In reviewing the judgment of a state court under § 709,
Rev.Stat., findings of fact resting on a false definition of a
right existing under a federal statute cannot be assumed to be
correct, and may be reconsidered; but the evidence will not be
discussed here, and this Court considers only whether there has
been a mistake of law.
Where the trial court merely called in an advisory jury and, in
the highest court of the state on appeal, the evidence was
discussed and the findings reestablished, reversal by this Court
can only be based on errors, if any, in opinion of the highest
court.
Where the state court has found on the facts based on the
evidence that the vein of plaintiff in error did not extend under
the claim of defendant in error, an expression of opinion that
there is a difference between a lode sufficient to validate a
location under § 2322, Rev.Stat., and an apex giving
extralateral rights (not decided by this Court,
Lawson v.
United States Mining Co., 207 U. S. 1) is not
necessary to the result, and does not deny a federal right and this
Court has not jurisdiction to review the judgment under § 709,
Rev.Stat.
Writ of error to review 29 Utah, 490, dismissed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was begun by the Grand Central Mining Company
Page 213 U. S. 73
to recover for the removal of ores from beneath the surface of
its Silveropolis mining claim, and for an injunction. The
defendant, the Mammoth Mining Company, filed a counterclaim,
setting up that it was the owner of certain mining claims,
especially the First Northern Extension of the Mammoth Mining
Claim, Lot No. 38, being senior to all the other claims concerned;
the Bradley and the Golden King; the last two being to the west of
the Mammoth Extension, between it and the Silveropolis, with more
or less overlapping, and that the vein or lode from which the ore
in question was taken has a part of its apex in the Mammoth
Extension for 1,100 feet; which, if true, would entitle the Mammoth
Company to the ore. It prayed that the plaintiff's claim be
adjudged invalid, both because of the foregoing alleged facts and
on the ground that the plaintiff's patent gave it no right to the
ore unless the apex of the lode was within its claim, and it prayed
also that the Mammoth Company's title be quieted and confirmed.
After a trial, the counterclaim of the Mammoth Company was
rejected; the judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Utah in an elaborate decision, and then the case
was brought here on the counterclaim alone.
Both of the parties are Utah corporations, and the suit was in a
state court. The ground on which this Court is asked to to take
jurisdiction is that the decision of the supreme court on the facts
rested on a definition of a lode or vein which the plaintiff in
error contests, and therefore turned on the construction of
Rev.Stat. § 2322. There is a faint argument on the other point
that we have mentioned, that the defendant in error had no right to
ore beneath the surface of the Silveropolis claim, unless from a
vein having its apex there, but that, if relevant, has been
disposed of by previous decisions of this Court, and may be
disregarded.
St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana
Mining Co., 194 U. S. 235. So
also may an attempt to reopen the findings of fact. Of course, if
these findings rest on a false definition, they may have to be
reconsidered, and cannot be assumed to be correct. But the evidence
will not be discussed here. The only
Page 213 U. S. 74
question with which we shall deal is whether the plaintiff in
error makes out the alleged mistake of law.
Chrisman v.
Miller, 197 U. S. 313,
197 U. S. 319;
Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188,
165 U. S.
189.
The record discloses that the Mammoth Company, in its
cross-complaint, set up the proposition as to the limits of the
title under the Silveropolis claim that we have dismissed, and that
it alleged that it set up a title under the laws of the United
States. The record also shows that, at the trial, the judge called
in an advisory jury, and that he gave them certain instructions as
to what constitutes the apex of a vein, etc., and it is argued that
it must be assumed that the judge, when he made his findings of
fact adverse to the Mammoth Company, was governed by the same views
of the law. But the cross-complaint, by itself, shows no warrant
for this writ of error, and as the case went to the supreme court
by appeal, and the facts were discussed at great length and
reestablished by that court, it is in the opinion of that court
alone, if anywhere, that the supposed error must be found. Indeed,
the instructions to the jury were treated as immaterial by that
court, and held not to be a ground for reversal, even if wrong, if
the judgment was right upon the evidence. It is necessary,
therefore, to show the nature of the case and of the course of
reasoning followed by the supreme court of the state.
For the character of the country where the question arises, we
quote from the judgment under review:
"The mines are found in a lime belt which covers about two
square miles, and is the great producing area of the Tintic
District. In some places, the limestone beds are upturned, large
areas tilted upon edge, the beds dipping nearly vertically down,
while in other places, they dip at lower angles, and in special
areas, the dips are quite uniform, and again, though, it seems, not
frequently, anticlinals exist. This limestone is surrounded on all
sides, except the north, by igneous rocks. The sedimentary rocks
are broken up and fractured, evidently the result of igneous
intrusion. The limestone carries some iron, the different forms of
iron oxide, also some manganese, and in places the limestone is
crushed, crumbled, and brecciated. . . . The
Page 213 U. S. 75
surface of the limestone area, wherever exposed, is marked with
innumerable seams, cracks, and small fissures filled with carbonate
of lime, stained more or less with iron, and sometimes manganese.
