Whether due effect was given by the state court to a judgment
rendered in the circuit court of the United States present a
federal question which give this Court jurisdiction to review the
judgment of the state court, and to determine the question this
Court will examine the judgment in the federal court, the pleading
and the issue and, if necessary, the opinion rendered.
Where the suit in which the former judgment is set up is not
upon the identical cause of action, the estoppel operate only as to
matters in issue or points controverted and actually decided in the
former suit.
Judgments become estoppels because they affect matters upon
which the parties have been heard, but are not conclusive upon
matters not in question or immaterial.
Reynolds v.
Stockton, 140 U. S. 254.
In a suit in which two of the parties successfully unite in
asking the court to award the fund to one of them against a third
party claiming it under an assignment, the judgment is not, as
between the two so uniting,
res judicata so that the one
to whom it is awarded is not obligated to account therefor to the
other under an agreement so to do if the record does not show that
such question was also at issue and determined.
167 Mich. 135 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the effect to be given by the state
court to a former judgment in a suit between some of the parties
rendered by the circuit court of the United States and the extent
to which such judgment was
res judicata of the matters in
controversy, are stated in the opinion.
Page 231 U. S. 727
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Elijah E. Myers brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Wayne
County, State of Michigan, against George W. Radford, the plaintiff
in error herein, for an accounting and for a decree for the balance
due him from a judgment in a suit of the former in which the latter
acted as one of his attorneys and received the amount of the
judgment. Myers having died during the pendency of the action, it
was revived in the name of his executrix, the defendant in error.
The decree of the circuit court in favor of the
Page 231 U. S. 728
defendant in error was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
State of Michigan (167 Mich. 135), and the case comes here on
error.
The record discloses that Myers had entered into a contract with
the County of Luzerne, State of Pennsylvania, to furnish the plans
and specifications for a courthouse, and had certain claims against
the county arising therefrom. Counsel had been employed and suit
commenced, but little progress made. Myers had assigned a one-half
interest in the contract to his son, George W. Myers. In this state
of affairs, the elder Myers employed the plaintiff in error, who
had theretofore been his attorney, and to whom he was indebted, to
prosecute the courthouse claim. To secure his indebtedness to
Radford, Myers assigned his remaining one-half interest in the
claim to the plaintiff in error. Later, April 2, 1900, George W.
Myers assigned his one-half interest to the plaintiff in error, the
latter to account to him for the proceeds after deducting a $1,000
attorney's fee and one-half of the costs, to which assignment
Elijah E. Myers gave his written assent, and shortly thereafter,
April 11, 1900, George W. Myers, in consideration of $150,
transferred his interest in his prior assignment and in the
assignment from his father to him to the plaintiff in error.
The plaintiff in error engaged local counsel in Pennsylvania,
who commenced suit in the United States Circuit Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, and prosecuted the courthouse
claim to a successful termination (
Myers v. Luzerne
County, 124 F. 436). Thereupon George W. Myers intervened in
that suit, setting up his right to one-half of the judgment,
claiming that his assignment to Radford had been fraudulently
obtained, and one-half of the amount of the judgment was paid into
court. Upon the petition of the plaintiff in error to remove the
money, the jurat of which was signed by Elijah E. Myers, the court
decreed that the
Page 231 U. S. 729
assignment was valid, and awarded the fund to Radford, and
dismissed George W. Myers' claim.
Elijah E. Myers thereafter brought this suit, alleging, among
other things, that Radford, on April 11, 1900, acting on his
behalf, purchased the one-half interest assigned by him to George
W. Myers, and that, at that time, it was distinctly understood and
agreed between the plaintiff in error and himself that the one-half
interest so purchased, with the one-half interest assigned by him
to Radford, should be held as security for the payment of all his
indebtedness to Radford for loans and services, and for the payment
of the $150 given by Radford to George W. Myers, and all costs in
the litigation of the courthouse claim, and that, after deducting
such amounts from the judgment collected, the plaintiff in error
should pay the balance to him. The plaintiff in error contended
that the judgment in the United States circuit court was
res
judicata as to his right to the one-half interest in the
courthouse claim assigned to him by George W. Myers. He further
alleged, however, that, notwithstanding his absolute ownership of
the George W. Myers one-half interest, he purchased it with the
distinct intention that he would apply for the benefit of Elijah E.
Myers the balance, if he succeeded in collecting the claim, after
paying expenses and services and all Myers' indebtedness to him.
But, he alleged, he did not intend to waive his right as absolute
owner, or allow Myers to dictate the amount of expenses, services,
or indebtedness. The circuit court entered a decree for the balance
due Myers.
The supreme court held that the assignment of April 2, 1900, was
merged in the assignment of April 11, 1900, and also held that the
federal decision in Pennsylvania had not determined that the trust
relation between the plaintiff in error and Elijah E. Myers had
terminated, as to which holdings the plaintiff in error assigns
error, upon the failure of the supreme court to give due credit in
those
Page 231 U. S. 730
respects to the judgment of the United States circuit court.
From the foregoing statement, it is evident that the sole
federal question involved arises from the alleged denial in the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan of due effect to the
judgment rendered in the United States circuit court in
Pennsylvania, which is relied upon by the plaintiff in error as
res judicata of the matters in controversy. Whether such
effect was given as the former judgment required presents a federal
question for determination.
National Foundry & Pipe Works
v. Oconto Water Supply Co., 183 U. S. 216,
183 U. S. 233.
To determine this issue, we examine the judgment in the former
case, the pleadings filed and the issues made, and, if necessary to
elucidate the matters decided, the opinion of the court which
rendered the judgment.
National Foundry & Pipe Works v.
