of the circuit court of appeals in such
controversies, proceedings, and cases shall be final. The case now
under consideration
Page 243 U. S. 124
is a controversy arising in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Hewit
v. Berlin Machine Works, 194 U. S. 296;
Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223;
Tefft, Weller & Company v. Munsuri, 222 U.
S. 114;
Barnes v. Pampel, 192 F. 525.
We find no merit in the contention that, after the passage of
the Act of 1915, appellate proceedings in this Court in such suits
as this should continue to be controlled by the general provisions
of the Judicial Code. This statute manifested the purpose of
Congress to relieve this Court from the necessity of considering
cases of this character except when brought here by writ of
certiorari.
Central Trust Co. v. Lueders, 239 U. S.
11;
Shattuck v. Title Guaranty & Surety
Co., 239 U.S. 637.
It follows that the motion to dismiss this appeal for want of
jurisdiction must be granted.
Appeal dismissed.