Where it sufficiently appears from the bill that jurisdiction
does not depend solely on diverse citizenship, but the controversy
involves the construction of an act of Congress, the decision of
the circuit court of appeals is not final, but an appeal lies to
this Court under 241, Judicial Code.
As an organized political division of the United States, a
territory possesses only such powers as Congress confers upon it,
and the legislature of a territory cannot provide for escheat
unless such provision is within the grant of authority.
A statutory authority to a territory to legislate upon all
rightful subjects of legislation includes the right to provide by
legislation for escheat for failure of heirs, and so
held
as to authority given by the Organic Act of Washington
Territory.
The prohibition in the Organic Act of,Washington of 1853 against
interference with the primary disposal of the soil had reference to
the disposition of public lands of the United States, and did not
limit the right of the territory to legislate in regard to the
escheat of private property for failure of heirs.
Subject to the general scheme of local government defined by the
Organic Act and the special provisions it contains, and the right
of Congress to revise, alter, and revoke, the territorial
legislatures have generally been entrusted with the enactment of
the entire systems of municipal law of the respective Territories
of the United States.
Escheat for failure of heirs has always been a familiar subject
of legislation in the American commonwealths.
In determining the extent of the power to legislate delegated by
Congress to a territory under the Organic Acts, and the validity of
a series of acts of the territorial legislature, it is significant
if none of such acts asserting legislative power during the entire
period until statehood were ever disapproved by Congress.
Provisions for escheat for failure of heirs have proper relation
to matters embraced in a law establishing probate courts and
defining their jurisdiction, and so
held that such
provisions in the statutes of
Page 239 U. S. 357
Washington Territory are not invalid because the title of the
probate act was not broad enough to cover escheats.
After reviewing the statute of Washington Territory in regard to
jurisdiction of probate courts,
held that the decree of
the probate court involved in this case decreeing that the property
of the intestate escheat to the county for failure of heirs was
within its jurisdiction, and the decree properly disposed of the
property.
Where the legislature has authority to establish its rule as to
escheat, it also has power to suitably provide for the tribunals
having jurisdiction and the procedure for determining whether the
rule is applicable in particular cases, and if other proceedings
are established, office found is not necessary to effect an
escheat.
Under the law of the Territory of Washington, the property
involved in this case escheated to the county in which it was
situated.
The proceedings in the probate court terminating in a decree
that the property of the intestate escheat to the county for
failure of heirs being in accord with valid laws of the territory,
even though informal, the decree was not void or subject to
collateral attack.
The decree of the probate court attacked in this case having
been entered in a proceeding
in rem properly conducted
with notice and opportunity to parties interested to appear, there
was no deprivation of property without due process of law.
Where a court of competent jurisdiction, in a proceeding
in
rem under a valid statute, determines that there are no heirs
to an intestate, the decree binds all the world, including heirs
who failed to appear.
203 Fed. 894.
This is a suit, brought in 1911, to recover lands in the City of
Seattle, County of King, State of Washington, and to quiet title.
(
See R. & B. Code, Washington, § 785.) The
plaintiff claimed title as heir, and grantee of other heirs, of
Lars Torgerson Grotnes, who died intestate in the County of King,
Territory of Washington, in March, 1865. The defendant, the County
of King, succeeded the County of King of the territory, which had
control of the property pursuant to a decree of escheat which was
passed by the probate court in May, 1869. The legislature of the
territory had provided that, in case of the death of an intestate
leaving no kindred, his estate should escheat to the county in
which it was situated. Washington Laws,
Page 239 U. S. 358
1862-63, p. 262. Demurrer was filed to the amended complaint on
the grounds (among others) that the complaint did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that the action had
not been commenced within the time limited by law. The demurrer was
sustained, and judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed by
the court of appeals. 203 F. 894.
After alleging title in fee in Lars Torgerson Grotnes, and the
fact that he had acquired the land under the name of John Thompson
(having changed his name to conceal his identity) through certain
mesne conveyances from the grantee of the United States, the
amended complaint set forth in detail the proceedings in the
probate court, which may be summarized as follows: that, on March
26, 1865, the probate court, upon an informal request of H.L.
