A state, in virtue of its authority to regulate railroads as
public highways, may, in a proper case, require two railroad
companies to make a connection between their tracks so as to
facilitate interchange of traffic, without violating rights of the
company secured by the federal Constitution.
Wisconsin R. Co.
v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287.
A state, acting within its jurisdiction and not in hostility to
any federal regulation of interstate commerce, may compel a carrier
to accept loaded cars from another line and transport them over its
own.
Chi., Mil. & St.P. Ry. v. Iowa, 233
U. S. 344.
A state may, on reasonable conditions, require a carrier to
permit its empty or loaded cars to be hauled from its line upon a
connecting line for purposes of loading or delivery of intrastate
freight and to permit cars of other carriers loaded with such
freight consigned to points on the connecting line to be hauled
from its line upon the connecting line for purposes of
delivery.
The common law is subject to change by legislation, and so
held that a state may require a carrier, within reasonable
bounds of regulation in the public interest, to permit its
equipment to be hauled off its line by other carriers, although it
was not bound to permit the same at common law.
It is a matter of common knowledge that interchange of freight
cars between carriers is the usual practice, and a state statute
requiring such interchange as to intrastate commerce is not so
unreasonable as to amount to a taking of property without due
process of law.
An order of a state railroad commission requiring carriers to
interchange freight cars for intrastate freight is to be read in
the light of the opinion delivered by the Commission, and, as so
read, the order involved in this case is not unreasonable, nor does
it take the property of the carriers without due process of
law.
An order of a state railroad commission requiring carriers to
exchange freight and passengers in accordance with the provisions
of the act establishing the Commission, which has been construed by
the state court as relating only to intrastate commerce, because
the jurisdiction of the Commission is limited thereto,
held not to disregard the needs of interstate commerce or
to be a burden thereon, and also
held
Page 236 U. S. 616
this Court presumes, until the contrary appears, that the state
court will not so construe or enforce the order as to interfere
with or obstruct interstate commerce.
An order of the Michigan state Railroad Commission requiring two
connecting railroads to make physical connection for transfer of
intrastate business, including loaded freight car and empty cars
being returned or forwarded for being loaded,
held within
the power of the state, and not to a taking of the property of the
carriers without due process of law or an interference with and
regulation of interstate commerce.
Central Stock Yards v.
Louis. & Nash. R. Co., 192 U. S. 568, and
Louis. & Nash. R. Co. v. Stock Yards, 212 U.
S. 132, distinguished.
18 Mich. 230 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the validity of an order of the State
Railway Commission of Michigan requiring a railway with respect to
intrastate traffic to interchange cars, freight, and passengers
with another railway, are stated in the opinion.
Page 236 U. S. 620
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ of error brings under review a judgment of the Supreme
Court of Michigan (168 Mich. 230) awarding a peremptory writ of
mandamus directing plaintiff in error, with respect to intrastate
traffic, to interchange cars, carload shipments, less than carload
shipments, and passenger traffic with the Detroit United Railway at
the point of physical connection between the tracks
Page 236 U. S. 621
of the two companies in the Village of Oxford in that state.
The Michigan Railway Commission, defendant in error, is a public
administrative body, continued and existing under Act No. 300 of
the Public Acts of 1909 as the successor of a similar Commission
established by Act No. 312 of the Public Acts of 1907. It has ample
regulative powers, originally conferred by the 1907 act and
continued by the 1909 act without modification material to the
present controversy.
* The mandamus
proceeding was based
Page 236 U. S. 622
upon an order made by the former Commission in the year 1908,
which, it is admitted, was preserved by § 49 of the 1909
act.
Page 236 U. S. 623
The Michigan Central Railroad Company is a corporation existing
under the General Railroad Law of the state (Comp.Laws 1897, c.
