The object of the commerce clause was to prevent interstate
trade from being destroyed or impeded by the rivalries of local
governments, and it is the essence of the complete and paramount
power confided
Page 234 U. S. 343
to Congress to regulate interstate commerce that, wherever it
exists, it dominates.
Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers
are so related that the government of the one involves the control
of the other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled
to prescribe the final and dominant rule; otherwise the Nation
would not be supreme within the National field.
While Congress does not possess authority to regulate the
internal commerce of a State, as such, it does possess power to
foster and protect interstate commerce, although, in taking
necessary measures so to do, it may be necessary to control
intrastate transactions of interstate carriers.
The use by the State of an instrument of interstate commerce in
a discriminatory manner so as to inflict injury on any part of that
commerce is a ground for Federal intervention; nor can a State
authorize a carrier to do that which Congress may forbid and has
forbidden.
In removing injurious discriminations against interstate traffic
arising from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates,
Congress is not bound to reduce the latter to the level of the
former.
Congress, having the power to control intrastate charges of an
interstate carrier to the extent necessary to prevent injurious
discrimination against interstate commerce, may provide for its
execution through the aid of a subordinate body.
By § 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, 24 Stat. 379, 380,
Congress has delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission power
to prevent all discriminations against interstate commerce by
interstate carriers, subject to the Act, which it is within the
power of Congress to condemn.
Where the Interstate Commerce Commission has found after due
investigation that unjust discrimination against localities exists
under substantially similar conditions of transportation, the
Commission has power to correct it, and this notwithstanding the
limitations contained in the proviso to § 1 of the Act to
Regulate Commerce.
The earlier action of the Interstate Commerce Commission was not
of such controlling character as to preclude the Commission from
giving effect to the Act to Regulate Commerce, and in this case
having, after examination of the question of its authority, decided
to make a remedial order to prevent unjust discrimination and the
Commerce Court having sustained that authority of the Commission,
this court should not reverse unless, as is not the case, the law
has been misapplied.
Page 234 U. S. 344
No local rule can nullify the lawful exercise of Federal
authority, and after the Interstate Commerce Commission has made an
order within its jurisdiction, there is no compulsion on the
carrier to comply with any inconsistent local requirement.
Although there is gravity in any question presented when state
and Federal news conflict, it has been recognized from the
beginning that this Nation could not prosper if interstate and
foreign trade were governed by many masters, and where the freedom
of such commerce is involved, the judgment of Congress and the
agencies it lawfully establishes must control.
An order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission that, in
order to correct discrimination found to exist against specified
localities, interstate carriers should desist from charging higher
rates for transportation between certain specified interstate
points than between certain specified intrastate points,
held to be within the power delegated by Congress to the
Commission; also
held that, so far as the carriers'
interstate rates conformed to what was found to be reasonable by
the Commission, they were entitled to maintain them, and that they
were free to comply with the order by so adjusting their intrastate
rates, to which the order related, as to remove the forbidden
discrimination.
205 Fed.Rep. 380, affirmed.
The facts, which involve the validity of an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission relating to rates between
Shreveport, Louisiana, and points within the State of Texas, and
the effect of orders of the Railroad Commission of the State of
Texas in regard to rates wholly within that State, are stated in
the opinion.
Page 234 U. S. 345
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.
These suits were brought in the Commerce Court by the Houston,
East & West Texas Railway Company, and the Houston &
Shreveport Railroad Company, and by the Texas & Pacific Railway
Company, respectively, to set aside an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, dated March 11, 1912, upon the ground that it
exceeded the Commission's authority. Other railroad companies
[
Footnote 1] intervened in
support of the petitions, and the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Railroad Commission of Louisiana intervened in opposition.
The petitions were dismissed. 205 Fed.Rep. 380.
The order of the Interstate Commerce Commission was made in a
proceeding initiated in March, 1911, by the Railroad Commission of
Louisiana. The complaint was that the appellants, and other
interstate carriers, maintained unreasonable rates from Shreveport,
Louisiana, to various points in Texas, and, further, that these
carriers in the adjustment of rates over their respective lines
unjustly discriminated in favor of traffic within the State of
Texas and against similar traffic between Louisiana and Texas. The
carriers filed answers; numerous pleas of intervention by shippers
and commercial bodies were allowed; testimony was taken and
arguments were heard.
The gravamen of the complaint, said the Interstate
Page 234 U. S. 346
Commerce Commission, was that the carriers made rates out of
Dallas and other Texas points into eastern Texas which were much
lower than those which they extended into Texas from Shreveport.
The situation may be briefly described: Shreveport, Louisiana, is
about 40 miles from the Texas state line, and 231 miles from
Houston, Texas, on the line of the Houston, East & West Texas
and Houston & Shreveport Companies (which are affiliated in
interest); it is 189 miles from Dallas, Texas, on the line of the
Texas & Pacific. Shreveport competes with both cities for the
trade of the intervening territory. The rates on these lines from
Dallas and Houston, respectively, eastward to intermediate points
in Texas were much less, according to distance, than from
Shreveport westward to the same points. It is undisputed that the
difference was substantial, and injuriously affected the commerce
of Shreveport. It appeared, for example, that a rate of 60 cents
carried first class traffic a distance of 160 miles to the eastward
from Dallas, while the same rate would carry the same class of
traffic only 55 miles into Texas from Shreveport. The first class
rate from Houston to Lufkin, Texas, 118.2 miles, was 50 cents per
100 pounds, while the rate from Shreveport to the same point, 112.5
miles, was 69 cents. The rate on wagons from Dallas to Marshall,
Texas, 147.7 miles was 36.8 cents, and from Shreveport to Marshall,
42 miles, 56 cents. The rate on furniture from Dallas to Longview,
Texas, 124 miles, was 24.8 cents, and that from Shreveport to
Longview, 65.7 miles, was 35 cents. These instances of differences
in rates are merely illustrative; they serve to indicate the
character of the rate adjustment.
The Interstate Commerce Commission found that the interstate
class rates out of Shreveport to named Texas points were
unreasonable, and it established maximum class rates for this
traffic. These rates, we understand, were substantially the same as
the class rates fixed by the
Page 234 U. S. 347
Railroad Commission of Texas, and charged by the carriers, for
transportation for similar distances in that State. The Interstate
Commerce Commission also found that the carriers maintained "higher
rates from Shreveport to points in Texas" than were in force "from
cities in Texas to such points under substantially similar
conditions and circumstances," and that thereby "an unlawful and
undue preference and advantage" was given to the Texas cities and a
"discrimination" that was "undue and unlawful" was effected against
Shreveport. In order to correct this discrimination, the carriers
were directed to desist from charging higher rates for the
transportation of any commodity from Shreveport to Dallas and
Houston, respectively, and intermediate points, than were
contemporaneously charged for the carriage of such commodity from
Dallas and Houston toward Shreveport for equal distances, as the
Commission found that relation of rates to be reasonable. 23 I.C.C.
31, 46-48.
The order in question is set forth in the margin. [
Footnote 2] The
Page 234 U. S. 348
report states that, under this order, it will be the duty of the
companies "to duly and justly equalize the terms and conditions"
upon which they will extend "transportation to traffic of a similar
character moving into Texas from
Page 234 U. S. 349
Shreveport with that moving wholly within Texas," but that, in
effecting such equalization, the class scale rates as prescribed
shall not be exceeded.
In their petition in the Commerce Court, the appellants assailed
the order in its entirety, but subsequently they withdrew their
opposition to the fixing of maximum class rates, and these rates
were put in force by the carriers in May, 1912.
The attack was continued upon that portion of the order which
prohibited the charge of higher rates for carrying articles from
Shreveport into Texas than those charged for eastward traffic from
Dallas and Houston, respectively, for equal distances. There are,
it appears, commodity rates fixed by the Railroad Commission of
Texas for intrastate hauls which are substantially less than the
class, or standard, rates prescribed by that Commission, and thus
the commodity rates charged by the carriers from Dallas and Houston
eastward to Texas points are less than the rates which they demand
for the transportation of the same articles for like distances from
Shreveport into Texas. The present controversy relates to these
commodity rates.
