The constitutional provision relating to fugitives from justice
is in the nature of a treaty stipulation entered into for the
purpose of securing a prompt and efficient administration of the
criminal laws of the several states, and its faithful and vigorous
enforcement is vital to their harmony and welfare, and while a
state should protect its people against illegal action, federal
courts should be equally careful that the provision be not so
narrowly interpreted as to enable those who have offended the laws
of one state to find a permanent asylum in another.
A person charged by indictment or affidavit before a magistrate
within a state with the commission of a crime covered by its laws
and who leaves the state, no matter for what purpose nor under what
belief, becomes
Page 203 U. S. 223
from the time of such leaving and within the meaning of the
Constitution and laws of the United States, a fugitive from
justice, and in the absence of preponderating or conceded evidence
of absence from the demanding state when the crime was committed,
it is the duty of the other state to surrender the fugitive on the
production of the indictment or affidavit properly
authenticated.
Although regularly one seeking relief by habeas corpus in the
state courts should prosecute his appeal to, or writ of error from,
the highest state court before invoking the jurisdiction of the
circuit court on habeas corpus, where the case is one of which the
public interest demands a speedy determination, and the ends of
justice will be promoted thereby, this Court may proceed to final
judgment on appeal from the order of the circuit court denying the
relief.
The appellant was indicted in the Supreme Court of New York,
County of Erie, for the crime of grand larceny, first degree,
alleged to have been committed in that county on the eighteenth day
of May, 1904.
Upon that indictment a warrant of arrest was issued, but the
accused was not arrested, for the reason that he was not found
within the state.
Then the District Attorney of Erie County applied to the
Governor of New York for a requisition upon the Governor of
Massachusetts for Appleyard as a fugitive from justice. The
application was based upon the above indictment and numerous
accompanying affidavits, stating, among other things, that the
accused was then in Massachusetts. A requisition was accordingly
made upon the Governor of that commonwealth for the apprehension of
Appleyard, and his delivery to a named agent of New York, who was
authorized to receive and convey him to the latter state, to be
there dealt with according to law. With that requisition went
properly authenticated copies of all the papers which had been
submitted to the Governor of New York by the District Attorney of
Erie County.
The Governor of Massachusetts received the requisition, and,
pursuant to the statutes of that commonwealth, referred it to the
Attorney General for examination and report. Giving the accused
full opportunity to be heard and to introduce
Page 203 U. S. 224
evidence, of which he availed himself, that officer examined the
case and reported that the requisition was in regular and proper
form and that there was no sufficient reason why it should not be
honored. The Governor thereupon issued a warrant for the arrest of
Appleyard and his delivery to the agent of New York, to be taken to
that state, the officer who should execute the warrant being
required to give the accused such opportunity to sue out a writ of
habeas corpus as was prescribed by the laws of Massachusetts in
such cases. Appleyard, having been arrested, applied for a writ of
habeas corpus to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. This
fact is stated in the return of the officer holding the accused,
and is not denied. That court, after hearing an argument, denied
the application, and remanded the petitioner to the custody of the
agent of New York, to be held in accordance with the warrant issued
by the Governor of Massachusetts.
The accused then applied to the circuit court of the United
States for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the warrant of
the Governor of Massachusetts and the order for his delivery to the
agent of New York were issued without authority of law, and
contrary to the Constitution and laws, as well of the United States
as of Massachusetts, and
"especially contrary to Section 2, Article IV, of the
Constitution of the United States and of § 5278 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States in that your petitioner is not a
fugitive from justice."
The writ was issued and a return was made of the above
facts.
At the hearing in the circuit court, the accused requested a
ruling that, on the evidence, it did not appear that, within the
meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States, he was a
fugitive from justice, and also that he should be discharged from
custody unless it appeared positively, by a preponderance of proof,
that he "consciously fled from justice when he left the State of
New York." Those requests were denied. But the court granted a
request that the finding by the Governor of Massachusetts as a fact
that the accused was a fugitive from justice was not conclusive.
