Hoke v. United States, ante, p.
227 U. S. 308,
followed to effect that the White Slave Traffic Act of June 25,
1910, is constitutional.
The White Slave Traffic Act of 1910 against inducing women and
girls to enter upon a life of prostitution or debauchery covers
acts which might ultimately lead to that phase of debauchery which
consists in sexual actions, and in this case
held that
there was no error in refusing to charge that the gist of the
offense is the intention of the person when the transportation is
procured, or that the word " debauchery " as used in the statute
means sexual intercourse, or that the act does not extend to any
vice or immorality other than that applicable to sexual
actions.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality and construction
of the White Slave Act and validity of an indictment and conviction
thereunder, are stated in the opinion.
Page 227 U. S. 327
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Indictment for violating the Act of Congress of June 25, 1910,
known as the White Slave Act. 36 Stat. 825, c. 395.
The charge is that the defendant transported or caused to be
transported, or aided in the transportation of, a girl
Page 227 U. S. 328
by the name of Agnes Couch, from Atlanta, Georgia, to Tampa,
Florida, for the purpose of debauchery.
A crime is variously charged against §§ 2 and 3 of the
act in thirty-nine counts, alleging that the transportation was for
"the purpose of debauchery" or "to give herself up to
debauchery."
A demurrer was filed to the indictment, alleging as grounds
thereof the unconstitutionality of the act and that the indictment
was insufficient in certain particulars of fact. The demurrer was
overruled, and after a trial upon a plea of not guilty defendants
were convicted. Defendant Athanasaw was sentenced to imprisonment
for two years and six months and the defendant Sampson for one year
and three months. The contentions of the defendants are that the
Act of Congress is unconstitutional and that errors were committed
by the district court in giving and refusing to give certain
instructions to the jury.
1. This case was argued and submitted with No. 381,
Hoke v.
United States, ante, p.
227 U. S. 308. The
constitutionality of the law was sustained in that case, and
further discussion is unnecessary.
2. To understand the ruling of the court on the instructions, an
outline of the facts must be stated. Agnes Couch was a girl of
seventeen years. She lived at Suwanee, Georgia, but, being in
Atlanta in September, 1911, and seeing an advertisement by one Sam
Massel for chorus girls, she applied at his office and signed a
contract to appear with the Imperial Musical Comedy Company at the
Imperial Theater, Tampa, Florida, as a chorus girl at a salary of
$20 a week for the first four weeks and $15 a week thereafter, she
to room and board in the theater. The theater was operated by the
defendants, and Massel acted as their booking representative at
Atlanta. After she signed the contract, Massel gave her a railroad
ticket which had been provided by the defendants for that
Page 227 U. S. 329
purpose. She arrived at Tampa about 6:30 A.M. and met the
defendant Athanasaw at 7 o'clock.
As to what then took place, the girl testified as follows:
"He showed me to my room and took the check to get my trunk. I
went to sleep and slept until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. At that
hour, one of the girls woke me up to rehearse. I went down in the
theater and stayed there about an hour, rehearsing, singing, and
then went to lunch in the dining room. All of the girls were there
and several boys. I had never had any stage experience. At lunch,
they were all smoking, cursing, and using such language I couldn't
eat. After lunch, I went to my room, and about 6 o'clock, Louis
Athanasaw, one of the defendants, came and said to me I would like
it all right; that I was good looking and would make a hit, and not
to let any of the boys fool me, and not be any of the boy's girl;
to be his. He wanted me to be his girl; to talk to the boys and
make a hit, and get all of the money I could out of them. His room
was next to mine, and he told me he was coming in my room that
night and sleep with me, and he kissed and caressed me. He told me
to dress for the show that night and come down into the boxes. I
went into the box about 9 o'clock. About that time, Louis
Athanasaw's son knocked on my door and told me to come to the
boxes. In the box where I went, there were four boys; they were
smoking, cursing, and drinking. I sat down and the boys asked me
what was the matter; I looked scared. I told them I was ashamed of
being in a place like that, and Arthur Schlemann, one of the boys,
said he would take me out. The others insisted on my staying, and
said I would like it when I got broke in. I tried to go out with
Schlemann, but a boy named Gilbert pulled me back, saying 'Let that
cheap guy alone.' Schlemann said he would send a policeman, and in
about fifteen minutes Mr. Thompson and Mr. Evans came in for me.
"
Page 227 U. S. 330
Athanasaw denied that he made improper proposals to the girl,
and it was testified that at the preliminary hearing she did not
charge him with such. In all else, however, her testimony was not
contradicted, and it was supported as to the character of the house
and as to what took place.
Three propositions are presented by defendants: (1) the gist of
the offense is the intention of the person when the transportation
was procured or aided to be procured; (2) the word "debauchery," as
used in the statute, means sexual intercourse; (3) the act did not
intend to prohibit the transportation of women for the purpose of
any other vice or immorality than that applicable to sexual
actions.
The instructions requested by the defendants presented these
propositions, and, by refusing them and giving others inconsistent
with them, it is contended that the court erred. The ruling of the
court is sufficiently exhibited by the instructions which it gave,
and they can be made the basis as well of a consideration of the
errors assigned by the refusal of the instructions requested by
defendants.
The instructions given by the court are as follows:
"The intent and purpose of the defendants at the time of the
furnishing of this transportation for Agnes Couch is the very gist
and question in this case. Did they intend to induce or entice or
influence her to give herself up to debauchery? It makes no
difference whether the profits which would be made by the
defendants came from the sale of liquor or other immoral purpose.
The question here is of intent; what was the intent with which they
brought her; that she should live an honest, moral, and proper
life? or that she came and they engaged and contracted with her for
the purpose of her entering upon a condition which might be termed
debauchery, or lead to or would necessarily and naturally lead her
to, a condition of debauchery just referred to?"
"The term 'debauchery' is not a legal or technical term. There
is no allegation that the defendants brought her
Page 227 U. S. 331
here with the purpose or with the intent to debauch her, but to
induce her or entice her, or influence her to enter upon a course
of debauchery. The term 'debauchery' is not a legal or technical
term. To debauch is to corrupt in morals or principles; to lead
astray morally into dishonest and vicious practices; to corrupt; to
lead into unchastity; to debauch. Debauchery, then, is an excessive
indulgence of the body; licentiousness, drunkenness, corruption of
innocence, taking up vicious habits. The term 'debauchery,' as used
in this statute, has an idea of sexual immorality -- that is, it
has the idea of a life which will lead eventually, or tends to
lead, to sexual immorality; not necessarily drunkenness or
immorality, but here it leads to the question in this case as to
whether or not the influences in which this girl was surrounded by
the employment which they called her to did not tend to induce her
to give herself up to a condition of debauchery which eventually,
necessarily, and naturally would lead to a course of immorality
sexually. That is the question for you to determine, and it is a
question that you alone can determine. You have heard the testimony
in the case in regard to the circumstances in which she was placed.
You have viewed the scene where she was employed. You have examined
by the testimony and your observation what was the character and
what was the condition or influence in which the girl was placed by
the defendant. Was or was not it a condition that would necessarily
and naturally lead to a life of debauchery of a carnal nature
relating to sexual intercourse between man and woman?"
"Now it is contended that they must have had a deliberate intent
to debauch her when she came here; that either one or the other
intended to debauch her or to get somebody else to debauch her.
Now, that term 'debauch' is used in a great many instances in the
law, and the usual connection is to have carnal intercourse with;
but there is no such language in this statute, nor is it the
language of
Page 227 U. S. 332
the indictment. The charge of the indictment in substance is
that they induced or influenced her to enter into a life or
condition of debauchery -- 'to induce or compel her to give herself
up to debauchery.'"
The language of the statute is directed against the
transportation
"of any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent
and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to
become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to
engage in any other immoral practice."
The instructions of the court were justified by the statute. It
is true that the court did not give to the word debauchery or to
the purpose of the statute the limited definition and extent
contended for by defendants, nor did the court make the guilt of
the defendants to depend upon having the intent themselves to
debauch the girl or to intend that someone else should do so. In
the view of the court, the statute had a more comprehensive
prohibition, and was designed to reach acts which might ultimately
lead to that phase of debauchery which consisted in "sexual
actions." The general expressions of the court, however, were
qualified to meet, and not go beyond, the conduct of the
defendants. The court put it to the jury to consider whether the
employment to which the defendants called the girl and the
influences with which they surrounded her tended "to induce her to
give herself up to a condition of debauchery which eventually and
naturally would head to a course of immorality sexually." That
question, the court said, the jury should determine, and
further:
"You have heard the testimony in the case in regard to the
circumstances in which she was placed. You have viewed the scene
where she was employed. You have examined by the testimony and your
observation what was the character and what was the condition or
influence in which the girl was placed by the defendants.
Page 227 U. S. 333
Was or was not it a condition that would necessarily and
naturally lead to a life of debauchery of a carnal nature relating
to sexual intercourse between man and woman?"
The plan and place justified the instructions. The plan might
have succeeded if the coarse precipitancy of one of the defendants
and the ribaldry of the habitues of the place had not shocked the
modesty of the girl. And granting the testimony to be true, of
which the jury was the judge, the employment to which she was
enticed was an efficient school of debauchery of the special
immorality which defendants contend the statute was designed to
cover.
Judgment affirmed.