Where there is no question as to the interpretation of the
Employers' Liability Act or as to the definition of legal
principles in its application, but the question is simply whether
there were matters for determination of the jury, this Court, with
due regard to the appropriate exercise of its jurisdiction, will
not disturb the decision of the court below unless error is
palpable.
In cases of this sort arising under the Employers' Liability
Act, not being
Page 240 U. S. 465
of exceptional character, this Court confines itself to the mere
announcement of its conclusion, as it does, in this case, of
affirmance.
130 Minn. 405 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the validity of a verdict and judgment
in suit for personal injuries under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. The plaintiff (defendant in error) was the station agent at
Dassel, Minnesota. It was a part of his duty to attend the
pumphouse some distance from the station once or twice a day and
keep filled the water tank for locomotives. The water was pumped by
means of a gasolene engine, and the pump and engine were in a small
room. In proceeding to start the pump at the time in question, the
plaintiff's arm was caught in the clutch of the engine and cut off.
As the supreme court of the state put it, the plaintiff claimed
that
"he lost his balance, either through a slip upon the greasy
floor or a jerk by his coat being drawn into the fly wheel or
shaft, and in striking out to catch himself, his hand and part of
the arm came between the crank of the shaft and top of the hood
which partially but inadequately guarded it."
The state court deemed the evidence to be "very clear" that it
was practicable to interpose safeguards "so as to fully protect
from danger those who had to pass by." The plaintiff alleged
negligence in his employer in failing to provide suitable
Page 240 U. S. 466
protection; the company denied negligence and insisted upon the
defense of assumption of risk. The trial court held that, upon the
evidence, these questions were for the jury, and there was a
verdict for the plaintiff. On motion, a new trial was ordered
unless the plaintiff should remit a portion of the damages, and,
this being done, judgment was entered, which was affirmed by the
supreme court of the state. 130 Minn. 405.
It was conceded that, when the injury was received, plaintiff
was engaged in work pertaining to the defendant's business as a
common carrier in interstate commerce, and that the federal act
applied. The court recognized that, if assumption of risk by the
plaintiff was made out, it would bar recovery under the act.
Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Horton, 233 U.
S. 492. The court charged the jury accordingly, and
there was no exception by the defendant to the charge, or request
on its part for any additional instructions, the defendant
contenting itself with its motion for dismissal or for a direction
of a verdict in its favor. The case, then, is one in which there is
no question as to the interpretation of any provision of the
federal act, or as to the definition of legal principle in its
application, but simply involves an appreciation of all the facts
and admissible inferences in the particular case for the purpose of
determining whether there were matters for the consideration of the
jury. The state courts, trial and appellate, held that there were.
Having regard to the appropriate exercise of the jurisdiction of
this Court, we should not disturb the decision upon a question of
this sort unless error is palpable. The present case is not of this
exceptional character, and we confine ourselves to an announcement
of our conclusion.
Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Padgett,
236 U. S. 668,
236 U. S. 673;
Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Koennecke, 239 U.
S. 352,
239 U. S.
355.
Judgment affirmed.