The wage of an employee residing in West Virginia having been
garnisheed in the hands of his employer in Virginia, judgment was
entered without notice to the employee, none being required under
the Virginia statute, and paid by the garnishee; the employee then
sued for his wages in West Virginia and the courts of that state
refused to enforce the Virginia judgment for want of service;
held error, and that, under the full faith and credit
provision of the federal Constitution, the judgment of the Virginia
court protected the garnishee.
The facts, which involve the construction and application of the
full faith and credit provision of the Constitution of the United
States, are stated in the opinion.
Page 240 U. S. 622
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Hostetter, the defendant in error, a resident of West Virginia,
sued in a justice's court in that state for wages due him by the
railroad company, now plaintiff in error. The defense was that the
wages had been paid by the railroad company as the result of a
garnishment proceeding taken against it in the State of Virginia,
where it was suable, to enforce a judgment rendered in Virginia
against Hostetter when he resided in that state, and after a
domiciliary service on him. The case went from the justice's court
for a
de novo trial to the intermediate court of Marion
County, where, as the result of a verdict against the railroad
company, it was condemned to pay again, the court holding that the
Virginia garnishment proceeding was not entitled to be enforced as
against Hostetter under the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution of the United States because he was not served with
process in such proceeding, he then residing in West Virginia,
although extrajudicial notice was given him by the railroad company
of the proceeding. The case is here on writ of error to review the
judgment of the court below, affirming that of the intermediate
court, and whether proper force was given to the full faith and
credit clause is the question for decision.
It is true that, in the argument for the defendant in error,
various suggestions are made as to the insufficiency of the record
concerning the existence of the Virginia judgment upon which
reliance on the full faith and credit
Page 240 U. S. 623
clause was placed, on the ground that the record contains mere
recitals with reference to the judgment, etc., etc. For the sake of
brevity, we do not stop to review these suggestions, although we
have considered them all, since we think they are not only without
merit, but many of them are in effect frivolous, because in our
opinion the record suffices to establish the facts which were
stated by the court below as the basis for its judgment, and which
we briefly recapitulate as follows:
The plaintiff, in July, 1911, resided in Clifton Forge,
Virginia, and was indebted to one Wagner in the sum of $35, for
which debt Wagner obtained a judgment against him in a justice's
court of Virginia, based upon a summons served
"on said plaintiff . . . by delivering a copy thereof to the
wife the plaintiff at his usual place of abode. . . . Said record
further shows . . . that, on the 17th day of September, 1912, a
garnishee summons was issued by H. H. Harlow, a justice of the
peace in the City of Staunton, Virginia, . . . which garnishee
summons was directed against the said Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company . . . charging that it had money, or other personal estate,
in its possession or control belonging to the said Hostetter, and
requiring the said railroad company to appear . . . to answer said
garnishment or suggestion; . . . and that, on the 3rd day of
October, 1912, said justice last above named rendered a judgment
against the said Hostetter and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company in favor of the said Wagner in the sum of $38.40, with
interest. . . . In this garnishment or suggestion proceeding, no
notice or process of any kind was given to or served upon the said
Hostetter, he then being a resident of this state [West Virginia],
and had been such resident for more than a year previous to the
date of the institution of the garnishment proceeding. From this
said last-named judgment, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company
Page 240 U. S. 624
appealed to the corporation court of the City of Staunton, and
this appeal was heard and passed upon by said court on the 27th day
of February, 1913. So far as the record shows, no notice of such
proceeding in the courts of Virginia was given to the defendant
until on or about the 14th day of February, 1913, when the said
railroad company did notify, in writing, the said Hostetter of the
pendency of the said garnishment proceedings on appeal in said
corporation court. . . . It is not contended that any formal notice
was given to said Hostetter of the garnishment proceedings for the
reason that the statute of Virginia under which said proceedings
was instituted does not require notice to be given a nonresident of
that state of the pendency of the garnishment or suggestion."
Although the railroad had paid in virtue of the judgment
rendered in the garnishment proceeding taken as above stated, the
court, agreeing in opinion, as we have said, with the trial court,
held that the garnishment proceeding and the judgment in it were no
protection to the railroad company because there was no power in
the Virginia courts to garnishee in that state in the hands of the
railroad a sum of money due by it to an employee domiciled in
another state without service on such employee in Virginia, and
that the full faith and credit clause imposed no duty to enforce a
judgment in garnishment proceedings affected with the want of power
stated.
In view of the decisions of this Court dealing with the exact
situation here presented and expressly holding that the principles
upon which the court below based its action were erroneous and
could not be upheld consistently with the duty to apply and enforce
the full faith and credit clause, we need do no more than cite the
cases referred to.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm,
174 U. S. 710;
Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215;
Louis. & Nash. R. Co. v. Deer, 200 U.
S. 176.
Page 240 U. S. 625
As it follows that the judgment below, insofar as it compelled
the railroad to pay the second time the sum which it had discharged
under the Virginia judgment, was erroneous, it must be reversed,
and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
And it is so ordered.