Oconto Water Supply Co., supra, 183 U. S. 234,
and previous cases in this Court therein cited.
As the suit in the Michigan court was not upon the identical
cause of action litigated in the United States circuit court, the
estoppel operates only as to matters in issue or points
controverted and actually decided in that suit.
Cromwell v. Sac
County, 94 U. S. 351;
Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S.
1,
168 U. S. 50;
Troxell v. Del., Lack. & West. R. Co., 227 U.
S. 434,
227 U. S.
440.
Applying these familiar principles, how stands the present case?
The elder Myers brought this suit upon the theory that the amount
of the judgment which had been paid over to Radford on August 22,
1903, which the Supreme Court of Michigan found was $12,711.23, was
held in trust and to be accounted for by Radford to him because of
the agreement set up in the complaint in the state court, already
referred to. The record of the proceedings in the United States
circuit court shows that one-half of the money due upon the claim
of Elijah E. Myers against Luzerne County had been paid into court
in the original suit of Myers against Luzerne County.
Page 231 U. S. 731
Radford had filed a petition asking for the payment of the money
to him as the owner of the judgment. George W. Myers, as
respondent, filed an answer, claiming the amount in court, and
attacking his assignment to Radford. It was upon that petition and
answer and testimony that the case was heard and the following
order made:
"
I
n the United States Circuit Court for the"
"
Middle District of Pennsylvania, February Term,
1903."
"
No. 3"
"
Elijah E. Myers"
"
v."
"
County of Luzerne."
"
I
n the Matter of Petition of George W. Radford to"
"
Take Money Out of Court."
"At a Session of said Court Hold at Scranton, in said district,
on the 31st Day of July, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Three."
"Present: Honorable R. W. Archbald, District Judge."
"The above matter having heretofore been heard upon said
petition, answers, and proofs, and the same having been argued by
counsel for petitioner, as well as for the respondent,
respectively, and due consideration had thereon, it is now ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the assignment from respondent to
petitioner of the 11th day of April, one thousand nine hundred, is
valid, and an absolute assignment of all the interest of said
respondent in the said contract between Elijah E. Myers and the
county commissioners of Luzerne County of date February 22, 1895,
and that the fund in court be awarded to petitioner, George W.
Radford, and that the claim of George W. Myers, respondent, be
dismissed, with costs to be taxed against said respondent."
A reading of this order, which is said to embody the federal
judgment relied upon by the plaintiff in error as
res
judicata of the present controversy, shows that the only
matter adjudged concerned the assignment from the
Page 231 U. S. 732
respondent (George W. Myers) to the petitioner (Radford), of
date the 11th day of April, 1900, the court holding that it was an
absolute assignment of the interest of the respondent in the
contract between Elijah E. Myers and the county of Luzerne,
awarding the fund in court (which was one-half of that recovery) to
the petitioner, and decreeing that the claim of the respondent be
dismissed and that he pay all the costs. Certainly there is nothing
in that judgment to conclude the present suit in the state court
between Elijah E. Myers and Radford. The proceeding in the United
States circuit court in Pennsylvania is specifically limited to the
controversy between Radford and the respondent in that proceeding,
George W. Myers. If there could be any doubt as to the effect of
the order, the opinion of Judge Archbald, found in the record,
shows how the matter was regarded by him. The opinion recites that,
a verdict having been rendered in favor of Elijah E. Myers, because
of a controversy with respect to one-half of it, leave of court had
been given to pay one-half of the judgment into court, and that the
petitioner, Radford, and George W. Myers, by each of whom ownership
was asserted, by pleadings and proof, had submitted the matter to
that court, and that it had jurisdiction to determine to whom the
fund belonged. After referring to the original contract and the
various steps to collect the money from the County of Luzerne and
the assignment of a one-half interest from the elder Myers to his
son in 1896, Judge Archbald said:
"Col. Myers explained to Mr. Radford that one-half the contract
had already been assigned to George, and it was recognized that, if
he held on to the assignment there would be little, if anything,
coming to Col. Myers after he had settled with Radford. But it was
stated by Col. Myers that the assignment was without consideration,
and if he succeeded, as he hoped, in getting George to surrender
it, then Radford was to account to him for that
Page 231 U. S. 733
interest also, after deducting for expenses and services. The
trust relation so established still continues."
The opinion then goes on to consider elaborately the claim of
George W. Myers to the one-half interest paid into court, as
against Radford, and finds that the assignment of April 11, 1900,
was a valid sale from George W. Myers to Radford, and that the
assignment was absolute in form, and intended by George W. Myers as
a complete disposition to Radford for $150 of the one-half interest
derived from his father. The judge concludes his opinion by
directing that an order be drawn awarding the fund to Radford and
dismissing the claim of George W. Myers with costs. Thereupon the
order which we have already set forth was made.
The fact that the order was made in an intervention in the
original suit of
Myers v. Luzerne County, and that Myers
verified the petition filed by Radford, asking to have the fund in
court paid over to the latter, did not raise any issue between
Elijah E. Myers and Radford as to the alleged agreement that
Radford should account to Myers for the fund. And the fact that
both Elijah E. Myers and Radford were parties in the same suit did
not have the effect to submit the controversy made in the present
litigation to the decision of the United States circuit court.
Judgments become estoppels because they affect matters upon which
the parties have been heard or have had an opportunity to be heard,
but are not conclusive upon matters not in question or immaterial.
Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254,
140 U. S.
268-269.
It seems very clear that there was nothing in this proceeding,
in the issues made, or the judgment rendered, that in any wise
concluded the right of Elijah E. Myers to bring suit, which he
subsequently prosecuted in the state court, calling upon Radford
for an accounting concerning the proceeds of the judgment in his
hands.
Judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed.