The courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the reasons
given by the Commissioner of Immigration for excluding aliens under
the Alien Immigration Act agree with the requirements of the
Act,
Page 239 U. S. 4
and, if the record shows that the Commissioner exceeded his
powers, the alien may obtain his release upon habeas corpus.
The Alien Immigration Act, by enumerating conditions upon which
aliens may be denied admission, prohibits the denial of admission
in other cases.
The conclusiveness of the decisions of immigration officers
under § 25 of the Immigration Act is conclusiveness of
questions of fact, but the court may review the findings of a
Commissioner on the question of whether the alien comes under the
Act.
Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S.
1.
An alien cannot be excluded under the Alien Immigration Act
simply because the immigration officers declare that he may become
a public charge on account of overstocked conditions of the labor
market at the point of immediate destination.
Under § 1 of the Alien Immigration Act, the ground of
exclusion of persons enumerated are permanent personal objections
irrespective of local conditions.
A phrase contained in a list such as that of disabilities in
§ 1 of the Alien Immigration Act is to be read as generically
similar to the others mentioned before and after.
The Alien Immigration Act deals with admission of aliens to the
United States, and not to particular points of destination
therein.
Where the determination of a class of questions covered by a
statute is left to the President, this Court will not presume that
a greater power is entrusted by implication to subordinate
officers, or that the same result can be effected under the guise
of a decision.
215 F. 573 reversed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Alien
Immigration Act and the power of the Commissioner of Immigration to
exclude aliens on the ground of likelihood of their becoming a
public charge, are stated in the opinion.
Page 239 U. S. 8
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioners are Russians seeking to enter the United States.
They have been detained for deportation by the Acting Commissioner
of Immigration, and have sued out a writ of habeas corpus. The writ
was dismissed by the district court and the circuit court of
appeals. 211 F. 236; 215 F. 573. By the return it appears that they
are part of a group of illiterate laborers, only one of whom, it
seems, Gegious, speaks even the ordinary Russian tongue, and, in
view of that fact, it was suggested in a letter from the Acting
Commissioner to the Commissioner General that their ignorance
tended to make them form a clique, to the detriment of the
community, but that is a trouble incident to the immigration of
foreigners generally, which it is for legislators, not for
Commissioners, to consider, and may be laid on one side. The
objection relied upon in the return is that the petitioners
were
"likely to become public charges for the following, among other
reasons: that they arrived here with very little money [$40 and
$25, respectively], and are bound for Portland, Oregon, where the
reports of industrial conditions show that it would be impossible
for these aliens to obtain employment; that they have no one
legally obligated here to assist them, and, upon all the facts, the
said aliens were upon the said grounds duly excluded,"
etc. We assume the report to be candid, and, if so, it shows
that the only ground for
Page 239 U. S. 9
the order was the state of the labor market at Portland at that
time; the amount of money possessed and ignorance of our language
being thrown in only as makeweights. It is true that the return
says for that, "among other reasons." But the state of the labor
market is the only one disclosed in the evidence or the facts that
were noticed at the hearing, and the only one that was before the
Secretary of Labor on appeal, and, as the order was general for a
group of twenty, it cannot fairly be interpreted to stand upon
reasons undisclosed. Therefore, it is unnecessary to consider
whether to have the reasons disclosed is one of the alien's rights.
The only matter that we have to deal with is the construction of
the statute with reference to the present case.
The courts are not forbidden by the statute to consider whether
the reasons, when they are given, agree with the requirements of
the act. The statute, by enumerating the conditions upon which the
allowance to land may be denied, prohibits the denial in other
cases. And when the record shows that a Commissioner of immigration
is exceeding his power, the alien may demand his release upon
habeas corpus. The conclusiveness of the decisions of immigration
officers under § 25 is conclusiveness upon matters of fact.
This was implied in
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
142 U. S. 651,
relied on by the government. As was said in
Gonzales v.
Williams, 192 U. S. 1,
192 U. S. 15,
"as Gonzales did not come within the Act of 1891, the
Commissioner had no jurisdiction to detain and deport her by
deciding the mere question of law to the contrary."
Such a case stands no better than a decision without a fair
hearing, which has been held to be bad.
Chin Yow v. United
States, 208 U. S. 8.
See
further Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272;
Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291,
233 U. S.
297.
The single question on this record is whether an alien can be
declared likely to become a public charge on the ground that the
labor market in the city of his immediate
Page 239 U. S. 10
destination is overstocked. In the Act of February 20, 1907, c.
1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, as amended by the Act of March 26,
1910, c. 128, § 1, 36 Stat. 263, determining who shall be
excluded, "persons likely to become a public charge" are mentioned
between paupers and professional beggars, and along with idiots,
persons dangerously diseased, persons certified by the examining
surgeon to have a mental or physical defect of a nature to affect
their ability to earn a living, convicted felons, prostitutes, and
so forth. The persons enumerated, in short, are to be excluded on
the ground of permanent personal objections accompanying them
irrespective of local conditions unless the one phrase before us is
directed to different considerations than any other of those with
which it is associated. Presumably it is to be read as generically
similar to the others mentioned before and after.
The statute deals with admission to the United States, not to
Portland, and in § 40 contemplates a distribution of
immigrants after they arrive. It would be an amazing claim of power
if Commissioners decided not to admit aliens because the labor
market of the United States was overstocked. Yet, as officers of
the general government, they would seem to be more concerned with
that than with the conditions of any particular city or state.
Detriment to labor conditions is allowed to be considered in §
1, but it is confined to those in the continental territory of the
United States, and the matter is to be determined by the President.
We cannot suppose that so much greater a power was entrusted by
implication in the same act to every commissioner of immigration,
even though subject to appeal, or that the result was intended to
be effected in the guise of a decision that the aliens were likely
to become a public charge.
Order reversed.
