CHICAGO, B & Q R. CO. v. WILLIAMS, 214 U.S. 492 (1909)
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U.S. Supreme Court
CHICAGO, B & Q R. CO. v. WILLIAMS, 214 U.S. 492 (1909)214 U.S. 492
CHICAGO, BURLINGTON, & QUINCY
RAILWAY COMPANY
v.
EDGAR C. WILLIAMS.
No. 154.
Argued and submitted April 16, 1909.
Decided April 26, 1909.
Opinions
v.
EDGAR C. WILLIAMS.
No. 154.
Argued and submitted April 16, 1909.
Decided April 26, 1909.
Page 214 U.S. 492, 494 'And the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit further certifies that other questions of law which relate to the admission of evidence are presented by the assignment of errors in this case, and are pending for the decision of this court, but that the following questions of law are also presented by the assignment of errors, and their decision is indispensable to a determination of this case in this court; and that, to the end that this court may properly decide the issues of law presented, it desires the instruction of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the following questions of law:
U.S. Supreme Court
CHICAGO, B & Q R. CO. v. WILLIAMS, 214 U.S. 492 (1909) 214 U.S. 492 CHICAGO, BURLINGTON, & QUINCY RAILWAY COMPANYv.
EDGAR C. WILLIAMS.
No. 154.
Argued and submitted April 16, 1909.
Decided April 26, 1909.
Page 214 U.S. 492, 494 'And the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit further certifies that other questions of law which relate to the admission of evidence are presented by the assignment of errors in this case, and are pending for the decision of this court, but that the following questions of law are also presented by the assignment of errors, and their decision is indispensable to a determination of this case in this court; and that, to the end that this court may properly decide the issues of law presented, it desires the instruction of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the following questions of law:
'1. In a contract between an owner of
cattle and a railway company for the transportation of the cattle
at the regular rate, which contains the further agreement that the
owner shall be transported on the cattle train free in
consideration that he contracts that the railway company shall not
be liable to him for any injury or damage which he sustains while
he is being so carried, and that he will load, unload, feed, and
care for the cattle during the transportation, is his agreement
that the railway company shall not be liable to him for any injury
or damage which he sustains while being so carried a valid
contract?
Page 214 U.S.
492, 495
'2. Where the owner of the cattle is
not constrained, required, or requested to make the contract
described in the foregoing question in order to have his cattle
transported at the regular rate, but freely chooses to make such an
agreement in preference to contracting for the transportation of
his cattle at the regular rate at the risk of the railway company,
and riding himself on a passenger train to the destination of the
cattle at the regular rate, is his agreement that the railway
company shall not be liable to him for any injury or damage which
he sustains while being so carried a valid contract?
'3. Do the facts which were
established at the trial, and which are set forth in the statement
which precedes these questions, show a valid contract by the owner
of the cattle, the plaintiff below, that the railway company should
not be liable to him for any injury or damage which he sustained
while he was riding in the caboose of the cattle train under the
contract specified in the statement?' Dismissed.
Messrs. O. H. Dean, W. D. McLeod, H. C. Timmonds, O. M. Spencer,
and Hale Holden for the railway company.
Messrs. John H. Denison, William E. Fowler, John Hipp, Ralph
Talbot, D. C. Allen, James M. Sandusky, and S. G. Sandusky for
Williams.
Per Curiam:
In the opinion of a majority of the court, this certificate is
essentially the same as that disposed of in Chicago, Burlington,
& Quincy Railway Company v. Williams, 205 U.S. 444, 51 L. Ed.
875, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559, and it is therefore dismissed on the
authority of that decision.
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting:
When this case was here before I felt doubts, but deferred to
the judgment of the majority, as I think one should when it does
not seem that an important principle is involved or that there is
some public advantage to be gained from a statement of the other
side. But it seems to me that the present order is a mistake upon
an important matter, and I am unwilling that it should seem to be
made by unanimous consent. I think that such questions are to be
encouraged as a mode of disposing of
Page 214 U.S.
492, 496
cases in the least cumbersome and most expeditious way. The
former certificate was thought to invite a consideration of mixed
questions of law and fact. However that may have been, the present
one puts definite questions of pure law, and I think that those
questions should be answered. Even if the third should be objected
to, the other two are complete in themselves. It is no objection to
a question of law that the case turns upon it. That is the best of
reasons for propounding it. The only objection is not to deciding
the case here, but to putting questions that turn upon conclusions
from evidence, or that present a general statement and ask a
judgment with regard to unspecified questions of law.
Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Moody concur in this
dissent.
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