The power given to Congress by the Constitution over interstate
commerce is direct, without limitation, and far-reaching.
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S.
45.
Commerce among the states consists of intercourse and traffic
between their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons
as well as property.
Page 227 U. S. 309
While our dual form of government has its perplexities, state
and Nation having different spheres of jurisdiction, we are one
people, and the powers reserved to the states and those conferred
on the Nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or
concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and
moral.
While women are not articles of merchandise, the power of
Congress to regulate their transportation in interstate commerce is
the same, and it may prohibit such transportation if for immoral
purposes.
The right to be transported in interstate commerce is not a
right to employ interstate transportation as a facility to do
wrong, and Congress may prohibit such transportation to the extent
of the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910.
Congress may adopt not only the necessary, but the convenient,
means necessary to exercise its power over a subject completely
within its power, and such means may have the quality of police
regulations.
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania,
114 U. S. 196.
The White Slave Traffic Act of June 25, 1910, c. 395, 36 Stat.
825, is a legal exercise of the power of Congress under the
commerce clause of the Constitution, and does not abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the states or interfere
with the reserved powers of the states, especially those in regard
to regulation of immoralities of persons within their several
jurisdictions.
A variance which is merely verbal as to the name of the railroad
over which transportation was obtained in violation of the White
Slave Traffic Act and which did not prejudice the defense,
held in this case not to be reversible error.
It is for the jury to determine the sufficiency of the evidence
tending to show that defendants induced women to become passengers
in interstate commerce in violation of the act, and in this case it
does not appear that their judgment was not justified.
One can violate the White Slave Traffic Act through a third
party acting for him.
Evidence of acts of defendants after the end of the journey
held in this case to be admissible to show the action of
defendants in inducing the transportation of women in interstate
commerce in violation of the White Slave Traffic Act.
There was no error in the various instructions of the court in
this case.
187 F. 992 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality under various
provisions of the federal Constitution of the Act of June 25, 1910,
prohibiting transportation in interstate and
Page 227 U. S. 310
foreign commerce of women and girls for immoral purposes, known
as the White Slave Act, are stated in the opinion.
Page 227 U. S. 316
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Error to review a judgment of conviction under the Act of
Congress of June 25, 1910, entitled, "An Act to
Page 227 U. S. 317
Further Regulate Interstate and Foreign Commerce by Prohibiting
the Transportation Therein for Immoral Purposes of Women and Girls,
and for Other Purposes." 36 Stat. 825, c. 395. It is commonly known
as the White Slave Act.
The constitutionality of the act was assailed by demurrer, and
as its sufficiency otherwise was not questioned, a brief summary of
its allegations is all that is necessary.
The charge against Effie Hoke is that she
"did, on the fourteenth day of November, A.D.1910, in the City
of New Orleans and State of Louisiana, unlawfully, feloniously, and
knowingly persuade, induce, and entice one Annette Baden, alias
Annette Hays, a woman, to go from New Orleans, a city in the State
of Louisiana, to Beaumont, a city in the State of Texas, in
interstate commerce, for the purpose of prostitution,"
etc.
The charge against Basile Economides is that he
"did unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly aid and assist the
said Effie Hoke to persuade, induce, and entice the said Annette
Baden . . . to go in interstate commerce . . . for the purpose of
prostitution,"
with the intent and purpose that the said woman "should engage
in the practice of prostitution in the said City of Beaumont,
Texas."
The second and third counts make the same charge against the
defendants as to another woman, the one named in the third count
being under eighteen years.
The demurrers were overruled, and after trial the defendants
were convicted and sentenced, each to two years' imprisonment on
each count. 187 F. 992.
The indictment was drawn under §§ 2, 3, and 4 of the
act, which sections are as follows:
"SEC. 2. That any person who shall knowingly transport or cause
to be transported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation
for, or in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, or in
any territory or in the District of Columbia, any woman or girl for
the purpose of prostitution
Page 227 U. S. 318
or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the
intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl
to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to
engage in any other immoral practice; or who shall knowingly
procure or obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained, or aid or
assist in procuring or obtaining, any ticket or tickets, or any
form of transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used
by any woman or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any
territory or the District of Columbia, in going to any place for
the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral
purpose, or with the intent and purpose on the part of such person
to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to the practice
of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, or any other
immoral practice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be
transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any territory
or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment of not more
than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court."
The third section is directed against the persuasion,
inducement, and enticement of any woman or girl to go from one
place to another in interstate or foreign commerce, whether with or
without her consent, to engage in the practices and for the
purposes stated in the first section, and provides that anyone
"who shall thereby knowingly cause, or aid or assist in causing,
such woman or girl to go or to be carried or transported as a
passenger upon the line or route of any common carrier or carriers
in interstate or foreign commerce, or any territory or the District
of Columbia"
shall be punished as prescribed in the first section.
Section 4 makes criminal persuasion, inducement, and enticement
of a woman or girl under the age of eighteen
Page 227 U. S. 319
years from any state or territory or the District of Columbia to
any other state or territory or the District of Columbia to engage
in the immoral practices enumerated. The person guilty thereof, and
who shall, in furtherance thereof, knowingly induce or cause such
woman or girl to be carried or transported as a passenger in
interstate commerce, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on
conviction the offender's punishment may be a fine of $10,000 or
imprisonment for ten years, or by both fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court.
The grounds of attack upon the constitutionality of the statute
are expressed by counsel as follows:
"1. Because it is contrary to and contravenes Art. IV, § 2,
of the Constitution of the United States, which reads: 'The
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states.'"
"2. Because it is contrary to and contravenes the following two
amendments to the Constitution:"
"Art. IX. The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."
"Art. X. The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people."
"3. Because that clause of the Constitution which reserves to
Congress the power (Art. I, § 8, subdiv. 2) 'to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,' etc.,
is not broad enough to include the power to regulate prostitution
or any other immorality of citizens of the several states as a
condition precedent (or subsequent) to their right to travel
interstate, or to aid or assist another to so travel."
"4. Because the right and power to regulate and control
prostitution, or any other immoralities of citizens, comes within
the reserved police power of the several states,
Page 227 U. S. 320
and under the Constitution Congress cannot interfere therewith,
either directly or indirectly, under the grant of power 'to
regulate commerce between the states.'"
We shall discuss at length but one of these grounds; the others
will be referred to incidentally. The power of Congress under the
commerce clause of the Constitution is the ultimate determining
question. If the statute be a valid exercise of that power, how it
may affect persons or states is not material to be considered. It
is the supreme law of the land, and persons and states are subject
to it.
Congress is given power "to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states." The power is direct; there
is no word of limitation in it, and its broad and universal scope
has been so often declared as to make repetition unnecessary. And
besides, it has had so much illustration by cases that it would
seem as if there could be no instance of its exercise that does not
find an admitted example in some one of them. Experience, however,
is the other way, and in almost every instance of the exercise of
the power, differences are asserted from previous exercises of it
and made a ground of attack. The present case is an example.
Commerce among the states, we have said, consists of intercourse
and traffic between their citizens, and includes the transportation
of persons and property. There may be therefore a movement of
persons as well as of property -- that is, a person may move or be
moved in interstate commerce. And the act under consideration was
drawn in view of that possibility. What the act condemns is
transportation obtained or aided, or transportation induced, in
interstate commerce, for the immoral purposes mentioned. But an
objection is made and urged with earnestness. It is said that it is
the right and privilege of a person to move between states, and
that, such being the right, another cannot be made guilty of the
crime of inducing or assisting or aiding in the exercise of it,
and
"that the
Page 227 U. S. 321
motive or intention of the passenger, either before beginning
the journey, or during or after completing it, is not a matter of
interstate commerce."
The contentions confound things important to be distinguished.
It urges a right exercised in morality to sustain a right to be
exercised in immorality. It is the same right which attacked the
law of Congress which prohibits the carrying of obscene literature
and articles designed for indecent and immoral use from one state
to another. 29 Stat. 512, c. 172;
United States v. Popper,
98 F. 423. It is the same right which was excluded as an element as
affecting the constitutionality of the act for the suppression of
lottery traffic through national and interstate commerce.
Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321,
188 U. S. 357.
It is the right given for beneficial exercise which is attempted to
be perverted to and justify baneful exercise, as in the instances
stated, and which finds further illustration in
Reid v.
Colorado, 187 U. S. 137.
This constitutes the supreme fallacy of plaintiffs' error. It
pervades and vitiates their contentions.
Plaintiffs in error admit that the states may control the
immoralities of its citizens. Indeed, this is their chief
insistence, and they especially condemn the act under review as a
subterfuge and an attempt to interfere with the police power of the
states to regulate the morals of their citizens, and assert that it
is in consequence an invasion of the reserved powers of the states.
There is unquestionably a control in the states over the morals of
their citizens, and, it may be admitted, it extends to making
prostitution a crime. It is a control, however, which can be
exercised only within the jurisdiction of the states, but there is
a domain which the states cannot reach and over which Congress
alone has power, and if such power be exerted to control what the
states cannot, it is an argument for -- not against -- its
legality. Its exertion does not encroach upon the jurisdiction of
the states. We have
Page 227 U. S. 322
examples; others may be adduced. The pure food and drugs act is
a conspicuous instance. In all of the instances, a clash of
national legislation with the power of the states was urged, and in
all rejected.
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, state and
nation having different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said;
but it must be kept in mind that we are one people, and the powers
reserved to the states and those conferred on the nation are
adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to
promote the general welfare, material and moral. This is the effect
of the decisions, and surely, if the facility of interstate
transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of
lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of
diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food and drugs, the
like facility can be taken away from the systematic enticement to
and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of women, and,
more insistently, of girls.
This is the aim of the law, expressed in broad generalization,
and motives are made of determining consequence. Motives executed
by actions may make it the concern of government to exert its
powers. Right purpose and fair trading need no restrictive
regulation, but let them be transgressed, and penalties and
prohibitions must be applied. We may illustrate again by the pure
food and drugs act. Let an article be debased by adulteration, let
it be misrepresented by false branding, and Congress may exercise
its prohibitive power. It may be that Congress could not prohibit
the manufacture of the article in a state. It may be that Congress
could not prohibit in all of its conditions its sale within a
state. But Congress may prohibit its transportation between the
states, and by that means defeat the motive and evils of its
manufacture. How far-reaching are the power and the
Page 227 U. S. 323
means which may be used to secure its complete exercise we have
expressed in
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States,
220 U. S. 45.
There, in emphasis of the purpose of the law, are denominated
adulterated articles as "outlaws of commerce," and said that the
confiscation of them enjoined by the law was appropriate to the
right to bar them from interstate transportation, and completed the
purpose of the law by not merely preventing their physical
movement, but preventing trade in them between the states. It was
urged in that case, as it is urged here, that the law was an
invasion of the power of the states.
Of course it will be said that women are not articles of
merchandise, but this does not affect the analogy of the cases; the
substance of the congressional power is the same, only the manner
of its exercise must be accommodated to the difference in its
objects. It is misleading to say that men and women have rights.
Their rights cannot fortify or sanction their wrongs, and if they
employ interstate transportation as a facility of their wrongs, it
may be forbidden to them to the extent of the Act of July 25, 1910,
and we need go no farther in the present case.
The principle established by the cases is the simple one, when
rid of confusing and distracting considerations, that Congress has
power over transportation "among the several states;" that the
power is complete in itself, and that Congress, as an incident to
it, may adopt not only means necessary but convenient to its
exercise, and the means may have the quality of police regulations.
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.
S. 196,
114 U. S. 215;
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed. 856. We have no
hesitation, therefore, in pronouncing the Act of June 25, 1910, a
legal exercise of the power of Congress.
There are assignments of error based upon rulings on the
admission and rejection of evidence and upon the instructions to
the jury and the refusing of instructions.
Page 227 U. S. 324
The asserted errors are set forth in twenty-five bills of
exceptions, and the special assignment of errors in this Court
occupy twenty-eight pages of the record, and present the
constitutional objections to the law in all the aspects that
counsel's ingenuity can devise. A like ingenuity has been exercised
to represent the many ways in which the conduct of the accused can
be viewed and shown to be inconsistent with guilty purpose. To
discuss them all is unnecessary. We shall pass more or less rapidly
over those we consider to be worthy of attention.
1. It is contended that there is variance between the indictment
and the proof, in that the indictment charges that the women were
transported over the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company's
road, and that the government failed to prove that such road was a
line extending from New Orleans to Beaumont, Texas, these places
marking the beginning and end of the transportation of the women.
Further, that the proof showed that their tickets were purchased
over the Southern Pacific Road. The indictment alleges that the
Texas & New Orleans Railroad was a part of the Southern Pacific
System, and was commonly known as the "Sunset Route," and there was
through transportation. The variance is not much more than verbal,
and that it prejudiced their defense in any way is not shown. If it
is error at all, it does not appear to have caused even
embarrassment to the defense. But was it error?
See
Westmoreland v. United States, 155 U.
S. 545,
155 U. S. 549.
Also § 1025, Rev.Stat..
2. The evidence does not show that the defendants or either of
them induced, etc., the women to become passengers in interstate
commerce. The particulars are recited wherein it is contended that
the evidence is deficient. It is not necessary to review them. It
was for the jury to consider and determine the sufficiency of the
evidence, and we cannot say they were not justified by it in the
judgment they pronounced.
Page 227 U. S. 325
3. It is contended that Florence Baden persuaded her sister
Gertrude to go to Beaumont, and an instruction of the court is
attacked on the ground that it declared the charge of the
indictment was satisfied against the defendants if Florence acted
for them. There was no error in the instruction under the
circumstances shown by the record.
4. Error is assigned on the refusal of the court to give certain
instructions requested by defendants. To consider them in detail
would require a lengthy review of the evidence, for they present
arguments on certain phases of it as to the degree of persuasion
used or its sufficiency to induce or entice the women. There was no
error in refusing the instructions.
5. The court permitted the women to testify as to the Acts of
Effie Hoke at her house at Beaumont, restraining the liberty of the
women, and coercing their stay with her. Such testimony was
relevant. The acts illustrated and constituted a completion of what
was done at New Orleans. They were part of the same scheme and made
clear its purpose.
There were other instructions asked by which the jury was
charged that they could not convict Effie Hoke for the character of
the house she kept or Economides for the business he conducted. The
charge of the court sufficiently excluded both views. It explained
the Act of Congress and the offenses it condemned and directed the
attention of the jury to them.
6. Defendants complain that they were not permitted to show that
the women named in the indictment were public prostitutes in New
Orleans. Such proof, they contend, was relevant upon the charge of
persuasion or enticement. This may be admitted, but there was
sufficient evidence, as the court said, of the fact of the
immorality of their lives, and explicitly ruled that they could be
shown to be public prostitutes. The court, however, excluded
Page 227 U. S. 326
certain details sought to be proved. Under the circumstances,
there was no error in the ruling.
In conclusion we say, after consideration of all errors
assigned, that there was no ruling made which was prejudicial to
defendants.
Judgment affirmed.