The Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, c.
149, as amended April 5, 1910, 36 Stat. 291, c. 143, regulating the
liability of common carriers by railroad to their employees, is
constitutional.
Congress may, in the execution of its power over interstate
commerce, regulate the relations of common carriers by railroad and
their employees while both are engaged in such commerce.
Page 223 U. S. 2
Congress has not exceeded its power in that regard by
prescribing the regulations embodied in the Employers' Liability
Act.
Those regulations have superseded the laws of the several states
insofar as the latter cover the same field.
Rights arising under the regulations prescribed by the act may
be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states when their
jurisdiction, as fixed by local laws, is adequate to the
occasion.
Congress, in the exertion of its power over interstate commerce,
and subject to the limitations prescribed in the Constitution, may
regulate those relations of common carriers by railroad and their
employees which have a substantial connection with interstate
commerce and while both carrier and employee are engaged
therein.
A person has no property -- no vested interest -- in any rule of
the common law. While rights of property created by the common law
cannot be taken without due process, the law as a rule of conduct
may, subject to constitutional limitations, be changed at will by
the legislature.
Under the power to regulate relations of employers and employees
while engaged in interstate commerce, Congress may establish new
rules of law in place of common law rules, including those in
regard to fellow servants, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, and right of action by personal representatives for
death caused by wrongful neglect of another.
In regulating the relations of employers and employees engaged
in interstate commerce, Congress may regulate the liability of
employers to employees for injuries caused by other employees even
though the latter be engaged in intrastate commerce.
The power of Congress to insure the efficiency of regulations
ordained by it is equal to the power to impose the regulations, and
prohibiting the making of agreements by those engaged in interstate
commerce which in any way limit a liability imposed by Congress on
interstate carriers does not deprive any person of property without
due process of law, or abridge liberty of contract in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.
Quaere whether an element of the due process provisions
of the Fifth Amendment is the equivalent of the equal protection
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A classification of railroad employees, even if including all
employees, whether subjected to peculiar hazards incident to
operation of trains or not, is not so arbitrary or unequal as to
amount to denial of equal protection of the laws. Such a
classification does not violate
Page 223 U. S. 3
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment even if equal
protection is an element of due process.
State legislation, even if in pursuance of a reserved power,
must give way to an act of Congress over a subject within the
exclusive control of Congress.
Until Congress acted on the subject, the laws of the several
states determined the liability of interstate carriers for injuries
to their employees while engaged in such commerce; but, Congress
having acted, its action supersedes that of the states so far as it
covers the same subject. That which is not supreme must yield to
that which is.
The inaction of Congress on a subject within its power does not
affect that power.
Rights arising under an act of Congress may be enforced, as of
right, in the courts of the states when their jurisdiction, as
prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion.
When Congress, in the exertion of a power confided to it by the
Constitution, adopts an act, it speaks for all the people and all
the states, and thereby establishes a policy for all, and the
courts of a state cannot refuse to enforce the act on ground that
it is not in harmony with the policy of that state.
Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U. S. 130.
A state court cannot refuse to enforce the remedy given by an
act of Congress in regard to a subject within the domain of
Congress on the ground of inconvenience or confusion.
The systems of jurisprudence of the state and of the United
States together form one system which constitutes the law of the
land for the state.
The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the
several states, but is a concurrent and, within its jurisdiction, a
paramount sovereign.
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S.
130.
Existence of jurisdiction in a court implies the duty to
exercise it notwithstanding such duty may be onerous.
82 Conn. 373 reversed; 173 F. 49 affirmed.
No. 120 (
Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Co.).