Yesler and J. Williamson, assumed to appoint Daniel Bagley
administrator of the estate of John Thompson, deceased, the order
reciting that the decedent had died in the county, intestate,
leaving property subject to administration; that, after certain
intermediate proceedings, the administrator presented his petition
on February 12, 1869, stating that no heirs at law had been found
after diligent search, and praying that the administrator might be
discharged and that, after due notice, the estate might be turned
over to the county or such further order made as might be meet, and
that, on May 26, 1869, after publication of notice for four weeks
in a local newspaper, a final decree of distribution was entered
which recited the proceedings and continued as follows:
"That said decedent died intestate in the County of King,
Washington Territory, on the-day of March, A.D. 1865, leaving no
heirs surviving him;"
"
* * * *"
"There being no heirs of said decedent, that the entire estate
escheat to the County of King, in Washington Territory. "
Page 239 U. S. 359
"Now on this 26th day of May, A.D. 1869, on motion of said
Daniel Bagley, administrator of said estate, and no exceptions or
objections being filed or made by any person interested in the said
estate or otherwise;"
"It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that all the acts
and proceedings of said administrator, as reported by this court
and as appearing upon the records thereof, be, and the same are
hereby, approved and confirmed, and that, after deducting said
estimated expenses of closing the administration, the residue of
said estate of John Thompson, deceased, not heretofore distributed,
hereinafter particularly described, and now remaining in the hands
of said administrator, and any other property not now known or
discovered which may belong to the said estate, or in which the
said estate may have any interest, be and the same is hereby
distributed as follows, to wit: the entire estate to the County of
King, in Washington Territory."
"
* * * *"
"The following is a particular description of the said residue
of said estate referred to in this decree, and of which
distribution is ordered, adjudged, and decreed, to-wit:"
"1st. Cash, to-wit: $343.83 gold coin."
"2nd. And real estate, to-wit: one hundred and sixty acres of
land on Duwamish River, in King County, W. T., more particularly
described in a certain deed from Joseph Williamson and William
Greenfield to John Thompson, dated January 19th, A.D. 1865, and
recorded in Volume 1 of the records of King County, W. T., on pages
458, 459, and 460."
"Third. A lease of said land to John Martin, dated March 5th,
1866, on which the entire reserved remains due and unpaid."
"Dated May 26th, 1869."
It was alleged that this decree was null and void, that the
probate court was wholly without jurisdiction to pass
Page 239 U. S. 360
upon the title to the land described or to declare it escheated;
that all claims to the land by defendant, and all its acts relating
thereto, had been under this assailed decree, and that the
defendant had no instrument or judgment purporting to evidence any
title in it; that neither the defendant nor any other authority had
instituted any suit or proceeding before any tribunal for the
purpose of having an escheat declared or its claim of title
confirmed. The acts of the county in relation to the land were set
forth, the tracts involved being described as the "King County
Farm," "King County Hospital Grounds," "King County Addition to the
City of Seattle," "King County 2nd Addition to the City of
Seattle." The plaintiff did not seek to recover the lands which had
been appropriated for railroad rights of way or highways, or that
portion which had been sold to innocent purchasers, and it was also
conceded that the county might retain the buildings and tangible
betterments which it had placed upon the land, as stated.
At the outset, after alleging that the plaintiff was a subject
of the King of Norway and that the matter in dispute exceeded in
value the sum of $300,000, the amended complaint set forth that the
controversy involved the construction of Amendments V and XIV of
the Constitution of the United States, and of §§ 1851,
1907, and 1924 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
relating to the Territory of Washington.
It was further stated that the heirs of the decedent had no
knowledge of his whereabouts or death until three years prior to
the beginning of the action, and that the heirs, and particularly
the plaintiff, had been diligent since receiving this information
in searching for the proofs of the decedent's identity and of their
relationship.
Page 239 U. S. 361
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The motion to dismiss must be denied. It sufficiently appears
from the amended bill that jurisdiction did not depend solely upon
the citizenship of the respective
Page 239 U. S. 362
parties, but that the controversy involved, with other
questions, the construction of the act of Congress prescribing the
authority of the territorial legislature. In this view, the
decision of the circuit court of appeals is not final.
Vicksburg v. Henson, 231 U. S. 259,
231 U. S.
267.
The plaintiff in error contends that the land in question did
not escheat to the County of King, Territory of Washington, for the
reasons (1) that the territory was not a sovereign, but a municipal
corporation; (2) that the organic law of the territory conveyed to
it no property rights of the United States; (3) that the act of the
territorial legislature providing for escheat to counties was
forbidden by the organic law; (4) that this legislative act was
invalid because its title was not broad enough to cover the subject
matter, and (5) that there was never any office found.
There is, of course, no dispute as to the sovereignty of the
United States over the Territory of Washington, or as to the
consequent control of Congress. As an organized political division,
the territory possessed only the powers which Congress had
conferred, and hence the territorial legislature could not provide
for escheat unless such provision was within the granted authority.
Sere v. Pitot,
6 Cranch 332,
10 U. S. 337;
American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 1 Pet. 511,
26 U. S. 543;
National Bank v. Yankton County, 101 U.
S. 129,
101 U. S. 133.
The Organic Act (March 2, 1853, 10 Stat. 172, 175) provided as
follows:
"SEC. 6. . . . That the legislative power of the territory shall
extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States. But no law
shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil,
no tax shall be imposed upon the property of the United States, nor
shall the lands or other property of nonresidents be taxed higher
than the lands or other property of residents. All the
Page 239 U. S. 363
laws passed by the legislative assembly shall be submitted to
the Congress of the United States, and, if disapproved, shall be
null and of no effect:
Provided, That nothing in this act
shall be construed to give power to incorporate a bank or any
institution with banking powers, or to borrow money in the name of
the territory, or to pledge the faith of the people of the same for
any loan whatever, directly or indirectly. No charter granting any
privileges of making, issuing, or putting into circulation any
notes or bills in the likeness of bank notes, or any bonds, scrip,
drafts, bills of exchange, or obligations, or granting any other
banking powers or privileges, shall be passed by the legislative
assembly, nor shall the establishment of any branch or agency of
any such corporation, derived from other authority, be allowed in
said territory, nor shall said legislative assembly authorize the
issue of any obligation, scrip, or evidence of debt, by said
territory in any mode or manner whatever except certificates for
service to said territory. And all such laws, or any law or laws
inconsistent with the provisions of this act, shall be utterly null
and void. And all taxes shall be equal an uniform, and no
distinctions shall be made in the assessments between different
kinds of property, but the assessments shall be according to the
value thereof. To avoid improper influences which may result from
intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper
relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and
that shall be expressed in the title."
This manifestly was not a grant of the property of the United
States, but it was an authority which extended to "all rightful
subjects" of legislation save as it was limited by the essential
requirement of conformity to the Constitution and laws of the
United States and by the restrictions imposed. The prohibition
against interference "with the primary disposal of the soil"
defined a limitation which had been established from the beginning
in organizing
Page 239 U. S. 364
territorial governments. This provision was found in the
ordinance passed by the Congress of the Confederation, April 23,
1784, for the government of the Western territory (Amer.Cong., Pub.
Journals, Vol. 4, 1782-1788, p. 379), and it was reenacted in the
superseding ordinance of 1787 (Art. IV, 1 Stat. 52, note). It was
incorporated either by appropriate reference [
Footnote 1] or by express statement [
Footnote 2] in the Organic Acts of the
territories, and it was continued in substantially the same words
in many of the enabling acts under which states were admitted to
the Union. [
Footnote 3] For
example, when Wisconsin was admitted, it was stipulated as a
condition (9 Stat. 58) that the state should "never interfere with
the primary disposal of the soil within the same by the United
States" -- a condition which had its exact equivalent in the
provision of other enabling acts that the states should "never
interfere with the primary disposal of the public lands" lying
within them (Arkansas, 5 Stat. 51; Iowa, Florida,
id.,
743, c. 48; California, 9 Stat. 452). The restriction had reference
to the disposition of the public lands of the United States, and
neither as to state nor as to territory did these words purport to
limit the legislative power, otherwise duly exercised, where
property had passed into private ownership and there was no
interference with the exclusive authority of Congress in dealing
with the public domain.
Carroll v.
Safford, 3 How. 441,
44 U. S. 461;
Witherspoon v.
Duncan, 4 Wall. 210,
71 U. S. 218;
Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.
S. 151,
117 U. S.
164-165
Page 239 U. S. 365
Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 24, 74;
Oury v.
Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, 260;
Topeka Co. v. McPherson, 7
Okl. 332, 338-340. So far as "the primary disposal of the soil" was
concerned, provision for escheat on the death of an owner in fee
without heirs could not be deemed to be an interference, whether
the provision was enacted by a territory or by a state.
The scope of the authority conferred upon territorial
governments has frequently been described. Subject to the general
scheme of local government defined by the Organic Act, and the
special provisions it contains, and subject also to the right of
Congress "to revise, alter, and revoke at its discretion," the
local legislature has generally been entrusted "with the enactment
of the entire system of municipal law."
Hornbuckle
v. Toombs, 18 Wall. 648,
85 U. S. 655.
"Rightful subjects" of legislation, except as otherwise provided,
included all those subjects upon which legislatures had been
accustomed to act.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.
S. 190,
125 U. S. 204;
Clinton v.
Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434,
80 U. S. 442;
Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S. 682,
137 U. S. 684;
Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R. Co.,
165 U. S. 593,
165 U. S. 604.
Unquestionably, authority was granted to the territory to legislate
with respect to the devolution of real property on the death of the
owner. Thus, in
Cope v. Cope, 137 U.
S. 682,
137 U. S. 684,
where the validity of an act of the Territorial Legislature of Utah
permitting inheritance by illegitimate children was sustained, it
was said by the Court, after referring to the restrictions of the
Organic Act:
"With the exceptions noted in this section, the power of the
territorial legislature was apparently as plenary as that the
legislature of a state.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S.
190,
125 U. S. 204. The
distribution of and the right of succession to the estates of
deceased persons are matters exclusively of state cognizance, and
are such as were within the competence of the territorial
legislature to deal with as it saw fit, in the absence of an
inhibition by Congress."
Escheat on failure
Page 239 U. S. 366
of heirs was a familiar subject of legislation in the American
commonwealths. The rule of the common law in this respect, as in
others, was subject to modification, and adaptation to local
conditions was essentially a matter of legislative policy. In the
case of the territories, Congress could have dealt with this
subject if it chose, but it did not see fit to establish a rule of
its own. The matter, however, remained a "rightful subject" of
legislation, and Congress did not except it from the broad grant of
legislative power. Assuming that it had authority, the Legislative
Assembly of the Territory of Washington, at its first session,
provided in its article on "Descent of Real Estate" that, "if the
intestate shall leave no kindred, his estate shall escheat to the
territory." Statutes of Washington Territory 1854, p. 306. Similar
provision was made in the case of personalty.
Id., p. 308.
In 1860, it was enacted that, if the intestate should leave no
kindred, his real estate should escheat to the county in which it
was situated, and his personal estate to the county in which the
administration was had. Washington Laws 1859-60, pp. 222, 224.
These provisions were reenacted in the "Probate Practice Act" of
1863. Washington Laws 1862-63, pp. 262, 265. By the Code of 1881,
the estate, on failure of heirs, was to escheat to the territory
"for the support of the common schools" in the county in which the
decedent resided or where the estate was situated. Sec. 3302,
Eighth. It is significant that these acts, thus asserting the
legislative power from the time of the organization of the
territory until it became a state, were never disapproved by
Congress.
It is urged that to sustain the legislative authority to enact
legislation of this character would be contrary to the principles
declared in the case of the
Mormon Church v. United
States, 136 U. S. 1. But
this contention is without basis. In that case, the suit was
brought pursuant to an act of Congress, and it was pointed out that
Congress had expressly declared in the earlier Act of 1862 that all
real
Page 239 U. S. 367
estate acquired by the corporation contrary to its provisions
should "be forfeited and escheat to the United States."
Id., p.
136 U. S. 47. Our
attention is also directed to statements in the opinions in
Williams v. Wilson, 1 Martin & Yerger 248, 252, and
Etheridge v. Doe, 18 Ala. 565, 574, but neither of these
cases involved the question of the validity of territorial
legislation for escheat. In
Territory v. Lee, 2 Mont. 124,
the act of the territory by which it was attempted to forfeit
placer mines held by aliens was declared to be invalid, but the
controlling consideration was that its provisions were repugnant to
the authority and action of Congress with respect to the
disposition of the public lands.
