A legacy to pay over net income to the legatee in periodical
payment during the legatee's life on which the legatee has received
several payments of income is not a contingent beneficial interest,
but a vested life estate, and taxes paid on the value of such a
legacy under the War Revenue Act of June 13, 1898, c. 448, 30 Stat.
48, 464, cannot be recovered under § 3 of the Act of June 27,
1902, c. 1160, 32 Stat. 406.
Vanderbilt v. Eidman,
196 U. S. 480,
distinguished.
Congress will be presumed to use familiar legal expressions in
their familiar legal sense.
45 Ct.Cl. 362 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit to recover a portion of a succession tax paid
under the Act of June 13, 1898, c. 448, 30 Stat. 448,
Page 222 U. S. 159
464, the action being based on the Act of June 27, 1902, c.
1160, § 3, 32 Stat. 406, which provides for refunding
"so much of said tax as may have been collected on contingent
beneficial interests which shall not have become vested prior to
July first, nineteen hundred and two."
The petitioner, appellee, was residuary legatee under a will, in
trust to hold the fund "either as at present invested, or in such
securities as to my said trustee may be deemed safe," and to pay
over the net income to the testator's niece "in quarterly payments
during all the period of her natural life." On June 8, 1900, the
appellee made a return to the collector of internal revenue stating
that the value of the residuary estate was $120,303.94, and that of
a specific legacy of silverware, etc., to the niece, $500. With the
aid of mortuary tables, the rate of interest being assumed to be
four percent, the clear value of the legacies to the niece was
fixed at $74,678.68, and an inheritance tax of $5,600.90 was
assessed upon it, which was paid on August 16, 1900. Up to July 1,
1902, the date fixed by the statute, the petitioner had paid to the
niece $17,027.59 income from the residue and had delivered to her
the specific legacy valued at $500. The tax on these sums at the
rate of taxation was $1,314.59, which, deducted from the whole tax
paid, leaves $4,286.31, to recover which this suit is brought. The
appellee had judgment in the Court of Claims. 45 Ct.Cl. 362.
The words "which shall not have become vested," quoted above,
mean the same as "absolutely vested in possession or enjoyment" in
a later clause ending the tax on contingent interests unless so
vested before July 1, 1902.
Vanderbilt v. Eidmar,
196 U. S. 480,
196 U. S. 500.
On this ground, it is argued at great length that only so much of
the life interest of the niece as she had received before the date
mentioned had vested in the sense of the clause. We are of opinion
that this argument cannot be maintained. The interest of the niece
was not a contingent right to income as
Page 222 U. S. 160
it should accrue in her lifetime; it was a vested life estate in
a fund, changing in investment at the discretion of the trustee,
but retaining its equitable identity. Objections like those that
are made to treating a life estate as a present unity in the
enjoyment of the life tenant might be made to the similar treatment
of absolute ownership in fee. In actual life, a fee can be enjoyed
only minute by minute, but, although eternal in theory of law, by
the same theory, at every moment, it is all and wholly in the
owner's hands. The statute does not invite speculation in a new
nomenclature or attempt to reach profounder conceptions than those
familiar to the law. When it speaks of interests absolutely vested
in possession, we presume that it uses familiar legal expressions
in their familiar legal sense. It deals in terms with the interest,
that is, the legal unit of right, not with the money received
before a given moment. No better example of such an interest could
be given than a life estate in a fund the enjoyment of which
actually has begun; none that more clearly and absolutely excludes
the qualification "contingent" in the sense of the law.
Vanderbilt v. Eidman, 196 U. S. 480,
concerned a life estate in remainder which, whether the remainder
was technically vested or contingent,
ibid., 196 U. S.
501-502, was not vested in possession or enjoyment. It
was assumed that the tax was payable in a case like this.
Ibid., 196 U. S. 488,
196 U. S.
495.
Decree reversed.