Under the Act of June 25, 1910, the Secretary of the Interior
has power to ascertain the legal heirs of an allottee Omaha Indian
dying during the period in which an allotment made to him under the
act of August 7, 1882, was held in trust, and the decision of the
Secretary is final and conclusive.
Congress, by the Act of June 25, 1910, restored to the Secretary
of the Interior the power taken from him by the Acts of 1894 and
1901 to determine the heirs of allottee Indians dying during the
trust period, making his jurisdiction exclusive, with no exceptions
for pending litigation.
The rule that the repeal of.a statute does not extinguish
liability incurred thereunder
held not applicable to the
statute in this case, which simply changes the tribunal to hear the
case and takes away no substantive rights.
Congress, in its plenary control of Indians, has power to pass
the Act
Page 239 U. S. 507
of June 25, 110, vesting in the Secretary of the Interior the
determination of heirs of allottee Indian dying within the trust
period; the act evinces a change of policy on the part of Congress,
and its opinion as to the better manner in which the rights of the
Indians can be preserved.
Even though the district court may have had jurisdiction of a
suit to determine the heirs of an allottee Omaha Indian who died
during the trust period when this suit was commenced, it has no
jurisdiction since the passage of the Act of June 25, 1910, vesting
exclusive jurisdiction in the Secretary of the Interior to
ascertain such heirs.
210 F. 793 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the district court
of the United States of a suit affecting title to an allotment made
under the Act of August 7, 1882, to a member of the Omaha Tribe of
Indians, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill to establish the equitable title of the plaintiff
to an allotment made to Jacob Hallowell, deceased, a member of the
Omaha Tribe, in accordance with §§ 5, 6, of the act of
August 7, 1882, c. 434, 22 Stat. 341. The patent to Jacob Hallowell
followed the language of § 6, and declared that the United
States would hold his land for the period of twenty-five years in
trust for the sole use of the allottee "or in case of his decease,
of his heirs according to the laws of the State of Nebraska." The
plaintiff says that he is the sole heir as against various other
claims set forth in the bill. We do not go into further
particulars, as we are of opinion that the circuit court of appeals
was right in holding that the district court had no
Page 239 U. S. 508
jurisdiction of the case. 127 C.C.A. 343, 210 F. 793.
It is unnecessary to consider whether there was jurisdiction
when the suit was begun. By the Act of June 25, 1910, c. 431, 36
Stat. 855, it was provided that, in a case like this of the death
of the allottee intestate during the trust period, the Secretary of
the Interior should ascertain the legal heirs of the decedent, and
his decision should be final and conclusive, with considerable
discretion as to details. This act restored to the Secretary the
power that had been taken from him by Acts of 1894 and February 6,
1901, c. 217, 31 Stat. 760,.
McKay v. Kalyton,
204 U. S. 458,
204 U. S. 468.
It made his jurisdiction exclusive in terms, it made no exception
for pending litigation, but purported to be universal, and so to
take away the jurisdiction that for a time had been conferred upon
the courts of the United States. The appellant contends for a
different construction on the strength of Rev.Stats. § 13,
that the repeal of any statute shall not extinguish any liability
incurred under it,
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.
S. 205,
218 U. S. 216,
and refers to the decisions upon the statutes concerning suits upon
certain bonds given to the United States,
United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 209 U.
S. 306. But, apart from a question that we have passed,
whether the plaintiff even attempted to rely upon the statutes
giving jurisdiction to the courts in allotment cases, the reference
of the matter to the Secretary, unlike the changes with regard to
suits upon bonds, takes away no substantive right, but simply
changes the tribunal that is to hear the case. In doing so it
evinces a change of policy, and an opinion that the rights of the
Indians can be better preserved by the
quasi-paternal
supervision of the general head of Indian affairs. The
consideration applies with the same force to all cases, and was
embodied in a statute that no doubt was intended to apply to all,
so far as construction is concerned.
Page 239 U. S. 509
There is equally little doubt as to the power of Congress to
pass the act, so construed. We presume that no one would question
it if the suit had not been begun. It is a strong proposition that
bringing this bill intensified, strengthened, or enlarged the
plaintiff's rights, as suggested in
De Lima v. Bidwell,
182 U. S. 1,
182 U. S.
199-200.
See Simmons v. Hanover, 23 Pick. 188,
193-194;
Hepburn v. Curts, 7 Watts 300;
Welch v.
Wadsworth, 30 Conn. 149, 154;
Atwood v. Buckingham,
78 Conn. 423. The difficulty in applying such a proposition to the
control of Congress over the jurisdiction of courts of its own
creation is especially obvious.
See Bird v. United States,
187 U. S. 118,
187 U. S. 124.
In any event, the rights of the Indians in this matter remained
subject to such control on principles that have been illustrated in
many ways.
See Marchie Tiger v. Western Investment Co.,
221 U. S. 286;
Hallowell v. United States, 221 U.
S. 317.
The decision of the circuit court of appeals in this case is in
accord with such earlier decisions, as we have seen.
Bond v.
United States, 181 F. 613;
Pel-ata-yakot v. United
States, 188 F. 387;
Parr v. Colfax, 197 F. 302.
Decree dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction
affirmed.