164, §§ 6223
et seq.), and as lessee operates a
line of railroad extending from Detroit to Bay City, and passing
through the village of Oxford, all in
Page 236 U. S. 624
the State of Michigan, this line being part of a railroad system
extending through that state and into adjoining states and the
Dominion of Canada, and over which the company transports
passengers and property in interstate and foreign, as well as in
intrastate commerce. The Detroit United Railway Company is a
corporation organized and existing under the Street Railway Act
(Comp.Laws 1897, c. 168, §§ 6434
et seq.), and
operates an interurban electric railway extending from Detroit to
the City of Flint, and likewise passing through the Village of
Oxford. Between Oxford and Flint, which are 28 miles apart, the
line passes through the Villages of Ortonville, Goodrich, and
Atlas, distant respectively 10, 16, and 18 miles from Oxford.
In the early part of the year 1908, petitions were filed before
the Commission by certain merchants resident in Ortonville and
Goodrich asking that a physical connection be established between
the tracks of the Michigan Central and Detroit United at Oxford for
the interchange of cars, carload shipments, less than carload
shipments, and passenger traffic. The Michigan Central answered
denying that it would be practicable to construct and maintain such
a physical connection, and denying the authority of the Commission
to order any such connection for the purposes mentioned in the
complaint. The Detroit United answered denying the practicability
of interchanging carload shipments (supposing a physical connection
to have been established), without out unreasonable expenditure of
money in changing its road and equipment. There was a full hearing
at which both companies were represented. The questions before the
Commission were three: (a) is a physical connection between the
tracks at Oxford practicable? (b) can the interchange of business
be accomplished without endangering the equipment, tracks, or
appliances of either party? and (c) are the facts and circumstances
such as to reasonably justify
Page 236 U. S. 625
the Commission in requiring such connection and interchange? The
question of through billing was not involved. The Commission held
that the statute in terms conferred upon it the authority which it
was asked to exercise, and declined to pass upon the question of
its validity, deeming that to be a judicial question and not within
its province. It found the construction and maintenance of the
connection between the tracks to be feasible and practicable, and
the expense of construction approximately $500. Upon the evidence
introduced and a personal inspection of the line of the Detroit
United, the Commission found that line to be of standard gauge,
with rails of the same pattern and weight as those used on many
steam roads, and without heavy grades offering resistance to
freight traffic, and that the handling of freight in steam railroad
cars over that line was practicable and might be accomplished
without endangering the equipment, tracks, or appliances of either
company, and without involving either in unreasonable, expense.
Whether steam or electricity should be used as a motive power was
declared to be a question to be solved by the Detroit United
Company in the light of its own experience. The Commission also
found the proposed interchange to be reasonable from the standpoint
of the Michigan Central, and that it entailed small sacrifice to
that company, which would have to expend its proportion of the
amount necessary to install the connection, but would not be
involved in further expenditure, and that the business to be
derived from Ortonville, Goodrich, and the surrounding country via
the Detroit United Railway and the proposed connection promised to
be considerable in amount, making the Michigan Central a
beneficiary by the connection, and held that, under its charter it
owed a duty as common carrier to the entire state, so that, while
required to give greatest consideration to those most accessible to
its operations, it must further give as great consideration to
those not immediately
Page 236 U. S. 626
upon its lines as was consistent with the other operations of
the road. The result was an order, dated June 5, 1908, made under
the provisions of § 7b of the 1907 act, requiring the Michigan
Central and Detroit United Companies, on or before August 15 in the
same year, to connect their tracks at such point in the Village of
Oxford as they should between themselves agree upon as most
desirable, and thereafter to interchange cars, carload shipments,
less than carload shipments, and passenger traffic at that point,
in accordance with the provisions of § 7, and declaring that,
if they should be unable to agree as to the point of connection,
the Commission would make a supplemental order determining its
location. Such a supplemental order was afterwards made. These
orders were duly served upon both companies, and neither instituted
any proceeding to test their validity in the manner permitted by
§§ 25 and 26 of the 1907 act. The physical connection
between the tracks was installed and is still maintained by the
companies, and no question is now made respecting this. But the
Michigan Central complied, to the extent of installing the physical
connection, under protest, particularly with respect to so much of
the order as required the interchange of cars, carload and less
than carload shipments, and passenger traffic at that point. The
Detroit United is willing and able to accept cars and carloads of
freight from the Michigan Central, to be delivered along the line
of the Detroit United under a service similar to that offered by
belt lines and terminal railroads in the same state, but the
Michigan Central has hitherto refused and still refuses to deliver
cars and carloads or less than carload shipments of freight in cars
to the Detroit United for transportation to points upon its line.
