A mere recital in an act, whether of fact or of law, is not
conclusive unless it be clear that the legislature intended that it
be accepted as a fact in the case.
Kinkead v. United
States, 150 U. S. 433.
The Court of Claims was not precluded by the recitals in the Act
of May, 1902, 32 Stat. 207, 243, referring this case to it, from
examining into the facts and determining whether the claimant's
lien referred to in the act as a prior lien was or was not a prior
lien, and basing its decision upon the actual facts found.
Section 106 of the Act of July 20, 1868, 15 Stat. 125, 167,
providing for an action in equity by the collector of internal
revenue to enforce a lien of the United States for unpaid revenue
taxes did not supersede the provision of the Act of July 13, 1866,
14 Stat. 107, giving the remedy of distraint so that such lien
could only be enforced by suit in equity, but it gave another and
cumulative remedy in cases where, as expressed in the act, the
collector deemed it expedient.
Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining
Co., 135 U. S. 326.
In this case,
held that the lien of the government for
unpaid revenue taxes on land of the delinquent was prior to that of
the mortgagee bringing this action, and that the sale of the land
by distraint proceeding, and not by foreclosure suit in equity, was
in conformity with the Act of July 13, 1866, then in force, and
vested the title in the purchasers at the sale and their grantee,
subject to the right of redemption given by the statute to the
owners of the land and of holders of liens thereon.
41 Ct.Cl. 89 affirmed.
This appeal brings up for review a judgment in the court
Page 208 U. S. 76
of claims dismissing a petition filed in that court against the
United States.
So far as it is necessary to state the facts, the case is
substantially as follows:
Smith, Ellett & Company, a firm composed of Rinaldo P. Smith
and Francis M. Ellett, were engaged in business as leather and
commission merchants in Baltimore from some time in 1867 or 1868 to
January 1, 1870.
On the twenty-sixth of October, 1869, George J. Stephens, a
distiller and tanner in Virginia, was indebted to Smith, Ellett
& Company, in the sum of $7,000, already due, and in the
further sum of $2,000, to become due in the course of future
dealings. On the same day, a certain deed was executed between
Stephens of the first part, Beazley, trustee, of the second part,
and Smith and Ellett, doing business as Smith, Ellett &
Company, of the third part. It recited that Stephens was indebted
to Smith, Ellett & Company in the sum of $4,000, evidenced by
the bond or demand note of Stephens dated October 26, 1869, and
that Smith, Ellett & Company had accepted, for the
accommodation of Stephens, a draft for $3,000, and had agreed to
accept a further accommodation draft for $2,000. In order that said
acceptances in addition to the note for $4,000 might be secured,
Stephens, by deed dated October 26, 1869, conveyed to Beazley a
tract of land containing about 400 acres, more or less, in Greene
County, Virginia, upon which Stephens then resided, with the
mansion house and all buildings thereon, including a tannery and
distillery, and all things appurtenant thereto,
"in trust to secure the said bond of $4,000, and all the
acceptances already made and given as aforesaid, now current and to
become payable, and all acceptances to be hereafter made and given
as aforesaid, and all which may be made and given for renewal of
former ones, or to replace the money paid by the party of the first
part in taking up former ones as aforesaid, or in any other manner
as stated in the premises, so as the same shall not exceed the sum
of $5,000."
The property conveyed was worth more than $3,000. The
Page 208 U. S. 77
deed was duly acknowledged and recorded on the thirtieth day of
October, 1869.
When that deed of trust was executed and recorded, there was due
from Stephens to the United States government internal revenue
taxes which had accrued from July, 1867, to October 26, 1869,
amounting to $4,000.
On the twenty-fifth of January, 1870, Smith and Ellett executed
the following instrument of writing:
"Baltimore, January 25, '70. We hereby give our consent to the
use of the distillery premises of Geo. J. Stephens, situated on the
Harrisonburg Turnpike, about four miles from Stannardsville, and
which premises contain about three acres of land, more or less,
immediately surrounding the distillery building, and which building
is contained thereon or comprised therein by said Geo. J. Stephens,
subject to the provisions of the internal rev. law, and that the
lien of the United States for taxes and penalties hereafter
incurred shall have priority, to the extent of the above-mentioned
premises, of a certain deed of trust executed by said Geo. J.
