Irrespective of compulsion or even agreement to observe its
intimation, the circulation of a "we don't patronize" or "unfair"
list manifestly intended to put the ban upon those whose names
appear therein, among an important body of possible customers,
combined with a view to joint action and in anticipation of such
reports, is within the prohibition of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2,
1890, if it is intended to restrain and does restrain commerce
among the states.
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers
Association v. United States, 234 U.
S. 600.
This Court agrees with the courts below that the action of the
unions and associations to which defendants belonged in regard to
the use and circulation of "we don't patronize" and "unfair dealer"
lists, boycotts, union labels, and strikes, amounted to a
combination and conspiracy forbidden by the Anti-Trust Act of July
2, 1890.
In this case,
held that the trial court properly
instructed the jury to the effect that defendants, members of labor
unions who paid their dues and continued to delegate authority to
their officers to unlawfully interfere with the interstate commerce
of other parties, are jointly liable with such officers for the
damages sustained by their acts.
Members of unions and associations are bound to know the
constitutions of their societies, and, on the evidence in this
case, the jury might well find that the defendants who were members
of labor
Page 235 U. S. 523
union knew how the words of the constitutions of such unions had
been construed in the act.
The use in this case of the word "proof" by the trial judge in
its popular way for "evidence"
held, in view of the
caution by the judge, not to have prejudiced the defendants.
A verdict for damages resulting from an illegal combination in
restraint of interstate trade under the Anti-Trust Act of 1890 may
include damages accruing after commencement of the suit but as the
consequence of acts done before and constituting part of the cause
of action declared on.
In this case, introduction of newspapers was not improper to
show publicity in places and directions to bring notice home to
defendants and to prove intended and detrimental consequences of
the acts complained of.
Letters from customers of a boycotted manufacturer, giving the
boycott as reason for ceasing to deal with him,
held
admissible in this case.
209 F. 721 affirmed.
The facts in this case, which is known as the
"Danbury
Hatters'" case, involving the validity of a verdict for
damages resulting from a combination and conspiracy in restraint of
trade under § 7 of the Anti-Trust Act, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 235 U. S. 533
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action under the Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, §
7, 26 Stat. 209, 210, for a combination and conspiracy in restraint
of commerce among the states, specifically directed against the
plaintiffs (defendants in error), among others, and effectively
carried out with the infliction of great damage. The declaration
was held good on demurrer in
208 U. S. 208 U.S.
274, where it will be found set forth at length. The substance of
the charge is that the plaintiffs were hat manufacturers who
employed nonunion labor; that the defendants were members of the
United Hatters of North America and also of the American Federation
of Labor; that, in pursuance of a general scheme to unionize the
labor employed by manufacturers of fur hats (a purpose previously
made effective against all but a few manufacturers), the defendants
and other members of the United Hatters caused the American
Federation of Labor to declare a boycott against the plaintiffs and
against all hats sold by the plaintiffs to dealers in other states,
and against dealers who should deal in them, and that they carried
out their plan with such success that they have restrained or
destroyed the plaintiff's commerce with other states. The case now
has been tried,
Page 235 U. S. 534
the plaintiffs have got a verdict, and the judgment of the
district court has been affirmed by the circuit court of appeals.
209 F. 721.
The grounds for discussion under the statute that were not cut
away by the decision upon the demurrer have been narrowed still
further since the trial by the case of
Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States, 234 U.
S. 600. Whatever may be the law otherwise, that case
establishes that, irrespective of compulsion or even agreement to
observe its intimation, the circulation of a list of "unfair
dealers," manifestly intended to put the ban upon those whose names
appear therein among an important body of possible customers,
combined with a view to joint action and in anticipation of such
reports, is within the prohibitions of the Sherman act if it is
intended to restrain and restrains commerce among the states.
It requires more than the blindness of justice not to see that
many branches of the United Hatters and the Federation of Labor, to
both of which the defendants belonged, in pursuance of a plan
emanating from headquarters, made use of such lists and of the
primary and secondary boycott in their effort to subdue the
plaintiffs to their demands. The union label was used, and a strike
of the plaintiffs' employees was ordered and carried out to the
same end, and the purpose to break up the plaintiffs' commerce
affected the quality of the acts.
