The rule that, where jurisdiction has attached to a person or
thing, it is exclusive in effect until it has wrought its function
is primarily a right of the court or sovereignty itself. The
sovereignty where jurisdiction first attaches may yield it, and the
implied custody of a defendant by his sureties cannot prevent it,
although the bail may be exonerated by the removal. Where the court
consents, the government may elect not to proceed on indictments in
the court having possession of the defendant and may remove him to
another district for trial under indictments there pending. Whether
such election exists without the consent of the court, not
decided.
The constitutional right of a defendant to a speedy trial and by
a jury of the district where the offense was committed relates to
the time, and not to the place, of trial, and cannot be invoked by
a defendant, indicted in more than one district to prevent his
removal from the district in which he happens to be to the other in
which the government properly elects to try him.
In removal proceedings, the degree of proof is not that
necessary upon the trial, and where defendant makes a statement and
under the law of the state claims exemption from, and refuses to
submit to, cross-examination, the deficiencies of his statement may
be urged against him, and, unless the testimony removes all
reasonable ground of the presumptions raised by the indictment,
this Court will consider the commissioner's finding of probable
cause was justified.
The District of Columbia is a district of the United States
within the meaning of § 1014, Rev.Stat., authorizing the
removal of accused persons from one district to another.
Benson
v. Henkel, ante, p.
198 U. S. 1.
These cases were submitted together. No. 354 is an appeal from
an order and judgment of the District Court of the Eastern District
of New York, in habeas corpus, remanding to
Page 198 U. S. 78
the custody of appellee. No 355 is an appeal from an order of
the United States circuit court for the same district dismissing a
writ of habeas corpus arising out of the same proceedings as No.
354. The same questions of law are presented, and we need not
further distinguish the cases.
The arrest from which appellant prayed to be discharged was made
upon a commitment and warrant in proceedings to remove him to the
District of Columbia, to be tried upon an indictment there found
against him. He attacks the commitment and warrant as not being due
process of law in that the commissioner who issued them had no
jurisdiction to entertain proceedings against him, or to require
bail, or in default thereof to commit him to await the order of the
district judge, because indictments were pending against him in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New
York. The contention is that, while the indictments were so
pending, he could not be removed to another jurisdiction.
The facts are as follows: on the sixteenth of July, 1903, two
indictments were found against appellant in the Eastern District of
New York, charging him with violations of sections 1781 and 1782 of
the Revised Statutes of the United States, and on the twenty-fifth
of July, 1903, another indictment was found against him in the same
district for the violation of section 1781.
On the third of September, 1903, a bench warrant was issued on
the indictments and proceedings instituted against him on the
indictment of July 25, 1903. A warrant of removal was issued by the
district judge of the Southern District of New York, and
subsequently an order was entered by the circuit court directing
appellant to surrender himself to the United States marshal for
said district, and in pursuance thereof the appellant did so, and
entered into a recognizance before one of the district judges for
said district in the penal sum of $10,000 for his appearance in the
Circuit Court for the Eastern District at the next regular
term.
On the first of June, 1904, he appeared in said court, in
pursuance of the notice from the United States district
attorney,
Page 198 U. S. 79
for the purpose of pleading to the indictments. On the seventh
of June, a continuance having been granted, he moved to quash the
indictment on affidavits and other papers properly served on the
district attorney. On the eighth, he appeared before the circuit
court, "prepared to move upon and plead to the said indictments."
Thereupon, the district attorney refused to proceed further with
the indictments, but stated his intention to institute proceedings
for the removal of appellant to the District of Columbia, under the
indictments found against him there. The court thereupon continued
the proceedings until the thirteenth of June, 1904, from time to
time thereafter, until the date of the petition herein, and
enlarged him from day to day upon his recognizance, which is still
in full force. On the eighth of June, 1904, he was arrested upon
the warrant now in question. The indictments have not been quashed
or nolle prossed, and the appellant is ready to plead thereto if
the motions submitted in respect thereto be overruled.