There is no controversy about the other parts of the order.
The issuance of the mandamus was opposed upon the ground (among
others) that the Commission's order and the statutes purporting to
authorize it were repugnant to
Page 236 U. S. 627
the Fourteenth Amendment in that enforcement of the order would
deprive the Michigan Central of its property without due process of
law, and also upon the ground that the order amounted to an attempt
to regulate and impose a burden upon interstate commerce, contrary
to § 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States.
The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the statute authorized the
making of such an order by the Commission, and that, since
plaintiff in error had failed to institute proceedings to review it
under §§ 25 and 26 of the act, the questions of the
practicability of the physical connection and of the interchange of
traffic, as well as the reasonableness of the service required,
were not open in the mandamus proceeding. It also held that the
jurisdiction of the Commission was limited to intrastate traffic,
and that its order in the present case must be deemed to be so
limited.
The act establishing the Michigan Railroad Commission, as it
stood after amendment by Public Acts 1911, No. 139, was under
consideration in
Grand Trunk Ry. v. Michigan Ry. Comm.,
231 U. S. 457,
which dealt with the compulsory interchange of intrastate traffic
at Detroit. With respect to judicial review, it will be observed
that, by § 25 (set forth in the margin,
supra), the
regulations prescribed by the Commission are to be treated as
lawful and reasonable until found otherwise in an action brought
for the purpose pursuant to the provisions of § 26, or until
modified by the Commission, as provided in § 24. Section 26
permits the railroad company or other party in interest, being
dissatisfied with the Commission's order, to commence an action in
the circuit court in chancery to set it aside on the ground of
unreasonableness, with opportunity to introduce original evidence
in addition to that which was submitted to the Commission. If new
evidence is offered, the court may refer it to the Commission for
its consideration, and that body may thereupon
Page 236 U. S. 628
rescind or modify the original order. The court passes upon
either the original or the modified order, and may affirm or set it
aside in whole or in part, and make such other order as may be in
accordance with the facts and the law. From its judgment there is
an appeal to the supreme court. The respective functions of the
Commission and the courts under this legislation were considered,
in a rate case, by the state supreme court in
Detroit &
Mackinac Ry. v. Michigan Railroad Comm'n, 171 Mich. 335, 346,
and by this Court in a subsequent case between the same parties in
235 U. S. 235
U.S. 402, affirming 203 F. 864.
The argument submitted here in behalf of plaintiff in error has
taken a wide range, many of the contentions being matters purely of
local law, and these so interwoven with the discussion of federal
questions that it is somewhat difficult to distinguish them. It
ought to be unnecessary to say that whether distinctions have
heretofore been recognized, under the laws of Michigan, between
"railroads" and "street railways," whether the Acts of 1907 and
1909 preserve or disregard these distinctions, and whether § 7
was intended to apply to both kinds of roads or to "railroads" only
are questions with which this Court has no proper concern, they
being conclusively disposed of by the decision of the state court
of last resort in the present case. So also it is, for all purposes
of our jurisdiction, established not only that the Commission, in
making the order, acted in the authorized exercise of the state's
power of regulation, but that the two companies are legally
competent to perform the duties thereby imposed upon them
respectively.
That a state, in virtue of its authority to regulate railroads
as public highways, may, in a proper case, require two companies to
make a connection between their tracks so as to facilitate the
interchange of traffic, without thereby violating rights secured by
the Constitution of the United
Page 236 U. S. 629
states, is settled by the decisions of this Court in
Wisconsin &c. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.
S. 287,
179 U. S. 296,
179 U. S. 301,
and
Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.
S. 510,
224 U. S.
528.
That a state, acting within its jurisdiction, and not in
hostility to any federal regulation of interstate commerce, may
compel the carrier to accept loaded cars from another line and
transport them over its own, such requirement being reasonable in
itself is settled by
Chi., Mil. & St. P. Ry. v. Iowa,
233 U. S. 334,
233 U. S. 344.
In that case, it was held there was no essential difference, so far
as concerned the power of the state, between such an order and one
requiring the carrier to make track connections and receive cars
from connecting roads in order that reasonably adequate facilities
for traffic might be provided.