The court refused
Page 203 U. S. 225
to find as facts that the acts of Appleyard did not constitute a
crime under the laws of New York; that no crime was committed by
him in that state, and that Appleyard was not in New York on May
eighteenth, 1904, the date of the alleged crime. It consequently
discharged the writ of habeas corpus. From that order the present
appeal was prosecuted.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
It cannot be said that the appellant has not had ample
opportunity to test the question whether his detention was in
violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States. He has
had three hearings upon that question -- first, before the
executive authorities of Massachusetts, then before the Supreme
Judicial Court of that commonwealth, and finally before the circuit
court of the United States. Upon each occasion, he insisted that,
within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United
States, he could not be regarded as a fugitive from justice. The
decision at each hearing was adverse to that contention, and,
unless this Court reverses the judgment of the circuit court, he
must stand his trial upon the charge that he committed a crime
against the laws of New York. In view of the history of this case
from the time of the demand upon the Governor of Massachusetts for
the surrender of the appellant, this Court should hesitate, by
disturbing the ruling below, to further delay the administration by
New York of its criminal laws through its own judicial tribunals.
Regularly, the accused should have prosecuted a writ of error to
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts before
Page 203 U. S. 226
invoking the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United
States upon habeas corpus.
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.
S. 241,
117 U. S.
251-253;
Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.
S. 184;
Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.
S. 499,
180 U. S. 502;
Reid v. Jones, 187 U. S. 153.
But, in view of the long time which has elapsed since the Governor
of New York made his requisition for the surrender of the accused,
and as the case is one which the public interests demand should be
speedily determined, we think the ends of justice will be promoted
if we proceed to a final judgment on this appeal.
Upon a careful scrutiny of the record, we discover no ground for
the assertion that the detention of the appellant is in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States. The crime with
which he is charged is alleged in the indictment to have been
committed at Buffalo, New York, on May 18, 1904. It is, we think,
abundantly established by the evidence that he was personally
present in that city on that day, and that thereafter he left New
York, although there was some evidence to the effect that, on the
particular day named he was not in the state. In his own affidavit,
submitted and accepted as evidence, the accused specified several
days when he was in Buffalo prior to and subsequent to May 18,
1904, but, as stated by the Attorney General of Massachusetts in
his report to the Governor of that commonwealth, there was in that
affidavit no statement directly denying that he was in New York at
the time and place indicated in the indictment.
But the appellant contended below, as he does here, that he had
no belief when leaving New York at any time that he had violated
its criminal laws, and therefore, within the meaning of the
Constitution and laws of the United States, he could not be deemed
a fugitive from its justice. This contention cannot be sustained --
indeed, it could not be sustained without materially impairing the
efficacy of the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to
fugitives from justice. An alleged fugitive may believe that he has
not committed any crime against the laws of the state in which he
is indicted,
Page 203 U. S. 227
and yet, according to the laws of such state, as administered by
its judicial tribunals, he may have done so, and his belief or want
of belief may be without foundation in law. It is the province of
the courts of New York to declare what its laws are and to
determine whether particular acts on the part of an alleged
offender constitute a crime under such laws. The constitutional
provision that a person charged with crime against the laws of a
state, and who flees from its justice, must be delivered up on
proper demand is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace any offense,
whatever its nature, which the state, consistently with the
Constitution and laws of the United States may have made a crime
against its laws.
Kentucky v.
Dennison, 24 How. 66,
65 U. S. 69;
Ex Parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642,
114 U. S. 650.
So that the simple inquiry must be whether the person whose
surrender is demanded is in fact a fugitive from justice, not
whether he consciously fled from justice in order to avoid
prosecution for the crime with which he is charged by the demanding
state. A person charged by indictment or by affidavit before a
magistrate with the commission within a State of a crime covered by
its laws, and who, after the date of the commission of such crime,
leaves the state, no matter for what purpose or with what motive,
nor under what belief, becomes, from the time of such leaving, and
within the meaning of the Constitution and the laws of the United
States a fugitive from justice, and if found in another state must
be delivered up by the Governor of such state to the state whose
laws are alleged to have been violated on the production of such
indictment or affidavit, certified as authentic by the Governor of
the state from which the accused departed. Such is the command of
the supreme law of the land, which may not be disregarded by any
state. The constitutional provision relating to fugitives from
justice, as the history of its adoption will show, is in the nature
of a treaty stipulation entered into for the purpose of securing a
prompt and efficient administration of the criminal laws of the
several states -- an object of the first concern to the people of
the entire country,
Page 203 U. S. 228
and which each state is bound, in fidelity to the Constitution,
to recognize. A faithful, vigorous enforcement of that stipulation
is vital to the harmony and welfare of the states. And while a
state should take care, within the limits of the law, that the
rights of its people are protected against illegal action, the
judicial authorities of the Union should equally take care that the
provisions of the Constitution be not so narrowly interpreted as to
enable offenders against the laws of a state to find a permanent
asylum in the territory of another state.
