Mandamus to Court of Claims to require it to modify its decree
to conform to a decree of this Court and make a distribution
per stirpes instead of
per capita refused on the
ground of laches.
Where the Court of Claims decrees a distribution
per
capita, parties who feel aggrieved thereby, and claim that the
distribution should
Page 220 U. S. 84
be
per stirpes in order to conform to the decree of
this Court, are not obliged to await the completion of the rolls on
which the distribution is to be made. They can apply at once to
this Court for mandamus,
In re Sandford Fork & Tool
Co., 160 U. S. 247, and
are chargeable with laches if they wait and permit all the steps to
be taken at great expense and the funds disbursed, so that, in case
of their success, the government might be required to pay twice,
and so
held in this case.
The facts, which involve the distribution of a fund between
Cherokee Indians pursuant to decrees of this Court and of the Court
of Claims, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petition for mandamus to the Court of Claims to require it to
conform to a decree of this Court modifying a decree of that court
in the case of the
United States v. Cherokee Indians,
202 U. S. 101.
A rule to show cause was issued, to which a response has been
made by the Court of Claims.
A recitation of the facts of the litigation between the Eastern
Cherokees and the United States need not be made. They are set out
in
202 U. S. 202
U.S. 201. We are only concerned with the decree and what took place
in accordance with it in the Court of Claims. It is enough to say
that the Eastern Cherokees, under the authority of acts of
Congress, brought suit against the United States for certain sums
alleged to be due under treaties with the United States, and the
Court of Claims decreed May 18,
Page 220 U. S. 85
1905, that, after deducting counsel fees, costs, and expenses,
the sum of $1,111,284.70, among other sums, with interest, should
be paid to the Secretary of the Interior, to be by him received and
held for the use and purpose of paying costs and expenses as
stated, and the remainder to be distributed
"directly to the Eastern and Western Cherokees, who were parties
to the Treaty of New Echola, as proclaimed May 23, 1836, or to the
Treaty of Washington of August 6, 1846, as individuals, whether
east or west of the Mississippi River, or to the legal
representatives of such individuals."
We held that the decree, "in directing that the distribution be
made to
the Eastern and Western Cherokees,'" was "perhaps
liable to misconstruction," though limited by a reference to the
treaties, and decided that the decree should be modified
"so as to direct the distribution to be made to the Eastern
Cherokees as individuals, whether east or west of the Mississippi,
parties to the Treaties of 1835-36 and 1846, exclusive of the Old
Settlers."
As modified, the decree was affirmed.
We also decided that the amount of the decree "should be paid to
the Secretary of the Interior, to be distributed directly to the
parties entitled to it."
Upon the going down of the mandate, the Court of Claims modified
its decree, as directed, by explicitly excluding the Old Settlers
in terms from its operation, and distributing the fund "to the
Eastern Cherokees as individuals," omitting the words "or to the
legal representatives of such individuals." And the Court directed
the Secretary of the Interior to prepare or have prepared a roll of
the Cherokees entitled to share in the amount of the decree, and
to
"accept as a basis for the distribution of said fund the rolls
of 1851, upon which the per capita payment to the Eastern Cherokees
was made, and make such distribution in pursuance of article 9 of
the treaty of 1846. "
Page 220 U. S. 86
It is stated in the response of the Court of Claims to the rule
to show cause that the special agent appointed by the Secretary
encountered difficulties in making up the roll "upon a
per
capita basis and otherwise," and that the Secretary of the
Interior called the attention of the court to the difficulties and
asked the following questions:
"First. Shall the rolls of 1851 be used as the exclusive basis
for the present distribution? Second. Shall the distribution be
per stirpes or
per capita? Third. If
per
capita, what disposition shall be made of those portions for
which there have been no applications?"
The court, considering that its decree, as modified by our
mandate, directed a
per capita distribution, ordered the
commissioner named for the purpose to
"enroll as entitled to share in the fund arising from said
decree of May 28, 1906, all such individual Eastern Cherokee
Indians by blood, living on May 28, 1906, as shall establish the
fact that they were members of the Eastern Cherokee Tribe of
Indians at the date of the Treaties of 1835-36 and 1846, or are
descendants of such persons, and who shall further establish the
fact that they have not been affiliated with any tribe of Indians
other than the Eastern Cherokees or the Cherokee Nation."
The court subsequently (as appears from its response to the rule
to show cause),
"at the written request of the Secretary of the Interior and
sundry other persons who petitioned therefor, as well as at the
request of counsel engaged in said cause,"
vacated the order which directed the Secretary of the Interior
to prepare the roll, and employed Guion Miller, who had theretofore
been employed by the Secretary, to prepare the roll under its
supervision. The roll was prepared as directed, to which exceptions
were filed, most of which were overruled, and on March 7, 1910, it
was approved.
