Where complainant not only sets up diverse citizenship, but also
a constitutional question, he has the right to appeal from the
judgment of the circuit court to the circuit court of appeals, and
from its decision an appeal or writ of error may be taken to this
Court.
Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U.
S. 618, distinguished.
A commission created by the law of a state for the purpose of
supervising and controlling the acts of railroad companies
operating within the state is subject to suit and a suit brought by
a company of another state in the
Page 203 U. S. 336
circuit court of the United States against the members of the
commission is not a suit against the state within the prohibitions
of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Railroad Commission of Mississippi is not, as has been
determined by the highest court of the state, a court, but a mere
administrative agency of the state, and the prohibitions of §
720, Rev.Stat., against injunctions from United States courts to
stay proceedings in state courts are not applicable thereto, and
even though the commission might, under the state law, resort to
the state courts to aid it in enforcing its orders, the proceeding
cannot be regarded as one in the state courts within the meaning of
§ 720, Rev.Stat. While a state railroad commission may, in the
absence of congressional legislation, order a railroad company to
stop interstate trains at stations where there is only an
incidental interference with interstate commerce based on a legal
exercise of the police power of the state exerted to secure proper
facilities for the citizens of the state, where the railroad
company has -- as in this case -- furnished all proper and
reasonable facilities, such an order is an improper and illegal
interference with interstate commerce and void as a violation of
the commerce clause of the Constitution.
138 F. 327 affirmed.
The Railroad Commission of the State of Mississippi and its
members and clerk, as appellants, bring to this Court by appeal the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
which court reversed the judgment of the United States Circuit
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi in favor of the
appellants and remanded the case with directions to enter a decree
for the complainant, the railroad company.
The case, as it appears in the record, shows the following
facts:
The citizens of the Town of Magnolia, which has about 1,200
inhabitants, and is situated in the State of Mississippi on the
line of the railroad of the appellee, and about 98 miles north of
New Orleans, in April, 1903, presented a petition to the
Mississippi Railroad Commission asking that commission to order the
railroad company to stop its passenger trains numbers 1, 3, and 4
at the Magnolia station, the ground of the request being, as stated
in the petition, that Magnolia was one of the most progressive
towns in the state and the county site of the county, and the
petitioners believed
Page 203 U. S. 337
that they were entitled to have these trains make regular stops
at that point, and they stated their belief that it was for the
best interest of the public, as well as the town, to have the
passenger trains named make regular stops at the town.
Trains numbers 1 and 3 were south-bound trains from Chicago,
passing Magnolia on their way to New Orleans, while train number 4
was a train on its way north to Chicago from New Orleans.
After a hearing before the railroad commission, on notice to the
railroad company, the commission made an order granting the
application as to trains 1 and 3 and denying it as to number 4.
Before obeying the order, the company brought this suit to
enjoin its enforcement. Upon the filing of the bill, a temporary
injunction was issued and a subsequent motion to dissolve it was
denied. The defendant in the suit, the railroad commission,
answered the bill and denied that the railroad company furnished
the Town of Magnolia with adequate accommodations for the south,
and put in issue the allegations of the bill that the order made by
the commission was unreasonable or an illegal interference with the
interstate commerce of the railroad company. The case came on for
hearing before the circuit court, at the end of which a decree was
made denying the relief asked for by the complainant, the court
holding that the order of the commission was not unreasonable, and
that therefore the temporary injunction should be, and it was,
dissolved. An appeal to the circuit court of appeals was prayed for
by the railroad company and granted.
