In this case, this Court thinks there was sufficient evidence as
to the authority of the agent to make the agreement to support the
verdict against the principal, and that the jury was warranted in
finding that an agreement had been reached before certain questions
reserved for further consideration had been raised.
The evidence tending to show that the agreement was a compromise
between a mortgagee and a lienor in view of doubts that had arisen
as to which had priority, this Court agrees with the lower courts
that there was no guaranty as to the exact status of the lien
either as to amount or priority.
Improprieties in remarks of counsel in addressing the jury may
be cured by the instructions of the trial judge.
Where the record does not show that an objection was raised upon
the appeal to the territorial Supreme Court, it cannot be
considered by this Court.
Gila Valley Ry. v. Hall, ante,
p.
232 U. S. 94.
13 Ariz. 418 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the validity of a verdict and judgment
for damages for breach of contract obtained in the territorial
courts, are stated in the opinion.
Page 232 U. S. 107
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Thomas Haverty Company, defendant in error, sued the Bank of
Arizona in a district court of the Territory of Arizona to recover
$9,313.90 upon a special agreement set out in the complaint
substantially as follows: that in February, 1908, the company had a
claim against one John Noble for $14,306, for materials furnished
and work done in the construction of the Noble Building, in
Phoenix, Arizona; that the company had taken the necessary steps,
under the provisions of the mechanics' lien statutes, to fix a lien
upon the building and the lands on which it stood; that in March,
1908, the company instituted a suit to enforce the lien and the
payment of the claim; that Noble, one Hugo Richards, and others
were joined as defendants in that action; that Richards at the time
held a mortgage upon the premises, which had been given to him for
the use and benefit of the Bank of Arizona, the bank being the real
party in interest; that, while the action was pending and on or
about November 30, 1908, it was agreed between the bank and the
Haverty Company that, if the company would prosecute its suit to
judgment, the bank would buy its demand and claim of
Page 232 U. S. 108
lien and pay the company for it the sum of $9,313.90 upon
assignment of the judgment to the bank, the sum just mentioned
being the amount claimed by the company ($14,306) less the sum of
$4,992.10, which was the value of two boilers and a certain heating
apparatus and certain tools furnished by the Haverty Company and
used in the construction of the building and for which the company
claimed a lien, which boilers, heating apparatus, and tools the
company was to be at liberty to remove from the building if this
could be done without injury thereto; that thereupon the company
agreed to sell to the bank its demand against Noble and its claim
for a lien upon the premises, and agreed to prosecute the action
thereon to judgment, and to assign the judgment to the bank; that
the company proceeded with its action, and recovered therein a
judgment for $12,429.22, with a foreclosure of its lien, and that
thereafter the company was ready and offered to assign the judgment
to the bank, but the bank refused to receive it or to pay the
agreed sum of $9,313.90 for it.
The bank, by demurrer to the complaint, and afterwards by
answer, interposed the defense that the company had failed to
perform the agreement, in that it had recovered a judgment for only
$12,429.22, and that, although the claim for lien set up by the
company in its suit against Noble was one alleged to be prior and
superior to the lien of the mortgage held by Richards for the
benefit of the bank, it was by the judgment in that suit determined
to be inferior and subordinate to the bank's lien.
There was a trial by jury, in the course of which it appeared
that the alleged agreement, if made at all, was made between
attorneys representing the Haverty Company, and attorneys
representing the bank. The principal questions of fact were whether
the agreement was made substantially as alleged, and, if so, then
whether the bank's attorneys were specially authorized to make
it
Page 232 U. S. 109
or whether the bank afterwards ratified their action with
knowledge of the facts. There was a verdict for the plaintiff for
the full amount claimed, and, on appeal, the resulting judgment was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the territory (13 Ariz. 418),
whereupon the present writ of error was sued out.
It is insisted that the evidence fails to show that the
attorneys who acted for the bank were authorized by it to enter
into the alleged agreement to purchase the Haverty claim. But we
think there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the
jury in favor of plaintiff upon this question.
It is also insisted that the parties never in fact came to an
agreement, because an item of about $100 for certain freight
charges was left open for further consideration. But the jury was
warranted by the evidence in finding that an agreement had in fact
been reached before the question respecting freight was raised.
The principal contention here, as in the court below, is that
the agreement alleged and proved was not performed, in that the
Haverty Company did not prosecute its claim to judgment, the claim
having been for $14,306, with a prior lien upon the building and
lots, but subject to a deduction of $4,992.10, provided the boilers
and tools could be removed without injury to the building, while
the judgment recovered was for $12,429.22, with a lien subordinate
to the bank's mortgage. We agree with the court below that neither
the averments of the complaint nor the evidence at the trial
imported a guaranty on the part of the Haverty Company as to the
exact amount of the judgment or the precise status of the lien. The
evidence tended to show that the agreement was made as a compromise
between the bank and the Haverty Company in view of doubts that had
arisen whether, in law the lien of the Haverty Company was entitled
to priority over the bank's mortgage.
Page 232 U. S. 110
Error is assigned respecting certain remarks made by counsel for
plaintiff in addressing the jury; but if there was any impropriety,
it was cured by the instructions of the trial judge.
The only other point deserving notice is the contention that the
motion of plaintiff in error (defendant below) for a direction of a
verdict in its favor ought to have been granted because of §
4, c. 99, p. 230, Session Laws 1907 of Arizona, which is in effect
that a contract for sale of any chose in action of the value of
$500 or upwards shall not be enforceable unless some note or
memorandum in writing be signed by the party to be charged, or his
agent. Assuming -- what is not clear -- that the point was brought
to the attention of the trial court, it is sufficient for present
purposes to say that there is nothing in the record to show that
the question was raised upon the appeal to the territorial supreme
court.
Gila Valley &c. Railway Co. v. Hall, ante, p.
232 U. S. 94, and
cases cited.
Judgment affirmed.