Carriers, whether saw-mill companies or railroads or both
combined, cannot purchase land by rebating to the grantor a part of
the freight rate on interstate shipments over the road built on the
right of way. A rebate made for purchase of land is illegal even
though much less that the value of the land acquired.
The prohibition of the Act to Regulate Commerce against rebates
cannot be evaded by calling them differentials or concessions, nor
by taking the money from a corporation that is the same as the
rebating carrier.
97 Ark. 623 reversed.
The facts, which involve the right, under the Act to Regulate
Commerce, of a carrier to pay rebates to a shipper in consideration
of a right of way granted by the latter, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 230 U. S. 318
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Bryant Lumber Company had its mill and sawmill plant at or
near Bigelow, Arkansas, on the Rock Island Railroad. The Fourche
Lumber Company's plant was located near by on a spur track laid
about a mile from the main line of the Rock Island R. Co. Both of
these lumber companies owned timber in a rough, hilly country which
could only be reached by a railroad belonging to the Bryant
Company. The Fourche Lumber Company had already built a road on
this land, claiming that it had been granted a right of way by the
Bryant Company, and had applied for a railroad charter. This
application was resisted by the Bryant Company, which denied that
it had made any grant of a right of way. Finally, and in order to
avoid threatened litigation, the parties, in August, 1905, entered
into an agreement in which, among many other matters, it was
provided that a charter should be granted to the Fourche River
Valley & Indian Territory R. Co., to be organized by the
Fourche Company; that the Bryant Company would grant this Fourche
Railroad a right of way, and that the Fourche Company was to
Page 230 U. S. 319
arrange for the building of switches to enable the Bryant
Company to reach its timber, which was to be transported at 37 1/2
cents per 1,000, and that
"the price for hauling future-acquired lumber of the Bryant
Company over the Fourche R. V. & I.T. R. Co. should be fixed by
a board of arbitrators, who should have authority to settle any
differences that might arise between the parties as to the details
of carrying out the contract,"
and
"so that the Bryant Company might be secured against any
discrimination in favor of the Fourche Company in the transaction
of its business, and the Fourche Company shall be required to carry
timber and other freight equally without discrimination for or
against the Bryant Company."
The Fourche Company agreed that it would cause the contract to
be ratified by the Fourche River Valley & Indian Territory R.
Co. Thereafter, the contract was carried out; the Fourche R. Co.
was incorporated; the Bryant Company made to it a conveyance of the
right of way, as stipulated; the railroad was constructed and
hauled freight in intrastate and interstate commerce.
There was evidence that all of the stock of the railroad, except
one or two qualifying shares, were held by the persons who owned
the Fourche Lumber Company, but the two corporations kept separate
books, and when the railroad made dividends, they were paid to its
stockholders of record.
In August, 1907, differences arose between the parties, and
under the provisions of the contract the Bryant Company demanded an
arbitration of several matters in issue -- among others, submitting
to the board the following proposition:
"Fourth. That the Fourche River Lumber Company, through the
Fourche River Valley & Indian Territory Railroad Company, shall
secure to the Bryant Lumber Company from the Fourche River Valley
& Indian Territory Railroad Company, the same freight
concessions as
Page 230 U. S. 320
are now enjoyed by the Fourche River Lumber Company through its
interest and the interest of its owners in the Fourche River Valley
& Indian Territory Railroad Company."
The arbitrators found in favor of the Bryant Company, and, the
terms of the award not having been complied with, the Bryant
Company brought suit against the Fourche Lumber Company.
It appears that, under the blanket rate, then of force, the same
rate of freight was charged from any point in Arkansas to St.
Louis, to Memphis, or to Oklahoma points. Out of this through rate,
the Rock Island allowed 2, 3, and 3 1/2 cents to the Fourche R. Co.
on all lumber originating on such road and shipped over the Rock
Island to St. Louis, Memphis, or Oklahoma. This division of through
rate between the two roads on interstate shipments was noted on the
tariffs filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
On the trial, the president of the Bryant Company testified that
it had shipped 13,251,759 pounds of lumber in interstate shipments,
and on it the Bryant Company claimed 2 cents per 100.
Being asked what was the basis of the claim, he said:
"They are getting it."
"Q. Who is getting it?"
"A. The Fourche River Vy. & Indian River R. Co., which are
the same people as the Fourche River Lumber Co."
"Q. They are two separate and distinct corporations?"
"A. Yes."
In reference to the claim for failing to lay the tracks and
switches as agreed, he was asked:
"Did the Fourche R. Co. furnish you with a profile?"
"A. I don't know that it was the railroad company, it was the
lumber company, I think."
"Q. Who did you get the profile from? The lumber company or the
railroad company?"
"A. I don't know. To me, they are all the same."
"Q. I understand that; it is to your advantage to have them all
the same; but as a matter of fact, from which institution did you
get the profile?"
"A. I could look
Page 230 U. S. 321
at the papers and see which one wrote the letter, but it is the
same people all the time."
The defendant excepted to the refusal of the court to instruct
the jury that
"a payment to the plaintiff of the differentials provided in the
award of the arbitrators would be granting to the Bryant Company of
a rebate forbidden by law, enabling the Bryant Company to transport
its goods at less than the tariff rate, and you will find for the
defendant on that issue."
Instead of giving the charge requested, the court instructed the
jury that,
"under the contract, and findings of the arbitrators, the
Fourche Lumber Company was required to pay the Bryant Company the
same differentials that the Fourche R. Co. received on interstate
shipments of the Fourche Lumber Company. If you find from the
testimony that the Fourche R. Co. has received certain
differentials from the Rock Island on interstate shipments, and
that the Fourche Lumber Company has not paid to the Bryant Lumber
Company the same differentials on lumber that the Bryant Company
has shipped to the same territory, then you are instructed that the
defendant (Fourche Company) is indebted to the Bryant Company the
amount of any such differentials which it has not paid."
A judgment on the verdict rendered in accordance with this
charge having been affirmed, the Fourche Lumber Company brought the
case here, insisting that the charge and verdict were in violation
of the Interstate Commerce Act, and, in effect, amounted to the
giving of a rebate to the Bryant Lumber Company. The latter replies
that the suit is against the Fourche Lumber Company, and that there
is no law preventing one company from paying the whole or any part
of the freight due by another. That may be true, but not where that
other party is sued as being in effect a common carrier, engaged in
interstate commerce. The arbitration was demanded and the award
made on the theory that, inasmuch as the contract provided that
there should be no discrimination, the Bryant Company
Page 230 U. S. 322
was entitled to receive from the Fourche Lumber Company
"the same freight concessions as are now enjoyed by the Fourche
Lumber Company through its interest and the interest of its owners
in the Fourche Railroad."
This suit is based upon the assumption that the two companies
are identical in fact, though different in name.
Thus treating it, the case is as though the Bryant Lumber
Company had sued the Fourche Lumber Company, doing business as an
interstate carrier, for so much of the through rate as had been
paid to it on the division by the Rock Island for hauling the
Bryant Company's shipments of lumber. To state the proposition is
to manifest its illegality, and to show that thereby the Bryant
Company would get a reduction on all of its lumber originating on
the Fourche line.
The Fourche Railroad was not only incorporated as a common
carrier, but is treated as such by the Interstate Commerce
Commission; and, under the filed tariffs of the Rock Island road,
receives a part of the through rate on all lumber originating upon
the line and shipped in interstate commerce. The status of this
road is discussed in Tap Line case, 23 I.C.C. 549, and its right to
a division of the freight recognized notwithstanding the fact that
the stockholders are the same as those who own the shares of the
Fourche Lumber Company. But it receives this part of the through
rate not as a concession, but for services actually rendered by it
as a common carrier in hauling freight for part of the distance
between the point of origin and the point of destination. In any
other view, it would have been unlawful for the Rock Island to pay,
and, if so, no agreement to divide such unlawful receipts would be
enforced by the courts. On the other hand, if the Fourche Railroad
was lawfully paid for services in hauling the lumber, it would be
illegal, directly or through a subsidiary, to give to the shipper a
part of such joint rate under any pretext whatever. Carriers,
whether sawmill
Page 230 U. S. 323
companies or railroads, or both combined, cannot purchase land
by rebating to the grantor a part of the freight rate on interstate
shipments over the road built on the right of way, even though the
amount of such rebate was much less than the value of the land thus
acquired.
Cf. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Mottley, 219 U. S. 467;
United States v. Lehigh Valley Railroad, 220 U.
S. 257;
United States v. Union Stock Yards,
226 U. S. 287,
226 U. S.
308.
The commerce act prohibits the payment of rebates, and its
command cannot be evaded by calling them differentials or
concessions, nor by taking the money from the railroad itself or
from a company that is proved to be the same as the railroad.
Otherwise nothing would be easier than for lumber companies to
charter a railroad, collect freight as a railroad, but pay it out
as a lumber company to shippers.
The suit in the present case proceeds on the theory that the
Fourche Lumber Company and the Fourche Railroad are the same, and
that therefore the division of the through rate allowed to the
railroad was in fact received and enjoyed by the lumber company.
And yet, notwithstanding that fact, it is claimed that, if the
Fourche Lumber Company should, under the contract, pay a part of
that freight to the Bryant Company, it would do so as a sawmill,
and not as a carrier. The law will not permit such a chameleon-like
change. The Fourche Lumber Company and the Fourche Railroad are
either the same or different. If they are the same, it cannot
refund a part of the rate to the Bryant Company. If they are
different, the Fourche Lumber Company was not bound by the terms of
the contract to make the payment now demanded. The court below
found that they were the same, and not different, and it results
that its judgment must be
Reversed.