The petitioner alleges that the only evidence adduced by the
government was a certified copy of the indictment, which, it is
alleged, constituted no proof, but was incompetent and inadmissible
because it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a crime,
and because it appeared from the testimony of the witnesses on
whose testimony it was found and who were called before the
commissioner that there was no probable cause to believe he was
guilty of any offense against the United States, and whatever
strength the indictment possessed was rebutted by such
evidence.
Page 198 U. S. 84
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after stating the facts as above, delivered
the opinion of the Court.
It will be observed that indictments were found against
appellant in the Eastern District of New York. He was then living
in the City of New York, which is in the Southern District. He was
removed from the latter, by removal proceedings, to the former for
trial, and, having been called upon to plead to the indictments, he
made certain motions in respect thereto. The district attorney,
however, announced an intention not to proceed further with the
prosecution, and announced further that he intended to prosecute
proceedings to remove appellant to the District of Columbia for
trial. This was done, and with the consent of the court. It is
stated in Judge Thomas' opinion that the circuit court
"deferred the hearing of the motions pending the hearing before
the commissioner for the purpose of allowing the warrant to be
served upon the defendant [petitioner], and to permit the
proceedings to continue before the commissioner."
The appellant contends nevertheless that the commissioner had no
power to issue warrants, and relies on two propositions:
(1) The proceedings were void because they were an unlawful
interference with the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for the
Eastern District of New York, in the custody of which he was.
Page 198 U. S. 85
(2) The proceedings were a violation of appellant's
constitutional rights to a speedy trial by jury upon such
indictments.
(1) In support of the first proposition is urged the
principle
"that, where jurisdiction has attached to person or thing, it
is, unless there is some provision to the contrary, exclusive in
effect until it has wrought its function."
Taylor v.
Taintor, 16 Wall. 366,
83 U. S. 370.
But this is primarily the right of the court or sovereignty, and
has its most striking examples in cases of extradition. The cited
case shows that whatever right a party may have is not a
constitutional right. The question in the case was the effect on
the bail of a defendant given to a state of the action of its
governor sending him out of the state under extradition
proceedings. It was held that his bail was exonerated. The Court
said:
"It is the settled law of this class of cases that the bail will
be exonerated where the performance of the condition is rendered
impossible by the act of God, the act of the obligee, or the act of
the law."
And the act of the governor of a state yielding to the
requisition of the governor of another state was decided to be the
act of the law. It was further said:
"In such cases, the governor acts in his official character, and
represents the sovereignty of the state in giving efficacy to the
Constitution of the United States and the law of Congress. If he
refuse, there is no means of compulsion. But if he act, and the
fugitive is surrendered, the state whence he is removed can no
longer require his appearance before her tribunals, and all
obligations which she has taken to secure that result thereupon at
once,
ipso facto, lose their binding effect."
This case establishes that the sovereignty where jurisdiction
first attaches may yield it, and that the implied custody of a
defendant by his sureties cannot prevent. They may, however, claim
exemption from further liability to produce him.
There is nothing in
In re Johnson, 167 U.
S. 120, which militates against this view. Indeed, that
it is the right of the court or sovereignty to insist upon or waive
its jurisdiction
Page 198 U. S. 86
is there decided (page
167 U. S.
126). In
Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U. S.
64, Cosgrove was brought into this country from Canada
under a treaty which confined action against him to the very
offense for which he was surrendered, until he should have an
opportunity of returning. His subsequent arrest for a
nonextraditable offense was held to be a violation of the process
under which he was brought into the United States, and therefore
illegal.
The circuit court, as we have seen in the case at bar, consented
to the removal of the appellant, and we are not called upon to
decide whether the government had the right of election, without
such consent, to proceed in New York or the District of
Columbia.
(2) Undoubtedly a defendant is entitled to a speedy trial and by
a jury of the district where it is alleged the offense was
committed. This is the injunction of the Constitution, but suppose
he is charged with more than one crime, to which does the right
attach? He may be guilty of none of them, he may be guilty of all.