Quartz, spar, and other materials, characteristic, in general, of
mineral-bearing limestone areas, are present, and in places the
surface is brecciated and recemented. A trace of mineral, and of
one or more of the precious metals, and, in places, more than a
trace, even where there is no known vein, seems also to be a
characteristic of that lime belt."
In the belt thus described, the Mammoth Company's lot 38 runs
northeasterly, and the Silveropolis claim about north, its
southerly boundary being considerably further north than the
southern boundary of Lot 38. It is admitted that the apex of a vein
extends northerly in Lot 38 from its southern boundary for 690 feet
to a point 90 feet south of the southern boundary of the
Silveropolis claim extended. But the Utah courts found that at that
point, the vein on its strike and at its apex wholly departs from
Lot 38, in a northwesterly and then in a more northerly direction,
whereas the Mammoth Company contends that it continues in that lot
to a line 1,100 feet distant from its southerly line, and that
large deposits of ore, taken by the court to represent the strike
of the vein, really are upon its dip.
In coming to its conclusion, the supreme court, after stating
the presumption that the ore belongs to the owner of the claim
under which it is found, lays great stress on the fact that the
Mammoth Company could not locate the hanging or foot wall of the
supposed vein north of the point at which the vein was found to
leave Lot 38. It goes on to find that, by the preponderance of
evidence, the surface indications for a long distance east and west
of Lot 38, north of the point indicated above, are the same as
those in the lot. It reaches the same result from assays of
numerous samples, taken from the open cuts and exposures in the
same part of the lot. It then elaborately discusses the workings
underground. It says that the fact is clear that the ore always is
found near the line of the great ore bodies,
Page 213 U. S. 76
whether they be on the strike or on the dip of the vein,
northwesterly beyond the above-mentioned point. It points out that
the boundaries of a vein north of that point, and apex in Lot 38,
and a strike and dip that would carry the vein to and include the
disputed ore bodies, have been left in doubt, at least,
notwithstanding great efforts by drifts, cross-cuts, raises, and
winzes, to prove that the vein exists. This doubt is explained by
the witnesses for the Grand Central Company and by the court, on
the ground that the vein was formed by replacement or metasomatic
action within narrowly limited areas, and that the boundaries of
the vein are the limits of the ore. Underground as at the surface,
excepting those from the vicinity of the back fissure and the ore
channel, the assays show no mineralization not common generally
through that limestone region. Underground, as at the surface, the
Mammoth Company cannot locate the hangings and foot walls of the
vein.
The court observes that a vein cannot be said to exist merely
because rock is crushed, shattered, or even fissured, and that what
will constitute one must depend somewhat upon the nature of the
country in which it is alleged to be found. It fully recognizes
that a true vein may be barren in places, but concludes that to
allow that Mammoth Company's claim would amount practically to
declaring the whole limestone area to be one vein thousands of feet
wide. After calling attention to the admitted fact that the vein
has well defined boundaries and strike from the south end of Lot 38
for about 700 feet, it finds that the same conditions continue to
exist from there on in a northwesterly direction outside the limits
of the lot, and that the ore bodies found outside those limits are
on the strike, and not upon the dip. It calls attention to the
almost vertical dip of the vein at specified places, and is of
opinion from that and other facts discussed in detail that no dip
is shown that could carry a vein from Lot 38 to the ore bodies in
dispute. It finds its conclusions confirmed by the conduct of the
Mammoth Company during all the years of operation in its mine,
making a strong argument that it is not necessary to recite.
Page 213 U. S. 77
The counsel for the Mammoth Company contends that the Supreme
Court of Utah based its judgment upon assays and a definition that
fails to recognize that a vein may be a vein, although it is in
soft rock, like limestone, where the walls of the fissures have
been eaten into by the mineralizing solutions, and although the
surface water has leached the valuable mineral constituents from
the upper portion down into the vein. But the abridged statement
that we have made of the material part of its reasoning shows that
assays played but a small part, and that definitions played no
important one in leading to the conclusion. On the contrary, most,
if not all, of the findings that we have stated deal with pure
matters of fact. So far as definitions go, the court adopted those
that were quoted in
Iron Silver Mining Company v.
Cheesman, 116 U. S. 529. It
is true that it expressed the opinion that there is a difference
between a lode sufficient to validate a location and an apex giving
extralateral rights. But, without intimating agreement or
disagreement with this view (
Lawson v. United States Mining
Co., 207 U. S. 1), it is
enough for us to say that it was not necessary to the result. The
court was against the Mammoth Company on the facts, it did not
accept its theory of leaching, etc., but was of opinion that the
ore deposits were made within originally narrow boundaries by the
mineral solutions rising through the main fissure from the
deep.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the opinion below at greater
length, as we think it entirely plain, upon a study of the lengthy
and careful discussion, that it presents no question that we can be
asked to review. The plaintiff in error makes an elaborate argument
upon the evidence that the supreme court was wrong in its findings
of fact. We repeat that, upon the writ of error, we shall not go
into such matters. It is enough to say that, upon the facts as
found, neither the record nor the opinion presents a federal
question, and that therefore the writs of error must be
dismissed.
Writs of error dismissed.