It seems to us that the principle of these decisions sustains
also the state's power to make a reasonable order requiring a
carrier to permit empty or loaded cars owned by it to be hauled
from its line upon the connecting line for purposes of loading or
delivery of intrastate freight, and to permit the cars of other
carriers loaded with such freight consigned to points on the
connecting line to be hauled from its line upon the connecting line
for purposes of delivery. This question was left undetermined in
McNeill v. Southern Railway, 202 U.
S. 543,
202 U. S. 563,
which had to do with a state regulation operating directly upon
interstate commerce.
The contentions of plaintiff in error to the contrary will be
briefly considered.
It is said that § 7b of the 1907 act, as reenacted in 1909,
under which the Commission's order was made, permits the use of
suburban and interurban railroads for the handling of freight in
carload lots in steam railroad freight cars only
"in the same manner and under the same general conditions,
except as to motive power, as belt line railroads and terminal
railroads are now or may hereafter be used for like purposes."
And it is insisted that the
Page 236 U. S. 630
terms "belt line railroads" and "terminal railroads" have not
been judicially construed by the Michigan courts, and, there being
no finding by the Commission or the court upon the question, the
order and judgment are in this respect indefinite. But the
Commission, in its petition for mandamus, averred:
"That belt line and terminal railroads within this state vary in
length from a fraction of a mile to fifteen miles or more; that
cars and carloads of freight are transported to and from industries
located along the line of such belt or terminal railroads to the
tracks of railroad companies with which said belt lines and
terminal railroads are connected, under a local switching charge or
tariff, and that through billing of freight as between other
railroads and belt and terminal railroads is not customary or
usual."
And in the answer of the railroad company this was admitted as
matter of fact, it being at the same time insisted
"that said Detroit United Railway Company is not in fact or in
law a belt line or terminal railroad corporation, nor authorized by
law to act as such, nor are the line or lines of railway operated
by it, extending from the Village of Oxford to the City of Flint,
and within the boundaries of said municipalities, belt or terminal
railroads, nor can they in fact or in law be used as belt or
terminal railroads may be or are now used, nor has said relator any
power or authority to require this respondent to give the use of
its tracks or terminal facilities for the purposes mentioned in
said orders or otherwise."
There is no question, therefore, as to the mode in which belt
line and terminal railroads are in fact used, and so the statute
and order are relieved from the charge of indefiniteness in this
respect. As already shown, the decision of the state court of last
resort is a conclusive response to the legal objections taken in
the clause quoted from the answer.
It is said the statute, as construed and enforced by the
Commission and the supreme court, is repugnant to the "due process"
clause because it in effect requires a delivery
Page 236 U. S. 631
by the Michigan Central at points off its own lines. By its
terms, however, the order does not require the Michigan Central to
haul the cars to points on the Detroit United, but only to permit
them to be hauled by the latter company. At common law, a carrier
was not bound to carry except on its own line, and probably not
required to permit its equipment to be hauled off the line by other
carriers.
A., T. & S.F. R. Co. v. D. & N.O. R.
Co., 110 U. S. 667,
110 U. S. 680;
Kentucky &c. Bridge Co. v. Louis. & Nash. R. Co.,
37 F. 567, 620;
Oregon Short Line v. Northern Pacific Ry.,
51 F. 465, 472, 475,
aff'd, 61 F. 158. But in this as in
other respects, the common law is subject to change by legislation,
and so long as the reasonable bounds of regulation in the public
interest are not thereby transcended, the carrier's property cannot
be deemed to be "taken" in the constitutional sense.
Minn.
& St.L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S.
53,
193 U. S. 63;
Atlantic Coast Line v. N. Car. Corp. Comm'n, 206 U. S.
1,
206 U. S. 19;
Grand Trunk Ry. v. Michigan Ry. Comm'n, 231 U.
S. 457,
231 U. S. 470;
Wisconsin &c. R. Co. v. Jacobson, supra; Chi., Mil. &
St.P. R. Co. v. Iowa, supra.