See also King v. Ware, 53
Ia. 97. On the other hand, in
Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich.
24, 76, the legislation of the Territory of Michigan providing for
escheat on failure of lawful heirs was found not to be in conflict
with the Ordinance of 1787 or with any act of Congress. And, so far
as the question has been considered with regard to the Territory of
Washington, the authority of the legislature has been upheld.
Pacific Bank v. Hannah, 90 F. 72, 79;
see Territory v.
Klee, 1 Wash. 183, 188.
It is also objected that the title of the act here involved was
not sufficient under the last provision of § 6 of the Organic
Act above quoted. (Rev.Stat. § 1924.) The statute under which
the proceeding was had was entitled, "An act Defining the
Jurisdiction and Practice in the Probate Courts of Washington
Territory." Washington Laws 1862-63, p. 193. It covered the whole
subject of probate practice, of wills, of descent, and of
distribution. We are of the opinion that the matter of escheat for
failure of heirs did have "proper relation" to the other matters
embraced in the statute, and that the object was adequately
expressed in the title within the meaning of the organic law. The
objection that there was no "office found" is not substantial, save
as it may be deemed to
Page 239 U. S. 368
raise the question whether there was compliance with the
territorial legislation, which we shall presently consider. If the
legislature had authority to establish its rule as to escheat, it
was also competent for it suitably to provide as to the tribunal
which should have jurisdiction and the procedure for determining
whether the rule was applicable in a particular case.
Hamilton
v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256,
161 U. S.
263.
Concluding that escheat in the case of death of an owner without
heirs was a rightful subject of legislation within the meaning of
the Organic Act, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
United States and not embraced within the stated exceptions, and
that the provision in the Probate Practice Act was a valid exercise
of the authority thus granted, we are brought to the question as to
the jurisdiction of the probate court to enter the decree set forth
in the amended complaint, and as to the effect of that decree.
Section 9 of the Organic Act (10 Stat. 175;
see
Rev.Stat. § 1907) provided that the "judicial power" of the
territory should be vested "in a supreme court, district courts,
probate courts, and in justices of the peace," and that the
jurisdiction of these courts, including the probate courts, should
be "as limited by law." The territorial legislature, having the
power to define the jurisdiction of the probate courts, provided in
the act which was in force at the time of the proceedings in
question that these courts should have original jurisdiction within
their respective counties over probate proceedings, the granting of
letters testamentary and of administration, and the settlement of
accounts of executors and administrators (Probate Practice Act of
January 16, 1863, § 3; Washington Laws 1862-63, 63, p. 199).
On qualification, an administrator was entitled to the immediate
possession of the real estate, as well as of the personal estate of
the deceased and to receive the rents and profits until the estate
was settled
Page 239 U. S. 369
or delivered over by order of the probate court to the heirs or
devisees (
id., § 165, p. 228). At any time subsequent
to the second term of the probate court after the issue of letters,
any heir might present his petition to the court, asking for his
share of the estate (
id., § 309, p. 256), and the act
contained the following express provisions for distribution, which
related to both real and personal property:
"Sec. 317. Upon the settlement of the accounts of the executor
or administrator or at any subsequent time, upon the application of
the executor or administrator, or any heir, devisee or legatee, the
court shall proceed to distribute the residue of the estate, if
any, among the persons who are by law entitled."
"Sec. 318. In the decree, the court shall name the person and
the portion or parts to which each shall be entitled, and such
persons shall have the right to demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator, or any person having the
same in possession."
Those "by law entitled" to the real estate were described in
§ 340 [
Footnote 4]
(
id., pp. 261, 262), which gave the order of taking
Page 239 U. S. 370
according to relationship, and in the last paragraph provided
for escheat to the county if there were no kindred. It does not
seem to be disputed that, under this act, if proceedings in a
probate court were properly initiated, that court would have
jurisdiction to enter a decree determining the interests of heirs
and distributing the real estate to those of the kindred, if any,
who were found to be entitled to take as provided in this section.
This jurisdiction formerly exercised by the probate courts of the
territory has been continued in the superior courts of the state,
sitting in probate. R. & B .Code, Washington, §§ 1587
et seq. See Stewart v. Lohr, 1 Wash. 341, 342;
Balch v. Smith, 4 Wash. 497, 500, 502;
Hazelton v.