Miller was also designated as a special commissioner to receive
from the Treasury Department all the warrants
Page 220 U. S. 87
for the persons enrolled, and to visit the various localities
where the Indians resided, as he had done in preparing the roll,
and to deliver the warrants, which he did prior to the filing of
the petition herein for mandamus, the response of the court stating
as follows:
"The money arising from said judgment was long prior to October
17, 1910, the date of the filing of said petition for said mandate
to show cause, distributed and paid to practically all of those on
said roll, so that of the 30,827 enrolled, only 313 remained
unpaid, as we are advised by said commissioner, who was also
entrusted, under the order of the court, with the delivery of the
warrants issued by the Treasury Department to the parties so
enrolled, respectively. Since which time, 44 additional payments
have been made, leaving 269 unpaid on October 28, 1910."
The court further states that, on the authority of the special
report of Miller, made for its information, persons of the same
name as those signing the power of attorney authorizing the filing
of the petition for mandamus were enrolled, as were those whom they
claimed to represent, and have been paid their respective shares
for which they receipted in full.
It is contended by petitioners that the Treaties of 1835-36 and
1846 required the Court of Claims to make a distribution
per
stirpes, and that, in its original decree of May 18, 1905, it
was so provided. And it is further contended that the mandate of
this Court so required, and that such interpretation was put upon
it by the Court of Claims and the commissioner appointed by the
Secretary of the Interior. It is insisted that, in consequence of
the error of the court, the roll prepared in accordance with its
orders contains the names of numerous persons not entitled under
the mandate of this Court to participate in the fund.
The respondent opposes these contentions, and makes
Page 220 U. S. 88
the counter one that petitioners have been guilty of laches,
which, if it be justified, makes a notice of other contentions
unnecessary. A summary of the proceedings shows that the contention
is justified. The first decree of the court, as we have seen,
distributed the fund to the Eastern and Western Cherokees as
individuals, or to the legal representatives of such individuals.
The decree, as modified by this Court, limited the distribution to
the Eastern Cherokees, and omitted the words "or to the legal
representatives of such individuals." A question arose as to
whether the mandate of this Court directed a
per capita or
per stirpes distribution, and, on March 5, 1907, the Court
of Claims gave notice that it would hear the parties on the
question.
The matter came on for hearing April 8, 1907, all parties being
represented, and a
per capita distribution of the judgment
was ordered, and a commissioner appointed to prepare the roll of
those entitled to share under the decree.
This was done, and a report made to the court, to which
exceptions were filed, which "in the main" were overruled. On March
10, 1910, the report as corrected was approved, and the amount of
the decree distributed, as we have seen, to the persons entitled
thereto.
This summary demonstrates the laches of petitioners. If it be
conceded that the mandate of this Court and the decree of the Court
of Claims as modified in accordance with it were ambiguous, the
Court of Claims decided, as early as April 28, 1907, that it
required a
per capita distribution. The petitioners took
no action against the decision, nor the order of distribution based
on it. They permitted the distribution to be made. And they might
have taken action.
In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co.,
160 U. S. 247,
160 U. S. 259.
Mandamus was available then, as now, and the circumstances condemn
the delay. The amount of the judgment was to be distributed
among
Page 220 U. S. 89
many thousands of persons. Such persons were to be ascertained,
their names enrolled, and payment made to them. Every step involved
expense, and the fund, once disbursed, could not be recovered, and
the United States might be required to pay a second time.
In explanation of these circumstances, which, on their face,
make a clear demonstration of negligence on the part of
petitioners, they urge that, after the modification on April 28,
1907, of the final decree, there were other proceedings, instancing
as such the ruling, on March 7, 1910, on exceptions to the roll,
and urge that "within eighty-five days thereafter," they "secured
counsel and invoked the jurisdiction of this Court for the
protection of their rights." They further urge that, "until the
roll had been approved, there was uncertainty what the Court of
Claims might do," and that "when the final order had been taken,
the petitioners were then only at liberty to institute the present
proceeding."
This overlooks that they attack the principle upon which
distribution was decreed by the Court of Claims -- in other words,
their contention is that a
per capita instead of a
per
stirpes distribution of the fund was directed by the decree of
April 28, 1907, the consequence of which was that "numerous persons
not entitled under the mandate of this Court" were made
participants in the fund, and their (petitioners') shares thereby
"much lessened." Petitioners are mistaken, therefore, when they say
that they were "only at liberty to institute the present
proceeding" when the roll was approved. The decree constituted
their grievance, if they had any, and if it did not execute the
mandate of this Court, the action of the Court of Claims in
rendering it could have been reviewed and corrected by appeal or
mandamus.
In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co. supra.
Rule discharged and petition dismissed.