The point of the objection to the order is that, as the
discrimination found by the Commission to be unjust arises out of
the relation of intrastate rates, maintained under state authority,
to interstate rates that have been upheld as reasonable, its
correction was beyond the Commission's power. Manifestly, the order
might be complied with, and the discrimination avoided, either by
reducing the interstate rates from Shreveport to the level of the
competing intrastate rates, or by raising these intrastate
Page 234 U. S. 350
rates to the level of the interstate rates, or by such reduction
in the one case and increase in the other as would result in
equality. But it is urged that, so far as the interstate rates were
sustained by the Commission as reasonable, the Commission was
without authority to compel their reduction in order to equalize
them with the lower intrastate rates. The holding of the Commerce
Court was that the order relieved the appellants from further
obligation to observe the intrastate rates, and that they were at
liberty to comply with the Commission's requirements by increasing
these rates sufficiently to remove the forbidden discrimination.
The invalidity of the order in this aspect is challenged upon two
grounds:
(1) That Congress is impotent to control the intrastate charges
of an interstate carrier even to the extent necessary to prevent
injurious discrimination against interstate traffic; and
(2) That, if it be assumed that Congress has this power, still
it has not been exercised, and hence the action of the Commission
exceeded the limits of the authority which has been conferred upon
it.
First. It is unnecessary to repeat what has frequently been said
by this court with respect to the complete and paramount character
of the power confided to Congress to regulate commerce among the
several States. It is of the essence of this power that, where it
exists, it dominates. Interstate trade was not left to be destroyed
or impeded by the rivalries of local governments. The purpose was
to make impossible the recurrence of the evils which had
overwhelmed the Confederation and to provide the necessary basis of
national unity by insuring "uniformity of regulation against
conflicting and discriminating state legislation." By virtue of the
comprehensive terms of the grant, the authority of Congress is at
all times adequate to meet the varying exigencies that arise and to
protect the national interest by securing the freedom of
interstate
Page 234 U. S. 351
commercial intercourse from local control.
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1,
22 U. S. 196,
22 U. S. 224;
Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419,
25 U. S. 446;
County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.
S. 691,
102 U. S. 696,
102 U. S. 697;
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 45,
124 U. S. 473;
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1,
223 U. S. 47,
223 U. S. 53,
223 U. S. 54;
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352,
230 U. S. 398,
230 U. S.
399.
Congress is empowered to regulate -- that is, to provide the law
for the government of interstate commerce; to enact "all
appropriate legislation" for its "protection and advancement"
(
The Daniel
Ball, 10 Wall. 557,
77 U. S. 564);
to adopt measures "to promote its growth and insure its safety"
(
County of Mobile v. Kimball, supra); "to foster, protect,
control and restrain" (
Second Employers' Liability Cases,
supra). Its authority, extending to these interstate carriers
as instruments of interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the
right to control their operations in all matters having such a
close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the
control is essential or appropriate to the security of that
traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the
maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be
conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance. As
it is competent for Congress to legislate to these ends,
unquestionably it may seek their attainment by requiring that the
agencies of interstate commerce shall not be used in such manner as
to cripple, retard or destroy it. The fact that carriers are
instruments of intrastate commerce, as well as of interstate
commerce, does not derogate from the complete and paramount
authority of Congress over the latter or preclude the Federal power
from being exerted to prevent the intrastate operations of such
carriers from being made a means of injury to that which has been
confided to Federal care. Wherever the interstate and intrastate
transactions of carriers are so related that the government of the
one involves the control of the other, it is Congress, and not the
State, that is entitled to prescribe
Page 234 U. S. 352
the final and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress would be
denied the exercise of its constitutional authority and the State,
and not the Nation, would be supreme within the national field.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 221 U. S. 612,
221 U. S. 618;
Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S.
20,
222 U. S. 26,
222 U. S. 27;
Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, pp.
223 U. S. 48,
223 U. S. 51;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co.,
224 U. S. 194,
224 U. S. 205,
224 U. S. 213;
Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, p.
230 U. S. 431;
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.
S. 473.
In
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, supra, the argument against the validity of the
Hours of Service Act (March 4, 1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415)
involved the consideration that the interstate and intrastate
transactions of the carriers were so interwoven that it was utterly
impracticable for them to divide their employes so that those who
were engaged in interstate commerce should be confined to that
commerce exclusively. Employes dealing with the movement of trains
were employed in both sorts of commerce; but the court held that
this fact did not preclude the exercise of Federal power. As
Congress could limit the hours of labor of those engaged in
interstate transportation, it necessarily followed that its will
could not be frustrated by prolonging the period of service through
other requirements of the carriers or by the commingling of duties
relating to interstate and intrastate operations. Again, in
Southern Railway Co. v. United States, supra, the question
was presented whether the amendment to the Safety Appliance Act
(March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943) was within the power of
Congress in view of the fact that the statute was not confined to
vehicles that were used in interstate traffic, but also embraced
those used in intrastate traffic. The court answered affirmatively,
because there was such a close relation between the two classes of
traffic moving over the same railroad as to make it certain that
the safety
Page 234 U. S. 353
of the interstate traffic, and of those employed in its
movement, would be promoted in a real and substantial sense by
applying the requirements of the act to both classes of vehicles.
So, in the
Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, it
was insisted that, while Congress had the authority to regulate the
liability of a carrier for injuries sustained by one employee
through the negligence of another, where all were engaged in
interstate commerce, that power did not embrace instances where the
negligent employee was engaged in intrastate commerce. The court
said that this was a mistaken theory, as the causal negligence,
when operating injuriously upon an employee engaged in interstate
commerce, had the same effect with respect to that commerce as if
the negligent employee were also engaged therein. The decision in
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463, is not opposed, for the statute there in
question (June 11, 1906, c. 3073, 34 Stat. 232) sought to regulate
the liability of interstate carriers for injuries to any employee
even though his employment had no connection whatever with
interstate commerce. (
See Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Behrens,
supra.)
While these decisions sustaining the Federal power relate to
measures adopted in the interest of the safety of persons and
property, they illustrate the principle that Congress, in the
exercise of its paramount power, may prevent the common
instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial
intercourse from being used in their intrastate operations to the
injury of interstate commerce. This is not to say that Congress
possesses the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a
State, as such, but that it does possess the power to foster and
protect interstate commerce, and to take all measures necessary or
appropriate to that end, although intrastate transactions of
interstate carriers may thereby be controlled.
This principle is applicable here. We find no reason to doubt
that Congress is entitled to keep the highways of
Page 234 U. S. 354
interstate communication open to interstate traffic upon fair
and equal terms. That an unjust discrimination in the rates of a
common carrier, by which one person or locality is unduly favored
as against another under substantially similar conditions of
traffic, constitutes an evil is undeniable, and where this evil
consists in the action of an interstate carrier in unreasonably
discriminating against interstate traffic over its line, the
authority of Congress to prevent it is equally clear. It is
immaterial, so far as the protecting power of Congress is
concerned, that the discrimination arises from intrastate rates, as
compared with interstate rates. The use of the instrument of
interstate commerce in a discriminatory manner so as to inflict
injury upon that commerce, or some part thereof, furnishes abundant
ground for Federal intervention. Nor can the attempted exercise of
state authority alter the matter, where Congress has acted, for a
State may not authorize the carrier to do that which Congress is
entitled to forbid and has forbidden.
It is also to be noted -- as the Government has well said in its
argument in support of the Commission's order -- that the power to
deal with the relation between the two kinds of rates, as a
relation, lies exclusively with Congress. It is manifest that the
State cannot fix the relation of the carrier's interstate and
intrastate charges without directly interfering with the former,
unless it simply follows the standard set by Federal authority.
This question was presented with respect to the long and short haul
provision of the Kentucky constitution, adopted in 1891, which the
court had before it in
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Eubank, 184 U. S. 27. The
state court had construed this provision as embracing a long haul,
from a place outside to one within the State, and a shorter haul on
the same line and in the same direction between points within the
State. This court held that, so construed, the provision was
invalid as being a regulation of interstate commerce
Page 234 U. S. 355
because "it linked the interstate rate to the rate for the
shorter haul, and thus the interstate charge was directly
controlled by the state law."
See 230 U.S. pp.
230 U. S. 428,
230 U. S. 429.
It is for Congress to supply the needed correction where the
relation between intrastate and interstate rates presents the evil
to be corrected, and this it may do completely by reason of its
control over the interstate carrier in all matters having such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is
necessary or appropriate to exercise the control for the effective
government of that commerce.
It is also clear that, in removing the injurious discriminations
against interstate traffic arising from the relation of intrastate
to interstate rates, Congress is not bound to reduce the latter
below what it may deem to be a proper standard fair to the carrier
and to the public. Otherwise, it could prevent the injury to
interstate commerce only by the sacrifice of its judgment as to
interstate rates. Congress is entitled to maintain its own standard
as to these rates, and to forbid any discriminatory action by
interstate carriers which will obstruct the freedom of movement of
interstate traffic over their lines in accordance with the terms it
establishes.
Having this power, Congress could provide for its execution
through the aid of a subordinate body, and we conclude that the
order of the Commission now in question cannot be held invalid upon
the ground that it exceeded the authority which Congress could
lawfully confer.
Second. The remaining question is with regard to the scope of
the power which Congress has granted to the Commission.
Section three of the Act to Regulate Commerce provides (February
4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 380):
"SEC. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this act to make or give any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to
Page 234 U. S. 356
any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality,
or any particular description of traffic, in any respect
whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm,
corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic,
to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any
respect whatsoever."
This language is certainly sweeping enough to embrace all the
discriminations of the sort described which it was within the power
of Congress to condemn. There is no exception or qualification with
respect to an unreasonable discrimination against interstate
traffic produced by the relation of intrastate to interstate rates
as maintained by the carrier. It is apparent from the legislative
history of the act that the evil of discrimination was the
principal thing aimed at, and there is no basis for the contention
that Congress intended to exempt any discriminatory action or
practice of interstate carriers affecting interstate commerce which
it had authority to reach. The purpose of the measure was thus
emphatically stated in the elaborate report of the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce which accompanied it:
"The provisions of the bill are based upon the theory that the
paramount evil chargeable against the operation of the
transportation system of the United States as now conducted is
unjust discrimination between persons, places, commodities, or
particular descriptions of traffic. The underlying purpose and aim
of the measure is the prevention of these discriminations. . .
."
(Senate Report No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 215).
The opposing argument rests upon the proviso in the first
section of the act which, in its original form, was as follows:
"Provided, however, that the provisions of this act shall not
apply to the transportation of passengers or property, or to the
receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of property, wholly
within one State, and not shipped to or from a foreign country from
or to any State or Territory
Page 234 U. S. 357
as aforesaid."
When the act was amended so as to confer upon the Commission the
authority to prescribe maximum interstate rates, this proviso was
reenacted, and when the act was extended to include telegraph,
telephone and cable companies engaged in interstate business, an
additional clause was inserted so as to exclude intrastate
messages.
See acts of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat.
584; June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 545.
Congress thus defined the scope of its regulation and provided
that it was not to extend to purely intrastate traffic. It did not
undertake to authorize the Commission to prescribe intrastate
rates, and thus to establish a unified control by the exercise of
the ratemaking power over both descriptions of traffic. Undoubtedly
-- in the absence of a finding by the Commission of unjust
discrimination -- intrastate rates were left to be fixed by the
carrier and subject to the authority of the States or of the
agencies created by the States. This was the question recently
decided by this court in the
Minnesota Rate Cases, supra.
There, the State of Minnesota had established reasonable rates for
intrastate transportation throughout the State, and it was
contended that, by reason of the passage of the Act to Regulate
Commerce, the State could no longer exercise the statewide
authority for this purpose which it had formerly enjoyed, and the
court was asked to hold that an entire scheme of intrastate rates,
otherwise validly established, was null and void because of its
effect upon interstate rates. There had been no finding by the
Interstate Commerce Commission of any unjust discrimination. The
present question, however, was reserved, the court saying (230 U.S.
p.
230 U. S.
419): " It is urged, however, that the words of the
proviso" (referring to the proviso above-mentioned)
"are susceptible of a construction which would permit the
provisions of section three of the act, prohibiting carriers from
giving an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
locality, to apply to unreasonable discriminations
Page 234 U. S. 358
between localities in different States, as well when arising
from an intrastate rate as compared with an interstate rate as when
due to interstate rates exclusively. If it be assumed that the
statute should be so construed, and it is not necessary now to
decide the point, it would inevitably follow that the controlling
principle governing the enforcement of the act should be applied to
such cases as might thereby be brought within its purview, and the
question whether the carrier, in such a case, was giving an undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to one locality as against
another, or subjecting any locality to an undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage, would be primarily for the investigation
and determination of the Interstate Commerce Commission and not for
the courts."
Here, the Commission expressly found that unjust discrimination
existed under substantially similar conditions of transportation
and the inquiry is whether the Commission had power to correct it.
We are of the opinion that the limitation of the proviso in section
one does not apply to a case of this sort. The Commission was
dealing with the relation of rates injuriously affecting, through
an unreasonable discrimination, traffic that was interstate. The
question was thus not simply one of transportation that was "wholly
within one State." These words of the proviso have appropriate
reference to exclusively intrastate traffic, separately considered;
to the regulation of domestic commerce, as such. The powers
conferred by the act are not thereby limited where interstate
commerce itself is involved. This is plainly the case when the
Commission finds that unjust discrimination against interstate
trade arises from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates as
maintained by a carrier subject to the act. Such a matter is one
with which Congress alone is competent to deal, and, in view of the
aim of the act and the comprehensive terms of the provisions
against unjust discrimination,
Page 234 U. S. 359
there is no ground for holding that the authority of Congress
was unexercised, and that the subject was thus left without
governmental regulation. It is urged that the practical
construction of the statute has been the other way. But, in
assailing the order, the appellants ask us to override the
construction which has been given to the statute by the authority
charged with its execution, and it cannot be said that the earlier
action of the Commission was of such a controlling character as to
preclude it from giving effect to the law. The Commission, having
before it a plain case of unreasonable discrimination on the part
of interstate carriers against interstate trade, carefully examined
the question of its authority and decided that it had the power to
make this remedial order. The Commerce Court sustained the
authority of the Commission, and it is clear that we should not
reverse the decree unless the law has been misapplied. This we
cannot say; on the contrary, we are convinced that the authority of
the Commission was adequate.
The further objection is made that the prohibition of section
three is directed against unjust discrimination or undue preference
only when it arises from the voluntary act of the carrier and does
not relate to acts which are the result of conditions wholly beyond
its control.
East Tennessee &c. Rwy. Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1,
181 U. S. 18. The
reference is not to any inherent lack of control arising out of
traffic conditions, but to the requirements of the local
authorities which are assumed to be binding upon the carriers. The
contention is thus merely a repetition in another form of the
argument that the Commission exceeded its power; for it would not
be contended that local rules could nullify the lawful exercise of
Federal authority. In the view that the Commission was entitled to
make the order, there is no longer compulsion upon the carriers by
virtue of any inconsistent local requirement. We are not unmindful
of the gravity of the
Page 234 U. S. 360
question that is presented when state and federal views
conflict. But it was recognized at the beginning that the Nation
could not prosper if interstate and foreign trade were governed by
many masters, and, where the interests of the freedom of interstate
commerce are involved, the judgment of Congress and of the agencies
it lawfully establishes must control.
In conclusion: reading the order in the light of the report of
the Commission, it does not appear that the Commission attempted to
require the carriers to reduce their interstate rates out of
Shreveport below what was found to be a reasonable charge for that
service. So far as these interstate rates conformed to what was
found to be reasonable by the Commission, the carriers are entitled
to maintain them, and they are free to comply with the order by so
adjusting the other rates to which the order relates as to remove
the forbidden discrimination. But this result they are required to
accomplish.
The decree of the Commerce Court is affirmed in each case.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas, the
St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company, and the St. Louis
Southwestern Railway Company of Texas.
[
Footnote 2]
"This case being at issue upon complaint and answers on file,
and having been duly heard and submitted by the parties, and full
investigation of the matters and things involved having been had,
and the Commission having, on the date hereof, made and filed a
report containing its findings of fact and conclusions thereon,
which said report is hereby referred to and made a part
hereof:"
"It is ordered, That defendants The Texas & Pacific Railway
Company, The Houston, East & West Texas Railway Company, and
Houston & Shreveport Railroad Company be, and they are hereby,
notified and required to cease and desist, on or before the 1st day
of May, 1912, and for a period of not less than two years
thereafter abstain, from exacting their present class rates for the
transportation of traffic from Shreveport, La., to the points in
Texas hereinafter mentioned on their respective lines, as the
Commission in said report finds such rates to be unjust and
unreasonable."
"It is further ordered, That defendant The Texas & Pacific
Railway Company be, and it is hereby, notified and required to
establish and put in force, on or before the 1st day of May, 1912,
and maintain in force thereafter during a period of not less than
two years, and apply to the transportation of traffic from
Shreveport, La. to the below-named points in Texas, class rates
which shall not exceed the following, in cents per 100 pounds,
which rates are found by the Commission in its report to be
reasonable, to-wit: (rates inserted)."
"It is further ordered, That defendants The Houston, East &
West Texas Railway Company and Houston & Shreveport Railroad
Company be, and they are hereby, notified and required to establish
and put in force, on or before the 1st day of May, 1912, and
maintain in force thereafter during a period of not less than two
years, and apply to the transportation of traffic from Shreveport,
La. to the below-named points in Texas, class rates which shall not
exceed the following, in cents per 100 pounds, which rates are
found by the Commission in its report to be reasonable, to wit:
(rates inserted)."
"It is further ordered, That defendant The Texas & Pacific
Railway Company be, and it is hereby, notified and required to
cease and desist, on or before the 1st day of May, 1912, and for a
period of not less than two years thereafter abstain, from exacting
any higher rates for the transportation of any article from
Shreveport, La. to Dallas, Tex. and points on its line intermediate
thereto, than are contemporaneously exacted for the transportation
of such article from Dallas, Tex. toward said Shreveport for an
equal distance, as said relation of rates has been found by the
Commission in said report to be reasonable."
"It is further ordered, That defendants The Houston, East &
West Texas Railway Company and Houston & Shreveport Railroad
Company be, and they are hereby, notified and required to cease and
desist, on or before the 1st day of May, 1912, and for a period of
not less than two years thereafter abstain, from exacting any
higher rates for the transportation of any article from Shreveport,
La., to Houston, Tex., and points on its line intermediate thereto,
than are contemporaneously exacted for the transportation of such
article from Houston, Tex. toward said Shreveport for an equal
distance, as said relation of rates has been found by the
Commission in said report to be reasonable."
"And it is further ordered, That said defendants be, and they
are hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force, on
or before the 1st day of May, 1912, and maintain in force
thereafter during a period of not less than two years,
substantially similar practices respecting the concentration of
interstate cotton at Shreveport, La. to those which are
contemporaneously observed by said defendants respecting the
concentration of cotton within the state of Texas, provided the
practices adopted shall be justifiable under the act to regulate
commerce and applicable fairly under like conditions elsewhere on
the lines of such defendants."