The business of mining coal is so attended with danger as to
render it the proper subject of police regulation by the state.
It is not an unreasonable exercise of the police power of the
state to require owners of adjoining coal properties to cause
boundary pillars
Page 232 U. S. 532
to be left of sufficient width to safeguard the employees of
either mine in case the other should be abandoned and allowed to
fill with water.
One attacking the constitutionality of a state statute must show
that he is within the class whose constitutional rights are
injuriously affected by the statute.
In determining whether the constitutional rights of a party have
been affected by a state statute, the courts will presume, until
the contrary is shown, that any administrative body to which power
is delegated will act with reasonable regard to property
rights.
Except in such cases as arise under the contract clause of the
Constitution, it is for the court of last resort of the state to
construe the statutes of that state, and in exercising jurisdiction
under 237, Judicial Code, it is proper for this Court to await the
construction of the state court, rather than to assume in advance
that such court will so construe the statute as to render it
obnoxious to the federal Constitution.
If a statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations,
one of which would render it unconstitutional and the other valid,
the courts should adopt the latter in view of the presumption that
the lawmaking body intends to act within, and not in excess of, its
constitutional authority.
In the absence of clear language to the contrary, a provision
for decision by a board in a public matter will be construed to the
effect that a majority of such board shall act and decide.
Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.
S. 180.
In matters of police regulation where decisions on questions of
public safety are delegated to an administrative board, the right
of appeal on other than constitutional grounds may be withheld by
the legislature in its discretion without denying due process of
law.
The statute of Pennsylvania requiring owners of adjoining coal
properties to cause barrier pillars to be left of suitable width to
safeguard employees is not unconstitutional either as depriving the
owners of their property without due process of law or as denying
them equal protection of the law, or because of the procedure and
method prescribed for determining the width of such barrier or
because it delegates the matter to an administrative board or does
not provide for any appeal thereupon.
232 Pa.St. 141 affirmed.
This case involves the constitutionality of a § of the
anthracite mine laws of the State of Pennsylvania,
Page 232 U. S. 533
being § 10 of Art. III of the Act of June 2, 1891
(Pub.Laws, p. 176, 183), which reads as follows:
"It shall be obligatory on the owners of adjoining coal
properties to leave, or cause to be left, a pillar of coal in each
seam or vein of coal worked by them, along the line of adjoining
property, of such width that, taken in connection with the pillar
to be left by the adjoining property owner, will be a sufficient
barrier for the safety of the employees of either mine in case the
other should be abandoned and allowed to fill with water, such
width of pillar to be determined by the engineers of the adjoining
property owners together with the inspector of the district in
which the mine is situated, and the surveys of the face of the
workings along such pillar shall be made in duplicate, and must
practically agree. A copy of such duplicate surveys, certified to,
must be filed with the owners of the adjoining properties and with
the inspector of the district in which the mine or property is
situated."
Art. XVIII, under the head of "Definition of Terms," contains,
inter alia, the following:
"The term 'owners' and 'operators' means any person or body
corporate who is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of
any coal mine or colliery or any part thereof. The term 'owner'
does not include a person or body corporate who merely receives a
royalty, rent, or fine from a coal mine or colliery or part
thereof, or is merely the proprietor of the mine, subject to any
lease, grant, or license for the working or operating thereof, or
is merely the owner of the soil, and not interested in the minerals
of the mine or any part thereof. But any 'contractor' for the
working of a mine or colliery, or any part or district thereof,
shall be subject to this act as an operator or owner, in like
manner as if he were the owner."
The record shows that the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company
and the Plymouth Coal Company are, respectively, the lessees or
owners of adjoining coal properties
Page 232 U. S. 534
situate at Plymouth, in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania; that, on
August 31, 1909, Mr. Davis, the Inspector of Mines of the district
in which the properties are located, wrote a letter to the
president of the Plymouth Coal Company which reads as follows:
"Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Aug. 31, '09"
"John C. Haddock, Pres. Plymouth Coal Co."
"Dear Sir: Kindly have your engineer report at my office
Thursday morning Sept. 2nd at 10 o'clock, at which time we can meet
the engineer of the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company to
decide as to thickness of barrier pillar to be left unmined between
the properties of the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company and
the Plymouth Coal Company, situated at Plymouth, Luz. Co., Pa. as
per Article III, § 10 anthracite mine laws of this
commonwealth, which reads as follows [quoting the section
verbatim]."
"[Signed] D. T. DAVIS"
"Inspector of Mines."
To this, the following reply was made:
"Wilkes-Barre, Pa."
"Sept. 1, 1909"
"Mr. D. T. Davis, Inspector, Ninth Anthracite Inspection
District, Wilkes-Barre, Pa."
"Dear Sir: I am in receipt of yours of the 31st ult."
"Allow me to say in reply that, while it would give us great
pleasure to meet you and the representatives of the Lehigh &
Wilkes-Barre Coal Company at the suggested conference, to be held
tomorrow, we cannot enter such a conference to even consider, much
less conclude, an agreement that may affect our rights and our duty
to our lessors at the Dodson Colliery."
"I assume it is needless to assure you that we stand
Page 232 U. S. 535
ready at all times to comply with any reasonable request that
may emanate from you or your office, but, if I am advised
correctly, this request or demand originated with the Lehigh &
Wilkes-Barre Coal Company."
"This was their right to make as it is ours to decline."
"Yours very truly,"
"[Signed] JOHN C. HADDOCK"
"
President The Plymouth Coal Co."
Thereupon, pursuant to Article XV of the above-mentioned
statute, the mine inspector, acting in behalf of the commonwealth,
filed his bill of complaint against the Plymouth Coal Company in
the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, setting forth the
above facts and averring that defendant refused to permit its
engineer to meet with the mine inspector and the engineer of the
adjoining property owner to determine the width of the barrier
pillar, or to even consider the matter, and refused to leave or
cause to be left a pillar that, taken in connection with the pillar
to be left by the adjoining property owner, would be a sufficient
barrier for the safety of the employees of either mine in case the
other should be abandoned and allowed to fill with water; that
defendant employed in its mine at least three hundred persons, and
the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company employed in its mine at
least seven hundred persons, and the refusal of the defendant
endangered the lives and safety of the employees of both mines.
There was a prayer for a preliminary and perpetual injunction to
restrain defendant from working its mine without leaving a barrier
pillar of coal of the thickness or width of at least 30 feet in
each seam or vein worked by it along the line of the adjoining
property. Defendant answered, admitting the truth of the averments
of the bill without qualification, except that it denied that any
barrier was necessary for the safety of the employees of either
mine in case
Page 232 U. S. 536
the other mine should be abandoned. At the same time, it averred
that the Act of June 2, 1891, upon which the bill was based, "is
confiscatory, unconstitutional, and void." There was a preliminary
injunction, restraining defendant from working its mine without
leaving a barrier pillar at least 70 feet wide. This was continued
until the final hearing, which resulted in a decree continuing the
injunction, but without prejudice to defendant's
"to apply to the court for a dissolution or modification
thereof, upon showing to the satisfaction of the court that the
proper mine inspector and the engineers of the defendant company
and the Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre Coal Company have, upon due
investigation and consultation, determined that a barrier pillar of
less width than that stated in the injunction (that is, less 70
feet on defendant's property) is sufficient for the protection of
the men employed in the mines of either company in case the mine of
the other should be abandoned and allowed to fill with water, and
have made duplicate surveys and filed copies of the same as
required by law, or, upon such investigation and consultation shall
have decided that no such barrier pillar is necessary to the safety
of the employees of either company in the event aforesaid."
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
decree (232 Pa. 141), and the case comes here by virtue of §
237, Judicial Code, for adjudication under the "due process" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.
Page 232 U. S. 539
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The statute in question is entitled
"An Act to Provide for the Health and Safety of Persons Employed
in and about the Anthracite Coal Mines of Pennsylvania, and for the
Protection and Preservation of Property Connected Therewith."
It applies to every anthracite coal mine in the commonwealth
employing more than ten persons; divides the anthracite coal region
into eight inspection districts, with a mine inspector for each
district, who is appointed by the governor of the commonwealth upon
the recommendation of a Board of Examiners composed of three
reputable coal miners and two reputable mining engineers, all to be
selected by judges of the county courts, and the inspector thus
appointed must be a citizen of Pennsylvania, more than thirty years
of age, having a knowledge of the different systems of working coal
mines, and at least five years practical experience in anthracite
coal mines of Pennsylvania, including experience in mines where
noxious and explosive gases are evolved. Each inspector is to
reside in the district for which he is appointed, and is to give
his whole time and attention to the duties of his office. He is to
examine all the collieries in his district as often as may be
required, see that every necessary precaution is taken to secure
the safety of the workmen and that the provisions of the act are
observed and obeyed, and is to keep the maps and plans of the mines
and the records thereof with all the papers relating thereto. The
act contains a multitude of provisions looking to the safety of the
men employed in and about the
Page 232 U. S. 540
mines, and deals apparently with every branch of the work and
every source of danger.
That the business of mining coal is attended with dangers that
render it the proper subject of regulation by the states in the
exercise of the police power is entirely settled.
Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U. S. 366,
169 U. S. 393;
Consolidated Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.
S. 203,
185 U. S. 207;
Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26,
229 U. S.
29.
Legislation requiring the owners of adjoining coal properties to
cause boundary pillars of coal to be left of sufficient width to
safeguard the employees of either mine in case the other should be
abandoned and allowed to fill with water cannot be deemed an
unreasonable exercise of the power. In effect, it requires a
comparatively small portion of the valuable contents of the vein to
be left in place so long as may be required for the safety of the
men employed in mining upon either property.
All of this is very frankly admitted by plaintiff in error, and
the criticism upon § 10 of the act is confined to the single
ground that the method of fixing the width of the barrier pillar is
so crude, uncertain, and unjust as to constitute a taking of
property without due process of law.
So far as the record discloses, this particular objection was
not brought to the attention of the state courts as a ground for
holding the section in question to be unconstitutional. The very
general objection raised by plaintiff in error in its answer has
been stated. The court of common pleas, in its opinion, not
treating the mode of defining the pillar as having any bearing upon
the constitutional question, but dealing with it as a matter of
interpretation, said:
"If the constitutionality of this provision be conceded for the
purpose of discussion, and if the question of the necessity for any
barrier pillar at all between these properties may be regarded as
an open one, the decision of that question would seem to be
committed by the statute
Page 232 U. S. 541
to the tribunal of experts thereby constituted --
viz.,
the mine inspector and the engineers of the owners of the adjoining
coal properties. The purpose of the enactment is to secure the
safety of the workmen in the mines. The law declares that 'it shall
be obligatory' on the mine owners to leave such a barrier pillar as
the tribunal of mine experts referred to shall determine to be
sufficient for that purpose. It is for them to fix its width. Until
they say that none at all is needed for the safety of the men, the
obligation imposed by the statute remains. . . . If, therefore, we
may apply the maxim that the law does not require a vain thing,
there is room for the construction that, in vesting in the
inspector and engineers the power to determine how wide the barrier
pillar should be to secure safety, the intent of the lawmaking
power was to also empower them to say, if such be the fact, that
the safety of the men does not require a barrier pillar of any
width at all. But, be that as it may, it is evident that the act
does not warrant a mine owner in refusing to permit his engineer to
participate in determining the question of the width of, or the
need for, a barrier simply because he, the mine owner, does not
consider one necessary. In our opinion, the law requires such a
pillar to be left unless the inspector and engineers, after due
examination of the premises and consideration of the subject,
determine that none is needed to secure the safety of the men
employed in either mine in case the other should be abandoned and
allowed to fill with water."
The same view was repeated in the "Conclusions of Law" at the
close of the opinion, and evidently afforded the reason for
inserting in the final decree a clause reserving to defendant the
right to apply for a dissolution or modification of the injunction
after action by the statutory tribunal. The supreme court affirmed
the decree on the opinion of the court of common pleas.
Page 232 U. S. 542
In a later case,
Curran v. Delano, 235 Pa. 478, 485, it
was held, in effect, that the tribunal created by the statute was
to be composed of "two mining engineers and a mine inspector;" or,
as was said, "three mine experts;" that its jurisdiction was
exclusive, and that even the act of one property owner in removing
the coal from its mine up to the boundary line could not deprive
the statutory tribunal of its authority or confer jurisdiction upon
a court of equity to determine the width of the boundary barrier.
And see Sterrick Creek Coal Co. v. Dolph Coal Co., 11
Lack.Jur. 219.
Although the act has been upon the statute book for over twenty
years, the cases just cited are, it seems, the only ones wherein
the state courts have placed an authoritative construction upon the
pertinent section.
The objections of plaintiff in error to the method of fixing the
width of the barrier pillar are based upon the supposed uncertainty
and want of uniformity in the membership of the statutory tribunal,
and upon the fact that the statute does not expressly provide for
notice to the parties interested, that the procedure is not
prescribed, and that there is no right of appeal.
The legislature has not defined with precision the width of the
pillar, and it is very properly admitted that, in the nature of
things, this would have been impossible because the width necessary
in each case must be determined with reference to the situation of
the particular property. From this it necessarily results that it
was competent for the legislature to lay down a general rule, and
then establish an administrative tribunal with authority to fix the
precise width or thickness of pillar that will suit the necessities
of the particular situation, and constitute a compliance with the
general rule.
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.
S. 506,
220 U. S.
517-522. Administrative bodies with authority not
essentially different are a recognized governmental institution.
Commissions for
Page 232 U. S. 543
the regulation of public service corporations are a familiar
instance.
Interstate Com. Commission v. Cincinnati, Railway
Co., 167 U. S. 479,
167 U. S. 495.
And it has become entirely settled that powers and discretion of
this character may be delegated to administrative bodies, or even
to a single individual.
In re Kollock, 165 U.
S. 526,
165 U. S. 536;
Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U. S. 32;
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183,
177 U. S. 186;
Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U. S. 361,
194 U. S.
371-372;
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U. S. 11,
197 U. S. 25;
Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.
S. 552,
199 U. S.
560-562.
But it is insisted that, under the language of the act before
us, the tribunal lacks uniformity and there is uncertainty
respecting the manner of its constitution. It is said that on one
side of the property line there might be but a single owner, while
on the other side there might be several owners, and the engineers
representing the latter might outnumber and combine against the
representative of the single owner and compel him to leave a
barrier pillar of an unreasonable width. This objection is for
present purposes sufficiently disposed of by the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which establish that the tribunal is
composed of three -- namely, the inspector and two engineers. We
see no difficulty in working this out in practice. The owner on
each side has a single engineer in the makeup of the body, and if
there be a subdivision of the property on one side of the line,
there would no doubt be separate findings with respect to the
frontage of each subdivision.
It is objected that the act presupposes a condition which does
not always exist --
viz., that the owners of coal
properties have engineers in their employ -- whereas it is insisted
that there are many coal owners who employ no engineer, especially
among the lessors of coal property. But it cannot be seriously
doubted, the business under regulation being so dangerous, that it
is within the power of the state to declare that coal mining shall
not be conducted
Page 232 U. S. 544
without the employment of an engineer, and we deem it to be
within the competency of the lawmaking power to require also that
notice of such a proceeding be given to the lessee actually in
charge of the mining operations, leaving the lessor's interest to
be represented by him. It is the lessee whose conduct is to be
controlled. The lessor's interest is not so directly involved, and
for the purpose in hand is not opposed to that of the lessee. It is
not a judicial, but a
quasi-legislative proceeding. And if
the lessor desires to participate, it is not to be supposed that he
would have difficulty in obtaining a hearing.
A requirement of reasonable notice to the lessee seems to be
implied in the language of the section. There is to be a
"determination" by a tribunal of which the lessee's representative
is a member. Assuming, as we do, that, for constitutional reasons,
there must be a fair though summary hearing, it requires no very
clear expression to justify such a construction of the section as
will render notice obligatory. Certainly this Court ought not to
adopt a contrary construction in the absence of something in the
state decisions to require it.
Respecting this and some of the other objections, it should be
said that the difficulties suggested are hypothetical, rather than
practical. Plaintiff in error had actual notice in fact, and made
no objection on the score of lack of sufficient notice. Its lessor
is not objecting. Plaintiff in error presumably has an engineer
competent to represent it, or could readily employ one. It refused
to enter the conference for other reasons, and the refusal can be
justified in law only upon the theory that the section is wholly
void.
We may once more repeat what has been so often said, that one
who would strike down a state statute as violative of the federal
Constitution must show he is within the class with respect to whom
the act is unconstitutional, and must show that the alleged
unconstitutional feature
Page 232 U. S. 545
injures him, and so operates as to deprive him of rights
protected by the federal Constitution.
Southern Railway Co. v.
King, 217 U. S. 524,
217 U. S. 534;
Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.
S. 540,
225 U. S. 550;
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260,
226 U. S.
271.
It is to be presumed, until the contrary appears, that the
administrative body would have acted with reasonable regard to the
property rights of plaintiff in error, and certainly if there had
been any arbitrary exercise of its powers, its determination would
have been subject to judicial review.
Lieberman v. Van De
Carr, 199 U. S. 552,
199 U. S. 562;
Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477,
227 U. S.
483.
Indeed, the statute seems to contemplate some judicial control,
for it prescribes no penalty for a violation of the findings of the
engineers and inspector, nor any mode of enforcing their
determination except by a suit for injunction under Art. XV of the
act. In such a suit, a party deeming himself aggrieved because of
arbitrary action by the statutory tribunal may presumably have his
opportunity to be heard with respect to this as well as other
fundamental defenses.
It is objected that the act does not state whether the tribunal
must be unanimous in order to reach a determination, or what shall
be done in case of disagreement, and it is argued that in case of
such disagreement the solution of the question to be determined
might be delayed for such a length of time as to embarrass the
mining operations and throw the workmen out of employment. Here,
again, plaintiff in error seems to be unnecessarily borrowing
trouble, but we will deal with the point on its merits. This
particular objection does not seem to be met by the decision of the
state court, either in the present case or in that of
Curran v.
Delano, 235 Pa. 478. They seem to hold simply that the
tribunal is made up of three, without deciding what function is to
be performed by the respective members, nor how a conclusion is to
be reached. That
Page 232 U. S. 546
being so, it is not incumbent upon us to construe the statute in
this regard, but rather to say merely whether the section admits of
any reasonable construction that will sustain its
constitutionality.
For, in cases other than such as arise under the contract clause
of the Constitution, it is the appropriate function of the court of
last resort of a state to determine the meaning of the local
statutes. And in exercising the jurisdiction conferred by §
237, Judicial Code, it is proper for this Court rather to wait
until the state court has adopted a construction of the statute
under attack than to assume in advance that a construction will be
adopted such as to render the law obnoxious to the federal
Constitution.
Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S.
36,
204 U. S. 40;
Adams v. Russell, 229 U. S. 353,
229 U. S.
360.
And, even aside from the consideration just adverted to, it is a
general and fundamental rule that, if a statute be reasonably
susceptible of two interpretations, one of which would render it
unconstitutional and the other valid, it is the duty of the courts
to adopt that construction which will uphold its validity, there
being a strong presumption that the lawmaking body has intended to
act within, and not in excess of, its constitutional authority.
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700,
99 U. S. 718;
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623,
123 U. S. 661;
Knights Templars' Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U.
S. 197,
187 U. S. 205;
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.
S. 366,
213 U. S.
407.
Approaching the subject from this point of view, we observe
first the language of the section --
"such width of pillar to be determined by the engineers of the
adjoining property owners, together with the inspector of the
district in which the mine is situated."
Attention has already been called to the qualifications of the
inspector, and the safeguards surrounding the mode of his
appointment. The statute confers upon him most important powers,
and gives him access to complete information
Page 232 U. S. 547
respecting the problems that come before him. There is provision
also for his removal if neglectful or incompetent, or if guilty of
malfeasance in office.
In the clause in question, we think it is quite reasonable to
interpret the words "together with the inspector of the district"
as meaning that the inspector shall be of the quorum -- shall
participate in any determination that is made. But the matter is
"to be determined by the engineers . . . together with the
inspector." The phrase, of course, admits of the interpretation
that, if the engineers agree, the added approval of the inspector
shall end the matter. We think it not an unreasonable construction
that, if the engineers disagree, they shall submit their
differences to the inspector, and that a determination agreed to by
one of them in conjunction with the inspector shall fulfill the
requirements of the act. It must be remembered that this tribunal
is to settle not a private property right, but a matter affecting
the public safety; hence, in the absence of clear language to the
contrary, the section is open to the construction that, as in other
public matters, a majority of the referees or arbitrators may act.
Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.
S. 180,
218 U. S.
192.
It is further objected that the statute provides for no appeal
from the determination of the tribunal. But in such cases, the
right of appeal on other than constitutional grounds may be
conferred or withheld at the discretion of the legislature. As
already pointed out, an appeal on fundamental grounds in this
instance seems to inhere in the very practice prescribed by the
statute for the enforcement of the determination of the statutory
tribunal. Were this not expressed in the act, it would nonetheless
be implied, at least so far as pertains to any violation of rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356,
118 U. S. 370;
Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.
S. 552,
199 U. S.
562.
Judgment affirmed.
