Sections 6509 and 6521, Mansfield's Digest of the General Laws
of Arkansas, dealing with appeals from the Probate to the Circuit
Court, were not put in force in Indian Territory by the Act of May
2, 1890, c. 182, § 31, 26 Stat. 81, as they were inapplicable
to conditions then existing in Indian Territory.
Section 6525, upon being adopted and separated from conflicting
provisions of the Civil Practice Act of Arkansas, assumed its
normal place among the other laws with which it was adopted and was
put in force by the Act of May 2, 1890.
Quaere whether § 6523 was adopted by the Act of
1890.
43 Okl. 267 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the application and construction of
statutes of the United States relating to the probate of wills in
Indian Territory, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a suit to set aside a will probated in common form, and
to avoid its probate. The suit was begun in the United States court
for the Indian Territory, wherein the will had been probated, and
was transferred to an Oklahoma court when that state was admitted
into the Union. The plaintiff ultimately prevailed, and the supreme
court
Page 241 U. S. 100
of the state affirmed the judgment. 38 Okl. 596, 43 Okl.
267.
The federal question in the case is whether certain statutes
bearing upon such a suit were put in force in the Indian Territory
by the Act of May 2, 1890, c. 182, § 31, 26 Stat. 81, whereby
Congress adopted and extended over the Indian Territory certain
general laws of Arkansas "in force at the close of the session of
the general assembly of that State of 1883, as published in 1884 in
the volume known as Mansfield's Digest," where "not locally
inapplicable or in conflict with" that or some other act of
Congress. In Arkansas, there were probate courts and courts of
general jurisdiction designated as circuit courts, while for the
Indian Territory only one court had been established at that time,
and it was a court of general jurisdiction. In view of this, the
act declared that "the United States court in the Indian Territory
herein referred to shall have and exercise the powers of courts of
probate under said laws," and "wherever in said laws of Arkansas
the courts of record of said state are mentioned, the said court in
the Indian Territory shall be substituted therefor."
Among the Arkansas laws enumerated in the act was chapter 155,
containing sections numbered from 6490 to 6548. The section under
which the will was probated declares:
"Sec. 6522. When any will shall be exhibited for probate, the
court of probate . . . may and shall receive the probate thereof in
common form, without summoning any party, and shall grant a
certificate of probate, or, if the will be rejected, shall grant a
certificate of rejection. . . ."
Other sections (6509 and 6521) provide for an appeal to the
circuit court from an order of the probate court establishing or
rejecting a will, and for bringing in parties and giving a hearing
de novo upon the appeal. The sections under which the suit
was brought read as follows:
Page 241 U. S. 101
"Sec. 6523. Any person interested who at the time of the final
decision in the circuit court, resided out of this state, and was
proceeded against by order of appearance only, without actual
appearance, or being personally served with process, and any other
person interested who was not a party to the proceedings by actual
appearance, or being personally served with process, may, within
three years after such final decision in the circuit court, by a
bill in chancery, impeach the decision and have a retrial of the
question of probate, and either party shall be entitled to a jury
for the trial thereof. An infant, not a party, shall not be barred
of such proceedings in chancery until twelve months after attaining
full age."
"Sec. 6525. If any person interested in the probate of any will
shall appear within five years after the probate or rejection
thereof, and, by petition to the circuit court of the county in
which such will was established or rejected, pray to have any such
will rejected, if previously established, or proven, if previously
rejected by the court of probate, it shall be the duty of the
circuit court to direct an issue to try the validity of such will,
which issue shall in all cases be tried by a jury."
As the functions of the probate and circuit courts in Arkansas
were united in a single court in the Indian Territory, it seems
plain, as was held by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in this case,
that the sections (6509 and 6521) dealing with appeals from the
probate to the circuit court were not applicable to the conditions
in the Indian Territory, and therefore were not adopted by the act
of Congress. It hardly was intended that a court at all times
presided over by a single judge should entertain appeals from its
own decisions.
The contention advanced respecting § 6523 is that it
related only to decisions of the circuit court upon appeals from
the probate court, and was inapplicable where such an appeal could
not be had, and therefore was not adopted.
Page 241 U. S. 102
This point was not considered in the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma, and it need not be decided here. However it
might be resolved, the result in the present case would be the
same.
The contention made respecting § 6525 is that it was not
adopted, because not in force in Arkansas at the close of the
session of the general assembly of 1883. The claim that it was not
then in force is based upon a decision of the Supreme Court of
Arkansas in 1885 holding that it was impliedly repealed by the
inclusion in the civil practice Act of 1868, which was a later
enactment, of certain provisions regulating appeals from the
probate to the circuit court, and prescribing the effect to be
given to the latter's decision upon such an appeal.
Dowell v.
Tucker, 46 Ark. 438. Of course, that decision was controlling
in Arkansas, but it has little bearing upon the question here
presented, and for these reasons: Section 6525 was published in
1884 in Mansfield's Digest as a general law "in force at the close
of the general assembly of 1883" (
see title page of that
publication), and the supreme court of the state had been treating
it as such (
Tobin v. Jenkins, 29 Ark. 151;
Janes v.
Williams, 31 Ark. 175, 189;
Jenkins v. Tobin, 31 Ark.
306, 308;
Mitchell v. Rogers, 40 Ark. 91, 93-95). Besides,
the particular provisions of the civil practice act which
ultimately were regarded as effecting its implied repeal in
Arkansas -- they became §§ 6509 and 6521 of Mansfield's
Digest -- were not adopted by the act of Congress, because
inapplicable to the conditions in the Indian Territory. In these
circumstances, we think the adopting act, rightly interpreted, put
the section in force there. Separated, as it then was, from the
restraining influence of the supposedly conflicting provisions of
the civil practice act, it assumed its normal place among the other
laws with which it was adopted. This conclusion is not opposed to
our decisions in
Adkins v. Arnold, 235 U.
S. 417, and
Perryman v. Woodward, 238 U.
S. 148, as
Page 241 U. S. 103
seems to be claimed by the plaintiff in error, but, on the
contrary, is in accord with what actually was there decided.
Other questions are discussed in the briefs, but, as they are
not federal, but essentially local, they cannot be reexamined by
us.
Judgment affirmed.