The bill stated, amongst other things, that the corporation was
created under the laws of the State of Illinois, and that the
complainant was a resident of that state, and domiciled in the City
of Chicago, and that the railroad commission was created by the
State of Mississippi, and its individual members were citizens and
residents of that state. The complainant further showed that it was
operating an interstate line of railroad, extending from the City
of New Orleans, in Louisiana,
Page 203 U. S. 338
north through that state and the States of Mississippi,
Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois to the Great Lakes of the
Northwest, connecting at various points with other lines of
interstate railroads. It is also averred that the Congress of the
United States had established the line of railroad operated by the
complainant as a national highway for the accommodation of
interstate commerce and the carriage of the mails of the United
States, and had been so recognized and promoted as such by various
acts of Congress; that, owing to the exigencies of its interstate
business and the requirements of modern commerce and passenger
transportation, as well as the transportation of freight and the
United States mails, the complainant had been, from time to time,
required to shorten its schedule, and to maintain and operate
certain fast through trains, intended primarily and chiefly for
interstate transportation and interstate commerce; that the two
trains numbered 1 and 3 -- one being known as the fast mail and the
other as the New Orleans & Chicago Limited -- were run
expressly for the purpose of carrying the interstate business and
for the transportation of the United States mail, and that they
were run on special schedules for that purpose, and of necessity
had to make close connections with other through trunk lines of
railroad doing an interstate business, and, in order to maintain
the necessary schedule of time for the operation of these
interstate trains, it was impossible and wholly impracticable to
stop at all stations, and further, that these trains, being
south-bound trains, only stop regularly at junction points and all
such points of importance in the State of Mississippi which are
necessary and which justify such stops. The bill showed the
accommodations which were afforded the Town of Magnolia by the
other trains provided by the company, and which it alleged
sufficiently accommodated the traveling public at that point; that
a compliance with the order of the commission by stopping the
trains named would imperil the ability of the complainant to comply
with its contract with the United States for the carriage of the
mails, and
Page 203 U. S. 339
would embarrass its interstate traffic, and that it would be
impossible under the present condition of the roadbed and equipment
of the complainant to increase the speed of the trains so as to
allow for the stoppage of the trains as directed by the commission;
that the complainant protested before the commission against the
issuing of the order, and it alleged that it showed that it was
then furnishing the Town of Magnolia all reasonable and necessary
railroad facilities, and that the effect of the order would be to
give that town greater railroad facilities than were afforded by
complainant to any other town in the State of Mississippi,
including the City of Jackson, the capital of the state, excepting
only the Town of McComb City, which, being a relay station on
complainant's road, it is necessary for all trains to stop there to
change the engine, and for fuel, water, etc.; that the effect of
the order also would be to give to the town five daily trains to
the City of New Orleans, running within short intervals of each
other. It was further alleged that, by the statutory law of the
State of Mississippi, the complainant was subject to a penalty of
$50 for each time it failed to stop its trains on the order of the
commission, and that the complainant would therefore be compelled
to comply with the order or be subject to a multiplicity of suits
for penalties arising from each and every violation of the order,
and that defendants threaten by suit to enforce the order. It was
then averred that the order of the commission was a direct burden
upon interstate commerce, and also a direct and unnecessary
interference with the speedy carriage of the mails of the United
States.
An amendment to the bill was subsequently filed showing that
Congress had granted a right of way and sections of land in the
State of Illinois to aid in the construction of a railroad from the
southern termination of the Illinois & Michigan Canal to a
point at or near the junction of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers,
with branches, etc., which should remain a public highway for the
use of the government of the United States, free from toll or other
charges upon the transportation of any
Page 203 U. S. 340
property or troops of the United States, and on which mails of
the United States should at all times be transported, and the
Congress had made like grants to the states of Alabama and
Mississippi, respectively, for the purpose of aiding in the
construction of a railroad from the City of Mobile to a point near
the mouth of the Ohio River, and it was also averred that the State
of Illinois had chartered the complainant in 1850, and ceded to it
rights and lands granted to that state by the act of Congress.
The defendant commission answered and denied the averments in
the bill, as already stated.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The decision in this case by the circuit court of appeals is
reported in 138 F. 327, in which will be found a statement of the
material portions of the evidence taken at the hearing before the
trial court. It is unnecessary to repeat it.
The first objection raised by the appellant is that this suit
is, in substance, one against a state. The commission was created
by the State of Mississippi, under the authority of its
constitution and laws, for the purpose of supervising, and, to some
extent, controlling, the acts of the railroads operating within the
state. Such a commission is subject to a suit by a citizen.
Reagan v. Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362;
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466;
Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537. We
do not see that
Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 191 U.
S. 405, is at all in point.
Page 203 U. S. 341
It is also objected that an injunction will not lie from a
United States court to stay proceedings in a state court, because
of the provisions of § 720, United States Revised Statutes. 1
Comp.Stat. 581. The commission is, however, not a court, and is a
mere administrative agency of the state, as held by the Mississippi
court.
Telegraph Co. v. Railroad Commission, 74 Miss.
80.
It is urged, however, that proceedings in a state court were
commenced by the presentation of the petition of the citizens of
Magnolia to the railroad commission, and because the commission,
having made an order to stop the trains, would have to resort to
the proper state court to aid it in the enforcement of its order,
therefore the whole proceeding must be regarded as in a state court
from the commencement. Whatever may be the provision in the state
statute in regard to the enforcement solely by the state court of
the order of the railroad commission, the proceeding, while before
the commission, never thereby became a proceeding in a state court,
and the jurisdiction of the federal court to enjoin the commission
from the enforcement of its order because such order was a
violation of the federal Constitution was not in the least
affected.