Stephens for our benefit, and whereof Wyatt S. Beazley is trustee,
and that in case of the forfeiture of the said distillery premises,
or any part thereof, the title of the same shall vest in the United
States, discharged from said deed of trust."
In order to satisfy the above taxes and the penalties authorized
by law, the collector of internal revenue for Virginia, by his
deputy, Lawson, during December, 1870, distrained the distillery
building and about three acres (of the 400-acre tract) upon which
the distillery stood, and advertised the property for sale. Prior
to any sale, the distillery building and contents, including a
quantity of whisky, were destroyed by fire. The collector
thereupon, before the day of sale, extended his distraint so as to
include the balance of Stephens' land, amounting in all to about
525 acres, which included the land embraced by the trust deed to
Smith, Ellett & Company, and advertised all of said land for
sale. Pursuant to the advertisement, the deputy collector, on
January 12, 1871, offered the whole of Stephens' land for sale at
public auction. Smith, being present
Page 208 U. S. 78
as a member of Smith, Ellett & Company, gave formal notice
of the above deed of trust, asserting a prior lien under it to that
of the government, and protesting against the sale of the land
except subject to that lien. The deputy collector proceeded with
the sale and the property was bid in for the government for
$4,239.50, that being the amount of delinquent taxes, penalties for
nonpayment thereof, and costs of distraint and sale. One year
thereafter, January 12, 1872, that officer executed a deed to the
United States, which was duly acknowledged and recorded on November
25, 1873.
Under the authority conferred upon the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue by § 3208 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the
Act of March 1, 1879, and with the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury, the lands so purchased were sold at public auction, by
order of the Commissioner, on the twelfth day of June 1888, and
Miss Stephens became the purchaser at the price of $500. She died
after the sale, and on October 6, 1888, the United States, by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, executed a quitclaim deed to the
devisees of the purchaser, conveying to them
"all right, title, and interest of the United States at the time
of said last-named sale in the premises aforesaid, and free from
any claim on the part of the United States."
By an Act of Congress of May 27th, 1902, 32 Stat. 207, 243, c.
887, it was provided:
"That jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the Court of Claims to
hear and determine the claim of Rinaldo P. Smith, of Baltimore,
Maryland, against the government of the United States on account of
the sale, purchase, or occupation by the government, through its
internal revenue office or others, of certain real estate of one
George J. Stephens in Greene County, Virginia, upon which the late
firm of Smith, Ellett & Company, now represented by Rinaldo P.
Smith, had a prior lien, and the right of the government to plead
the statute of limitations in bar of said claims is hereby waived:
Provided, That said claimant file his petition within
sixty days from the passage of this act, in said Court of Claims,
either at
Page 208 U. S. 79
law or in equity, as he may deem the rights of his case shall
require, and the government shall, upon notice served according to
the rules and practice of said court, appear and defend against
said suit, and the same shall proceed to final hearing and
judgment, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court of United
States by either party, as provided by law."
The present action was brought in 1904 by the executor of Smith
under the authority of that act.
The petition sets forth certain facts connected with the claim,
and, among other things, it alleged the following:
"9. The petitioner is advised and believers, and so charges,
that the proceeding and sale above recited, whereby the United
States acquired the title to said land and defeated the lien of
said firm, was in open violation of § 3207 of the Revised
Statutes, which was then in full force and should have governed the
proceeding of the United States in the premises, and that the
officers of the United States, having abundant notice of the prior
lien of the said Smith, Ellett & Company, should have commenced
a proceeding in the United States district court for said district,
in conformity with the provisions of the statute above cited, to
which proceeding the said Smith, Ellett & Company should have
been made parties, and whereby their prior lien should have been
audited, adjusted, and paid out of the proceeds of such sale in
preference to the claim of the United States, as provided by such
statute, and that, by adopting the summary proceeding which was
resorted to in the sale of said land, being the same authorized by
§§ 3197 and 3198, Revised Statutes, in cases where no
prior liens exist, the United States practically proclaimed to the
whole world, just as its agent who made the sale actually did, that
there was no valid prior lien on said land and that a clear title
was passed by the sale."
