In foreign extradition proceedings, the complaint is sufficient
to authorize the commissioner to act if it so clearly and
explicitly states a treaty crime that the accused knows exactly
what the charge is; nor need the record and depositions from the
demanding country be actually fastened to the complaint.
In this case,
held that depositions in the possession
of the officer of the demanding country making the complaint, which
showed actual grounds for the prosecution and of which the
commissioner had knowledge from their use in a former proceeding,
were admissible on the hearing before the commissioner and were
also admissible for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction in him to
issue the warrant.
166 F. 921 affirmed.
Page 215 U. S. 228
Pablo Yordi, being detained in custody by the United States
Marshal of the Western District of Texas, obtained from the
District Court for that district a writ of habeas corpus to secure
his release. He was charged in the Republic of Mexico with the
crime of "fraud and forgery of documents," and a warrant for his
arrest was duly issued by the criminal judge of the City of
Guadalajara. He avoided arrest in Mexico and fled to El Paso,
Texas, where he was detained in prison, under an order of the
United States commissioner, awaiting the issue by the proper
authorities of an order for his extradition.
At the hearing on the habeas corpus, it was stipulated that the
crimes in the complaint made before the United States commissioner
were extraditable offenses under the existing treaty between the
United States and Mexico; that, at the time of the hearing before
the commissioner, the complaint in the case, made by A. V. Lomeli,
Consul of Mexico, was solely upon information and belief; that he
had no actual or personal knowledge of the commission of any
offense, but, at the time of making the complaint, the said Mexican
Consul had before him the record and depositions of the witnesses
of the republic of Mexico in the proceedings before the Criminal
Judge of Guadalajara.
There were three complaints made against Yordi. The first, made
by the assistant United States attorney, was dismissed. The second
and third were made by the Mexican Consul.
Upon the hearing under the first complaint, the record and
evidence contained in the proceedings in Mexico were introduced in
evidence before the commissioner, as they were also on the hearing
on the second complaint. The commissioner found that there was
probable cause to believe Yordi guilty of the offense of uttering a
forged instrument in the State of Jalisco, United States of Mexico,
on or about the twenty-sixth day of May, 1908, and that there was
also probable cause to believe Yordi had committed the offense
Page 215 U. S. 229
of obtaining money by means of false device in the Mexican state
mentioned. The commissioner therefore ordered Yordi to be held for
extradition to the Republic of Mexico on the charges alleged in the
third and fourth counts of the complaint, and that he be committed
to the county jail of El Paso County, Texas, to await the action of
the proper authorities in the City of Washington, upon demand for
his extradition to the Republic of Mexico.
The case was heard before Maxey, District Judge, who discharged
the writ of habeas corpus and required the marshal to hold the
petitioner in custody until a warrant of extradition was duly
issued. From this final order, this appeal was taken. Judge Maxey's
opinion is reported in 166 F. 921.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court:
The contention of appellant's counsel is that, although the
Mexican Consul had possession of the record from Mexico and the
depositions of the witnesses therein contained, which embodied the
proceedings had before the judge at Guadalajara, Mexico, including
the testimony of witnesses, which appeared to the judge amply
sufficient to justify an order for the apprehension of the accused,
nevertheless there was still necessary, in order for the
commissioner to take jurisdiction to hear the application, that
either the record from Mexico should be attached to the complaint
or that the complaint should disclose upon its face the sources of
the consul's information. This record from Mexico was not only
before the Mexican Consul when he made the complaint against Yordi,
now under consideration, but the commissioner was
Page 215 U. S. 230
thoroughly familiar with it, as it had been introduced in
evidence before him upon the hearing of the first complaint.
Judge Maxey was of opinion that, as depositions from a foreign
country were admissible in evidence upon the hearing before the
commissioner, they were also to be admitted for the purpose of
vesting jurisdiction in the commissioner to issue the warrant; and
as, in this case, the depositions were in themselves sufficient to
satisfy the commissioner that the prosecution against the accused
was based upon real grounds, and not upon mere suspicion of guilt,
it was not indispensable to the jurisdiction of the commissioner
that the record and depositions from Mexico should be actually
fastened to the complaint when they were in the custody and keeping
of the consul, and the commissioner was already in possession of
the information which they contained. We concur in these views.
The general doctrine in respect of extradition complaints is
well stated by Judge Coxe in
Ex parte Sternaman, 77 F.