This was an action by a citizen of Connecticut against a
railroad corporation of that state, to recover for personal
injuries suffered by the plaintiff while in the defendant's
service. The injuries occurred in Connecticut August 5, 1908, the
action was commenced in one of the superior courts of that state in
October following, and the right
Page 223 U. S. 4
of action was based solely on the Act of Congress of April 22,
1908 (35 Stat. 65, c. 149). According to the complaint, the
injuries occurred while the defendant, as a common carrier by
railroad, was engaged in commerce between some of the states, and
while the plaintiff, as a locomotive fireman, was employed by the
defendant in such commerce, and the injuries proximately resulted
from negligence of the plaintiff's fellow servants, who also were
employed by the defendant in such commerce. A demurrer to the
complaint was interposed upon the grounds, first, that the act of
Congress was repugnant in designated aspects to the Constitution of
the United States, and, second, that, even if the act were valid, a
right of action thereunder could not be enforced in the courts of
the state. The demurrer was sustained, judgment was rendered
against the plaintiff, the judgment subsequently was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Errors of the state (82 Conn. 373) upon the
authority of
Hoxie v. N.Y., N.H. & H. R. Co., 82 Conn.
352, and the plaintiff then sued out the present writ of error.
No. 170 (
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Babcock).
This was an action by the personal representative of a deceased
employee of a railroad corporation to recover, for the exclusive
benefit of the surviving widow, for the death of the employee,
which resulted from an injury suffered in the course of his
employment. The injury and death occurred in Montana, September 25,
1908, the action was commenced in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Minnesota, October 4, 1909, and the
right of action was based solely on the Act of Congress before
mentioned. It appeared from the complaint that the injury occurred
while the defendant, as a common carrier by railroad, was engaged
in commerce between some of the states, and while the deceased, as
a locomotive fireman, was employed by the defendant in
Page 223 U. S. 5
such commerce; that the injury proximately resulted from
negligence of fellow servants of the deceased, who also were
employed by the defendant in such commerce; that the deceased
resided in Montana, and died without issue or a surviving father or
mother, but leaving a widow and also a sister, and that, if the
statutes of Montana were applicable, the recovery should be for the
equal benefit of the widow and sister, and not for the exclusive
benefit of the widow, as prayed in the complaint and as provided in
the Act of Congress. The defendant challenged the validity of the
act by a demurrer to the complaint, and in the subsequent
proceedings insisted that the recovery, if any, should be for the
benefit of the widow and sister jointly, and not for the benefit of
the widow alone, but the demurrer and the insistence were
overruled, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the
exclusive benefit of the widow, as prayed. By a direct writ of
error, the defendant seeks a reversal of that judgment.
Nos. 289 and 290 (
Walsh v. New York, New Haven and Hartford
R. Co.; New York, New Haven and Hartford R. Co. v. Walsh).
These writs of error relate to the judgment in a single case. It
was an action by the personal representative of a deceased employee
of a railroad corporation to recover, for the benefit of the
surviving widow and children, for the death of the employee which
resulted from an injury suffered in the course of his employment.
The injury and death occurred in Connecticut, February 11, 1909,
the action was commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Massachusetts in July following, and the right
of action asserted in the second count of the declaration was based
on the act of Congress before mentioned. There were several other
counts, but they may be passed without special notice. It was
charged in the second count that the injury occurred while the
defendant,
Page 223 U. S. 6
as a common carrier by railroad, was engaged in commerce between
some of the states, and while the deceased, in the course of his
employment by the defendant in such commerce, was engaged in
replacing a drawbar on one of the defendant's cars then in use in
such commerce, and that the injury proximately resulted from
negligence of fellow servants of the deceased in pushing other cars
against the one on which he was working. A demurrer to that count
challenged the validity of the Act of Congress, but the demurrer
was overruled. The defendant answered, putting in issue all that
was stated in that count, and also alleging that the deceased, by
his own negligence, contributed to the injury which resulted in his
death, and therefore that the damages should be diminished in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to him. A trial
to the court and a jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff upon the second count, and there was a judgment for the
defendant upon the other counts. Each party has sued out a direct
writ of error from this Court. The defendant calls in question the
ruling upon its demurrer and other rulings in the progress of the
cause, notably such as related to the nature of the employment in
which the deceased and the fellow servants whose conduct was in
question were engaged at the time of the injury, and to the
admeasurement of the damages. The plaintiff makes no complaint of
the judgment upon the second count, and, if it shall be affirmed,
wishes to waive her objections to the judgment upon the other
counts.