"10. That the United States accepted the conveyance so made, and
held the property by virtue thereof for many years, collecting the
rents and profits, and that the first notice this petitioner had of
its relinquishment of its holdings was through an official letter
from Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue Wilson,
Page 208 U. S. 80
bearing date January 7, 1895, in which it was stated that, by a
conveyance made in October, 1888, the United States had divested
itself of its title to said land."
"11. That, after the sale and conveyance aforesaid, the said
Smith did, as the representative of his said firm, make every
effort to collect the said debt from the said George J. Stephens in
said Greene County, and to that end at considerable expense,
retained counsel learned in the law; but he was advised that the
United States, by its summary proceeding, had taken over the title
to the mortgage land and defeated his lien thereon, and the said
Stephens, having no other property against which he could proceed,
his only recourse lay, first, in redeeming the property within one
year, under the provision of § 3202, Revised Statutes, by
paying to the deputy collector the full amount of $4,229.50,
claimed to be due from said Stephens to the United States, or,
second, in a demand of indemnity from the United States; but the
said firm, being wholly unable pecuniarily to advance that large
sum of money, and having serious doubts whether the mortgaged
property was at that time fairly worth that amount in addition to
their mortgage lien, and they were therefore unable to redeem said
property, and neither the said firms nor this petitioner has ever,
directly or indirectly, received any portion of said debt so due
from the said Stephens as aforesaid, but the same is still due and
unpaid in the full amount above stated."
"12. That, at the time of said sale and conveyance to the United
States, the land of said Stephens, to which the said lien of the
said Smith, Ellett & Company attached, was amply worth the
amount of their said lien, and would have brought that amount and
more at any fair and regular sale thereof at auction or
otherwise."
"13. That on the first day of January, A.D. 1875, the
partnership existing between the said Rinaldo P. Smith and the said
Francis M. Ellett and a certain William F. Larrabee, who had, in
the meantime, become a partner, expired by limitation in the
articles of copartnership and was dissolved by mutual consent, and
thereupon all the partnership assets of the old firm, including the
debt due from Stephens, as aforesaid,
Page 208 U. S. 81
passed to this petitioner by authority of the firm as settling
partner, with the exclusive right to collect the same and sign
valid acquittance therefor, and although this petitioner has
repeatedly made demand upon the proper officers of the Treasury
Department for payment of his said claim, the same has never been
paid, or any part thereof, but, on the contrary, allowance and
payment thereof has been refused."
The relief sought was a judgment against the United States for
$8,666.44, with interest thereon from January 12, 1871.
The government answered, denying all the allegations of the
petition, and asking for judgment dismissing the suit.
Page 208 U. S. 82
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have seen that, before the execution of the deed of trust
under which the plaintiff claims, taxes to the amount of $4,000 had
accrued to the United States against the distiller Stephens, which
he neglected, upon demand, to pay. What were the rights of the
United States after such demand and failure to pay? This question
depends upon the scope and effect of certain statutory provisions,
as follows:
1. That part of the §§ 28 and 30 of the Act of June
30, 1864, 13 Stat. 232-234, as amended by the ninth section of the
Internal Revenue Act of July 13th, 1866, 14 Stat. 98, 107, 108, c.
184, which declares that
"if any person, bank, association, company, or corporation
liable to pay any tax shall neglect or refuse to pay the same after
demand, the amount shall be a lien in favor of the United States
from the time it was due until paid, with the interest, penalties,
and costs that may accrue in addition
Page 208 U. S. 83
thereto, upon all property and rights to property belonging to
such person, bank, association, company, or corporation, and the
collector, after demand, may levy, or by warrant may authorize a
deputy collector to levy, upon all property and rights to property
belonging to such person, bank, association, company, or
corporation, or on which the said lien exists, for the payment of
the sum due as aforesaid, with interest and penalty for nonpayment,
and also of such further sum as shall be sufficient for the fees,
costs, and expenses of such levy. . . . That in any case where
goods, chattels, or effects sufficient to satisfy the taxes imposed
by law upon any person liable to pay the same shall not be found by
the collector or deputy collector whose duty it may be to collect
the same, he is hereby authorized to collect the same by seizure
and sale of real estate,"
etc.
