Whether the state court, in permitting an amendment to the
complaint in an action under the Employers' Liability Act,
disregarded the provision in § 6 limiting the time to commence
actions under the Act is a federal question, although the allowance
of the amendment otherwise might rest in the discretion of the
court and be a matter of local procedure.
An amendment which merely expands or amplifies what was alleged
in support of the cause of action asserted in the original
complaint relates back to the commencement of the action, and is
not affected by the intervening lapse of time.
An amendment which introduces a new or different cause of action
is the equivalent of a new suit which would be barred by § 6
if made more than two years after the cause of action arose.
Although the original complaint in this case may not have
distinctly shown that the cause of action arose under the
Employers' Liability Act, still, as it did not allege that the
cause of action arose under the law of the state where it occurred,
and did allege that defendant was engaged in operating its railroad
in that and other states,
held that an amendment that
plaintiff's employment and defendant's engagement were both in
interstate commerce at the time of the
Page 241 U. S. 291
injury did not amount to the statement of a new cause of action,
but merely amplified or expanded that already stated, and related
back to the commencement of the suit.
Both courts below having concurred against defendant's request
for instruction that there was no evidence of actionable
negligence, and there being no clear error, this Court will not
disturb such conclusions. Where the charge as a whole was fair,
objections made at the time, but which did not specifically draw
the attention of the trial court to inaccuracies in portions of the
charge respecting the measure of damages cannot, where not dealt
with by the appellate court, be pressed in this Court.
86 S.E. 964 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the validity of a verdict and judgment
for damages for personal injuries in an action under the Employers'
Liability Act, are stated in the opinion.
Page 241 U. S. 292
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action by an employee of a railroad company to
recover from the latter for personal injuries suffered through its
negligence. The plaintiff had a verdict and judgment under the
Employers' Liability Act of Congress, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65; c. 143,
36 Stat. 291, the judgment was affirmed, 86 S.E. 964, and the
defendant brings the case here.
The original complaint was exceedingly brief, and did
Page 241 U. S. 293
not sufficiently allege that, at the time of the injury, the
defendant was engaged and the plaintiff employed in interstate
commerce. During the trial, the defendant sought some advantage
from this, and the court, over the defendant's objection, permitted
the complaint to be so amended as to state distinctly the
defendant's engagement and the plaintiff's employment in such
commerce. Both parties conceded that what was alleged in the
amendment was true in fact and conformed to the proofs, and that
point has since been treated as settled. The defendant's objection
was that the original complaint did not state a cause of action
under the act of Congress, that with the amendment the complaint
would state a new cause of action under that act, and that, as more
than two years had elapsed since the right of action accrued, the
amendment could not be made the medium of introducing this new
cause of action consistently with the provision in § 6 that
"no action shall be maintained under this act unless commenced
within two years from the day the cause of action accrued." Whether
in what was done this restriction was in effect disregarded is a
federal question, and subject to reexamination here, however much
the allowance of the amendment otherwise might have rested in
discretion or been a matter of local procedure.
Atlantic Coast
Line v. Burnette, 239 U. S. 199. If
the amendment merely expanded or amplified what was alleged in
support of the cause of action already asserted, it related back to
the commencement of the action, and was not affected by the
intervening lapse of time.
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Cox,
145 U. S. 593,
145 U. S.
603-604;
Atlantic and Pacific R. Co. v. Laird,
164 U. S. 393;
Hutchinson v. Otis, 190 U. S. 552,
190 U. S. 555;
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U.
S. 570,
226 U. S. 576;
Crotty v. Chicago & Great Western Ry., 169 F. 593. But
if it introduced a new or different cause of action, it was the
equivalent of a new suit, as to which the running
Page 241 U. S. 294
of the limitation was not theretofore arrested.
Sicard v.
Davis, 6 Pet. 124,
31 U. S. 140;
Union Pacific Ry. v. Wyler, 158 U.
S. 285;
United States v. Dalcour, 203 U.
S. 408,
203 U. S. 423.
The original complaint set forth that the defendant was operating a
line of railroad in Virginia, North Carolina, and elsewhere; that
the plaintiff was in its employ; that, when he was injured, he was
in the line of duty and was proceeding to get aboard one of the
defendant's trains, and that the injury was sustained at Cochran,
Virginia, through the defendant's negligence in permitting a part
of its right of way at that place to get and remain in a dangerous
condition. Of course, the right of action could not arise under the
laws of North Carolina when the causal negligence and the injury
occurred in Virginia, and the absence of any mention of the laws of
the latter state was at least consistent with their
inapplicability. Besides, the allegation that the defendant was
operating a railroad in states other than Virginia was superfluous
if the right of action arose under the laws of that state, and was
pertinent only if it arose in interstate commerce, and therefore
under the act of Congress. In these circumstances, while the
question is not free from difficulty, we cannot say that the court
erred in treating the original complaint as pointing, although only
imperfectly, to a cause of action under the law of Congress. And,
this being so, it must be taken that the amendment merely expanded
or amplified what was alleged in support of that cause of action,
and related back to the commencement of the suit, which was before
the limitation had expired.
Error is assigned upon a refusal to instruct the jury, as matter
of law, that there was no evidence of actionable negligence on the
part of the defendant, and that the evidence conclusively
established an assumption by the plaintiff of the risk resulting in
his injury. Both courts, trial and appellate, held against the
defendant upon these
Page 241 U. S. 295
points. They involve an appreciation of all the evidence and the
inferences which admissibly might be drawn therefrom, and it
suffices to say that we find no such clear or certain error as
would justify disturbing the concurring conclusions of the two
courts upon these questions.
Great Northern Ry. v. Knapp,
240 U. S. 464;
Baugham v. New York &c. Ry. (decided this day,
ante, 241 U. S.
237).
Complaint also is made of the instructions given upon the
measure of damages. The criticism is directed against mere
fragments of this part of the charge, and the objections made at
the time were not such as were calculated to draw the trial court's
attention to the particular complaint now urged. The inaccuracies
were not grave, and the charge as a whole was calculated to give
the jury a fair understanding of the subject. The defendant
therefore is not in a position to press the complaint, especially
as it was not dealt with in the opinion of the appellate court.
See Magniac v.
Thompson, 7 Pet. 348,
32 U. S. 390;
McDermott v. Severe, 202 U. S. 600,
202 U. S. 610;
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Skaggs, 240 U. S.
66.
Judgment affirmed.
