Rights and liabilities in connection with interstate shipments
depend upon acts of Congress, the bill of lading, and common law
principles accepted and enforced by federal courts.
In order to determine the validity and effect of restrictions
upon liability contained in bills of lading issued by carrier for
interstate shipments, applicable schedules on file with the
Interstate Commerce Commission are material, and
held
error to exclude them in this case.
The common law rule long recognized in the federal courts is
that mere mental pain and anxiety are too vague for legal redress
where no injury is done to person, property, health or reputation,
and so
held in an action against an express company, that
the consignee of a casket and grave clothes, who admittedly
sustained no pecuniary damage by reason of delay in delivery, was
not entitled to recover any damages whatever for mere mental
suffering occasioned by such delay.
165 N.C. 642 reversed.
The facts, which involve the right of a shipper to recover
damages for the mental anguish caused by delay in arrival of an
interstate shipment, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Claiming damages solely on account of mental anguish occasioned
by failure promptly to deliver a casket and
Page 240 U. S. 613
grave clothes intended for his wife's burial, and accepted by
plaintiff in error with knowledge of the facts at Asheville, North
Carolina, for transportation to Hickory Grove, South Carolina,
Byers recovered a judgment against it for $250, and this was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 165 N.C. 542.
In defense, the Express Company averred that, while engaged in
interstate commerce, it received the described articles at
Asheville and transported them to Hickory Grove; that, as required
by Act of Congress approved June 29, 1906, and amendments, it had
filed a schedule of rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission;
that, at time of shipment, it issued a bill of lading limiting
liability to $50; that it had paid the shipper the full amount
expended by him in purchasing the articles; that no present
liability exists, and, especially under the laws of the United
States, it is not responsible for such damages as those
specified.
There was put in evidence a duly executed receipt for
$64.17,
"being in full payment for one coffin delivered to Southern
Express Company at Asheville, North Carolina, on April 1st, 1912,
by John Byers, to be shipped to Sarah Moore, Hickory Grove, South
Carolina,"
and Byers testified that
"the Southern Express Company paid him for all the money he had
paid out on the casket and other things contained in the shipment,
but did not pay him anything for damages."
The bill of lading was also introduced. It specified no value,
and undertook to restrict the carrier's liability to $50. Clause 1
is copied in the margin.
* Objection was
sustained to a seasonable
Page 240 U. S. 614
offer by the company to prove its schedules of rates on file
with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Manifestly the shipment was interstate commerce; and, under the
settled doctrine established by our former opinions, rights and
liabilities in connection therewith depend upon acts of Congress,
the bill of lading and common law principles accepted and enforced
by the federal courts. In order to determine the validity and
effect of restrictions upon liability contained in such bills, it
is important, if not indeed essential, to consider the applicable
schedules on file with the Commission.
Adams Express Co. v.
Croninger, 226 U. S. 491;
C., B. & Q. Ry. v. Miller, 226 U.
S. 513;
C., St. P., M. & O. Ry. v. Latta,
226 U. S. 519;
Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U.
S. 469;
Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Carl,
227 U. S. 639;
Mo., Kans. & Tex. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U.
S. 657;
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Cramer,
232 U. S. 490;
Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S.
97;
Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co.,
236 U. S. 278;
N.Y. &. Norfolk R. Co. v. Peninsula Exchange,
240 U. S. 34.
It was plain error to exclude the rate schedules.
Page 240 U. S. 615
Having been requested in apt time, the trial court refused to
charge the jury as follows:
"As the shipment which is alleged to have been delayed was a
shipment in interstate commerce, and as the damage claimed by the
plaintiff is damage for mental suffering only on account of the
delay of the delivery of said shipment, the court instructs the
jury that, under the evidence in this case, the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover any such damage; the jury is therefore directed
to render a verdict for the defendant."
This instruction should have been given.
The action is based upon a claim for mental suffering only --
nothing else was set up and the proof discloses no other injury for
which compensation had not been made. In such circumstances as
those presented here, the long recognized common law rule permitted
no recovery; the decisions to this effect
"rest upon the elementary principle that mere mental pain and
anxiety are too vague for legal redress where no injury is done to
person, property, health, or reputation."
Cooley, Torts, 3d ed. page 94. The lower federal courts, almost
without exception, have adhered to this doctrine, and in so doing
we think they were clearly right upon principle and also in accord
with the great weight of authority.
Chase v. West. Un. Tel.
Co., 44 F. 554;
Crawson v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 47 F.
544;
Wilcox v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 52 F. 264;
Tyler v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 54 F. 634;
Kester v.
West. Un. Tel. Co., 55 F. 603;
West. Un. Tel. Co. v.
Wood, 57 F. 471;
Gahan v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 59 F.
433;
McBride v. Sunset Tel. Co., 96 F. 81;
Stansell v.
West. Un. Tel. Co., 107 F. 668;
West. Un. Tel. Co. v.
Sklar, 126 F. 295;
Alexander v. West. Un. Tel. Co.,
126 F. 445;
Rowan v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 149 F. 550;
West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Burris, 179 F. 92;
Kyle v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 182 F. 613.
But see Beasley v.
West. Un. Tel. Co., 39 F. 181.
Page 240 U. S. 616
In
So Relle v. West. Un. Tel. Co., (1881) 55 Tex. 308,
the Supreme Court of Texas held the addressee of a message might
recover damages of a telegraph company because of mere mental
suffering. Subsequently the courts of Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky,
Nevada, North Carolina, and Tennessee approved and enforced a like
rule; those of Dakota, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Virginia, and West Virginia definitely rejected the innovation.
Many of the pertinent cases are reviewed in
West. Un. Tel. Co.
v. Chouteau (1911). 28 Okl. 664, and note; the general subject
is discussed and the authorities cited in Sutherland on Damages, 3d
ed., §§ 975
et seq., Sedgwick on Damages, 9th
ed., §§ 43
et seq., and Shearman & Redfield
on Negligence, 6th ed., §§ 756
et seq.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
And it is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA and MR. JUSTICE HOLMES concur in the
result.
*
"1. In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said
property which is regulated by the value and classification thereof
and is based upon a valuation of not exceeding $50 for any shipment
of 100 pounds or less, and not exceeding 50 cents per pound for any
shipment in excess of 100 pounds, unless a greater value is
declared at time of shipment, the shipper agrees that the company
shall not be liable, in any event, for more than fifty dollars
($50) on any shipment of 100 pounds or less, and for not exceeding
50 cents per pound on a shipment weighing more than 100 pounds, and
said property is valued at, and the liability of this company is
hereby limited to, the value above stated, unless a greater value
is declared at the time of shipment, and the charge for value paid
or agreed to be paid therefor, and in case of partial loss or
damage the company shall not be liable for more than such
proportion of the same as $50 if 100 pounds or less in weight, or
50 cents per pound if weight exceeds 100 pounds, or the value
declared bears to the actual value if greater."
If the said property is offered for shipment under the special
rates named in Sections "D" and "E" of the existing Official
Express Classification, it is agreed that the value of the same
does not exceed ten dollars ($10) per package, said rates not
applying on packages of greater value.