In
Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80,
116 U. S. 95-97,
this Court said that the act of Congress, § 5278 of the
Revised Statutes, made it the duty of the executive authority of
the state in which is found a person charged with crime against the
laws of another state, and who has fled from its justice,
"to cause the arrest of the alleged fugitive from justice
whenever the executive authority of any state demands such person
as a fugitive from justice, and produces a copy of an indictment
found, or affidavit made before a magistrate of any state, charging
the person demanded with having committed a crime therein,
certified as authentic by the Governor or Chief Magistrate of the
state from whence the person so charged has fled. It must appear
therefore to the Governor of the state to whom such a demand is
presented, before he can lawfully comply with it, first, that the
person demanded is substantially charged with a crime against the
laws of the state from whose justice he is alleged to have fled, by
an indictment or an affidavit, certified as authentic by the
Governor of the state making the demand, and second that the person
demanded is a fugitive from the justice of the state the executive
authority of which makes the demand. The first of these
prerequisites is a question of law, and is always open upon the
face of the papers to judicial inquiry, on an application for a
discharge under a writ of habeas corpus. The second is a question
of fact, which the Governor of the state upon whom the demand is
made must decide, upon such evidence as he may deem satisfactory.
How far his decision may be
Page 203 U. S. 229
reviewed judicially in proceedings in habeas corpus, or whether
it is not conclusive, are questions not settled by harmonious
judicial decisions, nor by any authoritative judgment of this
Court. It is conceded that the determination of the fact by the
executive of the state in issuing his warrant of arrest, upon a
demand made on that ground, whether the writ contains a recital of
an express finding to that effect or not, must be regarded as
sufficient to justify the removal until the presumption in its
favor is overthrown by contrary proof.
Ex Parte Reggel,
114 U. S.
642."
Replying to the suggestion in that case that the fugitive was
not within the demanding state subsequent to the finding of the
indictment, the Court further said:
"The appellant in his affidavit does not deny that he was in the
State of New York about the date of the day laid in the indictment
when the offense is alleged to have been committed, and states, by
way of inference only, that he was not in that state on that very
day, and the fact that he has not been within the state since the
finding of the indictment is irrelevant and immaterial. To be a
fugitive from justice in the sense of the act of Congress
regulating the subject under consideration, it is not necessary
that the party charged should have left the state in which the
crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found,
or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun,
but simply that, having within a state committed that which by its
laws constitutes a crime when he is sought to be subjected to its
criminal process to answer for his offense, he has left its
jurisdiction and is found within the Territory of another."
To the same effect are
Ex Parte Brown, 28 F. 653, 655;
In re White, 55 F. 54, 57;
In re Bloch, 87 F.
981, 983. It is suggested that
Roberts v. Reilly was
substantially modified in
Streep v. United States,
160 U. S. 128,
160 U. S. 134,
in which the Court had occasion to construe sec. 1045 of the
Revised Statutes. But this is an error. Interpreting the words
"fleeing from justice" as found in that section, the Court
expressly held that these words must receive
Page 203 U. S. 230
the same construction as was given in
Roberts v. Reilly
to like words in sec. 5278 of the Revised Statutes, the inquiry in
that case being whether the accused was a fugitive from
justice.
In support of his contention, the appellant refers to
Hyatt
v. New York, 188 U. S. 691.
That was the case of an arrest in New York, under the warrant of
the Governor of that state, of an alleged fugitive from the justice
of Tennessee, in which state he stood charged by indictment with
crime committed in that state. This Court said (p.
188 U. S. 719)
that, as the alleged fugitive
"showed without contradiction and upon conceded facts that he
was not within the State of Tennessee at the times stated in the
indictments found in the Tennessee court, nor at any time when the
acts were, if ever, committed, he was not a fugitive from justice
within the meaning of the federal statute upon that subject, and
upon these facts the warrant of the Governor of the State of New
York was improperly issued, and the judgment of the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York, discharging the relator from
imprisonment by reason of such warrant must be affirmed."
The present case is a wholly different one, for here the
presumption arising from the recitals in the warrant of arrest in
favor of its validity was not overthrown by the proof; on the
contrary, it appeared by a preponderance of evidence that the
accused was in the State of New York when the alleged crime was
committed.
Similar views to those expressed in
Roberts v. Reilly
have been expressed by state courts. In
Kingsubury's Case,
106 Mass. 223, 227-228, the contention of the fugitive from justice
was that, as she went into the demanding state and returned to her
home in the other state before the alleged crime was known, she
could not be deemed to have fled from justice. But the court
said:
"The material facts are that the prisoner is charged with a
crime in the manner prescribed, and has gone beyond the
jurisdiction of the state, so that there has been no reasonable
opportunity to prosecute him after the facts were known. The fact
in this case that she returned to her permanent home cannot be
material. . . . It is sufficient
Page 203 U. S. 231
that the crime of larceny has been properly charged, and that
the prisoner is a fugitive, and a requisition has been properly
made."
In
State v. Richter, 37 Minn. 436, 438, the contention
was that to constitute a fugitive from justice, a person must have
left the state where the crime was committed for the purpose of
escaping the legal consequences of his crime. Referring to
Roberts v. Reilly, above cited, as authoritative and
binding, and as in accordance with its own views, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota well said:
"The sole purpose of this statute, and of the constitutional
provision which it was designed to carry into effect, was to secure
the return of persons who had committed crime within one state, and
had left it before answering the demands of justice. The important
thing is not their purpose in leaving, but the fact that they had
left, and hence were beyond the reach of the process of the state
where the crime was committed. Whether the motive for leaving was
to escape prosecution or something else, their return to answer the
charges against them is equally within the spirit and purpose of
the statute, and the simple fact that they are not within the state
to answer its criminal process, when required, renders them, in
legal intendment, fugitives from justice, regardless of their
purpose in leaving."
In
In re Voorhees, 32 N.J.L. 141, 150, the court
said:
"A person who commits a crime within a state, and withdraws
himself from such jurisdiction without waiting to abide the
consequences of such act must be regarded as a fugitive from the
justice of the state whose laws he has infringed. Any other
construction would not only be inconsistent with good sense and
with the obvious import of the word to be interpreted in the
context in which it stands, but would likewise destroy, for most
practical purposes, the efficacy of the entire constitutional
provision."
In
Ex Parte Swearingen, 13 S.C. 74, 80, the court held
that the terms "fugitive from justice"
"were intended to embrace not only a case where a party, after
committing a crime, actually flees, in the literal sense of that
term, from the state where such crime was committed, but also a
case where
Page 203 U. S. 232
a citizen of one state who, within the territorial limits of
another state, commits a crime, and then simply returns to his own
home. The object of the Constitution was to enable a state whose
laws had been violated to secure the arrest of the person charged
with such violation even though such person might be beyond the
reach of the ordinary process of such state."
In
In re Mohr, 73 Ala. 503, 512, the court, referring
to the words in the Constitution, "who shall flee from justice and
be found in another state," said:
"There is a difference of opinion as to what must be the exact
nature of this flight on the part of the criminal, but the better
view, perhaps, is that any person is a fugitive within the purview
of the Constitution, 'who goes into a state, commits a crime, and
then returns home.'"
In
Hibler v. State, 43 Tex.197, 201, the court
said:
"The words 'fugitive from justice' as used in this connection,
must not be understood in a literal sense, but in reference to the
subject matter, considering the general object of the Constitution
and laws of the United States in relation thereto. A person who
commits a crime in one state, for which he is indicted, and departs
therefrom, and is found in another state, may well be regarded as a
fugitive from justice in the sense in which it is here used."
Referring to the opinion in
Pettibone v. Nichols (just
decided), for a further discussion of the general subject, and
perceiving no error in the action of the circuit court, its final
order is
Affirmed.
