It is essential to the validity of a judgment that the court
rendering it have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties; but it is for the highest court of a state to determine
its own jurisdiction and that of the local tribunals.
Where the constitution of a state gives to its highest court the
power
Page 224 U. S. 271
to issue writs of
quo warranto and to hear and
determine the same, judgment of ouster and fine entered by that
court implies that it had jurisdiction to so decide and enter
judgment, and is conclusive upon this Court whether the judgment is
civil or criminal or both.
Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee,
217 U. S.
420.
Under due process of law, one is entitled to notice and
opportunity to be heard, and the notice must correspond to the
hearing and the relief must be appropriate to the notice and the
hearing.
Even a court of original general jurisdiction, civil and
criminal, cannot enter a judgment beyond the claim asserted. It
would not be due process of law.
Quaere whether, under general rules, information in the
nature of
quo warranto is a civil or criminal proceeding,
and whether, under general allegations of misuse, with only a
prayer for ouster, a fine may be imposed in those jurisdictions
where
quo warranto has ceased to be a criminal
proceeding.
Whatever the rule elsewhere, in Missouri, a corporation may in
quo warranto be subjected to a money judgment, whether, in
nature of fine or damages for breach of implied contract not to
violate its franchise.
The prayer for relief is not a part of the notice guaranteed by
the due process clause of the Constitution. The facts state the
limit of the relief.
It is not a denial of due process of law for a court having
jurisdiction to determine
quo warranto and to enter
judgment for a fine because there is no statute fixing the maximum
penalty.
The power to fine reposed in a court of last resort is not
unlimited, but is limited by the obligation not to impose excessive
fines.
Right of appeal is not essential to due process of law, and the
legislature may determine where final power shall be lodged and
litigation cease.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U. S. 111.
If due process has been accorded as to notice and opportunity to
be heard, it is not for this Court to determine whether error has
been committed in construction of statute or common law.
If the judgment of the state court is not void, this Court
cannot consider collateral and nonfederal questions.
A corporation tried under information in the nature of
quo
warranto for combination in restraint of trade and sentenced
to ouster and fine is not denied equal protection of the law
because corporations prosecuted under the antitrust statute of the
state would not be subjected to as severe a penalty.
The highest court of Missouri having held that
quo
warranto for misuser
Page 224 U. S. 272
can be maintained against a corporation for entering into a
combination in restraint of trade, the validity or invalidity of
the antitrust statute of that state has no bearing on the
subject.
If the judgment of the state court cannot be reversed on the
constitutional ground, it cannot be modified or amended by this
Court.
This Court has no right to assume that a state statute will be
so applied as to interfere with the constitutional right of a
corporation to carry on interstate business.
218 Mo. 1 affirmed.
Writ of error to a judgment of ouster and fine against
plaintiffs in error in original
quo warranto proceedings
in the Supreme Court of Missouri.
The Missouri Anti-Trust Act (Rev.Stat. of 1899, §§
8968, 8971) provides that any person or corporation which shall
form a combination in restraint of trade shall be deemed guilty of
a conspiracy to defraud, and on conviction shall be subject to a
penalty of not less than $5 nor more than $100 per day for each day
the combination continues, and in addition the guilty corporation
shall have its franchises forfeited.
In April, 1905, while this act was in force, the Attorney
General filed an information in the nature of a writ of
quo
warranto against the Standard Oil Company and the Republic Oil
Company, foreign corporations, holding licenses to do business in
Missouri, and the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, a domestic company,
alleging that between the ___ day of ___, 1901, and March 29, 1905,
they had formed and maintained a combination to prevent competition
in the buying, selling and refining oil to the great damage of the
people of Missouri. The information contained no reference to the
Antitrust Act further than was involved in the allegation that
"by reason of the premises, said respondents . . . grossly
offended against the laws of the state and willfully and flagrantly
abused and misused their . . . franchises . . . , and their acts .