2. That part of § 32 of the same act which provides
"that there shall be levied, collected, and paid on all
distilled spirits upon which no tax has been paid according to law,
the tax of two dollars, on each and every proof gallon [reduced to
50 cents by Act of July 20th, 1868, c. 186, 15 Stat. 125], to be
paid by the distiller, owner, or any person having possession
thereof, and the tax shall be a lien on the spirits distilled, on
the distillery used for distilling the same, with the stills,
vessels, fixtures, and tools therein, and on the interest of said
distiller in the lot or tract of land whereon the said distillery
is situated, from the time said spirits are distilled until the
said tax shall be paid."
3. That part of § 106 of the Act of July 20th, 1868, 15
Stat. 125, 167, c. 186, which provides that
"in any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay
any tax imposed by the internal revenue laws, and where it is
lawful and has become necessary to seize and sell real estate to
satisfy the tax, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, if he
deems it expedient, direct that a bill in chancery be filed in a
district or circuit court of the United States, to enforce the lien
of the United States for tax upon any real estate, or to subject
any
Page 208 U. S. 84
real estate owned by the delinquent, or in which he has any
right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax. And all
persons having liens upon the real estate sought to be subjected to
the payment of any tax as aforesaid, or claiming any ownership or
interest therein, shall be made parties to such proceedings, and
shall be brought into court, as provided in other suits in chancery
in said courts. And the said courts shall have, and are hereby
given, jurisdiction in all such cases, and shall at the term next
after such time as the parties shall be duly notified of the
proceedings, unless otherwise ordered by the court, proceed to
adjudicate all matters involved therein, and to pass upon and
finally determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon the
real estate in question, and shall, in all cases where a claim or
interest of the United States therein shall be established, decree
a sale, by the proper officer of the court, of such real estate,
and a distribution of the proceeds of such sale, according to the
findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties
and of the United States."
This section is substantially preserved in § 3207 of the
Revised Statutes, except that the latter omits the words "if he
deems it expedient," found in the above section of the act of
1868.
Before considering these statutory provisions, it is proper to
refer to one point. The plaintiff insists that, in view of the
words of the act under which this suit was brought, it must be
taken that the lien created by the trust deed of October 26, 1869,
was prior to any then existing in behalf of the government. This
contention rests entirely on the statement in that act that the
late firm of Smith, Ellett & Company, represented by Smith,
"had a prior lien." But plainly, from the context and the admitted
facts, that was merely be way of recital, and as showing what that
firm or Smith claimed. It could not have been intended as an
admission by Congress that no lien existed in favor of the United
States at the time that deed of trust was executed. The findings
expressly state that, when the deed was executed, taxes had accrued
against the distiller in favor of the United States from July,
1867, to August, 1869, amounting
Page 208 U. S. 85
to $4,000, and that a demand was made for their payment prior to
the execution of the deed of trust under which the plaintiff
claims. By the statute of 1866, it is provided that, if any
delinquent, liable to taxes, shall neglect or refuse to pay them
after demand, there shall be a lien in favor of the United States
from the time it was due "upon all property and rights to property"
belonging to the delinquent. In
Kinkead v. United States,
150 U. S. 483,
150 U. S. 497,
the Court said it was well settled
"that a mere recital in an act, whether of fact or of law, is
not conclusive unless it be clear that the legislature intended
that the recital should be accepted as a fact in the case."
No such intention is to be imputed in this case to Congress. On
the contrary, it is manifest that Congress intended that the claim
of the parties was to be judicially investigated and determined
according to all the facts as disclosed by the evidence adduced. We
are clear that, whatever the legal effect of the fact, it must be
taken that the lien of the United States for its unpaid taxes
attached before the trust deed was executed and recorded. That the
government acquired a lien on the property in question after the
failure of the distiller to pay, upon demand, the taxes due to the
United States is too manifest, under the words of the statute, to
admit of doubt. And this lien, we have seen, attached before the
execution of the deed of trust of October 26, 1869.
