The management of the post office business has been placed by
Congress in the hands of the Postmaster General and his assistants,
and the Postal Laws and Regulations provide for the delivery of
mail where two or more persons of the same name receive mail at the
same post office.
While the benefit of one's legal name belongs to every party,
individual or corporation, it may at times be necessary and proper
to look beyond the exact legal name to the name by which a party is
customarily known and addressed in order to properly deliver mail
to the person to whom it is addressed.
The findings of fact by officers in charge of the several
departments of the government are conclusive unless palpable error
appears.
In this case, the First Assistant Postmaster General having made
an order directing delivery of mail addressed to Central Trust
Company, Chicago, to the Central Trust Company of Illinois instead
of to a South Dakota corporation having the name Central Trust
Company,
held that there was not enough clear right shown
by the latter company to justify the setting aside of the order by
the court.
152 F. 427 affirmed.
On June 22, 1906, the Central Trust Company, a corporation
Page 216 U. S. 252
engaged in the mining, promoting, real estate, and trust
business, filed its bill in the Circuit Court of the United States
for the Northern District of Illinois to compel the defendant
Frederick A. Busse, postmaster at Chicago, to deliver to it certain
mail matter which it claims it was entitled to receive, and which
he wrongfully delivered to the defendant the Central Trust Company
of Illinois. Demurrers to the bill were filed, which were
sustained, and the bill dismissed. On appeal to the United States,
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the decree of
dismissal was affirmed, and thereupon the case was brought here on
appeal.
The allegations in the bill are that, on or about April 17,
1897, the complainant was created a corporation by the State of
South Dakota under the name and title of "Central Trust Company,"
and was authorized by said state to establish an office and hold
directors' meetings in Chicago; that, on or about that date, it
established an office in Chicago on the corner of Monroe and La
Salle Streets, and began to carry on its business, though without
any express authority from the State of Illinois, and continued to
do so up to and including February 7, 1903; that in August, 1902,
it applied to the Secretary of State of Illinois for a license to
do business within that state, and complied with all the statutory
requirements for foreign corporations desiring to do business
within the state; that, owing to a contest made before the
secretary of state by the Central Trust Company of Illinois, the
granting of said license was delayed until February 7, 1903, at
which time it was granted, and that from that date complainant has
continuously conducted its business in Chicago at the office and
under the above-stated name; that ever since its coming to Chicago,
it has received through the post office a large amount of mail
matter addressed to it by simply its name.
The bill further alleges that the defendant the Central Trust
Company of Illinois is a corporation chartered by the State of
Illinois on or about July, 1902, and engaged in a general banking
and trust business at No. 142 Monroe Street, in
Page 216 U. S. 253
Chicago; that its first place of business was at the corner of
Dearborn and Monroe Streets, but, about the beginning of the year
1906, it removed to No. 142 Monroe Street, where it has ever since
remained.
The bill still further alleges that, from 1897 to 1901, the name
of complainant appeared in the Lakeside directory, a directory of
general circulation in Chicago, and recognized as a reliable and
authoritative publication; that, while its name was omitted from
the directory for 1902, the omission was due to a mere error by the
publishers of the directory, and was through no fault of the
complainant; that said directory for 1902 was not published and
issued until after defendant the Central Trust Company of Illinois
had filed its articles of incorporation.
It also appears that complaint having been made to the
Postmaster General of the action of the postmaster at Chicago in
reference to the delivery of the mail received at Chicago, an order
was made by the First Assistant Postmaster General in these
words:
"January 10, 1903."
"The Postmaster, Chicago, Ill."
"Sir: I am in receipt of information to the effect that a letter
was delivered to Mr. Pfau, a representative of the Central Trust
Company of South Dakota, which contained remittances intended to
protect checks drawn on the Central Trust Company of Illinois; that
Mr. Pfau, instead of returning the letter promptly to the post
office for delivery to the trust company for which it was intended,
returned it to the sender, thereby jeopardizing his credit. Mr.
Pfau well knew that the deposit was intended for the Central Trust
Company of Illinois."
You are hereby directed to deliver mail addressed "Central Trust
Co., Chicago, Ill.," without the addition of the street, box, or
other designation to indicate that it is intended for the South
Dakota Company, to the Central Trust Company of Illinois, and
request that company to return to you promptly for delivery to the
Central Trust Company of South Dakota all
Page 216 U. S. 254
letters falling into their hands intended for the company
represented by Mr. Pfau.
"Very respectfully,"
"(Signed) R. J. WYNNE"
"
First Assistant Postmaster General"
The prayer of the bill is that the defendant Busse be
restrained
"from delivering mail addressed 'Central Trust Company' without
the street address of this complainant thereon, or some other mark
thereon indicating for whom the same is intended, or with the
street address 'corner of La Salle and Monroe Streets,' to the
defendant Central Trust Company of Illinois, and restraining the
Central Trust Company of Illinois and its cashier, the defendant
William R. Dawes, from receiving and opening said mail so
described. "
Page 216 U. S. 259
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The management of the great post office business of the country
is placed in the hands of the Postmaster General and assistants.
Rev.Stat. §§ 388, 389, 396. In the discharge of his
duties as Postmaster General, he has assigned to the First
Assistant Postmaster General "the preparation of decisions as to
delivery of ordinary mail, the ownership of which is in dispute."
