In the trial of an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, defendant is denied a federal right if he is denied a fair
opportunity to show, in accordance with proper practice, negligence
attributable to the employee in diminution of damages nor, in the
absence of a settled local rule of practice requiring counsel to
announce in advance the purpose for which evidence is tendered, can
evidence as to contributory negligence be excluded because tendered
without notice that it is restricted to diminution of damages.
When evidence can be introduced for one purpose only, it is
unnecessary for counsel, in offering it, to go through the idle
form of announcing its purpose.
137 La. 178 reversed.
The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment for damages
recovered by the representative of an employee of an interstate
carrier in the state court and under the Federal Liability Act, are
stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Claiming under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (April 22,
1908, c.. 149, 35 Stat. 65, c. 143,
Page 241 U. S. 182
36 Stat. 291), defendant in error brought this suit in a state
court against the railroad company to recover damages resulting
from her husband's death by accident while employed as engineer on
a passenger train. A loaded car, having escaped from the switching
crew, ran down a long grade, struck his engine with great violence
as it was rounding a curve near the Shreveport yard, and killed
him.
The company denied negligence on its part, but interposed no
plea setting up the defense of contributory negligence. A jury
found for the administratrix, and judgment thereon was affirmed by
the supreme court of the state.
During cross-examination of the fireman, counsel attempted to
show that the engineer was negligent in not having his train under
proper control. The court sustained an objection "to any evidence
as to contributory negligence as same is not pleaded." Proper
exception was taken and duly noted. Thereupon, the record recites,
"counsel for plaintiff asks that this objection and ruling and bill
of exceptions be made general to apply to all such evidence, and it
is so ordered." Upon rehearing, the supreme court held evidence of
contributory negligence, though not pleaded, and inadmissible to
defeat a recovery, should have been received in mitigation of
damages if offered for that specific purpose. But it said the
evidence in question was properly excluded because tendered without
restriction.
We have been cited to no authority showing a settled local rule
requiring counsel, without inquiry by the court, to announce in
advance the purpose for which evidence is tendered. Earlier cases
in Louisiana lend support to the contrary and commonly approved
practice.
Thompson v. Chauveau, 6 Mart.N.S. 458, 461;
Hitchcock v. North, 5 Robinson 328, 329;
Fortunich v.
New Orleans, 14 La.Ann. 115;
Caspar v. Prosdame, 46
La.Ann. 36.
See McAfee v.
Crofford, 13 How. 447,
54 U. S. 456;
Buckstaff v. Russell, 151 U. S. 626,
151 U. S. 636;
Farnsworth v. Nevada Co., 102
Page 241 U. S. 183
F. 578, 580;
Hubbard v. Allyn, 200 Mass. 166, 171;
Mighell v. Stone, 175 Ill. 261, 262.
It is declared by the act of Congress upon which the suit is
based:
"Sec. 3. That in all actions hereafter brought against any such
common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of the
provisions of this act to recover damages for personal injuries to
an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in his death, the
fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to such employee. . . ."
Manifestly, under this provision, a defendant carrier has the
federal right to a fair opportunity to show in diminution of
damages any negligence attributable to the employee.
The state supreme court upheld the railway company's claim of
right to show contributory negligence under its general denial, but
the trial court emphatically denied this, and positively excluded
all evidence to that end. As, under the federal statute,
contributory negligence is no bar to recovery, the plain purpose in
offering the excluded evidence was to mitigate damages. In such
circumstances, it was unnecessary to go through the idle form of
articulating the obvious. If timely objection upon the ground
ultimately suggested by the supreme court had been sustained, it
could have been easily obviated; but counsel had no reason to
anticipate such a ruling, and certainly, we think, were not
required to do so at their peril.
Plaintiff in error has been improperly deprived of a federal
right. The judgment below is accordingly reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed.