This Court cannot pass upon questions which have, as an
inevitable legal consequence of the European War now flagrant,
become moot. This Court takes judicial notice of the European War,
and that its inevitable consequence has been to interrupt the
steamship business between this country and Europe.
It is a rule of this Court based on fundamental principle of
public policy not to establish a rule for controlling predicted
future conduct, and it will not decide a case involving a
combination alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Trust Act which
has become moot as a legal consequence of war because of
probability of its being recreated on the cessation of war.
California v. San Pablo R. Co., 149 U.
S. 308.
The power of this Court cannot be enlarged or its duty affected
in regard to the decision of a moot case by stipulation of parties
or counsel.
Where a case to dissolve a combination alleged to be illegal
under the Anti-Trust Act has become moot and this Court has thus
been prevented from deciding it upon the merits, and the court
below decided against the government, the course most consonant
with justice is to reverse, with directions to dismiss the bill
without prejudice to the government in the future to assail any
actual contract or combination deemed to offend the Anti-Trust
Act.
216 F. 971 reversed.
The facts, which involve the construction and application of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 and the practice of this
Court in regard to cases which have become moot, and the effect of
the legal consequence of war, are stated in the opinion.
Page 239 U. S. 468
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States, on January 4th, 1911, commenced this suit to
prevent the further execution of an agreement to which the
defendants were parties and which it was charged constituted the
foundation of an illegal combination in violation of the Anti-Trust
Act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. 209, c. 647). The relief asked,
moreover, in the nature of things embraced certain subsidiary
agreements made during the course of the execution of the main
contract, in furtherance of its alleged prohibited result. The
principal agreement was made in 1908, to last until February 28,
1911, but was to continue in force thereafter from year to year
unless, not later than December 1st of each year a notice of the
intention not to continue was given. On December 3, 1910, however,
just a month before this suit was filed, the agreement in question
was renewed for a period of five years.
We give from the argument on behalf of the United States a
statement of the corporate defendants to the bill, some of whom had
become parties to the alleged illegal combination by subsidiary
agreement or agreements made at a later date than the original
contract.
"1. The Allan Line Steamship Company, Limited, hereafter called
the 'Allan Line,' a British corporation, operating from Portland,
Boston, and Philadelphia to London, Liverpool, and Glasgow and
return. "
Page 239 U. S. 469
"2. International Mercantile Marine Company, a New Jersey
corporation, operating from New York and Philadelphia to Liverpool
and Southampton and return."
"3. Its ships, together with those of its subsidiary company,
defendant International Navigation Company, Limited, also operating
from New York and Philadelphia to Liverpool and Southampton, . . .
are referred to as the 'American Line.' Besides International
Navigation Company, Limited, it also controls through stock
ownership the defendants British & North Atlantic Steam
Navigation Company, Limited, Societe Anonyme de Navigation Belge
Americaine, and Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, Limited."
"4. British & North Atlantic Steam Navigation Company,
Limited, a British corporation, hereafter called the 'Dominion
Line,' operating from Portland to Liverpool and return."
"5. Societe Anonyme de Navigation Belge Americaine, a Belgian
corporation, hereafter called the 'Red Star Line,' operating from
New York and Philadelphia to Antwerp and return."
"6. Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, Limited, a British
corporation, hereafter called the 'White Star Line,' operating from
New York and Boston to Liverpool and Southampton and return."
"7. The Anchor Line (Henderson Brothers), Limited, a British
corporation, hereafter called the 'Anchor Line,' operating from New
York to Glasgow and return."
"8. Canadian Pacific Railway Company, a Canadian corporation,
operating a regular line of steamships, hereafter called the
'Canadian Pacific Line,' from Montreal, Quebec, and St. John in the
Dominion of Canada to Liverpool, England, and return. It also owns
and operates a transcontinental railroad which, partly through
branches running into the United States and partly though
connections with the Wabash and other American railroads,
Page 239 U. S. 470
transports a substantial proportion (12%) of its steamship
passengers to and from points in this country."
"9. The Cunard Steamship Company, Limited, a British
corporation, hereafter called the 'Cunard Line,' operating from New
York and Boston to Liverpool in England, Fiume in Hungary, and
Trieste in Austria, and return."
"10. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, a
German corporation, hereafter called the 'Hamburg-American Line,'
operating from New York to Hamburg and return."
"11. Nord Deutscher Lloyd, a German corporation, hereafter
called the 'North German Lloyd Line,' operating from New York,
Baltimore, and Galveston to Bremen and return."
"12. Nederlandsh-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschapij
(Holland-Amerika Lijn), a Netherlands corporation, hereafter called
the 'Holland-American Line,' operating between New York and
Rotterdam and return."
"13. Russian East Asiatic Steamship Company, a Russian
corporation, hereafter called the 'Russian-American Line,'
operating between New York and Libau, Russia, and return."
The individuals named as defendants were the principal officers
and agents in this country of the corporate defendants. We extract
from the argument on behalf of the government the following
statement of the main provisions of the principal agreement.
"(1) The parties guarantee to each other certain definite
percentages of the entire steerage traffic carried by them both
eastbound and westbound between European ports and the United
States and Canada, except Mediterranean passengers."
"(2) Any line exceeding its allotment must pay into the pool a
compensation price of �4 for each excess passenger, which
sum is to be paid proportionately to the line or lines
Page 239 U. S. 471
which have not carried their full quota. It is expressly stated
that this provision 'forms one of the main features of the entire
contract.'"
"(3) Each line must make a weekly report of the number of
steerage passengers carried, and from these the secretary of the
pool compiles weekly statements showing the pool position of each
line. He also prepares each month provisional accounts of the
compensation due from lines which have exceeded their quota. This
must be paid immediately on pain of heavy penalties. Final
settlements are made at the end of each year."
"(4) Each line undertakes to arrange its rates and service in
such manner that the number of steerage passengers it actually
carries shall correspond as nearly as possible with the number
allotted to it by the contract. If any line exceeds its proportion,
it is in duty bound to adopt measures calculated to bring about a
correct adjustment. The other lines may either await the action of
the individual line, or a majority of the lines representing 75
percent of the pool shares can immediately order rates on a plus
line to be raised or rates on a minus line to be lowered, and from
this order there is no appeal. It is expressly stated, however,
that"
"all parties were unanimously of the opinion that the adjustment
is, whenever practicable, to be effected not by reducing the rates
of one line, but, on the contrary, by
raising the rates of
one or several of the lines."
"(5) No line has the right to alter its steerage rates without
having previously informed the secretary --
i.e., all
lines are bound to maintain existing rates until the other pool
members are notified."
"(6) No circulars or publications shall be issued by any line
reflecting upon or instituting comparisons with any other
conference line unfavorable to the latter, and no party shall
support (advertise in) any newspaper which shall systematically
attack any conference line."
"(7) To insure the faithful performance of the agreement,
Page 239 U. S. 472
each line deposits with the secretary a promissory note in the
amount of �1,000 for each percent of traffic allotted to it
in the pool. From this amount penalties may be collected ranging
from �250 for smaller infractions to the forfeiture of the
entire deposit if the line withdraws from the agreement before its
expiration, refuses to pay compensation money, or assists directly
or indirectly any opposition line."
"(8) New lines may be admitted or the terms of the agreement
altered only by unanimous vote, unless otherwise provided in the
contract."
"(9) To assist in the carrying out of the agreement, a secretary
was appointed."
"(10) Regular meetings are to be held alternately at London and
Cologne for the purpose of carrying out this agreement and
agreements collateral thereto. These meetings constitute what is
called the Atlantic Conference."
"Representatives of the Atlantic Conference Lines likewise meet
in New York in what is called the American Atlantic Conference or
New York Conference."
It is to be observed in addition that the agreement expressly
provided that the withdrawal of any one of the lines from the
contract should release all others from all future obligation
unless the others agreed among themselves to continue.
To the elucidation of the view we take of the case, it suffices
to say that, as the result of the answers of the defendants, the
issues which arose for decision were two-fold in character: did the
Anti-Trust Act relate to the business of ocean transportation with
which the assailed agreement and those subsidiary to it were
concerned, and if so, did the agreements and the conduct of the
defendants under them constitute a violation of the provisions of
the Anti-Trust Act?
The court below, although deciding that the ocean
Page 239 U. S. 473
transportation covered by the main agreement was under the
control of the Anti-Trust Act, yet held that the assailed contract
and the action of the parties under it were not within the terms of
the act, and therefore that the complaint of the government on that
subject was without foundation. The court, however, concluded that
a certain subsidiary agreement which had been entered into in the
process of the execution of the original agreement had given rise
to a practice which was reprobated by the Anti-Trust Act, and the
further execution of such agreement and the carrying out of the
practice under it were by the decree forbidden. The court reached
these conclusions upon opinions formed concerning the nature and
character of ocean transportation with which the agreement was
concerned, the evils which had existed in the traffic and which it
was the purpose of the agreement to remedy, the practice of the
commercial world in dealing with such transportation in the past,
the benefit which had resulted to commerce from the execution of
the agreement, the reflex light thrown upon its intent and object
by the reasonable rates which had been applied in its execution,
and many other conditions which had come to pass as a result of the
agreement, tending to the amelioration of the conditions of
steerage travel and the resulting benefaction to the safety,
comfort, and health of the millions of human beings traveling by
steerage, to which class of traffic alone the contract related. 216
F. 971.
The contentions which presumably were urged in the court below
and which it is deemed by the parties here arise for decision will
at once appear by giving a brief statement concerning those made on
this appeal by the United States and by the defendants as appellees
or an a cross-appeal. On behalf of the United States, it is
insisted that the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act agreement
constitute a plain violation of agreement constitute a plain
violation of that act, that the conduct of the parties under
Page 239 U. S. 474
it adds additional force to the considerations arising from the
text of the contract, since it demonstrates that the purpose of the
agreement was to destroy competition, to acquire dominion over
rates, and to fix them as the result of monopoly, and that it is
wholly irrelevant to inquire whether, in executing the wrongful
powers which were acquired by the contract, the parties were
beneficent in their action, since what the act forbids is the
monopoly and the combination for the purpose of obtaining monopoly,
and there is no distinction in the act between a good monopoly and
a bad one. On the other hand, the contentions of the defendants are
as follows: First, that, conceding the power, it is not to be
assumed, in the absence of express declaration to that effect, that
the purpose of Congress in the Anti-Trust Act was to extend its
authority into foreign countries to prevent the execution in such
countries of contracts which were there legal and and which were
intended, in view of the conditions there prevailing, to better
enable the discharge by ocean carriers of their duty. Second, that
it appears from subsequent legislation of Congress that it was not
its intention to deal with ocean transportation from and to foreign
countries by the Anti-Trust Act, since such transportation was
dealt with in subsequent legislation in a manner which persuasively
leads to such conclusion. Tariff Act of August 27, 1894, c. 349,
§§ 73-77, 28 Stat. 570; Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, c.
11, § 34, 30 Stat. 151, 213; Joint Resolution, September 19,
1914, No. 43, 38 Stat. 779. Third, that in fully investigating and
considering the question whether ocean transportation to and from
foreign countries was included in the Anti-Trust Act, in an
elaborate report, a committee of the House of Representatives had
expressed conclusions in conflict with the view that the act did
apply, and had recommended the adoption of legislation to guard
against evils in such traffic, if any, and which legislation, if
adopted, would be in a large sense incompatible
Page 239 U. S. 475
with the conclusion that the Anti-Trust Act was applicable to
such transportation.
While this mere outline shows the questions which are at issue
and which would require to be considered if we had the right to
decide the controversy, it at once further demonstrates that we may
not, without disregarding our duty, pass upon them because of their
absolute want of present actuality -- that is, because of their now
moot character as an inevitable legal consequence springing from
the European War which is now flagrant -- a matter of which we take
judicial notice.
Montgomery v. United
States, 15 Wall. 395;
United
States v. Lapene, 17 Wall. 601, 7 Moore, Int.Law
Dig. 244, 250. The legal proposition is not in substance
controverted, but it is urged, in view of the character of the
questions and the possibility or probability that, on the cessation
of war, the parties will resume or recreate their asserted illegal
combination, we should now decide the controversies in order that,
by operation of the rule to be established, any attempt at renewal
of or creation of the combination in the future will be rendered
impossible. But this merely upon a prophecy as to future conditions
invokes the exercise of judicial power not to decide an existing
controversy, but to establish a rule for controlling predicted
future conduct, contrary to the elementary principle which was thus
stated in
California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co.,
149 U. S. 308,
149 U. S.
314:
"The duty of this Court, as of every judicial tribunal, is
limited to determining rights of persons or of property which are
actually controverted in the particular case before it. When, in
determining such rights, it becomes necessary to give an opinion
upon a question of law, that opinion may have weight as a precedent
for future decisions. But the Court is not empowered to decide moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare, for the
government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot
affect the result as to the thing in issue
Page 239 U. S. 476
in the case before it. No stipulation of parties or counsel,
whether, in the case before the Court or in any other case, can
enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of the Court in this
regard."
See also Lord Veazie, 8
How. 251;
Cheong Ah Moy v. United States, 113 U.
S. 216;
Little v. Bowers, 134 U.
S. 547;
Jones v. Montague, 194 U.
S. 147;
Security Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt,
200 U. S. 446;
Richardson v. McChesney, 218 U. S. 487;
Stearns v. Wood, 236 U. S. 75.
Our attention has indeed been directed to a recent decision in
United States v. Prince Line, Limited, 220 F. 230, where,
although it was recognized that
"the combination against which this proceeding is directed,
composed of two British and two German steamship companies, has
been practically dissolved as a result of the European War,"
and the questions presented "have become largely academic," the
court nevertheless proceeded to consider and dispose of the case on
the merits, observing in conclusion, however:
"In view of the fact that the logic of events has turned this
investigation into an autopsy, instead of a determination of live
issues, it seems unnecessary to discuss the persuasiveness of the
proofs,"
etc. But we cannot give our implied sanction to what was thus
done, or accept the persuasiveness of the reasoning upon which the
action was based, in view of the settled decisions of this Court to
the contrary and the fundamental principles of public policy upon
which they are based. In fact, at this term, although we were
pressed to take jurisdiction of a cause in a capital case after the
death penalty had been inflicted on the accused, we declined to do
so and dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the case had
become a moot one.
Director of Prisons v. Court of First
Instance of the Province of Cavite, post, p. 633.
Nor is there anything in
United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, and
Southern Pacific Terminal Co.
v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S.
Page 239 U. S. 477
498, which conflicts with this fundamental doctrine. In the
first, the
Trans-Missouri case, a combination between
railroads, charged to be illegal, was by consent dissolved, and it
was held that, in view of the continued operation of the railroads
and the relations between them, their mere consent did not relieve
of the duty to pass upon the pending charge of illegality under the
statute of their previous conduct, since, by the mere volition of
the parties, the combination could come into existence at any
moment. Leaving aside some immaterial differences, in terms, the
ruling in the
Southern Pacific case was based upon the
decision in the
Trans-Missouri case. Here, on the
contrary, the business in which the parties to the combination were
engaged has, by force of events beyond their control, ceased, and
by the same power and a continued relation concerning it between
them has become unlawful and impossible. The difference between
this and the
Trans-Missouri case was clearly laid down in
Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651,
where, after announcing the general rule as to the absence of
authority to consider a mere moot question, and referring to
possible exceptions resulting from the fact that the want of
actuality had arisen either from the consent of the parties or the
action of a defendant, it was declared: "But if the intervening
event is owing to the plaintiff's own act or to a power beyond the
control of either party, the Court will stay its hand."
Although it thus follows that there are no issues on the merits
before us which we have a right to decide, it yet remains to be
determined what our order should be with reference to the decree
below rendered, which, as we have seen, was against the government
and in favor of the assailed combination because it was found not
to be within the prohibitions of the Anti-Trust Act. As established
by the ruling in
South Spring Hill Gold Co. v. Amador Gold
Co., 145 U. S. 300, our
conclusion on such subject must be reached without at all
considering the merits of the cause,
Page 239 U. S. 478
and must be based solely upon determining what will be "most
consonant to justice" in view of the conditions and circumstances
of the particular case. Coming to consider the question in that
light, and in view of the nature and character of the conditions
which have caused the case to become moot, we are of opinion that
the ends of justice exact that the judgment below should not be
permitted to stand when, without any fault of the government, there
is no power to review it upon the merits, but that it should be
reversed and the case be remanded to the court below with
directions to dismiss the bill without prejudice to the right of
the government in the future to assail any actual contract or
combination deemed to offend against the Anti-Trust Act.
And it is so ordered.