The insistence that the property of plaintiff in error in its
cars is taken by the order requiring it to deliver them to the
Detroit United Railway involves, as we think, a fundamental error
in that it overlooks the fact that the vehicles of transportation,
like the railroad upon which they run, although acquired through
the expenditure of private capital, are devoted to a public use,
and thereby are subjected to the reasonable exercise of the power
of the state to regulate that use, so far, at least, as intrastate
commerce is concerned.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113. That it is not, as a rule, unreasonable to require
such interchange of cars sufficiently appears from the universality
of the practice, which became prevalent before it was made
compulsory and may be considered as matter of common knowledge,
inasmuch as a freight train made up wholly
Page 236 U. S. 632
of the cars of a single railroad is, in these days, a rarity. In
Michigan, car interchange has long been a statutory duty. Mich.Gen.
Acts 1873, No. 79, § 15, p. 99; No.198, § 28, p. 521;
Michigan Central R. Co. v. Smithson, 45 Mich. 212, 221.
And see Peoria & P. U. Ry. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry., 109, Ill. 135, 139;
Burlington &c Ry. v.
Dey, 82 Ia. 312, 335;
State v. Chicago &c. Ry.,
152 Ia. 317, 322,
aff'd, 233 U. S. 334;
Pittsburgh &c. Ry. v. R. Commission, 171 Ind. 189,
201;
Jacobson v. Wisconsin &c. R. Co., 71 Minn. 519,
531,
aff'd, 179 U. S. 179 U.S.
287.
To speak of the order as requiring the cars of plaintiff in
error to be delivered to the Detroit United "for the use of that
company" involves a fallacy. The order is designed for the benefit
of the public having occasion to employ the connecting lines in
through transportation. The Detroit United, like the Michigan
Central, acts in the matter as a public agency.
The contention that no provision is made for the paramount needs
of plaintiff in error for the use of its own equipment, nor for the
prompt return or adjustment for loss or damage to such equipment,
nor for compensation for the use thereof, is not substantial. The
order is to receive a reasonable interpretation, and, according to
its own recitals, is to be read in the light of the opinion of the
Commission, which shows that it is not intended to have an effect
inconsistent with the other operations of the company. It was
expressly found that there was no special ground for apprehending
loss or damage to the equipment. Certainly the order does not
exclude the ordinary remedies for delay in returning cars or for
loss or damage to them. Nor does it contemplate that plaintiff in
error shall be required to permit the use of its cars (or of the
cars of other carriers for which it is responsible) off its line
without compensation. The state court expressly held that § 7c
provides for reasonable compensation to the
Page 236 U. S. 633
carrier whose cars are used in the interchange. The finding of
the Commission, approved by the court, was that the Michigan
Central would merely have to expend its proportion of the amount
necessary to install the connection between the two roads, and
would be called upon for no further expenditure in the premises,
and that the business to be derived by it from Ortonville,
Goodrich, and the surrounding country via the Detroit United
Railway, promised to be considerable in amount, and thereby the
Michigan Central would be a beneficiary from the proposed
connection and interchange. It was, we think, permissible for the
court to find, as in effect it did find, that the benefits thus
derived would include compensation for the use of the cars of the
Michigan Central for purposes of loading and delivery along the
line of the Detroit United. We are unable to see that any question
as to the adequacy of the compensation was raised in the state
court.
Plaintiff in error relies upon
Central Stock Yards v. Louis.
& Nash. R. Co., 192 U. S. 568, and
Louis. & Nash. R. Co. v. Stock Yards Co., 212 U.
S. 132. The former of these was an action in the federal
court, and came here by appeal from the circuit court of appeals.
This Court held as a matter of construction that the Constitution
of Kentucky did not require that the railroad company should
deliver its own cars to another road. The second case was a review
of the judgment of the court of last resort of the state. That
court having held that the state constitution did require the
carrier to deliver its own cars to the connecting road, it was
contended that this requirement was void under the Fourteenth
Amendment as an unlawful taking of property. This Court said (212
U.S.
