The full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution
does not preclude the court of a state in which the judgment of a
sister state is presented from inquiry as to jurisdiction of the
court by which the judgment is rendered, nor is this inquiry
precluded by a recital in the record of jurisdictional facts.
Every state has exclusive jurisdiction over property within its
borders, and where testator has property in more than one state,
each state has jurisdiction over the property within its limits,
and can, in its own courts, provide for the disposition thereof in
conformity with its laws.
There is no privity between the executor and an administrator
with the will annexed appointed in another state which makes a
decree in a court of such state against the latter binding under
the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution upon
the former in the courts of the state in which such executor is
appointed.
Page 210 U. S. 83
Where a party dies pending a suit which is subsequently revived
against an administrator with the will annexed appointed in the
state in the court of which the suit is pending, the judgment is
binding only upon the parties against which it is revived and who
are within the jurisdiction of the court, and the courts of another
state are not bound under the full faith and credit clause of the
federal Constitution to give effect to such judgment against the
executors of such deceased party, and this applies to a judgment
entered on an arbitration had in pursuance of a stipulation that it
should be conducted under control of the court and that it should
continue notwithstanding the decease of either party.
Quaere as to the effect of the death of either party on
an arbitration under a contract of submission made independently of
judicial proceedings where the contract provides that the
arbitration shall in such event continue and the award be binding
upon the representatives of the deceased party.
146 Mich. 401 affirmed.
On April 24, 1874, a bill of complaint in a suit for an
accounting was filed in the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, sitting in equity, against George N. Fletcher, of
Detroit, Michigan. The latter personally appeared and defended the
suit. Without going into the details of the protracted litigation
in Massachusetts or showing how the plaintiff in error became at
last the plaintiff in whose favor the Massachusetts court entered
judgment, it is enough to say that, on April 4, 1892, an agreement
was made between the parties for submitting to arbitration all the
claims and demands either party might have against the other;
providing that the arbitration should be under rule of court, and
that it should not operate as a discontinuance of the suit. It was
further stipulated that the decease of either party should not
terminate the submission, but that the arbitration should continue,
and his successors and legal representatives should be bound by the
final award therein. On October 18, 1893, the Hon. William L.
Putnam was selected as arbitrator. On May 22, 1894, he filed a
preliminary award. After this, and before a final award, Fletcher
died, leaving a will, which was probated in the Probate Court of
Wayne County, Michigan. Letters testamentary were issued to his
executors, citizens of Michigan, who qualified as such, and took
possession of the decedent's estate in Michigan.
Page 210 U. S. 84
His principal estate, as well as his domicil, was in Michigan,
but he owned two small tracts in Massachusetts. The Probate Court
of Middlesex County, Massachusetts, by proceedings regular in form,
appointed Frank B. Cotton, a citizen of that state, administrator
with the will annexed. The Massachusetts property was afterwards
sold by that administrator for $350.
After the death of Fletcher, the principal suit was revived, the
administrator entered his appearance therein, and an order was made
by the Massachusetts court that the executors and the children and
residuary legatees of the decedent be notified to appear, and that,
in default thereof, the arbitration proceed. They were notified by
personal service of the order in the State of Michigan, but did not
appear. The arbitration proceeded in their absence, and a final
award was made. It should also be stated that, on his death,
Fletcher's counsel withdrew their appearance in the case. On April
14, 1903, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court confirmed the
awards of the arbitrator, and adjudged that Albert W. Brown recover
from Frank B. Cotton, administrator with the will annexed, the sum
of $394,372.87 and $4,495.85 as interest and the costs of suits
afterwards taxed as $5,385.40. It was further adjudged and decreed
that the Michigan executors of the last will were bound by the
final award of the arbitrator, and liable to pay to Albert W. Brown
that aforesaid sums; that the legal representatives of George N.
Fletcher were likewise bound by the award, and liable for any
deficiency. Thereafter, the decree of the Massachusetts court was
filed in the Probate Court of Wayne County, Michigan, as evidence
of a claim against the estate. It was disallowed by that court,
and, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan, the disallowance
was affirmed. 146 Mich. 401. Thereupon the case was brought here on
error.
Page 210 U. S. 88
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal question presented is whether the Michigan courts
gave force and effect to the first section of Article IV of the
federal Constitution, which provides that "full faith and credit
shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state." That this is a federal
question is not open to doubt.
Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U. S. 657,
146 U. S. 666,
and cases cited.
The constitutional provision does not preclude the courts of a
state in which the judgment of a sister state is presented from
inquiry as to the jurisdiction of the court by which the judgment
was rendered.
See the elaborate opinion by Mr. Justice
Bradley, speaking for the Court, in
Thompson
v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457. That opinion has been
followed in many cases, among which may be named
Simmons v.
Saul, 138 U. S. 439,
138 U. S. 448;
Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254,
140 U. S. 265;
Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350.
Even record recitals of jurisdictional facts do not preclude oral
testimony as to the existence of those facts.
Knowles v.
Gaslight &c. Co., 19 Wall.