The act whose validity is drawn in question, 35 Stat. 65, c.
149, and the amendment of April 5, 1910, 36 Stat. 291, c. 143, are
as follows:
"An Act Relating to the Liability of Common Carriers by Railroad
to Their Employees in Certain cases."
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives
Page 223 U. S. 7
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That every common carrier by railroad, while engaging in commerce
between any of the several states or territories, or between any of
the states and territories, or between the District of Columbia and
any of the states or territories, or between the District of
Columbia or any of the states or territories and any foreign nation
or nations, shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or,
in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal
representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband
and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such
employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent
upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or
in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines,
appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or
other equipment."
"SEC. 2. That every common carrier by railroad in the
territories, the District of Columbia, the Panama Canal Zone, or
other possessions of the United States, shall be liable in damages
to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier
in any of said jurisdictions, or, in case of the death of such
employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of
the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee, and,
if none, then of such employee's parents, and, if none, then of the
next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death
resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the
officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any
defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars,
engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats,
wharves, or other equipment."
"SEC. 3. That in all actions hereafter brought against
Page 223 U. S. 8
any such common carrier by railroad under or by virtue of any of
the provisions of this act, to recover damages for personal
injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in
his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages
shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to such employee:
Provided, That
no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have
been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the
violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the
safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such
employee."
"SEC. 4. That in any action brought against any common carrier
under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this act to recover
damages for injuries to, or the death of, any of its employees,
such employee shall not be held to have assumed the risks of his
employment in any case where the violation by such common carrier
of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to
the injury or death of such employee."
"SEC. 5. That any contract, rule, regulation, or device
whatsoever the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this
act shall to that extent be void:
Provided, That in any
action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue
of any of the provisions of this act, such common carrier may set
off therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance,
relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured
employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the injury or
death for which said action was brought."
"SEC. 6. That no action shall be maintained under this act
unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action
accrued."
"SEC. 7. That the term 'common carrier' as used in
Page 223 U. S. 9
this act shall include the receiver or receivers or other
persons or corporations charged with the duty of the management and
operation of the business of a common carrier."
"SEC. 8. That nothing in this act shall be held to limit the
duty or liability of common carriers, or to impair the rights of
their employees under any other act or acts of Congress, or to
affect the prosecution of any pending proceeding or right of action
under the Act of Congress entitled, 'An Act Relating to Liability
of Common Carriers in the District of Columbia and Territories, and
to Common Carriers Engaged in Commerce between the states and
Foreign Nations to their Employees,' approved June eleventh,
nineteen hundred and six."
"Approved April 22, 1908."
"An Act to Amend an Act Entitled, 'An Act Relating to the
Liability of Common Carriers by Railroad to Their Employees in
Certain cases,' Approved April Twenty-second, Nineteen Hundred and
Eight."
"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That an
act entitled 'An Act Relating to the Liability of Common Carriers
by Railroad to Their Employees in Certain cases,' approved April
twenty-second, nineteen hundred and eight, be amended in section
six so that said section shall read:"
"SEC. 6. That no action shall be maintained under this act
unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action
accrued."
"Under this act, an action may be brought in a circuit court of
the United States, in the district of the residence of the
defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the
defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such
action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under
this act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several
states, and no case
Page 223 U. S. 10
arising under this act and brought in any state court of
competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United
States."
"SEC. 2. That said act be further amended by adding the
following section as section nine of said act:"
"SEC. 9. That any right of action given by this act to a person
suffering injury shall survive to his or her personal
representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband
and children of such employee, and if none, then of such employee's
parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such
employee, but in such cases, there shall be only one recovery for
the same injury."