212 U. S.
143):
"In view of the well known and necessary practice of connecting
roads, we are far from saying that a valid law could not be passed
to prevent the cost and loss of time entailed by needless
transshipment or breaking bulk, in case of an
Page 236 U. S. 634
unreasonable refusal by a carrier to interchange cars with
another for through traffic. We do not pass upon the question. It
is enough to observe that such a law perhaps ought to be so limited
as to respect the paramount needs of the carrier concerned, and at
least could be sustained only with full and adequate regulations
for his protection from the loss or undue detention of cars, and
for securing due compensation for their use. The Constitution of
Kentucky is simply a universal, undiscriminating requirement, with
no adequate provisions such as we have described. . . . We do not
mean, however, that the silence of the constitution might not be
remedied by an act of legislature or a regulation by a duly
authorized subordinate body if such legislation should be held
consistent with the state constitution by the state court."
The case now before us is plainly distinguishable, as appears
from what we have said. And, upon the whole, we see no sufficient
ground for denouncing the regulation in question as either
arbitrary or unreasonable.
There remains the contention that the statute and the order made
in pursuance of it operate as a burden upon and interference with
interstate commerce. That the order intrinsically applies only to
intrastate traffic was held by the state court in this case, upon
the ground that the jurisdiction of the Commission is thus limited,
and in this, the court did but follow its previous ruling in
Ann Arbor R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 163 Mich. 49.
Therefore, the contention under the commerce clause is narrowed to
the single point that the order requires the cars of the Michigan
Central to be turned over to the connecting carrier "at all times
and under all circumstances and without reference to the needs and
demands of interstate commerce." But it seems to us that this is an
unreasonable construction of the order. By its terms, as thus far
construed by the state court, it merely requires the two companies
to interchange cars, carload shipments,
Page 236 U. S. 635
less than carload shipments, and passenger traffic, in
accordance with the provisions of § 7 of the act -- that is to
say,
"in the same manner and under the same general conditions except
as to motive power as belt line railroads and terminal railroads
are not or may be used for like purposes."
Manifestly, this involves no disregard of the needs of
interstate commerce, and we must indulge the presumption, until the
contrary is made to appear, that the state will not so construe or
enforce the order as to interfere with or obstruct such commerce.
Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576,
232 U. S. 591;
St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.
S. 350,
235 U. S. 369.
The recent decisions of this Court, cited in support of the
contention that the order interferes with interstate commerce
(
Houston & Tex. Cent. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U.
S. 321,
201 U. S. 329;
McNeill v. Southern Railway, 202 U.
S. 543,
202 U. S. 561;
St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 217 U.
S. 136,
217 U. S. 149;
Chi., R.I. &c. Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator Co.,
226 U. S. 426,
226 U. S.
433), are so plainly distinguishable that no time need
be spent in discussing them.
Judgment affirmed.
* Michigan Public Acts 1907, No. 312.
"SEC. 7."
"
* * * *"
"(b) Where it is practicable and the same may be accomplished
without endangering the equipment, tracks or appliances of either
party, the Commission may, upon application, require steam
railroads and interurban and suburban railroads to interchange
cars, carload shipments, less than carload shipments, and passenger
traffic, and for that purpose may require the construction of
physical connections upon such terms as it may determine:
Provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed to
require through billing of freight as between steam and electric,
suburban or interurban railroads, but such suburban and interurban
railroads may be used for the handling of freight in carload lots
in steam railroad freight cars between shippers or consignees and
the steam railroads, in the same manner and under the same general
conditions, except as to motive power, as belt line railroads and
terminal railroads are now or may hereafter be used for like
purposes."
"(c) Every corporation owning a railroad in use shall at
reasonable times and for a reasonable compensation, draw over the
same the merchandise and cars of any other corporation or
individual having connecting tracks:
Provided, such cars
are of the proper gauge, are in good running order and equipped as
required by law and otherwise safe for transportation and properly
loaded:
Provided further, if the corporations cannot agree
upon the times at which the cars shall be drawn, or the
compensation to be paid, the said Commission shall, upon petition
of either party and notice to the other, after hearing the parties
interested, determine the rate of compensation and fix such other
periods, having reference to the convenience and interests of the
corporation or corporations, and the public to be accommodated
thereby, and the award of the Commission shall be binding upon the
respective corporations interested therein until the same shall
have been revised. . . ."
