During the lifetime of the ancestor, no heir has a vested right
to inherit from him, and heirs only have such rights of inheritance
as are given to them by the laws in force at their ancestor's
death.
It is not an interference with vested rights to prescribe the
mode of procedure, or the time within which to enforce them,
provided reasonable time be given therefor.
Under the laws of Porto Rico, while Law Eleven of Toro as to
effect of acts of recognition of rights of natural children may be
in force, the provisions of § 133 and 137 of the Code of 1902
must be complied with in order to enforce such rights, and this
applies to persons whose alleged parent died prior to the enactment
of the Code.
Decisions of the courts of Spain rendered after 1898, construing
Spanish law applicable to possessions ceded to the United States,
although entitled to great consideration, do not preclude the local
court from reaching an independent judgment.
16 P.R. 593 affirmed.
5 P.R. 191 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the law of Porto
Rico in regard to actions for acknowledgment of natural children,
are stated in the opinion.
Page 227 U. S. 376
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
The first of these suits was brought by the appellant, in 1908,
it would seem, to have herself declared a natural daughter and
entitled to a share of the estate of Don Santiago Rijos Correa, who
died on April 29, 1869. The appellees demurred to the complaint on
the grounds adverted to in
Burnet v. Desmornes y Alvarez,
226 U. S. 145. By
the Civil Code of 1889, Art. 137, actions for the acknowledgment of
natural children can be instituted only during the life of the
presumed parents, or, if the parent dies during the minority of the
child, within the first four years of its majority. If the
appellant was not of age at the death of Correa, she reached
majority at the latest in 1893, and the action was barred in 1897.
(Under the Code of 1902, § 199, the action is allowed only for
two years after coming of age.) The supreme court sustained the
demurrer and dismissed the complaint.
The second suit, begun in June, 1909, had a similar object. The
appellant alleged that she was born on August 4, 1875, and was a
natural child of Damian Morell; that he left her mother and married
in 1880; in 1889, removed to Mallorca, and died on December 29,
1899. On demurrer, the bill was dismissed by the district court,
following the authority of the foregoing decision of the supreme
court. (We may assume that, as the plaintiff retained her domicil
in Porto Rico, and as a considerable part of the estate consisted
of land in the same place, the possible bearing on the case of the
removal of Morell to Spain need not be considered.)
The appellants say that, at the time of their birth, the
Page 227 U. S. 377
law in force was Law Eleven of Toro (Law 1, Title 5, bk. 10,
Novisima Recopilacion); that, under that law, they acquired the
status and rights of natural children by the facts alleged in their
complaints, without the need of acknowledgment by public document
or judicial approval, as required in the Civil Code of 1889, Art.
133, and so that they were entitled to sue for their share of the
inheritance at once.
So far as the second case goes, perhaps it would be a sufficient
answer to say that, during the lifetime of an ancestor, no heir has
a vested right to inherit from him; that the Civil Code of 1889
confines the right of natural children to inherit to those children
that are acknowledged (Art. 134); that is, presumably, to those
that are acknowledged as it provides, and since heirs have only
such rights of inheritance as are given to them by the laws in
force at their ancestor's death, that there is no reason why the
appellant should take greater ones because she had been informally
acknowledged before 1889.
But in the first case, the alleged parent died before the Civil
Code was enacted, and so it would seem that the plaintiff had
ground for claiming rights by inheritance vested before that date.
But this claim was met by the supreme court by a reference to the
statement of motives for the Civil Code, which reads that, if it
was proper to give effect to rights acquired under prior
legislation, no consideration of justice required that the
subsequent exercise of them "as well as their duration and the
proceedings for enforcing them should be exempted from the
provisions of the Code," and by the interpretation of the fourth
transitory provision (following Art.1976). This reads in the
official translation:
"Actions and rights arising before this Code became operative,
and not exercised, shall continue with the extension and according
to the terms recognized by prior legislation, but shall be subject,
with regard to the exercise, duration, and proceedings
Page 227 U. S. 378
for enforcing them, to the provisions of this Code."
The court interpreted these words as meaning that, in order to
enforce the rights of a natural child when there was not a solemn
recognition, but only acts tending to establish paternity under the
Laws of Toro, an action of filiation must be brought, as required
by Articles 133 and 137 of the Code.
In other words, while, under the Laws of Toro, the Acts of
recognition alleged, although not amounting to a solemn
recognition, may have entitled a natural child to sue for her share
of the inheritance and to prove the acts in the same suit, the Code
requires a preliminary proceeding to prove those acts and to
declare their effect, and limits the time within which such
proceeding can be brought. This hardly can be called an
interference with vested rights when a reasonable time for bringing
the preliminary proceeding is allowed. In the present case, it does
not appear that the plaintiff had not reasonable time for an action
after the Code went into effect.
It is objected that the Supreme Court of Spain has construed the
fourth transitory provision otherwise, as has been recognized by
the Supreme Court of Porto Rico.
Gual v. Bonafoux, 15 P.R.
545, 555, referring to a judgment of April 11, 1906, but citing as
contradictory one of December 19, 1902, that it deemed correct. The
Spanish decisions, however, have not the same effect as do those
construing a statute subsequently copied by another state. They
were rendered after Porto Rico had ceased to be subject to Spanish
jurisdiction, and although entitled to great consideration, which
no doubt they received, they do not preclude the local court from
exercising an independent judgment. The construction adopted in
Porto Rico, at least, does no violence to the words of the statute;
it concerns local affairs under a system with which the court of
the Island is called on constantly to deal, and we are not
prepared, as against the weight properly
Page 227 U. S. 379
attributed to the local decision, to say that it is wrong.
Gray v. Taylor, Jan. 20, 1913. How the first case should
have been dealt with if it had appeared in the record that the
plaintiff came of age before the Code went into effect we are not
called upon to consider. The construction adopted might give
trouble unless a right to bring an action of filiation within a
reasonable time were implied. But we have to remember that the
lawmaking power of Spain was not restricted in the way familiar to
us.
141.
Judgment affirmed.
160.
Decree affirmed.