"Approved, April 5, 1910. "
Page 223 U. S. 46
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER, after stating the cases as above,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal questions presented in these cases as discussed at
the bar and in the briefs are: 1. May Congress, in the exertion of
its power over interstate commerce, regulate the relations of
common carriers by railroad and their employees while both are
engaged in such commerce? 2. Has Congress exceeded its power in
that regard by prescribing the regulations which are embodied in
the act in question? 3. Do those regulations supersede the laws of
the states insofar as the latter cover the same field? 4. May
rights arising under those regulations be enforced, as of right, in
the courts of the states when their jurisdiction, as fixed by local
laws, is adequate to the occasion?
The clauses in the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, clauses 3 and
18) which confer upon Congress the power "to regulate commerce . .
. among the several states," and "to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper" for the purpose, have been considered by this
Court so often and in such varied connections that some
propositions bearing upon the extent and nature of this power have
come to be so firmly settled as no longer to be open to dispute,
among them being these:
1. The term "commerce" comprehends more than the mere exchange
of goods. It embraces commercial intercourse in all its branches,
including transportation of passengers and property by common
carriers, whether carried on by water or by land.
2. The phrase "among the several states" marks the distinction,
for the purpose of governmental regulation, between commerce which
concerns two or more states and commerce which is confined to a
single state and does
Page 223 U. S. 47
not affect other states -- the power to regulate the former
being conferred upon Congress and the regulation of the latter
remaining with the states severally.
3. "To regulate," in the sense intended, is to foster, protect,
control, and restrain, with appropriate regard for the welfare of
those who are immediately concerned and of the public at large.
4. This power over commerce among the states, so conferred upon
Congress, is complete in itself, extends incidentally to every
instrument and agent by which such commerce is carried on, may be
exerted to its utmost extent over every part of such commerce, and
is subject to no limitations save such as are prescribed in the
Constitution. But, of course, it does not extend to any matter or
thing which does not have a real or substantial relation to some
part of such commerce.
5. Among the instruments and agents to which the power extends
are the railroads over which transportation from one state to
another is conducted, the engines and cars by which such
transportation is effected, and all who are in any wise engaged in
such transportation, whether as common carriers or as their
employees.
6. The duties of common carriers in respect of the safety of
their employees, while both are engaged in commerce among the
states and the liability of the former for injuries sustained by
the latter while both are so engaged have a real or substantial
relation to such commerce, and therefore are within the range of
this power.
Cooley v. Port
Wardens, 12 How. 299,
53 U. S.
315-317;
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558,
88 U. S. 577;
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99,
93 U. S.
103-105;
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.
S. 465,
124 U. S. 479;
Nashville &c. Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S.
96,
128 U. S. 99;
Peirce v. Van Dusen, 78 F. 693, 698-700;
Baltimore
& O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368,
149 U. S. 378;
Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.
S. 169,
190 U. S. 176;
Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U. S.
1;
Schlemmer v. Buffalo &c. Ry. Co.,
205 U. S. 1;
Employers'
Page 223 U. S. 48
Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463,
207 U. S. 495;
Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161,
208 U. S.
176-178;
Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612,
221 U. S. 618;
Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S.
20.
As is well said in the brief prepared by the late Solicitor
General:
"Interstate commerce -- if not always, at any rate when the
commerce is transportation -- is an act. Congress, of course, can
do anything which, in the exercise by itself of a fair discretion,
may be deemed appropriate to save the act of interstate commerce
from prevention or interruption, or to make that act more secure,
more reliable, or more efficient. The act of interstate commerce is
done by the labor of men and with the help of things, and these men
and things are the agents and instruments of the commerce. If the
agents or instruments are destroyed while they are doing the act,
commerce is stopped; if the agents or instruments are interrupted,
commerce is interrupted; if the agents or instruments are not of
the right kind or quality, commerce in consequence becomes slow or
costly or unsafe or otherwise inefficient, and if the conditions
under which the agents or instruments do the work of commerce are
wrong or disadvantageous, those bad conditions may and often will
prevent or interrupt the act of commerce or make it less
expeditious, less reliable, less economical, and less secure.
