One's lawful uses of his own property cannot be subjected to the
servitude of the wrongful use by another of the latter's
property.
In an action at law by the owner of a natural product of the
soil, such as flax straw, which he lawfully stored on his own
premises and which was destroyed by fire caused by the negligent
operation of a locomotive engine, to recover the value thereof from
the railroad company operating the engine, it is not a question for
the jury whether the owner was also negligent without other
evidence than that the railroad company preceded the owner in the
establishment of its business, that the property was inflammable in
character, and that it was stored near the railroad right of way
and track.
It is not a question for the jury whether an owner who lawfully
stores his property on his own premises adjacent to a railroad
right of way and track is held to the exercise of reasonable care
to protect it from fire set by the negligence of the railroad
company and not resulting from unavoidable accident or the
reasonably careful conduct of its business.
As respects liability for the destruction by fire of property
lawfully held on private premises adjacent to a railroad right of
way and track, the owner discharges his full legal duty for its
protection if he exercises that care which a reasonably prudent man
would exercise under like circumstances to protect it from the
dangers incident to the operation of the railroad conducted with
reasonable care.
The following questions are certified:
"1. In an action at law by the owner of a natural product of the
soil, such as flax straw, which he lawfully stored on his own
premises, and which was destroyed by fire caused by the negligent
operation of a locomotive engine, to recover the value thereof from
the railroad company operating the engine, is it a question for the
jury whether the owner was also negligent, without other evidence
than
Page 232 U. S. 341
that the railroad company preceded the owner in the
establishment of its business, that the property was inflammable in
character, and that it was stored near the railroad right of way
and track?"
"2. Is it a question for the jury whether an owner who lawfully
stores his property on his own premises adjacent to a railroad
right of way and track is held to the exercise of reasonable care
to protect it from fire set by the negligence of the railroad
company, and not resulting from unavoidable accident or the
reasonably careful conduct of its business?"
"3. As respects liability for the destruction by fire of
property lawfully held on private premises adjacent to a railroad
right of way and track, does the owner discharge his full legal
duty for its protection if he exercises that care which a
reasonably prudent man would exercise under like circumstances to
protect it from the dangers incident to the operation of the
railroad, conducted with reasonable care?"
The LeRoy Fibre Company, plaintiff in error (we will refer to it
as plaintiff), brought an action against defendant in error
(referred to herein as defendant) in a state court of Minnesota to
recover the value of certain flax straw alleged to have been
negligently burned and destroyed by defendant. The cause was
removed to the circuit court for the District of Minnesota, where
it was tried. One of the grounds of negligence set forth was that a
locomotive engine of defendant, while passing the premises of
plaintiff, was so negligently managed and operated by defendant's
employees that it emitted and threw sparks and coals of unusual
size upon the stacks of flax straw, and thereby set fire to and
destroyed them.
The evidence at the trial showed the following without
dispute:
"Some years after defendant had constructed and commenced
operating its line of railroad through Grand Meadow, Minnesota, the
plaintiff established at
Page 232 U. S. 342
that village a factory for the manufacture of tow from flax
straw. The plaintiff had, adjacent to its factory premises, a tract
of ground abutting upon the railroad right of way and approximately
250 by 400 feet in dimension, upon which it stored flax straw it
purchased for use in its manufacturing business. There were about
230 stacks, arranged in two rows, parallel with the right of way.
Each stack contained from three to three and a half tons of straw.
The distance from the center of the railroad track to the fence
along the line of the right of way was 50 feet, from the fence to
the nearest row of stacks, 20 or 25 feet, and from the fence to the
second row of stacks, about 35 feet. A wagon road ran between the
fence and the first row. On April 2, 1907, during a high wind, a
fire started upon one of the stacks in the second row, and as a
result all were consumed. The fire did not reach the stack through
the intervening growth or refuse, but first appeared on the side of
the stack above the ground. The flax straw was inflammable in
character. It was easily ignited and easily burned."
"There was substantial evidence at the trial tending to show
that the fire was started by a locomotive engine of defendant which
had just passed, and that, through the negligent operation of
defendant's employees in charge, it emitted large quantities of
sparks and live cinders, which were carried to the straw stack by a
high wind then prevailing. It was contended at the trial by
defendant that plaintiff itself was negligent, and that its
negligence contributed to the destruction of its property. There
was no evidence that plaintiff was negligent save that it had
placed its property of an inflammable character upon its own
premises so near the railroad tracks -- that is to say, the first
row of stacks, 70 or 75 feet, and the second row, in which the fire
started, about 85 feet from the center of the railroad track. In
other words, the character of the property and its proximity
Page 232 U. S. 343
to an operated railroad, for which plaintiff was responsible,
was the sole evidence of plaintiff's contributory negligence."
"The trial court charged the jury that, though the destruction
of the straw was caused by defendant's negligence, yet if the
plaintiff, in placing and maintaining two rows of stacks of flax
straw within a hundred feet of the center line of the railroad,
failed to exercise that ordinary care to avoid danger of firing its
straw from sparks from engines passing on the railroad that a
person of ordinary prudence would have exercised under like
circumstances, and that the failure contributed to cause the
accident, the plaintiff could not recover. The trial court also
submitted two questions to the jury, as follows:"
"1. Did the Fibre Company, in placing and keeping two rows of
flax straw within 100 feet of the center line of the railroad, fail
to use the care to avoid danger to its straw from sparks of fire
from engines operating on that railroad that a person of ordinary
prudence would have used under like circumstances? 2. Did the
engineer McDonald fail to use that degree of care to prevent sparks
from his engine from firing the stacks as he passed them, on April
2, 1907, that a person of ordinary prudence would have used under
like circumstances?"
"The jury answered both questions in the affirmative, and found
a general verdict for the defendant. Judgment was accordingly
entered for defendant. The plaintiff duly saved exceptions to the
charge of the court regarding its contributory negligence and to
the submission of the first question to the jury, and has assigned
the action of the court as error. "
Page 232 U. S. 348
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions certified present two facts -- (1) the negligence
of the railroad was the immediate cause of the destruction of the
property; (2) the property was placed
Page 232 U. S. 349
by its owner near the right of way of the railroad, but on the
owner's own land.
The query is made in the first two questions whether the latter
fact constituted evidence of negligence of the owner, to be
submitted to the jury. It will be observed the use of the land was
of itself a proper use -- it did not interfere with nor embarrass
the rightful operation of the railroad. It is manifest, therefore,
the questions certified, including the third question, are but
phases of the broader one, whether one is limited in the use of
one's property by its proximity to a railroad -- or, to limit the
proposition to the case under review, whether one is subject in its
use to the careless as well as to the careful operation of the
road. We might not doubt that an immediate answer in the negative
should be given if it were not for the hesitation of the circuit
court of appeals, evinced by its questions, and the decisions of
some courts in the affirmative. That one's uses of his property may
be subject to the servitude of the wrongful use by another of his
property seems an anomaly. It upsets the presumptions of law, and
takes from him the assumption, and the freedom which comes from the
assumption, that the other will obey the law, not violate it. It
casts upon him the duty of not only using his own property so as
not to injure another, but so to use his own property that it may
not be injured by the wrongs of another. How far can this
subjection be carried? Or, confining the question to railroads,
what limits shall be put upon their immunity from the result of
their wrongful operation? In the case at bar, the property
destroyed is described as inflammable, but there are degrees of
that quality, and how wrongful must be the operation? In this case,
large quantities of sparks and "live cinders" were emitted from the
passing engine. Houses may be said to be inflammable, and may be,
as they have been, set on fire by sparks and cinders from defective
or carelessly handled locomotives. Are they to be subject, as well
as
Page 232 U. S. 350
stacks of flax straw, to such lawless operation? And is the use
of farms also, the cultivation of which the building of the
railroad has preceded? Or is that a use which the railroad must
have anticipated, and to which it hence owes a duty which it does
not owe to other uses? And why? The question is especially
pertinent, and immediately shows that the rights of one man in the
use of his property cannot be limited by the wrongs of another. The
doctrine of contributory negligence is entirely out of place.
Depart from the simple requirement of the law that everyone must
use his property so as not to injure others and you pass to
refinements and confusing considerations. There is no embarrassment
in the principle even to the operation of a railroad. Such
operation is a legitimate use of property; other property in its
vicinity may suffer inconveniences and be subject to risks by it,
but a risk from wrongful operation is not one of them.
The legal conception of property is of rights. When you attempt
to limit them by wrongs, you venture a solecism. If you declare a
right is subject to a wrong, you confound the meaning of both. It
is difficult to deal with the opposing contention. There are some
principles that have axiomatic character. The tangibility of
property is in its uses, and that the uses by one owner of his
property may be limited by the wrongful use of another owner of his
is a contradiction. But let us pass from principle to
authority.
Grand Trunk Railroad Company v. Richardson,
91 U. S. 454, was
an action for damages for the destruction of a sawmill, lumber
shed, and other buildings and manufactured lumber by fire
communicated by a locomotive engine of a railroad. Some of the
buildings were erected in part on the company's land near its
track, and the railroad company requested the court to charge the
jury that the erection of the buildings or the storing of lumber so
near the company's track, as the evidence showed, was an
Page 232 U. S. 351
improvident or careless act, and that, if such location
contributed in any degree to the loss which ensued, then the
plaintiffs could not recover, even though the fire was communicated
by the railroad company's locomotive. The court refused the request
and its action was sustained. MR. JUSTICE STRONG, speaking for the
Court, said:
"Such a location, if there was a license [for it, it not then
being a trespass], was a lawful use of its property by the
plaintiffs, and they did not lose their right to compensation for
its loss occasioned by the negligence of the defendant.
Cook v.
Champlain Transp. Co., 1 Denio, 91;
Fero v. Railroad,
22 N.Y. 215."
In
Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. South Fork Coal Co.,
139 F. 530, there was the destruction of lumber placed on the
railroad's right of way by permission of the railroad. It was
destroyed by fire occurring through the negligent operation of the
railroad's trains. Contributory negligence was urged against the
right of recovery. The court (Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit), commenting on the cases cited by the railroad,
said:
"But, insofar as the opinions go upon the theory that a
plaintiff must lose his right of compensation for the negligent
destruction of his own property, situated upon his own premises,
because he had exposed it to dangers which could come to it only
through the negligence of the railroad company, they do not meet
our approval."
After citing cases, the court continued:
"The rights of persons to the use and enjoyment of their own
property are held upon no such tenure as this. The principle would
forbid the use of property for many purposes if in such proximity
to a railroad track as to expose it to dangers attributable to the
negligent management of its business."
Other cases might be adduced. They are cited in Thompson on
Negligence, § 2314, and Shearman and Redfield on Negligence,
§ 680, for the principle that an owner of property is not
limited in the uses of his property by its
Page 232 U. S. 352
proximity to a railroad, or subject to other risks than those
which come from the careful operation of the road or unavoidable
accident.
The first and second questions we answer in the negative, and
the third question in the affirmative.
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, partially concurring:
The first two questions concern a standard of conduct, and
therefore that which, in its nature and in theory, is a question of
law. In this, I gather, we all agree, although the proposition
often is forgotten or denied. But, while the standard is external
to the judgment of the party concerned, and must be known and
conformed to by him at his peril (
The Germanic,
196 U. S. 589,
196 U. S.
596), courts, by a practice that seems at first sight an
abdication of their function where it is most needed, but that I
dare say is justified by good sense, in nice cases leave the
standard to the jury as well as the facts. In the questions before
us, however, the elements supposed are few and frequently
recurring, so that, but for what I have to say, I should be very
content to find that we were able to lay down the proper rule
without a jury's aid. Furthermore, with regard to what that rule
should be, I agree, for the purposes of argument, that, as a
general proposition, people are entitled to assume that their
neighbors will conform to the law; that a negligent tort is
unlawful in as full a sense as a malicious one, and therefore that
they are entitled to assume that their neighbors will not be
negligent.
Nevertheless, I am not prepared to answer the first question
"no," if it is to be answered at all. We are bound to consider
that, at a trial, the case would be presented with more facts --
that this case was presented with at least one more fact bearing
upon the right to recover -- I mean the distance. If a man stacked
his flax so near to a railroad
Page 232 U. S. 353
that it obviously was likely to be set fire to by a well managed
train, I should say that he could not throw the loss upon the
railroad by the oscillating result of an inquiry by the jury
whether the road had used due care. I should say that, although, of
course, he had a right to put his flax where he liked upon his own
land, the liability of the railroad for a fire was absolutely
conditioned upon the stacks' being at a reasonably safe distance
from the train. I take it that probably many -- certainly some --
rules of law based on less than universal considerations are made
absolute and universal in order to limit those over-refined
speculations that we all deprecate, especially where such rules are
based upon or affect the continuous physical relations of material
things. The right that is given to inflict various inconveniences
upon neighboring lands by building or digging is given, I presume,
because of the public interest in making improvement free, yet it
generally is made absolute by the common law. It is not thought
worthwhile to let the right to build or maintain a barn depend upon
the speculations of a jury as to motives. A defect in the highway,
declared a defect in the interest of the least competent travelers
that can travel unattended without taking legal risks, or in the
interest of the average man, I suppose to be a defect as to all.
And as, in this case, the distinction between the inevitable and
the negligent escape of sparks is one of the most refined in the
world, I think that I must be right so far as to the law in the
case supposed.
If I am right so far, a very important element in determining
the right to recover is whether the plaintiff's flax was so near to
the track as to be in danger from even a prudently managed engine.
Here certainly, except in a clear case, we should call in the jury.
I do not suppose that anyone would call it prudent to stack flax
within 5 feet of the engines, or imprudent to do it at a distance
of half a mile, and it would not be absurd if the law
ultimately
Page 232 U. S. 354
should formulate an exact measure, as it has tended to in other
instances (
Martin v. District of Columbia, 205 U.
S. 135,
205 U. S.
139); but at present, I take it that, if the question I
suggest be material, we should let the jury decide whether 70 feet
was too near by the criterion that I have proposed. Therefore,
while the majority answer the first question "np" on the ground
that the railroad is liable upon the facts stated as matter of law,
I should answer it "yes," with the proviso that it was to be
answered "no" in case the jury found that the flax, although near,
was not near enough to the trains to endanger it if the engines
were prudently managed, or else I should decline to answer the
question because it fails to state the distance of the stacks.
I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that
my view depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so
as soon as it is civilized.
See Nash v. United States,
229 U. S. 373,
229 U. S.
376-377. Negligence is all degree -- that of the
defendant here, degree of the nicest sort, and between the
variations according to distance that I suppose to exist, and the
simple universality of the rules in the Twelve Tables, or the
Leges Barbarorum, there lies the culture of two thousand
years.
I am authorized to say that the CHIEF JUSTICE concurs in the
opinion that I express.