Postal Laws and Regulations, 1902, § 17, par. 9. The question
here presented is whether, the First Assistant Postmaster General
having directed the postmaster at Chicago to deliver to the
"Central Trust Company of Illinois," defendant herein, mail matter
addressed "Central Trust Company, Chicago, Ill.," without any
further designation of the party for whom it was intended, the
courts are, upon the facts as presented, justified in setting aside
that order and directing the delivery of such mail to the
complainant. It is not always easy to determine for whom a letter
is intended. In furtherance of the effort to secure delivery of
mail matter to the proper party, pars. 3 and 4, § 634, and
pars. 4 and 5, § 645, of Postal Laws and Regulations,
provide:
"SEC. 634, Par. 3. When a postmaster is in doubt as to the
identity of the addressee, he may require proof, and should
exercise great care, especially where mail matter appears to be of
value, to make proper delivery."
"Par. 4. Where two or more persons of the same name receive mail
at the same office, the postmaster should advise them to adopt some
address or means by which their mail may be distinguished.
Postmasters will deliver such matter according to their best
judgment, and will not return it to the mailing office for better
description of the addressee until, after inquiry, they are unable
to determine to whom it should be delivered. "
Page 216 U. S. 260
"SEC. 645, Par. 4. Attempts to secure the mail of an established
house, firm, or corporation through the adoption of a similar name
should not be recognized. Where disputes arise between individuals,
firms, or corporations as to the use of a name or designation,
matter addressed to a street, number, or building should be
delivered according cording to such address. When not so addressed,
the mail will be delivered to the firm or corporation which first
adopted the name of the address at that place."
"Par. 5. When in doubt as to the firm or corporation for which
any mail matter is intended, and claim therefor is disputed,
postmasters will withhold delivery, and report the facts and any
statements made by either claimant to the First Assistant
Postmaster General, for advice."
Appellant contends that its legal name is "Central Trust
Company," while the legal name of defendant is "Central Trust
Company of Illinois;" that therefore it has a right to have mail
directed to "Central Trust Company, Chicago," without further
designation, delivered to it, rather than to defendant. The
argument primarily is that every corporation is entitled to the
legal benefit of its own name; that, when that name appears on mail
matter as the party addressed, and nothing else is shown, the
postmaster has simply the ministerial duty of making a delivery to
that corporation, and that a failure to discharge this ministerial
duty can be corrected by the courts.
While in a certain sense it is true that the benefit of one's
legal name belongs to every party, individual or corporation, yet
that may not be the name by which it is customarily known or
addressed, and, of course, the object is and must be to deliver the
mail matter to the party for whom it is intended. In the
determination of this it may often be necessary to look beyond the
exact legal name. Many things may have to be considered, and the
action of an officer charged with that duty should not lightly be
disturbed by the courts, and only when it is clear that a mistake
has been made or a wrong
Page 216 U. S. 261
done. Initials are often used, abbreviations made, words left
out. The number of letters delivered to the respective parties and
the disposition made by each of those received may cast some light
upon the question, for while a party for whom a single letter is
intended has a right to receive it, yet the number of letters,
taken in connection with the amount of business apparently done by
the recipient, may well suggest for whom any given letter was
intended, and the action taken by the recipient, when, as here,
each knows of the existence of the other, may show its good or bad
faith in dealing with the post office. So, also, the character of
the business done may be considered. Where a corporation is engaged
in the banking business, letters from other banks will point to it
as the intended recipient, while, if it is a real estate
corporation, letters from real estate firms will indicate
differently. And so we might go on and mention other things which,
while by not means conclusive, tend to throw light on the
matter.
We have had occasion to consider the effect of findings of fact
by officers in charge of the several departments of government, and
the accepted rule is that those findings are conclusive unless
palpable error appears.
Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne,
194 U. S. 106, and
cases cited in the opinion;
United States ex Rel. Parish v.
MacVeagh, Secretary, &c., 214 U.
S. 124,
214 U. S. 131.
In
National Life Insurance Company v. National Life Insurance
Company, 209 U. S. 317, it
appeared that the Post Office Department had made a special order
in reference to the delivery of mail, and the court was asked to
correct that order. In denying this application, the Court, by Mr.
Justice Peckham, said (p.
209 U. S.
325):
"The appeal made by the complainant to the department was really
nothing but an appeal to its discretion. . . . Assuming that the
court in some cases has the power to, in effect, review the
determination of the department, we do not think this is an
occasion for its exercise. The complaint is really appealing from
the discretion of the department to the discretion of the court,
and the complainant has no clear
Page 216 U. S. 262
legal right to obtain the order sought.
See Bates &
Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106-108."
"A court in such case ought not to interfere in the
administration of a great department like that of the Post Office
by an injunction, which directs the department how to conduct the
business thereof, where the party asking for the injunction has no
clear right to it."
We do not deem it necessary to consider other questions
discussed by counsel, for, upon the facts presented and for the
reasons stated, we are of opinion that there is not enough to show
such clear right in the complainant as justifies the setting aside
of the order of the First Assistant Postmaster General.
The decree is therefore
Affirmed.