Therefore, Congress may legislate about the agents and instruments
of interstate commerce, and about the conditions under which those
agents and instruments perform the work of interstate commerce,
whenever such legislation bears, or, in the exercise of a fair
legislative discretion, can be deemed to bear, upon the reliability
or promptness or economy or security or utility of the Interstate
Commerce Act."
In view of these settled propositions, it does not admit of
doubt that the answer to the first of the questions before stated
must be that Congress, in the exertion of its power over interstate
commerce, may regulate the relations
Page 223 U. S. 49
of common carriers by railroad and their employees, while both
are engaged in such commerce, subject always to the limitations
prescribed in the Constitution and to the qualification that the
particulars in which those relations are regulated must have a real
or substantial connection with the interstate commerce in which the
carriers and their employees are engaged.
We come, then, to inquire whether Congress has exceeded its
power in that regard by prescribing the regulations embodied in the
present act. It is objected that it has, (1) because the abrogation
of the fellow servant rule, the extension of the carrier's
liability to cases of death, and the restriction of the defenses of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk have no tendency to
promote the safety of the employees or to advance the commerce in
which they are engaged; (2) because the liability imposed for
injuries sustained by one employee through the negligence of
another, although confined to instances where the injured employee
is engaged in interstate commerce, is not confined to instances
where both employees are so engaged, and (3) because the act
offends against the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution (a) by
unwarrantably interfering with the liberty of contract, and (b) by
arbitrarily placing all employers engaged in interstate commerce by
railroad in a disfavored class, and all their employees engaged in
such commerce in a favored class.
Briefly stated, the departures from the common law made by the
portions of the act against which the first objection is leveled
are these: (a) the rule that the negligence of one employee
resulting in injury to another was not to be attributed to their
common employer is displaced by a rule imposing upon the employer
responsibility for such an injury, as was done at common law when
the injured person was not an employee; (b) the rule exonerating an
employer from liability for injury sustained by an employee through
the concurring negligence of the employer
Page 223 U. S. 50
and the employee is abrogated in all instances where the
employer's violation of a statute enacted for the safety of his
employees contributes to the injury, and in other instances is
displaced by the rule of comparative negligence, whereby the
exoneration is only from a proportional part of the damages
corresponding to the amount of negligence attributable to the
employee; (c) the rule that an employee was deemed to assume the
risk of injury, even if due to the employer's negligence, where the
employee voluntarily entered or remained in the service with an
actual or presumed knowledge of the conditions out of which the
risk arose is abrogated in all instances where the employer's
violation of a statute enacted for the safety of his employees
contributed to the injury, and (d) the rule denying a right of
action for the death of one person, caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another is displaced by a rule vesting such a right of
action in the personal representatives of the deceased, for the
benefit of designated relatives.
Of the objection to these changes it is enough to observe:
First.
"A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of
the common law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law, and
is no more sacred than any other. Rights of property which have
been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due
process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed
at the will . . . of the legislature unless prevented by
constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes is
to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to
adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances."
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113,
94 U. S. 134;
Martin v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. Co., 203 U.
S. 284,
203 U. S. 294;
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558,
88 U. S. 577;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial Milling Co.,
218 U. S. 406,
218 U. S.
417.
Second. The natural tendency of the changes described
Page 223 U. S. 51
is to impel the carriers to avoid or prevent the negligent acts
and omissions which are made the bases of the rights of recovery
which the statute creates and defines, and as whatever makes for
that end tends to promote the safety of the employees and to
advance the commerce in which they are engaged, we entertain no
doubt that, in making those changes, Congress acted within the
limits of the discretion confided to it by the Constitution.
Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321,
188 U. S.
353-355;
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside
Mills, 219 U. S. 186,
219 U. S.
203.
We are not unmindful that that end was being measurably attained
through the remedial legislation of the several states, but that
legislation has been far from uniform, and it undoubtedly rested
with Congress to determine whether a national law, operating
uniformly in all the states, upon all carriers by railroad engaged
in interstate commerce, would better subserve the needs of that
commerce.
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558,
88 U. S.
581-582;
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh,
149 U. S. 368,
149 U. S.
378-379.
The second objection proceeds upon the theory that, even
although Congress has power to regulate the liability of a carrier
for injuries sustained by one employee through the negligence of
another where all are engaged in interstate commerce, that power
does not embrace instances where the negligent employee is engaged
in intrastate commerce. But this is a mistaken theory, in that it
treats the source of the injury, rather than its effect upon
interstate commerce, as the criterion of congressional power. As
was said in
Southern Railway Co. v. United States,
222 U. S. 20,
222 U. S. 27,
that power is plenary, and competently may be exerted to secure the
safety of interstate transportation and of those who are employed
therein, no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten
it. The present act, unlike the one condemned in
Employers'
Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463,
deals only with the liability of a carrier engaged in interstate
commerce for injuries sustained
Page 223 U. S. 52
by its employees while engaged in such commerce. And, this being
so, it is not a valid objection that the act embraces instances
where the causal negligence is that of an employee engaged in
intrastate commerce, for such negligence, when operating
injuriously upon an employee engaged in interstate commerce, has
the same effect upon that commerce as if the negligent employee
were also engaged therein.
Next in order is the objection that the provision in § 5,
declaring void any contract, rule, regulation, or device the
purpose or intent of which is to enable a carrier to exempt itself
from the liability which the act creates is repugnant to the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution as an unwarranted interference with
the liberty of contract. But of this it suffices to say, in view of
our recent decisions in
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549;
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Riverside Mills,
219 U. S. 186, and
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 221 U. S. 612,
that, if Congress possesses the power to impose that liability,
which we here hold that it does, it also possesses the power to
insure its efficacy by prohibiting any contract, rule, regulation,
or device in evasion of it.
Coming to the question of classification, it is true that the
liability which the act creates is imposed only on interstate
carriers by railroad, although there are other interstate carriers,
and is imposed for the benefit of all employees of such carriers by
railroad who are employed in interstate commerce, although some are
not subjected to the peculiar hazards incident to the operation of
trains, or to hazards that differ from those to which other
employees in such commerce, not within the act, are exposed. But it
does not follow that this classification is violative of the "due
process of law" clause of the Fifth Amendment. Even if it be
assumed that that clause is equivalent to the "equal protection of
the laws" clause of the Fourteenth
Page 223 U. S. 53
Amendment, which is the most that can be claimed for it here, it
does not take from Congress the power to classify, nor does it
condemn exertions of that power merely because they occasion some
inequalities. On the contrary, it admits of the exercise of a wide
discretion in classifying according to general, rather than minute,
distinctions, and condemns what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61,
220 U. S. 78.
Tested by these standards, this classification is not
objectionable. Like classifications of railroad carriers and
employees for like purposes, when assailed under the equal
protection clause, have been sustained by repeated decisions of
this Court.
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mackey,
127 U. S. 205;
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Melton,
218 U. S. 36;
Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Railroad Co. v.
Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35.
It follows that the answer to the second of the questions before
stated must be that Congress has not exceeded its power by
prescribing the regulations embodied in the present act.
The third question, whether those regulations supersede the laws
of the states insofar as the latter cover the same field, finds its
answer in the following extracts from the opinion of Chief Justice
Marshall in
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316:
"[P.
17 U. S. 405] If any one
proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might
expect it would be this -- that the government of the Union, though
limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. This
would seem to result necessarily from its nature. It is the
government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents
all, and acts for all. Though any one state may be willing to
control its operations, no state is willing to allow others to
control them. The nation, on those subjects on which it can act,
must necessarily bind its component
Page 223 U. S. 54
parts. But this question is not left to mere reason: the people
have, in express terms, decided it, by saying, 'this Constitution,
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof,' 'shall be the supreme law of the land,' and by requiring
that the members of the state legislatures, and the officers of the
executive and judicial departments of the states, shall take the
oath of fidelity to it. The government of the United States, then,
though limited in its powers, is supreme, and its laws, when made
in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land,
'anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.'"
"[P.
17 U. S. 426] This great
principle is that the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof are supreme; that they control the Constitution and laws of
the respective states, and cannot be controlled by them."
And particularly apposite is the repetition of that principle in
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465,
124 U. S.
473:
"The grant of power to Congress in the Constitution to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, it is
conceded, is paramount over all legislative powers which, in
consequence of not having been granted to Congress, are reserved to
the states. It follows that any legislation of a state, although in
pursuance of an acknowledged power reserved to it, which conflicts
with the actual exercise of the power of Congress over the subject
of commerce must give way before the supremacy of the national
authority."
True, prior to the present act, the laws of the several states
were regarded as determinative of the liability of employers
engaged in interstate commerce for injuries received by their
employees while engaged in such commerce. But that was because
Congress, although empowered to regulate that subject, had not
acted thereon, and because the subject is one which falls within
the police
Page 223 U. S. 55
power of the states in the absence of action by Congress.
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99,
93 U. S. 23 L.
ed. 819; Smith v. Alabama,
124 U. S. 465,
124 U. S. 473,
124 U. S.
480-482;
Nashville &c. Railway v. Alabama,
128 U. S. 96,
128 U. S. 99;
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137,
187 U. S. 146.
The inaction of Congress, however, in no wise affected its power
over the subject.
The
Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558,
88 U. S. 581;
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.
S. 196,
114 U. S. 215.
And now that Congress has acted, the laws of the states, insofar as
they cover the same field, are superseded, for necessarily that
which is not supreme must yield to that which is.
Gulf,
Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S.
98,
158 U. S. 104;
Southern Railway Co. v. Reid, 222 U.
S. 424;
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
Washington, 222 U. S. 370.
We come next to consider whether rights arising under the
congressional act may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of
the states when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is
adequate to the occasion. The first of the cases now before us was
begun in one of the superior courts of the State of Connecticut,
and in that case, the Supreme Court of errors of the state answered
the question in the negative. That however, was not because the
ordinary jurisdiction of the superior courts, as defined by the
constitution and laws of the state, was deemed inadequate or not
adapted to the adjudication of such a case, but because the Supreme
Court of Errors was of opinion (1) that the congressional act
impliedly restricts the enforcement of the rights which it creates
to the federal courts, and (2) that, if this be not so, the
superior courts are at liberty to decline cognizance of actions to
enforce rights arising under that act, because (a) the policy
manifested by it is not in accord with the policy of the state
respecting the liability of employers to employees for injuries
received by the latter while in the service of the former, and (b)
it would be inconvenient and confusing for the same court, in
dealing with cases of the
Page 223 U. S. 56
same general class, to apply in some the standards of right
established by the congressional act and in others the different
standards recognized by the laws of the state.
We are quite unable to assent to the view that the enforcement
of the rights which the congressional act creates was originally
intended to be restricted to the federal courts. The act contains
nothing which is suggestive of such a restriction, and in this
situation the intention of Congress was reflected by the provision
in the general jurisdictional act
"[t]hat the circuit courts of the United States shall have
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several
states, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and
costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States."
25 Stat. 433, c. 866, § 1;
Robb v. Connolly,
111 U. S. 624,
111 U. S. 637;
United States v. Barnes, 222 U. S. 513.