596, 597, as follows:
"The complaint should set forth clearly and briefly the offense
charged. It need not be drawn with the formal precision of an
indictment. If it be sufficiently explicit to inform the accused
person of the precise nature of the charge against him, it is
sufficient. The extreme technicality with which these proceedings
were formerly conducted has given place to a more liberal practice,
the object being to reach a correct decision upon the main question
-- is there reasonable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed? The complaint may, in some instances, be upon
information and belief. The exigencies may be such that the
criminal may escape punishment unless he is promptly apprehended by
the representatives of the country whose law he has violated. From
the very nature of the case, it may often happen that such
representative can have no personal knowledge of the crime. If the
offense be one of the treaty crimes, and if it be stated clearly
and explicitly, so that the accused knows
Page 215 U. S. 231
exactly what the charge is, the complaint is sufficient to
authorize the commissioner to act. The foregoing propositions are,
it is thought, sustained by the following authorities:
In re
Farez, 7 Blatchf. 345, Fed.Cas. No. 4,645;
In re
Roth, 15 F. 506;
In re Henrich, 5 Blatchf. 414,
Fed.Cas. No. 6,369;
Ex parte Van Hoven, 4 Dill. 415,
Fed.Cas. No. 16,859;
In re Breen, 73 F. 458;
Ex parte
Lane, 6 F. 34;
In re Herres, 33 F. 165;
Castro v.
De Uriarte, 16 F. 93;
In re Macdonnell, 11 Blatchf.
79, Fed.Cas. No. 8,771."
It was argued that this court had held otherwise, particularly
in
Rice v. Ames, 180 U. S. 371,
where Mr. Justice Brown, delivering the opinion, declared that
several counts of the complaint were obviously insufficient
"since the charges were made solely upon information and belief,
and no attempt was made even to set forth the sources of
information, or the grounds of affiant's belief."
But Mr. Justice Brown further said (pp.
180 U. S.
375):
"We do not wish, however, to be understood as holding that, in
extradition proceedings, the complaint must be sworn to by persons
having actual knowledge of the offense charged. This would defeat
the whole object of the treaty, as we are bound to assume that no
foreign government possesses greater power than our own to order
its citizens to go to another country to institute legal
proceedings. This is obviously impossible. The ordinary course is
to send an officer or agent of the government for that purpose, and
Rev. Stat. § 5271 makes special provisions"
"that in every case of complaint and of a hearing upon the
return of the warrant of arrest, any depositions, warrants, or
other papers offered in evidence, shall be admitted and received
for the purpose of such hearing, if they shall be properly and
legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received as
evidence of the criminality of the person so apprehended, by the
tribunals of the foreign country from which the accused party shall
have escaped, and copies of any such depositions,
Page 215 U. S. 232
warrants, or other papers shall, if authenticated according to
the law of such foreign country, be in like manner received as
evidence,"
"of which authentication the certificate of the diplomatic or
consular officer of the United States shall be sufficient. This
obviates the necessity which might otherwise exist of confronting
the accused with the witnesses against him. Now it would obviously
be inconsistent to hold that depositions, which are admissible upon
the hearing, should not also be admitted for the purpose of vesting
jurisdiction in the commissioner to issue the warrant. Indeed, the
words of the statute 'in every case of complaint' seem to
contemplate this very use of them. If the officer of the foreign
government has no personal knowledge of the facts, he may with
entire propriety, make the complaint upon information and belief,
stating the sources of his information and the grounds of his
belief, and annexing to the complaint a properly certified copy of
any indictment or equivalent proceeding which may have been found
in the foreign country, or a copy of the depositions of witnesses
having actual knowledge of the facts, taken under the treaty and
act of Congress. This will afford ample authority to the
commissioner for issuing the warrant."
The same learned judge said in
Grin v. Shine,
187 U. S.
193:
"All that is required by § 5270 is that a complaint shall
be made under oath. It may be made by any person acting under the
authority of the foreign government, having knowledge of the facts,
or, in the absence of such person, by the official representative
of the foreign government, based upon depositions in his
possession."
We think the evidence produced at the hearing justified the
detention of the accused and corrected any irregularity in the
complaint. As this Court said in
Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U. S.
662:
"A writ of habeas corpus is not like an action to recover
damages for an unlawful arrest or commitment, but its
Page 215 U. S. 233
object is to ascertain whether the prisoner can lawfully be
detained in custody; and if sufficient ground for his detention by
the government is shown, he is not to be discharged for defects in
the original arrest or commitment.
Ex parte
Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 114 [argument of counsel --
omitted],
8 U. S. 125;
Coleman v.
Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509,
97 U. S.
519;
United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S.
621,
104 U. S. 624;
Kelley v.
Thomas, 15 Gray, 192;
The King v. Marks, 3 East 157;
In re Shuttleworth, 9 Q.B. 651."
The District Judge was right, and his final order discharging
the writ of habeas corpus is
Affirmed.