Loewe v.Lawlor,
208 U. S. 274,
208 U. S. 299.
We agree with the circuit court of appeals that a combination and
conspiracy forbidden by the statute were proved, and that the
question is narrowed to the responsibility of the defendants for
what was done by the sanction and procurement of the societies
above named.
The court in substance instructed the jury that, if these
members paid their dues and continued to delegate authority to
their officers unlawfully to interfere with the
Page 235 U. S. 535
plaintiffs' interstate commerce in such circumstances that they
knew or ought to have known, and such officers were warranted in
the belief that they were acting in the matters within their
delegated authority, then such members were jointly liable, and no
others. It seems to us that this instruction sufficiently guarded
the defendants' rights, and that the defendants got all that they
were entitled to ask in not being held chargeable with knowledge as
matter of law. It is a tax on credulity to ask anyone to believe
that members of labor unions at that time did not know that the
primary and secondary boycott and the use of the "We don't
patronize" or "Unfair" list were means expected to be employed in
the effort to unionize shops. Very possibly, they were thought to
be lawful.
See Gompers v. United States, 233 U.
S. 604. By the Constitution of the United Hatters, the
directors are to use "all the means in their power" to bring shops
"not under our jurisdiction" "into the trade." The bylaws provide a
separate fund to be kept for strikes, lockouts, and agitation for
the union label. Members are forbidden to sell nonunion hats. The
Federation of Labor, with which the Hatters were affiliated, had
organization of labor for one of its objects, helped affiliated
unions in trade disputes, and, to that end, before the present
trouble, had provided in its constitution for prosecuting and had
prosecuted many what it called legal boycotts. Their conduct in
this and former cases was made public, especially among the
members, in every possible way. If the words of the documents, on
their face and without explanation, did not authorize what was
done, the evidence of what was done publicly and habitually showed
their meaning and how they were interpreted. The jury could not but
find that, by the usage of the unions, the acts complained of were
authorized, and authorized without regard to their interference
with commerce among the states. We think it unnecessary to repeat
the evidence of the publicity of this particular
Page 235 U. S. 536
struggle in the common newspapers and union prints, evidence
that made it almost inconceivable that the defendants, all living
in the neighborhood of the plaintiffs, did not know what was done
in the specific case. If they did not know that, they were bound to
know the constitution of their societies, and at least well might
be found to have known how the words of those constitutions had
been construed in act.
It is suggested that injustice was done by the judge's speaking
of "proof" that, in carrying out the object of the associations,
unlawful means had been used with their approval. The judge
cautioned the jury with special care not to take their view of what
had been proved from him, going even farther than he need have
gone.
Graham v. United States, 231 U.
S. 474,
231 U. S. 480.
But the context showed plainly that proof was used here in a
popular way for evidence, and must have been understood in that
sense.
Damages accruing since the action began were allowed, but only
such as were the consequence of acts done before and constituting
part of the cause of action declared on. This was correct.
New
York, Lake Erie & Western R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U.
S. 591,
147 U. S.
615-616. We shall not discuss the objections to evidence
separately and in detail, as we find no error requiring it. The
introduction of newspapers, etc., was proper in large part to show
publicity in places and directions where the facts were likely to
be brought home to the defendants, and also to prove an intended
and detrimental consequence of the principal acts, not to speak of
other grounds. The reasons given by customers for ceasing to deal
with sellers of the Loewe hats, including letters from dealers to
Loewe & Co., were admissible. 3 Wigmore, Evidence §
1729(2). We need not repeat or add to what was said by the circuit
court of appeals with regard to evidence of the payment of dues
after this suit was begun. And, in short, neither the argument
Page 235 U. S. 537
nor the perusal of the voluminous brief for the plaintiffs in
error shows that they suffered any injustice, or that there was any
error requiring the judgment to be reversed.
Judgment affirmed.