The appellants also object that the circuit court of appeals had
no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the circuit court in this
case because, as is stated, the jurisdiction was predicated upon
diversity of citizenship, and also upon the claim that the state
statutes requiring the stoppage of trains, when applied to the
trains under discussion, violated the commerce clause of the
federal Constitution, and therefore the case should have come
directly here from the circuit court, and
Field v. Barber
Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 618, is
cited as authority. The complainant in this case, by a proper
pleading, set up not only the diversity of citizenship, but also a
constitutional question, and the complainant had the right to
appeal from the judgment of the circuit court to the circuit court
of appeals, and from its decision in such a case an appeal or writ
of error may be taken to this Court.
American
Sugar
Page 203 U. S. 342
Refining Co. v. New Orleans, 181 U.
S. 277,
181 U. S. 281;
Huguley Manufacturing Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills,
184 U. S. 290,
184 U. S. 295.
The case of
Field v. Asphalt Co. supra, does not hold
otherwise. It simply holds that, where the jurisdiction of the
circuit court attaches on the ground of diverse citizenship, and
also upon a separate and independent constitutional ground, the
party may take a direct appeal to this Court; but it does not hold
that the defeated party must do so, and that he cannot go to the
circuit court of appeals.
The main question is, as stated in the court below, whether the
order of the commission is valid with reference to the federal
Constitution. That depends upon the question whether it is only an
incidental interference with interstate commerce, based upon a
legal exercise of the police powers of the state for the purpose of
securing proper and sufficient accommodation from the railroad
company for railroad facilities for the residents of the state. The
authority of the commission to interfere with a railroad is based
on the statutes of Mississippi. Section 3550 (Chapter 112, Code of
Mississippi, 1892, relating to railroads) reads as follows:
"3550.
To stop all passenger trains, if, etc. at county
seats. -- Every railroad shall cause each and all of its
passenger trains to stop for passengers at all county seats at
which it has a depot at the discretion of the railroad
commission."
Chapter 134 of the same Code relates to the supervision of
common carriers. Section 4302 thereof reads as follows:
"
Necessary depots to be maintained. -- Every railroad
shall establish and maintain such depots as shall be reasonably
necessary for the public convenience, and shall stop such of the
passenger and freight trains at any depot as the business and
public convenience shall require, and the commission may cause all
passenger trains to permit passengers to get on and off in a city
at any place other than at the depot, where it is for the
convenience of the traveling public. And it shall be unlawful for
any railroad to abolish or disuse any depot when once established,
or to fail to keep up the same and to regularly
Page 203 U. S. 343
stop the trains thereat, without the consent of the
commission."
Under these statutes, the commission has power (
a) to
stop, in its discretion, all passenger trains at all county seats
at which the company has a depot; (
b) to stop such of the
passenger and freight trains at any depot as the business and
public convenience may require. The order in question was made with
regard to a place which is both a county seat and also one where
the railroad has a depot. It is not plain under which section the
commission acted. Its order simply states that the petition of the
citizens of Magnolia is granted as to trains 1 and 3, and denied as
to train 4. The petition throws no light upon the subject. We may
assume, however, that the commission acted under all the authority
it had from the above quoted sections of the statute. It is fair to
assume that it had exercised its discretion in causing the trains
to stop at a county seat, and that it did so because, in its
judgment, it was reasonable and necessary for the public
convenience. The question is whether, having regard to the facts,
the order is valid.
The matter of the validity of statutes directing railroad
companies to stop certain of their trains at stations named has
been before this Court several times, and the result of its
holdings is that a statute of Illinois, which required the Illinois
Central Railroad to stop its fast mail train from Chicago to New
Orleans at Cairo, in the State of Illinois, which was a county
seat, was unconstitutional if the company had made adequate
accommodation by other trains for interstate passengers to and from
Cairo. That a statute which required every railroad corporation to
stop all regular passenger trains running wholly within the state
at its stations at all county seats was a reasonable exercise of
the police power of the state, where the statute did not apply to
railroad trains entering the state from any other state, or
transcontinental trains of any railroad. A statute relating to
railroad companies which provided that a company should cause three
of its trains each
Page 203 U. S. 344
way, if so many were run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at a
station containing over 3,000 inhabitants, was valid in the absence
of legislation by Congress on the subject, and also a state statute
which required all regular passenger trains to stop at county seats
was invalid when applied to an interstate train, intended only for
through passengers from St. Louis to New York, when it appeared
that the railroad company furnished sufficient trains to
accommodate all the local through business in the state, and where
such trains stopped at county seats. These principles have been
decided in
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois,
163 U. S. 142;
Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427;
Lake Shore &c. Ry. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.