. . constitute a
Page 224 U. S. 273
willful and malicious perversion of the franchise granted the
said corporations. . . . Wherefore, your informant, prosecuting in
this behalf for the State of Missouri, prays"
that each of the defendants be ousted of their said corporate
franchises and license to do business under the laws of the
state.
The defendants answered, denying all the allegations of the
petition and moving to dismiss on many grounds not material to be
considered here. The case was referred to a commissioner to take
testimony and report findings of fact and conclusions of law.
While the case was under consideration, the antitrust statute
was amended in March, 1907, so as to provide that, if any
corporation should be found guilty of a violation of the provisions
of the act, its charter or license should be forfeited, and the
court might also forfeit any or all of its property to the state,
or cancel its right to do business, or the court might assess a
fine. It was provided that the act should not operate to release
any penalty, forfeiture, or liability already incurred.
After the passage of this amendment, making new and increased
penalties for a violation of the antitrust statute, the
commissioner made his report, finding (May 24, 1907) against the
defendants on the law and the fact. On June 22, 1907, the Republic
Oil Company filed with the Secretary of State, in statutory form, a
notice of its withdrawal from the state. On October 23, 1907, the
fact of this withdrawal was brought to the attention of the court,
and a motion was made that the case be abated so far as the
Republic Oil Company was concerned. The motion was overruled, and
later the court found that each of the defendants had entered into
a combination in restraint of trade, and prevented and destroyed
competition. And it was adjudged that the defendants had each
forfeited their right to do business, and they were each ousted of
any and all right and franchise, and fined
Page 224 U. S. 274
$50,000. In view of the capital of the company and the amount of
profits that had been made during the period of the combination,
some members of the court expressed the opinion that the fine
should be $1,000,000.
A motion for rehearing was denied. The Waters-Pierce Oil Company
paid the fine and complied with conditions, by virtue of which it
was permitted to continue to do business in the state. The other
two defendants brought the case here.
It is alleged that --
"(b) The court held that this was a civil proceeding, and that
it had no criminal jurisdiction. It then, in addition to an ouster,
adjudged that this respondent should pay a fine of $50,000. This
fine was at least the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in an
original proceeding, which was beyond the court's power and
jurisdiction. The court thereby takes from the respondent its
property without due process of law, discriminates against
respondent, and refuses to accord to it the equal protection of the
law, all of which is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States."
There are various assignments of error challenging the
constitutionality of the antitrust statute on the ground that it
deprived defendants of their property without due process of law
and interfered with interstate commerce. It was also claimed that
the defendants were denied the equal protection of the law in that,
in forfeiting their franchise and imposing a fine of $50,000
without a jury trial, a different procedure had been adopted and a
different judgment entered from that which could have been rendered
on conviction by a jury for violation of the antitrust statute.
The defendants (now plaintiffs in error) sought first a reversal
of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri, and, in the
alternative, a modification of the judgment.
Page 224 U. S. 275
To this end, attention was called to the fact that the
plaintiffs in error were parties in the case of
United States
v. Standard Oil Company et al. They pray that the judgment
herein be modified so as to provide that it should not be held to
conflict with any decree entered in that equity cause so far as
concerned property in Missouri belonging to plaintiffs in
error.
It was also urged that the statute making it a felony for any
person to sell or deal in articles manufactured by a corporation
whose license had been forfeited would operate to destroy the value
of the plaintiffs' property in Missouri, and would in effect
prevent them from engaging in interstate commerce. They moved that
the judgment be modified here so as to provide against any such
result.
Page 224 U. S. 280
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Standard Oil Company and the Republic Oil Company by this
writ of error seek to reverse a judgment of ouster and fine of
$50,000, entered against each of them in original
quo
warranto proceedings by the Supreme Court of Missouri,
contending that they are thereby deprived of property without due
process of law and denied the equal protection of the law.
The briefs and arguments for the defendants were addressed
mainly to the proposition that the fine of $50,000 was a criminal
sentence in a civil suit, and void because beyond the jurisdiction
of the court, and, for the further reason that the pleadings and
prayer gave no notice which would support such a sentence.
1. It is, of course, essential to the validity of any judgment
that the court rendering it should have had jurisdiction not only
of the parties, but of the subject
Page 224 U. S. 281
matter.
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U. S. 234,
166 U. S. 247.
But it is equally well settled that it is for the supreme court of
a state finally to determine its own jurisdiction and that of other
local tribunals, since the decision involves a construction of the
laws of the state by which the court was organized. In this case,
the Constitution of Missouri declared that
"the supreme court shall have power to issue writs of habeas
corpus,
quo warranto, certiorari, and other remedial
writs, and to hear and determine the same."
Its decision and judgment necessarily imply that, under that
clause of the constitution, it had jurisdiction of the subject
matter and authority to enter judgment of ouster and fine in civil
quo warranto proceedings. That ruling is conclusive upon
us regardless of whether the judgment is civil or criminal, or both
combined.
Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217
U. S. 420.
2. The federal question is whether, in that court, with such
jurisdiction, the defendants were denied due process of law. Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, they were entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard. That necessarily required that the notice
and the hearing should correspond, and that the relief granted
should be appropriate to that which had been heard and determined
on such notice. For even if a court has original general
jurisdiction criminal and civil at law and in equity, it cannot
enter a judgment which is beyond the claim asserted, or which, in
its essential character, is not responsive to the cause of action
on which the proceeding was based.
"Though the court may possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the
subject matter, and of the parties, it is still limited in its
modes of procedure and in the extent and character of its
judgments. It must act judicially in all things, and cannot then
transcend the power conferred by the law. If, for instance, the
action be upon a money demand,
Page 224 U. S. 282
the court, notwithstanding its complete jurisdiction over the
subject and parties, has no power to pass judgment of imprisonment
in the penitentiary upon the defendant. If the action be for a
libel or personal tort, the court cannot order in the case a
specific performance of a contract. If the action be for the
possession of real property, the court is powerless to admit in the
case the probate of a will. . . . The judgments mentioned, given in
the cases supposed, would not be merely erroneous, they would be
absolutely void because the court, in rendering them, would
transcend the limits of its authority in those cases."
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274,
93 U. S. 282.
See also Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.
S. 254,
140 U. S.
265-268;
Barnes v. Railway, 122 U. S.
1,
122 U. S. 14.
The defendants claim that the present case is within this
principle -- that the judgment for a fine of $50,000, which some of
the Missouri court thought should have been a million dollars, was
not only a criminal sentence in a civil suit, but beyond the issues
and the prayer for relief in the information, and therefore void as
having been in substance entered without notice and opportunity to
be heard. This raises the old question whether information in the
nature of
quo warranto is a civil or a criminal
proceeding, and the further question whether, under general
allegations of misuser in an information with only a prayer for
ouster, a fine may be imposed in those jurisdictions where
quo
warranto has ceased to be a criminal proceeding. The
uncertainty as to the relief that may be granted in such case
arises from the fact that, at one time, the proceeding was wholly
criminal, and those guilty of usurping a franchise were prosecuted
by information instead of by indictment, and punished both by
judgment of ouster and by fine. But, in England, before the
Revolution, and since that date in most of American states,
including Missouri,
quo warranto has been resorted to for
the purpose of trying the civil right and determining
Page 224 U. S. 283
whether the defendant had usurped or forfeited the franchise in
question. After this method of procedure began to be used as a form
of action to try title, it was inevitable that the civil feature
would tend to dominate in fixing its character for all purposes.
But the discussion as to the nature of such writs and the character
of the judgment that could be entered, though not controlled by
their use (
Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U.
S. 659,
204 U. S. 664;
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 667;
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.
634), has been prolonged by the retention of the words
information, prosecute, guilty, punish, fine -- survivals of the
period when the writ was a criminal proceeding in every
respect.
In some jurisdictions, the writ is still treated as criminal,
both in the procedure adopted and in the relief afforded.
State
v. Kearn, 17 R.I. 401. But there are practically no decisions
which deal with the nature and amount of the fine which can be
entered in states where, as in Missouri,
quo warranto is
treated as a purely civil proceeding. The references to the
subject, both in textbooks and opinions, are few and casual. They
usually repeat Blackstone's statement (3 Com. 262) that the writ is
now used for trying the civil right, "the fine being nominal only."
Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 470;
Commonwealth v. Woelper, 3 Serg. & R. 53; High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies 702, 697, 593. These authorities and
the general practice indicate that, in most of the American states,
only a nominal fine can be imposed in civil
quo warranto
proceedings. We shall not enter upon any discussion of the question
as to the character of the proceeding nor the amount and nature of
the money judgment. For, in Missouri, and prior to the decision in
this case, the rulings were to the effect that the Supreme Court of
Missouri had jurisdiction not only to oust, but to impose a
substantial fine in
quo warranto.
In 1865, under a constitution which, like the present,
Page 224 U. S. 284
conferred power "to issue writs of
quo warranto and
hear and determine the same," the court tried the case of
State
ex Inf. v. Bernoudy, 36 Mo. 279, brought against the clerk of
a circuit court for usurpation of the office. There was a prayer
for judgment of ouster and costs. The court said:
"No evidence is offered to charge the defendant with any evil
intent, and it being probable that he acted from mistaken views
only, [the court] will not avail itself of the power given by law,
to impose a fine on him, and will condemn him to pay the cost only
of this proceeding."
In 1902, in
State v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 393,
information in the nature of
quo warranto was filed in the
supreme court against three corporations praying that their
franchises be forfeited because they had formed and maintained a
conspiracy in restraint of trade. The court held that, "under the
circumstances, the judgment of absolute ouster is not necessary,
but the needs of justice will be satisfied by the imposition of a
fine." It thereupon adjudged that each of the defendants should pay
the sum of $5,000 as a fine, together with the costs of court.
In
State ex Inf. v. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 37, 92
S.W. 185, 98 S.W. 53,
quo warranto was brought to forfeit
the charter of the company because it had violated a criminal
statute prohibiting the sale of pools on horse races. A judgment of
ouster was entered, and a fine of $5,000 was imposed. On rehearing,
the judgment was amended and the provision for a fine omitted.
Evidently this was not for want of jurisdiction to impose such
sentence, but because it was considered that ouster was all that
was demanded by the facts. This appears from the fact that, in the
present case, the court adopted the language of the original
Delmar decision, in which it was said that the fine is
imposed for a violation of the corporation's implied contract
Page 224 U. S. 285
not to violate the franchise granted by the state (218 Mo. 360).
So that, whatever may be the rule elsewhere, in Missouri, a
corporation may, in
quo warranto, be subjected to a money
judgment, whether called a fine as punishment or damages for its
implied contract not to violate its franchise.
3. But the defendants insist that, even if the court had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and was authorized to impose a
fine, there was nothing in the pleading to indicate that such an
issue was to be tried, nor any prayer warranting such relief, and
hence that the judgment is wanting in due process of law, and void
for want of notice of what was to be heard and determined. It is
true that the information did not ask for damages or that a fine
should be imposed. But if this be treated as a criminal case, a
prayer was no more necessary than in an indictment or ordinary
information, since such proceedings never contain any reference
whatever to the judgment or sentence to be rendered on conviction.
In civil suits, the pleadings should, no doubt, contain a prayer
for judgment so as to show that the judicial power of the court is
invoked. The rules of practice also may well require that the
plaintiff should indicate what remedy he seeks. But the prayer does
not constitute a part of the notice guaranteed by the Constitution.
The facts stated fix the limit of the relief that can be granted.
While the judgment must not go beyond that to which the plaintiff
was entitled on proof of the allegations made, yet the court may
grant other and different relief than that for which he prayed.
4. Nor, from a federal standpoint, is there any invalidity in
the judgment because there was no statute fixing a maximum penalty,
no rule for measuring damages, and no hearing on a subject which it
is claimed was not referred to in the information. At common law
and under many English statutes, the amount of the fine to be
imposed
Page 224 U. S. 286
in criminal cases was not fixed. This was true of the statute of
9 Ann, chapter 20, which, in
quo warranto cases, made it
"lawful as well to give judgment of ouster as to fine for usurping
or unlawfully exercising any office or franchise." The amount to be
paid in all such cases was left to the discretion of the court,
"regulated by the provisions of Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights
that excessive fines ought not to be demanded." 4 Black.Comm. 378.
Or, considering the fine as in the nature of a civil penalty, the
case is within the principle which permits the recovery of punitive
damages. They are not compensatory, nor is the amount measured by
rule. But "where the defendant has acted wantonly or perversely, or
with such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal
indifference to civil obligations" (
Lake Shore &c. Ry. Co.
v. Prentice, 147 U. S.
107), damages may in some jurisdictions be assessed even
in civil cases, by way of punishment. It is true that, except in
cases for the breach of a contract of marriage, punitive damages
have been allowed only in actions for torts. But no federal
question arises on a ruling that, in Missouri, punitive damages may
be recovered from a corporation for the violation of its implied
contract when, as alleged in the information, the defendants
"willfully and wantonly misused their licenses."
Iowa Central
Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389.
The real objection is not so much to the existence of the power
to fix the amount of the fine as the fact that, when exercised by
the supreme court of the state, it is not subject to review, and is
said to be unlimited. But it is limited.
Waters-Pierce Oil Co.
v. Texas, 212 U. S. 111.
It is limited by the obligation to administer justice, and to no
more assess excessive damages than to impose excessive fines. But
the power to render a final judgment must be lodged somewhere, and
in every case a point is reached where litigation must cease. What
that point is can be determined by the legislative power of the
state,
Page 224 U. S. 287
for right of appeal is not essential to due process of law.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.
111.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that the defendant shall be
given that character of notice and opportunity to be heard which is
essential to due process of law. When that has been done, the
requirements of the Constitution are met, and it is not for this
Court to determine whether there has been an erroneous construction
of statute or common law.
Iowa Central Railway v. Iowa,
160 U. S. 389;
West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 261.
The matter was summed up by Justice Moody in
Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 110,
where, citing many authorities, he said:
"Due process requires that the court which assumes to determine
the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction, . . . and that there
shall be notice and opportunity for hearing given the parties. . .
. Subject to these two fundamental conditions, which seem to be
universally prescribed in all systems of law established by
civilized countries, this Court has, up to this time, sustained all
state laws, statutory or judicially declared, regulating procedure,
evidence, and methods of trial, and held them to be consistent with
due process of law."
There is nothing in the present record which takes the case out
of that principle. This was not like a suit on a note resulting in
a sentence to the penitentiary; nor does it resemble any of the
extreme illustrations given in
Windsor v. McVeigh,
93 U. S. 282,
in which, after a trial, the judgment of a court having
jurisdiction might be invalidated because the relief so far
exceeded the issue heard as, in effect, to deprive the defendant of
the benefit of his constitutional right to notice. No such question
is presented in the present case, for the plaintiffs in error were
bound to know that, under the laws of Missouri, the court, on proof
of the charge contained in the information, might impose a fine,
and afforded an opportunity
Page 224 U. S. 288
to offer evidence in mitigation or reduction. On the application
for a rehearing, there was no claim that the fine was excessive,
but the judgment was attacked on the ground that, for want both of
jurisdiction and of notice, no such penalty could be imposed. We
are concluded by the decision of the supreme court of the state as
to its power; the judgment was within the issues submitted, and is
not void as having been entered without due process of law.