"SEC. 24. . . ."
"(b) The Commission may at any time, upon application of any
person or any railroad, and upon notice to the parties interested,
including the railroad, and after opportunity to be heard as
provided in section twenty-two, rescind, alter, or amend any order
fixing any rate or rates, fares, charges or classifications or any
other order made by the Commission, and certified copies shall be
served and take effect as herein provided for original orders."
"SEC. 25. All rates, fares, charges, classifications and joint
rates fixed by the Commission and all regulations, practices and
services prescribed by the Commission shall be in force and shall
be
prima facie, lawful and reasonable until finally found
otherwise in an action brought for the purpose pursuant to the
provisions of section twenty-six of this act, or until changed or
modified by the Commission as provided for in paragraph (b),
section twenty-four of this act."
"SEC. 26. (a) Any railroad or other party in interest, being
dissatisfied with any order of the Commission fixing any rate or
rates, fares, charges, classifications, joint rate or rates, or any
order fixing any regulations, practices or services, may within
sixty days commence an action in the circuit court in chancery
against the Commission as defendant to vacate and set aside any
such order on the ground that the rate or rates, fares, charges,
classifications, joint rate or rates fixed is unlawful or
unreasonable, or that any such regulation, practice or service
fixed in such order is unreasonable, in which suit the Commission
shall be served with a subpoena. The Commission shall file its
answer, and, on leave of court, any interested party may file an
answer to said complaint, whereupon said action shall be at issue
and stand ready for hearing upon ten days' notice by either party.
All suits brought under this section shall have precedence over any
civil cause of a different nature pending in such court, and the
circuit court shall always be deemed open for the hearing thereof,
and the same shall proceed, be tried and determined as other
chancery suits. Any party to such suit may introduce original
evidence in addition to the transcript of evidence offered to said
Commission, and the circuit courts in chancery are hereby given
jurisdiction of such suits and empowered to affirm, vacate, or set
aside the order of the Commission in whole or in part, and to make
such other order or decree as the courts shall decide to be in
accordance with the facts and the law."
"
* * * *"
"(c) If, upon the trial of said action, evidence shall be
introduced by the complainant which is found by the court to be
different from that offered upon the hearing before the Commission,
or additional thereto, the court, before proceeding to render
judgment, unless the parties in such action stipulate in writing to
the contrary, shall transmit a copy of such evidence to the
Commission, and shall stay further proceedings in said action for
fifteen days from the date of such transmission. Upon receipt of
such evidence, the Commission shall consider the same, and may
alter, modify, amend and rescind its order relating to such rate or
rates, fares, charges, classifications, joint rate or rates,
regulations, practice or service complained of in said action, and
shall report its action thereon to said court within ten days from
the receipt of such evidence."
"(d) If the Commission shall rescind its order complained of,
the action shall be dismissed; if it shall alter, modify or amend
the same, such altered, modified or amended order shall take the
place of the original order complained of, and judgment shall be
rendered thereon as though made by the Commission in the first
instance. If the original order shall not be rescinded or changed
by the Commission, judgment shall be rendered upon such original
order."
"(e) Either party to said action, within sixty days after
service of a copy of the order or judgment of the court, may appeal
to the supreme court, which appeal shall be governed by the
statutes governing chancery appeals. When the appeal is taken, the
case shall, on the return of the papers to the supreme court, be
immediately placed on the calendar of the then pending term, and
shall be brought to a hearing in the same manner as other cases on
the calendar, or, if no term is then pending, shall take precedence
of a different nature (sic), except criminal cases at the next term
of the supreme court."
"(f) In all actions under this section, the burden of proof
shall be upon the complainant to show by clear and satisfactory
evidence that the order of the Commission complained of is unlawful
or unreasonable, as the case may be."
The foregoing provisions were substantially reenacted in Public
Acts 1909, No. 300, as §§ 7b and c, 24, 25, 26a, c, d,
and e, respectively.