A classification based on the use of engines, locomotives, and
cars propelled by steam, electricity, gas, gasoline or lever power
and running on tracks, in a state statute, abolishing the principle
of negligence of fellow servant as a defense to actions against
corporations and individuals for damages, is not so unequal as to
deny equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and so
held as to c. 194, Laws of Mississippi of 1908.
A state statute which cuts off no substantive defense but simply
provides a rule of evidence controlling the burden of proof does
not deny
Page 235 U. S. 381
due process of law, even when applied in the trial of an action
for injuries sustained prior to the enactment of the statute, and
so
held as to c. 215, Laws of Mississippi of 1912, making
proof of the happening of an accident a
prima facie
presumption of negligence.
64 So. 461 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the
Fourteenth Amendment of two statutes of Mississippi, one abolishing
the defense of fellow servant in certain cases and the other
creating a presumption of negligence in certain cases, are stated
in the opinion.
Memorandum opinion by direction of the court, by MR. CHIEF
JUSTICE WHITE:
The injuries for which damages were awarded by the judgment
sought to be reviewed (64 So. 461) happened on a steam logging
railroad engaged in purely domestic business. The power to here
review is based on two constitutional grounds seasonably asserted
below, assailing two state statutes, the one (c. 194, Miss.Laws of
1908, p. 204) enacted before the accident, doing away in the cases
for which it provided with the principle of fellow servant, and the
other (c. 215, Miss.Laws of 1912) enacted after the happening of
the accident, but before the trial below, providing that from the
proof of the happening of an accident there should arise a
prima facie presumption of negligence.
The constitutional objection to the first statute is that the
classification for which it provided was so unequal as to cause the
statute to be in conflict with the Fourteenth
Page 235 U. S. 382
Amendment. The classification was this:
"Every employee of a railroad corporation, and all other
corporations and individuals, using engines, locomotives, or cars
of any kind or description whatsoever, propelled by the dangerous
agencies of steam, electricity, gas, gasolene, or lever power, and
running on tracks. . . ."
That the objection is without merit is so clearly established as
to require only references to the decided cases to that effect.
[
Footnote 1]
The objection to the second statute is that it was wanting in
due process because retroactively applied to the case, since the
statute was enacted after the accident occurred. But the court
below held that the statute cut off no substantive defense, but
simply provided a rule of evidence controlling the burden of proof.
That, as thus construed, it does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is also so
conclusively settled as to again require nothing but a reference to
the decided cases. [
Footnote
2]
As it results that, at the time the writ of error was sued out,
it had been conclusively settled by the decisions of this Court
that both grounds relied upon were devoid of merit, we think the
alleged constitutional questions were too frivolous to sustain
jurisdiction, and we therefore maintain the motion which has been
made to dismiss, and our judgment will be
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 1]
Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 175 U.
S. 348;
Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline,
199 U. S. 593;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S.
36;
Aluminum Co. v. Ramsey, 222 U.
S. 251.
[
Footnote 2]
Mobile, J. & K. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S.
35,
219 U. S. 42-43;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61,
220 U. S. 82;
Reitler v. Harris, 223 U. S. 437,
223 U. S.
441-442;
Luria v. United States, 231 U. S.
9,
231 U. S.
25-27.