Page 210 U. S. 89
58,
86 U. S. 61;
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714,
95 U. S. 730;
Cooper v. Newell, 173 U. S. 555,
173 U. S.
566.
Every state has exclusive jurisdiction over the property within
its borders.
Overby v. Gordon, 177 U.
S. 214. We make this extract from the opinion of MR.
JUSTICE WHITE in that case, p.
177 U. S.
222:
"To quote the language of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in
Rose v.
Himely, 4 Cranch 241,
8 U. S.
277:"
"It is repugnant to every idea of a proceeding
in rem
to act against a thing which is not in the power of the sovereign
under whose authority the court proceeds, and no nation will admit
that its property should be absolutely changed, while remaining in
its own possession, by a sentence which is entirely
ex
parte."
"As said also in
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714,
95 U. S. 722:"
"Except as restrained and limited by the Constitution, the
several states of the Union possess and exercise the authority of
independent states, and two well established principles of public
law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent state over
persons and property are applicable to them. One of these
principles is that every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory. . . .
The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one
mentioned -- that is, that no state can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory. Story, Confl. Laws, c. 2; Wheaton, International Law,
pt. 2, c. 2. The several states are of equal dignity and authority,
and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all
others. And so it is laid down by jurists as an elementary
principle that the laws of one state have no operation outside of
its territory except so far as is allowed by comity, and that no
tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that
territory so as to subject either persons or property to its
decisions. Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this
limit, says Story, is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such
persons or property in any other tribunals. Story, Confl. Laws, s.
539. "
Page 210 U. S. 90
Fletcher, at the time of his decease, was the owner of property,
some of it situated in Massachusetts and some in Michigan. Each
state had jurisdiction over the property within its limits, and
could, in its own courts, in conformity with its laws, provide for
the disposition thereof. Massachusetts exercised its jurisdiction
over the property within its limits and disposed of it by legal
proceedings in its courts. The contention now is that the
proceedings in the Massachusetts court can be made operative to
control the disposition of the property in Michigan. In support of
this contention, counsel for plaintiff in error state two
propositions:
"The Supreme Judicial Court in Equity for Suffolk County,
Massachusetts, having had jurisdiction in Fletcher's lifetime over
the subject matter and the parties to the suit and, on his death,
the suit having been duly revived, the decree is conclusive
evidence of debt in this proceeding."
"Fletcher's Michigan executors and the administrator with the
will annexed of his estate in Massachusetts are in such privity
that the decree is conclusive evidence of debt in this
proceeding."
Considering first the latter proposition, we are of opinion that
there is no such relation between the executor and an administrator
with the will annexed, appointed in another state, as will make a
decree against the latter binding upon the former, or the estate in
his possession. While a judgment against a party may be conclusive
not merely against him, but also against those in privity with him,
there is no privity between two administrators appointed in
different states.
Vaughan v.
Northup, 15 Pet. 1;
Aspden v.
Nixon, 4 How. 467;
Stacy v.
Thrasher, 6 How. 44. In this latter case, on page
47 U. S. 58, it
was said:
"Where administrations are granted to different persons in
different states, they are so far deemed independent of each other
that a judgment obtained against one will furnish no right of
action against the other, to affect assets received by the latter
in virtue of his own administration, for, in contemplation
Page 210 U. S. 91
of law, there is no privity between him and the other
administrator.
See Story, Confl. of Laws, § 522;
Brodie v. Bickley, 2 Rawle 431."
See also McLean v. Meek,
18 How. 16;
Johnson v. Powers, 139 U.
S. 156, in which the question is discussed at some
length by Mr. Justice Gray. This doctrine was enforced in
Massachusetts.
Low v. Bartlett, 8 Allen 259, where a
judgment had been recovered in Vermont against an ancillary
administrator appointed in that state, whose appointment had been
made at the request of the executor under the will probated in
Massachusetts, and it was held that the administrator was not in
privity with the executor, because the two were administering two
separate and distinct estates; the court saying, p. 262:
"If we look at the question of privity between the executor here
and the ancillary administrator in Vermont, it is difficult to find
any valid ground on which such privity can rest. The executor
derives his authority from the letters testamentary issued by the
probate court here; he gives bond to that court; is accountable to
it for all his proceedings; makes his final settlement in it, and
is discharged by it, in conformity with the statutes of this
commonwealth. The administrator derives his authority from the
probate court in Vermont, and is accountable to it in the same
manner in which the executor is account able to our court. The
authority of the executor does not extend to the property there,
nor to the doings of the administrator. Nor does the authority of
the administrator extend to the property here, or to the doings of
the executor. When the plaintiff commenced his suit against the
administrator, the executor had no right to go there and defend it.
If he had been found in Vermont, he could not have been sued there.
The judgment rendered in the suit was not against him, or against
the testator's goods in his hands, but was simply against the
administrator and the testator's goods in his hands. The courts of
Vermont had no jurisdiction of the executor or of the goods in his
hands, any more than our
Page 210 U. S. 92
courts would have over the administrator and the goods in his
hands. It is this limitation of state jurisdiction that creates a
necessity for an administration in every state where a deceased
person leaves property, and each state regulates for itself
exclusively the manner in which the estate found within its limits
shall be settled."
The Massachusetts statutes proceed along this line. Secs. 10,
11, and 12, c. 136, Mass.Rev.Laws 1902, provide for the probate of
foreign wills in Massachusetts. Sec. 12 reads:
"After allowing a will under the provisions of the two preceding
sections, the probate court shall grant letters testamentary on
such will, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and
shall proceed in the settlement of the estate which may be found in
this commonwealth in the manner provided in c. 143, relative to
such estates."
With reference to the first contention of counsel, we remark
that, while the original suit against Fletcher in the Massachusetts
court was revived after his death, yet the revivor was operative
only against the administrator with the will annexed. Neither the
executors nor the residuary legatees were made parties, for it is
elementary that service of process outside of the limits of the
state is not operative to bring the party served within the
jurisdiction of the court ordering the process. Such also is the
statutory provision in Massachusetts. Section 1, c. 170,
Mass.Rev.Laws 1902, reads:
"A personal action shall not be maintained against a person who
is not an inhabitant of this commonwealth unless he has been served
with process within this commonwealth, or unless an effectual
attachment of his property within this commonwealth has been made
upon the original writ; and, in case of such attachment without
such service, the judgment shall be valid to secure the application
of the property so attached to the satisfaction of the judgment,
and not otherwise."
The Massachusetts court therefore proceeded without any personal
jurisdiction over the executors and legatees, who
Page 210 U. S. 93
were all domiciled in Michigan, did not appear, and were not
validly served with process.
The argument of plaintiff in error is that, by personal
appearance during his lifetime, the Massachusetts court acquired
jurisdiction of the suit in equity against Fletcher; that his death
prior to a decree did not abate the suit, but only temporarily
suspended it until his representative should be made a party; that,
if a decree had been rendered against him in his lifetime, it would
have established, both against himself, and, after his death,
against his estate, whatever of liability was decreed; that, while
the suit was pending, the parties entered into a stipulation for an
arbitration; that that arbitration did not abate, nor was it
outside the suit, but, in terms, made under rule of court, and not
to operate as a discontinuance of the suit. Provision was also made
in the stipulation for the contingency of death, its terms
being
"that the decease of any party shall not revoke said submission,
but that said arbitration shall continue, and that . . . the legal
representatives of said Brown and said Fletcher shall be bound by
the final award therein,"
so that there is not merely the equity rule that a suit in
equity does not abate by the death of the defendant, and that the
jurisdiction of the court is only suspended until such time as the
proper representatives of the deceased are made parties defendant,
but also a special agreement in the submission to arbitration that
it shall be made under a rule of court, and that the death of
either party shall not terminate the arbitration proceedings, but
that they shall continue until the final award. It is urged that,
on the death, a revivor was ordered; that the representative of the
decedent's estate in Massachusetts, to-wit, the administrator, was
made a party defendant and appeared to the suit, and notice was
given by personal service upon the executors and legatees in
Michigan of the fact of the revivor, and that they were called upon
to appear and defend.
But it must be borne in mind that this arbitration was made
under a rule of court. Not only that, but special provision
Page 210 U. S. 94
was made for the action of the court in deciding questions of
law arising upon the report of the arbitrator, so that the
arbitration was not an outside and independent proceeding, but
simply one had in court, for the purpose of facilitating the
disposition of the case. And we may remark in passing that we do
not have before us the case of a simple arbitration contract,
executed independently of judicial proceedings, and express no
opinion as to the rights and remedies of one party thereto in case
of the death of the other. The validity of the decree must depend
upon the proceedings subsequent to the death of Fletcher. On his
death, the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts court was not wholly
destroyed, but suspended until the proper representative of
Fletcher was made a party. The Massachusetts administrator was made
a party and did appear, and the decree rendered unquestionably
bound him, but the executors, the domiciliary representatives of
the decedent's estate, did not appear, and were not brought into
court. The Massachusetts administrator was not a general
representative of the estate, and could not bind it by any
appearance or action other than in respect to the property in his
custody. If the home estate was to be reached, it had to be reached
by proceedings to which the home representatives were parties. The
agreement of the parties that the arbitration should continue in
case of the death of either, and that the legal representatives of
the party should be bound by the final award, was an agreement made
in the course of judicial proceedings of the suit in the
Massachusetts court. It did not operate to make the home
representatives of the decedent parties to the suit on the death of
Fletcher. It did not bring his general estate into court. We concur
in the views expressed by the Supreme Court of Michigan in the
close of its opinion that:
"It must be held that the proceeding in the Massachusetts court
abated with the death of Mr. Fletcher, that its revival was
possible only because there was brought into existence, by the
exercise of the sovereign power of the state, a representative
Page 210 U. S. 95
of the decedent, clothed with certain powers with respect to the
estate of decedent within the state, and that the decree thereafter
rendered in the suit so revived is without effect save upon the
administrator of the estate, who was, in accordance with the law of
the place, brought upon the record."
We are of opinion that the Supreme Court of Michigan did not
fail to give "full faith and credit" to the decree of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, and therefore the judgment is
Affirmed.
