Plaintiff sued railroad company for personal injuries in the
state court and defendant removed the case to the federal court on
ground of diverse citizenship; more than two years after the cause
of action arose plaintiff amended his complaint setting up that he
was engaged in mining coal to be sent out of the state and that he
could recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act; on the
trial, defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that, under that
act the two-year statute applied, and plaintiff thereupon moved to
amend by striking out allegations as to interstate commerce, which
the court denied, and the case was submitted to the jury on the
issues joined under the common law and the state statute. There was
a verdict for the
Page 238 U. S. 440
plaintiff, and the judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of
appeals. On writ of error from this Court to review the judgment
held that:
In order for this Court to review the judgment of the circuit
court of appeals, jurisdiction in the district court must have
rested not on diverse citizenship alone, but must also in part have
arisen because of averments in the complaint showing a cause of
action under the Constitution or laws of the United States
involving a substantial controversy.
In the absence of such averments in the complaint, the judgment
of the circuit court of appeals is final.
The fact that coal may be used in interstate commerce after
being mined and transported does not make an injury sustained by
the miner an injury sustained while engaged in interstate commerce,
or create a cause of action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act.
Where this Court cannot review the judgment of the circuit court
of appeals because the jurisdiction of the federal court rests on
diverse citizenship alone, it cannot pass on other questions, such
as whether the plaintiff had not, prior to commencement of the
action, removed to, and become a citizen of, defendant's state.
Writ of error to review 220 F. 429 dismissed.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this Court to
review the judgments of the state court under § 237, Judicial
Code, are stated in the opinion.
Page 238 U. S. 442
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was brought in the supreme court of New York to
recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while in
the employ of the defendant railroad company. The complaint charged
that the injuries were received while the plaintiff was employed in
the defendant's colliery in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. As to the
manner of injury, the complaint averred that, while the plaintiff
was in the employ of the defendant in its colliery, and was engaged
in and about the performance of his duties, preparing and setting
off a charge of dynamite for the purpose of blasting coal, the
explosive gases which accumulated at the place where plaintiff was
working suddenly ignited and exploded, causing a squib attached to
the charge of dynamite to catch fire and to be immediately
consumed, so that the charge of dynamite was exploded and
discharged, and as a result thereof the plaintiff received great,
severe, and permanent injuries.
The complaint also charged the carelessness and negligence of
the defendant in failing to provide and keep a safe place for the
plaintiff to work, and certain other acts unnecessary to be
repeated, but alleged to be of a negligent character. The complaint
also charged a violation of the law of the State of Pennsylvania,
providing for the health and safety of persons employed in or about
the coal mines of that state. Upon the petition of the railroad
company, the case was removed to the District Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of New York, where trial was had
and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
The petition for removal alleged that the plaintiff, at the
beginning of the suit and since, resided in Richmond County, New
York, and was at the time of the beginning of the action, and still
was, an alien and citizen of a foreign country, and that the
defendant railroad company was a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the
Page 238 U. S. 443
State of Pennsylvania. After the removal of the case to the
United States district court, the defendant filed an answer, taking
issue upon the allegations of the complaint. Five months after the
removal, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which contained
the same allegations as to the manner of the injury and allegations
as to the common law and statutory liability of the defendant. The
amended complaint added certain allegations wherein it was alleged
that the defendant, for the purpose of its railroad, owned,
managed, and operated a certain mine or colliery known as the
"Pettibone" colliery in the State of Pennsylvania, in which
plaintiff was employed at the time of the injury, and where at all
of the times covered by the complaint, the defendant did and still
does mine and prepare anthracite coal for use in its locomotives
and engines and other equipment used in its business as a common
carrier in interstate commerce. That, at the time of receiving the
injury, plaintiff was employed by the defendant at said mine or
colliery in such interstate commerce. The amended complaint did not
change the allegations as to the manner in which plaintiff received
his injuries. The defendant took issue upon the amended complaint,
and the case came on for trial. In the course of the trial, during
examination of a witness, while evidence was being offered to show
the disposition of the coal mined, counsel for defendant stated
that it used the coal mined in its locomotives in interstate
commerce. He said that, as a matter of fact and as a matter of law,
coal which plaintiff mined was used in that way, and that "we are
engaged in interstate commerce." At the close of the evidence, the
defendant moved for the direction of a verdict upon the ground that
the evidence had established liability under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, and that, as the amended complaint had been served
more than two years after the injuries occurred, the action was
barred by the statute of limitations. Thereupon, plaintiff's
counsel moved to
Page 238 U. S. 444
amend the amended complaint by striking out the allegations
relating to interstate commerce. The court denied this motion and
submitted the case to the jury, upon the issues joined under the
common law and Pennsylvania statute. The circuit court of appeals
held that the trial court should have granted this motion, but that
the case was devoid of any showing that the federal employers' act
applied under the circumstances, and that, had it applied, it would
have been the controlling law of the case, and the court affirmed
the judgment of the district court.
There is a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction of this
Court to review the judgment of the circuit court of appeals. It is
well settled that, in order to review the judgment of the circuit
court of appeals, jurisdiction in the district court must not have
rested upon diverse citizenship alone, but that jurisdiction must
in part at least, have arisen because of averments showing a cause
of action under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and,
in order to come to this Court by writ of error to the circuit
court of appeals, such allegations of federal right must be found
in the complaint.
MacFadden v. United States, 210 U.S.
436. The allegations in that respect must show as a basis of action
a substantial controversy respecting the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
Hull v. Burr, 234
U. S. 713. In the absence of such allegations in the
complaint, the jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals is
final.
Roman Catholic Church, &c. v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 237 U. S. 575;
Merriam v. Syndicate Publishing Company, 237 U.
S. 618.
The averments of the complaint as to the manner of the receiving
of the injury by plaintiff showed conclusively that it did not
occur in interstate commerce. The mere fact that the coal might be
or was intended to be used in the conduct of interstate commerce
after the same was
Page 238 U. S. 445
mined and transported did not make the injury one received by
the plaintiff while he was engaged in interstate commerce. The
injury happening when plaintiff was preparing to mine the coal was
not an injury happening in interstate commerce, and the defendant
was not then carrying on interstate commerce -- facts essential to
recovery under the Employers' Liability Act.
It therefore follows that the jurisdiction of the court of
appeals in this case was final. The plaintiff in error insists that
the court of appeals should have reversed the case and remanded it
to the district court with instructions to remand the case to the
state court for want of jurisdiction in the federal court, and this
because, in the course of the testimony, the plaintiff said that he
had been a citizen of the United States some years before the
action was begun, and the defendant alleges that the record shows,
notwithstanding the allegations in its petition for removal, that
plaintiff did not remove to New York from Pennsylvania until after
the suit was brought, the result being that, if there was no
foundation for the suit under a federal statute, the want of
diverse citizenship ousted the jurisdiction of the district court.
Without expressing any opinion as to what the circuit court of
appeals should have done, we are not concerned with its action
unless we have jurisdiction to review the judgment of that court,
which we do not have, for the reasons already stated.
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.