The act prohibited by § 240, Criminal Code, making it
punishable to ship or cause to be shipped from one state into
another state or from a foreign country into a state, a package of
intoxicating liquor not marked as required by the statute is
essentially a continuing act the performance whereof is begun when
the package is delivered to the carrier and completed when it
reaches its destination.
The word "ship" as used in § 240, Criminal Code, is not
used in the sense of "deliver for shipment," making the offense a
completed one upon delivery of the goods.
A criminal statute applicable alike to shipments in interstate
and foreign commerce will not be so construed as to render it
obviously futile as to foreign commerce; it should be so construed,
if its words permit, as to cause it to reach both classes of
shipments and to accomplish the object of its enactment.
Section 240, Criminal Code, refers to the continuing act of
shipping goods whereby the transportation into a state is
accomplished, and the district court within the state into which
the goods are shipped has jurisdiction of the offense under §
42, Judicial Code, as well as the district court within the state
from which the goods are shipped.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the District Court
of the offense of shipping intoxicating liquor in interstate and
foreign commerce in violation of, and the construction of §
240, Criminal Code, are stated in the opinion.
Page 239 U. S. 119
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an indictment under § 240 of the Criminal Code
making it a punishable offense knowingly to "ship or cause to be
shipped from one state, . . . into any other state, . . . or from
any foreign country into any state, . . ." any package of or
containing intoxicating liquor of any kind
"unless such package be so labeled on the outside cover as to
plainly show the name of the consignee, the nature of its contents,
and the quantity contained therein. The indictment was returned in
the District of Kansas, and charges the defendant with violating
the statute by knowingly shipping and causing to be shipped from
Joplin, Missouri, into Cherokee County, Kansas, six unlabeled
trunks severally containing from 12 to 15 gallons of intoxicating
liquor. By a motion to quash and a demurrer, it was objected that
the offense denounced by the statute is complete when the package
is delivered to the carrier for shipment, and therefore that the
offense charged was not cognizable in the District of Kansas, but
only in the Western District of Missouri. Acceding to this
construction of the statute, the district court sustained the
motion to quash and the demurrer, and entered a judgment
discharging the defendant. The government brings the case here
under the
Page 239 U. S. 120
Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat.
1246."
As usually understood, to ship a package from one state into
another, or from a foreign country into a state, is to accomplish
its transportation from the one into the other by a common carrier,
and is essentially a continuing act whose performance is begun when
the package is delivered to the carrier, and is completed when it
reaches its destination. We think it is to such an act that the
statute refers. To reach a different conclusion, the word "ship"
must be read as if it were "deliver for shipment." No doubt it
sometimes has that meaning, but it plainly is not so used in this
instance. The statute deals with shipping liquor from a foreign
country into a state, as well as with shipping it from one state
into another state. It puts both upon the same plane, and makes
them equally criminal. Whatever marks the completion of the offense
in one likewise marks it in the other. If it be the delivery to the
carrier in the case of interstate shipments, it equally is this
delivery in the case of shipments from a foreign country. And yet
all will concede that Congress did not intend to do anything so
obviously futile as to denounce as criminal an act wholly done in a
foreign country, such as is the delivery to the carrier where the
shipment is from a foreign country into a state. So, if its words
permit, as we think they do, the statute must be given a
construction which will cause it to reach both classes of
shipments, and thereby to accomplish the purpose of its enactment.
United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525.
This, we think, requires that it be construed as referring to the
continuing act before indicated whereby the transportation into a
state is accomplished whether the package comes from another state
or from a foreign country. In this view, the completion of the
offense will always be within a jurisdiction where the statute can
be enforced.
Page 239 U. S. 121
The district court rightly recognized that, under Judicial Code,
§ 42, formerly Rev.Stat. § 731, the offense charged was
cognizable in the District of Kansas, as well as in the Western
District of Missouri, if the place to which the packages were
transported was the place of the completion of the offense.
Therefore, nothing need be said upon that point.
Judgment reversed.