He cannot be tried for all at the same time, and his rights must be
considered with regard to the practical administration of justice.
To what offense does the right of the defendant attach? To that
which was first charged, or to that which was first committed? Or
may the degree of the crimes be considered? Appellant seems to
contend that the right attaches and becomes fixed to the first
accusation, and, whatever be the demands of public justice, they
must wait. We do not think the right is so unqualified and
absolute. If it is of that character, it determines the order of
trial of indictments in the same court. Counsel would not so
contend at the oral argument, but such manifestly is the
consequence. It must be remembered that the right is a
constitutional one, and, if it has any application to the order of
trials of different indictments, it must relate to the time of
trial, not to the place of trial. The place of trial depends upon
other considerations. It must be in the district where the crime
was committed. There is no other injunction or condition,
Page 198 U. S. 87
and it cannot be complicated by rights having no connection with
it. The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is
consistent with delays, and depends upon circumstances. It secures
rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public
justice. It cannot be claimed for one offense and prevent arrest
for other offenses, and removal proceedings are but process for
arrest -- means of bringing a defendant to trial. And this leads to
the other contentions of appellant.
Upon the hearing before the commissioner, the government
introduced in evidence a copy of the indictment and proof of the
identity of appellant. The letter called witnesses, and made a
statement in his own behalf, and contends that he rebutted every
material allegation of the indictment, and that the finding of the
commissioner gave to the indictment the effect of conclusive
proof.
Two questions are involved -- whether appellant may rebut the
indictment and whether he has done so. If the latter be answered in
the negative, and we think it must be, no reply need be given to
the other.
There is no question made of the sufficiency of the indictment.
It certainly charges a crime. It charges that Beavers was
superintendent of the division of salaries and allowances in the
office of the First Assistant Postmaster General, and that he
entered into a corrupt agreement with W. Scott Towers, an agent of
the Elliott & Hatch Book Typewriter Company, whereby Towers
promised to pay to Beavers the sum of $25 out of each $200 paid to
said company for book typewriters, and that Beavers received from
Towers, in pursuance of the agreement, a draft for the sum of $350.
The agreement was made and the draft given for the purpose of
influencing Beavers' official judgment and action. The only
testimony that is material to notice was delivered by Henry J.
Gensler, Charles Flint, Howard W. Jacobs, and E. H. Schley.
Gensler testified that up to June, 1900, he was an agent of the
Elliott & Hatch Book Typewriter Company, and as such
Page 198 U. S. 88
had charge of all the trade in the locality of the District of
Columbia. After that time, his son had such charge. It may be
inferred that he had some knowledge of his son's business and was
familiar with sales made during the year 1900. He testified that he
had no knowledge of any agreement with Towers and Beavers in
October, 1900, relating to Beavers' official conduct with regard to
the Elliott & Hatch Book Typewriter Company.
Flint was the assistant treasurer and the assistant secretary of
the company from February, 1901, to March, 1903. He testified that,
during the year 1901, the corporation, so far as the books and
accounts showed, paid no money to Beavers for any purpose whatever,
and that he had no knowledge that would lead him to believe that
such money was paid. He further testified that, if any money of the
corporation had been paid for the purpose of securing the contract
of the government, it would necessarily have come under his notice.
Also that he had no knowledge of money's being paid by Towers to
Beavers, nor had he knowledge of money's having been authorized by
the corporation to be paid, either directly or indirectly, to
Beavers, either $350 or any sum, on July 11, 1901, or any other
time, and if such payment had been authorized, he would have known
it. He further testified that the sales to the Post Office
Department were to Mr. Gensler, and the method adopted was that the
machines were charged to Gensler as being outright purchases by him
at $140 each. The machines returned were credited to his account. A
few sales were charged directly against the Postmaster General,
with the understanding that they were to be paid for at $200 and
charged to Gensler at $140. He also testified that, while he was
assistant treasurer, he had no knowledge of the payment of money to
Gensler, or of authority given Gensler to pay money to Towers for
Beavers, for the purpose of influencing Beavers' official action in
regard to the sale of the Elliott & Hatch Book Typewriter, or
that Beavers ever received
Page 198 U. S. 89
anything of value from the company for such purpose, and that,
if such payment had been made, he believed he would have known
it.