If the judgment was not void, we cannot consider the collateral
questions as to whether the suit abated against the Republic Oil
Company when it gave notice of its withdrawal from the state, nor
whether the Act of 1907, amending the Anti-Trust Act, operated to
relieve the defendant from the penalties for all combinations in
restraint of trade entered into prior to the adoption of the
amending statute. These are nonfederal questions.
5. It is further contended that the defendants were denied the
equal protection of the law. This claim is based upon the fact
that, without indictment or trial by jury, they were ousted of
their franchise and subjected to a fine of $50,000 at the
discretion of the supreme court, while corporations prosecuted in
the circuit court for the identically same acts in violation of the
antitrust statute were entitled to a trial by jury, and, if
convicted, could be ousted of their franchises and subjected to a
fine not to exceed $100 per day during the time the combination
continued in effect.
But proceedings by information in the nature of
quo
warranto differ in form and consequence from a prosecution by
indictment for violation of a criminal statute. In the one, the
state proceeds for a violation of the company's private contract;
in the other, it prosecutes for a violation of public law. The
corporation may be deprived of its franchise for nonuser -- a mere
failure to act. It may also be deprived of its charter for that
which, though
Page 224 U. S. 289
innocent in itself, is beyond the power conferred upon it as an
artificial person. If, however, the act of misuser is not only
ultra vires but criminal, there is no merger of the civil
liability in the criminal offense. Separate proceedings may be
instituted -- one to secure the civil judgment and the other to
enforce the criminal law. Both cases may involve a consideration of
the same facts, and evidence warranting a judgment of ouster may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction for crime. A judgment may in one
case sometimes be a bar to the other, but neither remedy is
exclusive. The double liability, in civil and criminal proceedings,
finds its counterpart in many instances -- as, for example, where
an attorney is disbarred or ousted of his right to practice in the
court because of conduct for which he may likewise be prosecuted
and fined.
In addition to these considerations, it is to be noted that,
though the antitrust act provides for penalties somewhat similar to
those which may be entered in
quo warranto proceedings,
the statute did not, and, as held by the supreme court, could not,
lessen the power conferred upon it to hear and determine
quo
warranto proceedings and to enter judgments which, on general
principles, appertained to the exercise of such constitutional
jurisdiction.
Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217
U. S. 421;
Delmar Jockey Club v. Missouri,
210 U. S. 324.
It was pointed out in the opinion (218 Mo. 349) that, where a
corporation had entered into a combination in restraint of trade,
it thereby offended against the law of its creation, and
consequently forfeited its right longer to exercise its franchise.
It was thereupon held that, in Missouri,
quo warranto
might have been instituted for such acts of misuser, even though
there had been no criminal statute on the subject. For this reason,
neither the validity nor invalidity of the antitrust statute has
any bearing on the case. The plaintiffs in error cannot
Page 224 U. S. 290
complain that they were deprived of the equal protection of law
because in the civil proceeding they were not tried in the manner
and subjected to the judgment appropriate in criminal cases.
If the plaintiffs in error were afforded due process of law and
were not deprived of the equal protection of the law, the judgment
cannot be reversed. And, if it cannot be reversed, it cannot be
modified to provide that it shall not be construed to conflict with
a decree entered in an equity cause in another court to which
plaintiffs are parties. Neither can it be amended by adding a
provision that the judgment of ouster shall not operate to make
those who buy plaintiff's products subject to prosecution, under
the Act of 1907, making it a felony for any person to deal in
articles manufactured by a corporation whose license had been
forfeited. This statute, which, it is said, will deprive plaintiffs
of the right to do interstate business, is not before us. We have
no right to assume that it will be applied so as to interfere with
any right which plaintiffs have under the Constitution to do
interstate business.
Affirmed.