This is emphasized by the amendment engrafted upon the original act
in 1910, to the effect that
"the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this
act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several
states, and no case arising under this act, and brought in any
state court of competent jurisdiction, shall be removed to any
court of the United States."
The amendment, as appears by its language, instead of granting
jurisdiction to the state courts, presupposes that they already
possessed it.
Because of some general observations in the opinion of the
Supreme Court of Errors, and to the end that the remaining ground
of decision advanced therein may be more accurately understood, we
deem it well to observe that there is not here involved any attempt
by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state
courts, or to control or affect their modes of procedure, but only
a question of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary
jurisdiction,
Page 223 U. S. 57
as prescribed by local laws, is appropriate to the occasion, and
is invoked in conformity with those laws, to take cognizance of an
action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under the Act
of Congress, and susceptible of adjudication according to the
prevailing rules of procedure. We say "when its ordinary
jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is appropriate to the
occasion" because we are advised by the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Errors that the superior courts of the state are courts of
general jurisdiction, are empowered to take cognizance of actions
to recover for personal injuries and for death, and are accustomed
to exercise that jurisdiction not only in cases where the right of
action arose under the laws of that state, but also in cases where
it arose in another state, under its laws, and in circumstances in
which the laws of Connecticut give no right of recovery, as where
the causal negligence was that of a fellow servant.
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with
the policy of the state, and therefore that the courts of the state
are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible, because it
presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When
Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the
Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all
the states, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy
is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act had emanated
from its own legislature, and should be respected accordingly in
the courts of the state. As was said by this Court in
Claflin
v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130,
93 U. S.
136-137:
"The laws of the United States are laws in the several states,
and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the
state laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as
regards the several states, but is a concurrent, and, within its
jurisdiction, paramount, sovereignty. . . . If an act of Congress
gives a penalty [meaning civil and remedial] to a party aggrieved,
without
Page 223 U. S. 58
specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why
it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of
Congress, by a proper action in a state court. The fact that a
state court derives its existence and functions from the state laws
is no reason why it should not afford relief, because it is subject
also to the laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to
recognize these as operative within the state as it is to recognize
the state laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence,
which constitutes the law of the land for the state, and the courts
of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be
treated by each other as such, but as courts of the same country,
having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent. . . .
It is true, the sovereignties are distinct, and neither can
interfere with the proper jurisdiction of the other, as was so
clearly shown by the Chief Justice Taney in the case of
Ableman
v. Booth, 21 How. 506, and hence the state courts
have no power to revise the action of the federal courts, nor the
federal the state, except where the federal Constitution or laws
are involved. But this is no reason why the state courts should not
be open for the prosecution of rights growing out of the laws of
the United States, to which their jurisdiction is competent, and
not denied."
We are not disposed to believe that the exercise of jurisdiction
by the state courts will be attended by any appreciable
inconvenience or confusion, but, be this as it may, it affords no
reason for declining a jurisdiction conferred by law. The existence
of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise it,
and that its exercise may be onerous does not militate against that
implication. Besides, it is neither new nor unusual in judicial
proceedings to apply different rules of law to different situations
and subjects, even although possessing some elements of similarity,
as where the liability of a public carrier for personal injuries
turns upon whether the injured person
Page 223 U. S. 59
was a passenger, an employee, or a stranger. But it never has
been supposed that courts are at liberty to decline cognizance of
cases of a particular class merely because the rules of law to be
applied in their adjudication are unlike those applied in other
cases.
We conclude that rights arising under the act in question may be
enforced, as of right, in the courts of the states when their
jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the
occasion.
In No. 289, several rulings in the progress of the cause, not
covered by what already has been said, are called in question, but
it suffices to say of them that they have been carefully
considered, and that we find no reversible error in them.
In Nos. 170, 289, and 290, the judgments are affirmed, and
in No. 120 the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
