The rule that the Court of Claims has not jurisdiction of
actions founded on tort is based on a policy imposed by necessity
that governments are not liable for unauthorized wrongs inflicted
on the citizens by their officers, even though occurring while
engaged in discharge of official duties.
Schillinger v. United
States, 155 U. S. 163.
Congress has wisely reserved to itself the right to give or
withhold relief where the claim is founded on the wrongful
proceedings of an officer of the government.
Schillinger v.
United States, 155 U. S. 163.
Neither
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.
S. 222, nor
United States v. Lynah,
188 U. S. 445,
sustaining jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in cases
respectively to recover sums wrongfully exacted for taxes and for
compensation for property taken for public purposes, overrules,
Page 239 U. S. 603
or is antagonistic to,
Schillinger v. United States,
155 U. S. 163,
which is subsisting authority of this Court that the Court of
Claims has no jurisdiction of an action for a claim for private
injury to an individual through the tortious act of an officer of
the United States.
49 Ct.Cl. 702 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
in cases founded on a tort of an officer of the United States, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 239 U. S. 604
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant is a Spanish subject who resided at the time his
alleged cause of action accrued and at the time his petition was
filed in the Court of Claims, in the Island of Porto Rico.
Porto Rico was ceded to the United States by the Treaty of
Paris, ratifications of which were exchanged April 11, 1899. The
island was occupied by the military forces of the United States
prior to January 1, 1899, and February 1, 1899, the President of
the United States, by order, promulgated the "Amended Customs
Tariff and Regulations for Ports in Porto Rico," which fixed and
provided for the collection of duties upon all articles imported
into
Page 239 U. S. 605
Porto Rico. And duties were collected thereafter in accordance
with such tariff and the amendments thereto made from time to time
until May 1, 1900.
Certain officers of the Army were designated to act and did act
as collectors of customs under such tariff at the several ports of
entry in Porto Rico, and enforced such tariff upon merchandise
brought into Porto Rico from the United States and from foreign
countries.
Under authority of general order No. 88, the general commanding
in the island established a provisional court of the United States
for the Department of Porto Rico.
On or about July 13, 1899, by information filed by the
prosecuting officer of the provisional court, appellant was charged
before that court with the crime of having imported from the United
States into Porto Rico certain merchandise without having made
entry of the same in the customhouse, and without having paid duty
thereon. He was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and the case was set
for trial.
At the trial, he entered a plea that §§ 2865 and 3082
of the Revised Statutes of the United States were without force or
effect in Porto Rico, that the latter was part of the United
States, and that there was no warrant in law for imposing duties on
goods brought from the United States into the Island.
The defenses were not allowed, he was found guilty, sentenced to
imprisonment, and was imprisoned for twenty-seven days.
He alleged the foregoing facts in his petition, and that he
suffered damages thereby in the sum of $10,000, $7,500 general and
$2,500 special damages. That he is advised by counsel that the act
for which he was accused and condemned did not then constitute a
crime; that the said sections of the Revised Statutes of the United
States under which the provisional court claimed authority to act
were not in force in Porto Rico, and the court was
Page 239 U. S. 606
wholly without jurisdiction in the premises, and its sentence
was null and void, and that, by reason of such accusation, trial,
conviction, sentence, and imprisonment, he was deprived of his
liberty without due process of law in violation of the Constitution
of the United States.
Judgment was prayed for the sum of $10,000.
The United States filed a general traverse of the petition, but
subsequently moved to dismiss upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction to consider it, it presenting "an action for damages
in a case sounding in tort."
The motion was sustained and judgment entered dismissing the
petition for want of jurisdiction. This appeal was then taken.
Appellant concedes that "the cause of action not merely "sounds
in tort," but is based wholly upon the tortious actions of the
agents of the United States." He, however, contends that the Court
of Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker act over claims
ex
delicto founded upon the Constitution of the United States.
And this, he further contends, is supported by the recent decisions
of this Court, and relies especially upon
Dooley v. United
States, 182 U. S. 222.
But that case did not overrule
Schillinger v. United
States, 155 U. S. 163,
which, counsel says, holds directly contrary to his contention, and
that he has not the ingenuity to suggest how the court can now
decide the case at bar in appellant's favor without, at least by
implication, overruling the
Schillinger case. We are not
disposed to overrule the case, either directly or by implication.
The court found nothing in it antagonistic to the reasoning and
conclusion reached in the
Dooley case.
In
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.
S. 445, the
Schillinger case was treated as
subsisting authority, and Mr. Justice Brown, who wrote the opinion
in the
Dooley case, in his concurring opinion in the
Lynah case, considered it as correctly declaring the
law.
Page 239 U. S. 607
The
Dooley case and cases subsequent to it which are
relied upon by appellant concerned the exaction of duties or taxes
by the United States or its officers, or property taken by the
government for public purposes.
* In such cases,
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims for the recovery of the duties
and taxes or for the value of the property taken was declared.
In the case at bar (assuming as true all that is charged), there
was a wrong inflicted, if a wrong can be said to have been
inflicted by the sentence of a court legally constituted, after
judgment upon issues openly framed by the opposing parties, both of
fact and the applicable law, whether that law was §§ 2865
and 3082 of the Revised Statutes or the Constitution of the United
States. But, conceding that a wrong was inflicted through these
judicial forms, the case nevertheless is of different character
from the
Dooley case, as was also the
Schillinger
case. The latter case passed upon the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims in actions founded on tort, and declared the general
principle to be, based on a policy imposed by necessity, that
governments are not liable "for unauthorized wrongs inflicted on
the citizen by their officers, though occurring while engaged in
the discharge of official duties." And it was further said:
"Congress has wisely reserved to itself the right to give or
withhold relief where the claim is founded on wrongful proceedings
of an officer of the government."
Gibbons v. United
States, 8 Wall. 269,
75 U. S. 275;
Morgan v. United
States, 14 Wall. 531,
81 U. S.
534.
The
Schillinger case was cited in the
New
Orleans-Belize Royal Mail v. United States, ante, p.
239 U. S. 202, in
rejection of a contention that the United States was liable for
services imposed by their officers outside of a contract
Page 239 U. S. 608
with the Royal Mail Company, in the performance of which the
vessel owned by the company was damaged.
We repeat, therefore, that the
Schillinger case being
subsisting authority, and appellant conceding that, if such be its
value, it is controlling, further discussion is unnecessary.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS took no part in the consideration and
decision of this case.
*
United States v. Welch, 217 U.
S. 333;
United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.
S. 180;
United States v. Emery, 237 U. S.
28.