S. 285;
Cleveland &c. Ry. Co. v. Illinois,
177 U. S. 514.
Upon the principles decided in these cases, a state railroad
commission has the right, under a state statute, so far as
railroads are concerned, to compel a company to stop its trains
under the circumstances already referred to, and it may order the
stoppage of such trains if the company does not otherwise furnish
proper and adequate accommodation to a particular locality, and in
such cases the order may embrace a through interstate train
actually running, and compel it to stop at a locality named. In
such case, in the absence of congressional legislation covering the
subject, there is no illegal or improper interference with the
interstate commerce right; but if the company has furnished all
such proper and reasonable accommodation to the locality as fairly
may be demanded, taking into consideration the fact, if it be one,
that the locality is a county seat, and the amount and character of
the business done, then any interference with the company (either
directly, by statute, or by a railroad commission acting under
authority of a statute) by causing its interstate trains to stop at
a particular locality in the state is an improper and illegal
interference with the rights of the railroad company, and a
violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution.
In reviewing statutes of this nature, and also orders made by a
state railroad commission, it frequently becomes necessary
Page 203 U. S. 345
to examine the facts upon which they rest and to determine from
such examination whether there has been an unconstitutional
exercise of power and an illegal interference by the state or its
commission with the interstate commerce of the railroad. Whether
there has or has not been such an interference is a question of law
arising from the facts. In this case, there was no important
conflict of evidence on the material points, and so the circuit
court of appeals has stated, and these facts are clearly and
sufficiently set forth in 138 F.,
supra. The fact that the
company has contracts to transport the mails of the United States
within a time which requires great speed for the trains carrying
them, while not conclusive, may still be considered upon the
general question of the propriety of stopping such trains at
certain stations within the boundaries of a state. The railroad has
been recognized by Congress, and is the recipient of large land
grants, and the carrying of the mails is a most important function
of such a road. We think that the railroad company has fully
performed its duty towards the town in the way of furnishing it
proper and adequate and reasonable accommodation, without stopping
these interstate trains as ordered, and therefore the order of the
commission was improper and illegal, and not merely an incidental
interference with the interstate commerce of the company. The
circuit court of appeals has, in effect, so held, although it did
say that the commission and the circuit court had made an order
that indicated that the trains which already stopped at Magnolia
were not sufficient, and that the town should have five daily
trains going south, and therefore the court said it thought it well
to examine other questions, which it did. A reading of the whole
opinion of the circuit court of appeals shows that the court did
not concede in any degree that the passenger facilities afforded
were inadequate, but that the remedy was to compel the company to
run more trains, and not stop the ones in question. The opinion
simply suggests that, even if the facilities were inadequate, the
appropriate course was to order more trains
Page 203 U. S. 346
instead of stopping those mentioned. In any event, the question
is before us upon uncontradicted evidence as to whether there were
or were not proper facilities, and we hold there were.
The order cannot be viewed alone in the light of ordering a stop
at one place only, which might require not more than three minutes,
as asserted. It is the question whether these trains can be stopped
at all at any particular station when proper and adequate
facilities are otherwise afforded such station. If the commission
can order such a train to be stopped at a particular locality under
such circumstances, then it could do so as to other localities, and
in that way the usefulness of a through train would be ruined and
the train turned from a through to a local one in Mississippi. The
legislature of a state could not itself make such an order, and it
cannot delegate the power to a commission to do so, in its
discretion, when adequate facilities are otherwise furnished.
The transportation of passengers on interstate trains as rapidly
as can with safety be done is the inexorable demand of the public
who use such trains. Competition between great trunk lines is
fierce, and at times bitter. Each line must do its best even to
obtain its fair share of the transportation between states both of
passengers and freight. A wholly unnecessary, even though a small,
obstacle ought not, in fairness, to be placed in the way of an
interstate road which may thus be unable to meet the competition of
its rivals. We by no means intend to impair the strength of the
previous decisions of this Court on the subject, nor to assume that
the interstate transportation, either of passengers or freight, is
to be regarded as overshadowing the rights of the residents of the
state through which the railroad passes to adequate railroad
facilities. Both claims are to be considered, and after the wants
of the residents within a state or locality through which the road
passes have been adequately supplied, regard being had to all the
facts bearing upon the subject, they ought not to be permitted to
demand more at the cost of the ability of
Page 203 U. S. 347
the road to successfully compete with its rivals in the
transportation of interstate passengers and freight.
We are of opinion that the judgment of the circuit court of
appeals was right, and it is
Affirmed.