Howard W. Jacobs was bookkeeper and cashier of the corporation;
Schley became secretary and treasurer in 1899. Both these witnesses
testified as to knowledge of the affairs of the corporation, the
trades made by it, and sales in Washington of machines, and the
business, and that they had no knowledge of the payment by the
corporation or any of its officers or agents to Beavers, or to
Towers for Beavers, substantially as Flint. The witnesses also
testified that the Elliott & Hatch machines were the best of
the book typewriters, and their usual price was $200.
Beavers was sworn for the purpose, as expressed by his counsel,
"of permitting the accused to make a statement in his own behalf."
In answer to questions of his counsel, he testified that he was the
person accused, and the person against whom three indictments had
been found in the Eastern District of New York, charged with
violations of sections 1781 and 1782 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States. That it was not at his instance the Elliott &
Hatch typewriter was placed in the Post Office Department; it was
placed there under the direction of the First Assistant Postmaster
General. It was the rule of the Department, in making the allowance
for the typewriter, to act under the instructions of that officer,
and he so acted. Under a like rule, he acted in the purchase of the
machines, and he further testified that he entered into no
agreement with Towers whereby he was to receive $25 for each
typewriter thereafter purchased by the Post Office Department. He
admitted he received a draft from Towers, but it was in the nature
of a loan, as he remembered it; also that he received many drafts
from Towers, who was a man of considerable influence with the banks
of Washington, and frequently obtained drafts for him (Beavers) and
had notes discounted for him. This practice ran through their
entire acquaintance. There was not, he further testified, on or
Page 198 U. S. 90
about July 11, 1901, any matter relating to the Elliott &
Hatch Book typewriter pending before him.
Counsel for government attempted to cross-examine Beavers, to
which the latter's counsel objected. The commissioner ruled against
the objection, and counsel directed Beavers not to answer. The
objection to cross-examination was based upon the ground that
Beavers took the stand merely for the purpose of making a statement
in answer to the charge made against him, and to explain the facts
alleged, in accordance with section 196 of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure, and it was urged that that section, or any
other section which governed the proceedings, did not contemplate
cross-examination. And counsel further observed that, as the
indictment which was the basis of the proceedings was not the only
one found against Beavers, "for that reason it would be extremely
unwise to allow him to enter into any rambling
cross-examination."
The commissioner committed the appellant in default of bail,
finding that there was probably cause that the offenses charged had
been committed. The finding was affirmed by the district court in
the proceedings for habeas corpus.
We think the finding was justified -- in other words, the proof
afforded by the indictment was not overcome, and this is all that
it is necessary to now decide. Regarding the letter of the
testimony when weighed with the indictment, it does not remove all
reasonable grounds of presumption of the commission of the offense.
The degree of proof is not that necessary upon the trial of the
offense, and a certain latitude of judgment must be allowed the
commissioner. We cannot say that such latitude was exceeded. The
testimony was negative, and, for the most part, confined to general
statements, and Beavers resisted cross-examination and the test of
the circumstances which might thereby have been elicited. But
granting that he could, under the New York Code, offer himself to
be sworn, and deliver a statement under the directions of questions
by counsel, and be exempt from cross-examination,
Page 198 U. S. 91
nevertheless the deficiencies of his statement may be urged
against him. It cannot be said, therefore, that the commissioner's
finding of probable cause was not justified.
The contention that the District of Columbia is not a district
of the United States within the meaning of section 1014 of the
Revised Statutes, authorizing the removal of accused persons from
one district to another, is disposed of by
Benson v.
Henkel, page 1
198 U. S. .
The orders of the Circuit Court and the district court
dismissing the writs of habeas corpus are
Affirmed.