Bogardus, 8 Wash. 102, 103;
Re Sullivan, 48 Wash.
631;
In re Ostlund's Estate, 57 Wash. 359, 364-366.
Speaking of the essential nature of this proceeding for
distribution, and describing the decree if rendered upon due
process of law as final and conclusive, the court said in the case
of
Ostlund's Estate, supra: "Its very object and purpose
is to judicially determine who takes the property left by the
deceased."
See also Alaska Banking Co. v. Noyes, 64 Wash.
672, 676;
McDowell v. Beckham, 72 Wash. 224, 227;
Krohn v. Hirsch, 81 Wash. 222, 226. But it is contended
that the county, asserting escheat, did not claim as successor to
the decedent; that the jurisdiction of the probate court ceased as
soon as it ascertained that there were no heirs, and that it had no
power to declare the escheat and decree distribution to the county.
We cannot accede to this view. It is not the case, in a proper
sense, of an attempt to determine the title of third persons --
that is, of adverse claimants.
Stewart v. Lohr, 1 Wash.
341, 342. The provision for escheat to the county in case the
intestate left no kindred was a part of the scheme of distribution
defined by the act, and we cannot doubt that not only had the court
the power to determine the interests of the
Page 239 U. S. 371
heirs in the real estate to be distributed, but it likewise had
the power to determine whether there were heirs, and, if it was
found that there were none, to decree distribution according to the
statute.
It is insisted that § 480 of the Civil Practice Act of 1854
(p. 218) prescribed the procedure in relation to escheats -- that
is, it provided for the filing of an information by the prosecuting
attorney in the district court and for proceedings like those in
civil action for the recovery of property. This section applied
whenever property should "escheat or be forfeited to the
territory," but, in 1860, the Civil Practice Act of 1854 was
repealed (§ 500, Washington Laws 1859-60, p. 103), and, in the
provision which corresponded to § 480 of the former act, the
word "escheat" was struck out (§ 472, p. 98). In the Civil
Practice Act of 1863, this provision, without the reference to
escheat, was continued (§ 519, Washington Laws 1862-63, p.
192), and it is found in the same form in the Code of 1881 (§
713). It appears that from 1863 to the year 1907 (
see R.
& B. Code, § 1356), there was no provision in the laws of
either the territory or the state in relation to escheat, save
those found in the Probate Practice Acts, and the Act of 1907 did
not disturb the jurisdiction of the court which had the
administration of the estate. Referring to this, it is stated by
the district judge that
"the probate courts of the territory and the superior courts of
the state have uniformly assumed jurisdiction in this class of
cases, and the right of the state or county to appear in the
probate proceeding and contest the rights of other claimants has
been recognized by the highest court of the state."
196 F., p. 799, citing
In re Sullivan's Estate, 48
Wash. 631.
See also Helm v. Johnson, 40 Wash. 420,
421.
Deeming it to be clear that the probate court had jurisdiction
to declare an escheat and to distribute the real property to the
county when it was found that the intestate had left no kindred
(Probate Practice Act 1893,
Page 239 U. S. 372
§§ 317, 318, 340, 8th, p. 262), we pass to the
remaining question with respect to the proceedings that were
actually taken in that court in connection with the property in
controversy. It is objected that the petition for the appointment
of an administrator was informal; that it did not set forth the
jurisdictional facts; that it was signed by the persons not shown
to have any interest in the estate, and asked for the appointment
of another "stranger;" and that hence the court never acquired
jurisdiction, and that its appointment of the administrator and its
subsequent proceedings were null and void. But it is not disputed
that the real property was within the county. The owner, a resident
of that county, had died. The order of appointment recited that he
had died intestate. As a court of record (
id., § 5,
p. 200) having capacity to administer, its jurisdiction over the
subject -- as has been said by the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington with reference to the probate court of the territory
[
Footnote 5] -- "carries with
it the presumption of the integrity of the judgment, the same as
does the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction."
Magee v.
Big Bend Land Co., 51 Wash. 406, 409-410. Despite the
informality of the petition, the appointment of the administrator
was not void, and, not being void, it is not subject to collateral
attack.
Ibid.; 43 U. S.
Astor, 2 How. 319,
43 U. S. 339;
Florentine v.
Barton, 2 Wall. 210,
69 U. S. 216;
Comstock v.
Crawford, 3 Wall. 396,
70 U. S. 403;
McNitt v.
Turner, 16 Wall. 352,
83 U. S. 366;
Veach v. Rice, 131 U. S. 293,
131 U. S. 314;
Simmons v. Saul, 138 U. S. 439,
138 U. S. 457;
4 Bacon, Abr. 96;
Pick v. Strong, 26 Minn. 303;
Morgan
v. Locke, 28 La.Ann. 806;
Riley v. McCord, 24 Mo.
265. It appears that subsequently, the probate court, after
opportunity had been afforded to discover
Page 239 U. S. 373
heirs, entertained a petition of the administrator for final
account and distribution. The statutory notice (Probate Practice
Act 1863, § 319) was published, and on the return day, the
proceeding was duly continued, and, on hearing, the decree was
entered settling the account, finding that there were no heirs, and
directing distribution of the real property, as described, to the
County of King. This proceeding was essentially
in rem.
In re Ostlund's Estate, supra; Alaska Banking & Safe
Deposit Co. v. Noyes, 64 Wash. 672, 676;
McDowell v.
Beckham, 72 Wash. 224, 227;
Krohn v. Hirsch, 81 Wash.
222, 226. It was competent for the court to inquire whether there
were heirs, and, if there were such, to determine who were entitled
to take according to the order prescribed by the statute, and also,
if it was found that there were no heirs, to make the distribution
to the county, as the statute required. It is apparent that there
was no deprivation of property without due process of law. The
court, after appropriate notice, did determine that there were no
heirs, and its decree, being the act of a court of competent
jurisdiction under a valid statute, bound all the world, including
the plaintiff in error. It cannot be regarded as open to attack in
this action.
Grignon's Lessee v.
Astor, 2 How. 319,
43 U. S. 339;
Florentine v.
Barton, 2 Wall. 210,
69 U. S. 216;
Caujolle v.
Ferrie, 13 Wall. 465,
80 U. S. 474;
Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503;
Simmons v. Saul,
138 U. S. 439,
138 U. S. 457;
Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U. S. 71,
214 U. S.
80-81.
As, in this view, the judgment of the court below must be
affirmed, we do not find it necessary to consider the questions
that have been argued with respect to the application of the
statute of limitations.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Territory south of the Ohio, 1 Stat. 123; Mississippi, 1 Stat.
549; Indiana, 2 Stat. 58; Michigan, 2 Stat. 309; Illinois, 2 Stat.
514; Alabama, 3 Stat. 371.
[
Footnote 2]
E.g. Territory of Orleans, 2 Stat. 284; Missouri, 2
Stat. 747; Florida, 3 Stat. 655; Wisconsin, 5 Stat. 13; Iowa, 5
Stat. 237; Oregon, 9 Stat. 325; Minnesota, 9 Stat. 405; New Mexico,
9 Stat. 449; Utah, 9 Stat. 454.
[
Footnote 3]
E.g. Missouri, 3 Stat. 547; Arkansas, 5 Stat. 51; Iowa,
Florida, 5 Stat. 743; California, 9 Stat. 452; Wisconsin, 9 Stat.
58; Kansas, 12 Stat. 127.
[
Footnote 4]
This section provided:
"Sec. 340. When any person shall die seised of any lands,
tenements, or hereditaments, or any right thereto, or entitled to
any interest therein, in fee simple, or for the life of another,
not having lawfully devised the same, they shall descend, subject
to his debts, as follows:"
"1st. In equal shares to his children, and to the issue of any
deceased child, by right of representation, and if there be no
child of the intestate living at the time of his death, his estate
shall descend to all his other lineal descendants, and if all the
same descendants are in the same degree of kindred to the
intestate, they shall have the estate equally, otherwise they shall
take according to representation."
"2d. If he shall leave no issue, his estate shall descend to his
father."
(Then follow paragraphs 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th with respect
to kindred of different degrees.)
"8th. If the intestate shall leave no kindred, his estate shall
escheat to the county in which such estate may be situate."
[
Footnote 5]
The reference is to the probate court of the territory as it
existed under the Code of 1881, but its jurisdiction was not
essentially different from that of the probate court under the
earlier Probate Practice Act.