It is to be observed that the statute gave to the government, in
order to secure its taxes, not only a sweeping lien "upon all
property or rights to property" belonging to the delinquent, but a
specific or special lien on spirits for the gallon taxes. It was
therefore said by Solicitor General Phillips, 16 Op.A.G. 634,
636:
"It may be true that, because of the
greater
definiteness of the special provision for a lien for the tax
upon spirits, there is rarely occasion for calling in the provision
for a lien for taxes in general, but there is nothing to forbid
that general policy to apply in all cases where there is nothing in
the special policy to contradict."
The plaintiff contends that the act of 1868 superseded the
Page 208 U. S. 86
provisions of the previous law giving the remedy of distraint,
and that, after the passage of that act, the United States could
only proceed, in case of conflicting liens, by a regular suit in
equity in a federal court. the government, it is contended that the
remedy given by that act is not exclusive, but can be used by the
United States whenever it sees proper to pursue that remedy, rather
than the remedy of distraint.
We are of opinion that the government correctly interprets the
act of 1868. If Congress had intended to prescribe a formal suit in
equity as the only mode by which the government could sell real
estate upon which it had a lien for internal revenue taxes, and
upon which private parties also had liens by mortgage or deed of
trust, it would have done so in clear words, particularly as
Congress knew at the time of the then-existing remedy by distraint.
The words used do not show that Congress intended a suit in equity
as exclusive of all other methods in such cases. It seems to have
taken care not to so prescribe. The two remedies could well
coexist. The act of 1868 declared that the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue may, "if he deems it expedient," proceed by bill in
chancery, without using any words implying a purpose to withdraw
from the government the right then existing to resort to distraint
and sale. Congress, we assume, doubtless thought that cases might
arise in which it would be desirable that all questions of title to
property to be sold for taxes should be cleared up before a sale
took place. Hence, the provision which authorized, but did not
require, a suit in equity, and which left untouched the right of
the government to proceed by distraint. We must not be understood
as saying that, if the words "if he deems it expedient" had not
been in the statute, that the result would have been different. But
those words are significant as tending to remove all doubt as to
the correct interpretation of the statute, and make it evident that
Congress did not intend to take away the remedy by distraint and
make the remedy by suit exclusive, but only to give another and
cumulative remedy for the enforcement of liens and taxes.
Page 208 U. S. 87
This was the view taken of the statute by the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in
Alkan v. Bean, 8 Biss. 83, 89. Judge Dyer, delivering the
judgment of the court in that case, held that the remedy given by
the act of 1868, Rev.Stat. § 3207, and that given by distraint
were concurrent, neither remedy being exclusive.
It is said that these views are inconsistent with the judgment
of this Court in
Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co.,
135 U. S. 326. We
do not think so. In that case, the principal question was what
title passed by a collector's sale for delinquent taxes due from a
distiller who held, at the time of sale, only a leasehold interest
in the property seized? It was held that the collector could only
sell by distraint the interest of the distiller, and that his deed
to the purchaser should be regarded as conveying only such interest
as the collector was entitled to sell; the Court, in that case,
recognizing the right of the government to enforce by distraint
whatever lien it had for unpaid taxes, subject to the rights of
other lienholders. It said:
"But in what mode may the government enforce its prior lien? In
order to collect the taxes due from Hinds, the distiller, it might
have instituted a suit in equity, to which not only the distiller,
who had simply a leasehold interest, but all persons having liens
upon, or claiming any interest in, the premises, could be made
parties; in which suit it would have been the duty of the court to
determine finally the merits of all claims to and liens upon the
property, and to order a sale, distributing the proceeds among the
parties according to their respective interests. Of course, the
United States, having, by stipulation, priority of lien, would have
been first paid out of the proceeds. But no such course was
pursued. The officers of the government preferred to adopt the
summary method of sale by the collector upon notice and
publication, as provided for in § 3197. It may be conceded
that, if the distiller had been the owner of the fee, a sale in
that mode would have passed his interest, subject to the rights of
any prior encumbrancer, and subject to the right of any
subsequent
Page 208 U. S. 88
encumbrancer, to redeem the premises. But the delinquent
distiller had no interest except a leasehold interest, and that
expired, as we have seen, on the first of May, 1877. We are of
opinion that the collector's sale in the summary mode prescribed in
§ 3197 passed, and under the statute could have passed,
nothing more than the interest of the delinquent distiller. When
the collector distrains and sells personal property for taxes, his
certificate, by the express words of the statute (§ 3194),
transfers to the purchaser the right, title, and interest of the
delinquent in the property sold. When he sells real estate for
taxes, the statute, in terms equally explicit (§ 3199),
declares that his certificate of purchase shall be considered and
operate as a conveyance of the right, title, and interest the party
delinquent had in the real estate so sold. Now if Congress intended
to invest the collector with authority to sell, by the summary
process of notice and publication, the interest of any other person
than the delinquent distiller, the statute would have described a
certificate that would pass the interest of such person in the
property sold. The provision that the certificate of purchase shall
pass the interest of the delinquent in the property sold by the
collector excludes, by necessary implication, the interest of any
other person. This is made clear by the fact that the statute, in
the case of a sale by the collector, requires notice to 'the person
whose estate it is proposed to sell' (§ 3197), which person
is, of course, the one who is delinquent in the matter of taxes.
Any other construction would impute to Congress the purpose, in
order that the taxes against the delinquent distiller, having only
a leasehold interest, might be collected, to seize and sell the
interest of the owner of the fee, and to destroy the lien of an
encumbrancer, without giving either an opportunity to be
heard."
While the
Mansfield case recognized the right of the
government to proceed by a regular suit in equity, it also
distinctly recognized its right to proceed by distraint, and to
sell the interest of the delinquent taxpayer, whatever such
interest was, saving, of course, the rights of encumbrancers. In
the
Page 208 U. S. 89
present case, the distiller was the owner of the fee when the
lien of the government for taxes accrued -- a fact which
distinguishes this from the
Mansfield case. When that lien
accrued, there was on the property no encumbrance whatever. The
encumbrance arising from the deed of trust of 1869 arose after the
lien of the government attached. Therefore the government had the
right, by distraint, to sell such interest in the lands as the
delinquent distiller owned at the time its lien attached -- which
was the fee -- just as the collector had the right, in the
Mansfield case, to sell the leasehold interest of the
distiller. As the leasehold interest of the distiller passed by the
sale in the
Mansfield case, so the interest which the
distiller in this case had when the government's lien attached
passed by the sale of the collector, subject, of course, to the
right of the holder of the subsequent encumbrance created by the
deed of trust of 1869, to redeem the property from the sale. By the
statute under which the sale took place, it was provided:
"Any person whose estate may be proceeded against as aforesaid
shall have the right to pay the amount due, together with the costs
and charges thereon, to the collector or deputy collector at any
time prior to the sale thereof, and all further proceedings shall
cease from the time of such payment. The owners of any real estate
sold as aforesaid, their heirs, executors, or administrators,
or any person having any interest therein, or a lien
thereon, or any person in their behalf, shall be permitted to
redeem the land sold as aforesaid, or any particular tract thereof
at any time within one year after the sale thereof, upon payment to
the purchaser, or, in case he cannot be found in the county in
which the land to be redeemed is situate, then to the collector of
the district in which the land is situate, for the use of the
purchaser, his heirs or assigns, the amount paid by the said
purchaser, and interest thereon at the rate of twenty percentum per
annum."
So that neither the distiller nor the holder of the lien created
by the deed of trust of 1869 was without remedy. The lienholder,
under the deed of trust of 1869, could have prevented the sale
Page 208 U. S. 90
by paying the amount of taxes due the United States, with costs
and charges, or, after sale, could have redeemed the land in the
mode prescribed by the statute. But neither of those courses was
pursued, because, as the petition states, the firm represented by
Smith was pecuniarily unable to pay the amount necessary for the
redemption of the land from the sale. But that was the misfortune
of the parties concerned. The fact could not affect the right of
the United States to have the interest of the distiller, whatever
that was at the time its lien attached, sold for the taxes.
These views dispose of the case, for it cannot be that any
liability rests upon the United States to pay the debt secured by
the deed of trust of 1869, if it be true, and we hold it to be
true, that whatever the government did in the collection of the
taxes due to it was in pursuance of its rights under the law. We
are unable to perceive that either the distiller Stephens or anyone
asserting rights under the above deed of trust had or has any
ground of action against the government.
Passing, as unnecessary to decide, many of the questions
discussed by counsel, we affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.
