Mere ignorance of the law, standing alone, does not constitute
any defense against its enforcement, and a mistake of law, pure and
simple, without the addition of any circumstances of fraud or
misrepresentation, constitutes no basis for relief at law or in
equity and forms no excuse in favor of the party asserting that he
made the mistake.
The rule of law is that a party taking a benefit of a provision
in his favor under a will is estopped from attacking the validity
of the instrument, and where an heir at law has taken a benefit
under the will, acquiesced in its validity for many years,
permitted the legatees and devisees to act upon such consent and
acquiescence, has so changed his position on that account that he
cannot be restored to it, and meanwhile witnesses have died, this
estoppel is not affected because he was at the time ignorant of
this rule of law.
The plaintiff in error seeks by this writ to review the judgment
of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 22 App.D.C.
31, affirming the decree of the Supreme Court of that District,
sitting as a court of probate, admitting the will of George W.
Utermehle to probate as a will of real estate, by virtue of the
jurisdiction conferred upon the court by the Act of Congress of
June 8, 1898. 30 Stat. 434, c. 394. The same will had been admitted
to probate in the District in the year 1889 as a will of personalty
(which was all the jurisdiction at that time possessed by the
court), with the concurrence and consent of the plaintiff in error.
The facts upon which the case hinges are in substance the
following:
George W. Utermehle, the testator, died in the City of
Washington on the sixteenth day of April, 1889, leaving a large
amount of real and personal property, the real estate amounting, as
is said, to about a million dollars, and the personalty to between
six hundred thousand and a million of dollars. He left a will,
bearing date December 7, 1887, which
Page 197 U. S. 41
appeared on its face to have been duly executed for the
conveyance of real estate. The testator left him surviving his
widow, two daughters -- Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Norment -- and the
plaintiff in error, his grandson, the son of his deceased son, as
his sole heirs at law and next of kin. The widow was named
executrix of the will, and she propounded the same for probate
April 26, 1889. It was duly admitted to probate on that day, on the
petition of the widow, as executrix, with the written consent of
the daughters and the plaintiff in error. The executrix gave a bond
in the sum of $20,000 for the payment of all just debts and claims
against the deceased, and for the payment of the legacies
bequeathed by the will, and letters were issued to her. She duly
administered upon the estate, paid the funeral expenses and other
charges, and the legacies mentioned in the will, including that to
the plaintiff in error. She filed no inventory, but made a
statement of account on the fourteenth day of May, 1890. The
personal property, except such as was otherwise disposed of under
the will and in payment of debts and legacies, she retained for
herself, as sole and absolute owner, in accordance with the terms
of the will. Of this amount it is said that she thereafter disposed
of a large part in charities. By the will of George W. Utermehle,
he bequeathed to each of his three nieces, residing in Germany, the
sum of $3,000; he devised to his grandson, the plaintiff in error,
the property known as the Young Law Building, in Washington; he
also bequeathed to him the interest due or to become due on a note
for $750, secured on a lot in Washington, and also the principal of
the same; he bequeathed to his wife, Sarah Utermehle, all the rest
of his personal property, of every kind, to be taken by her in lieu
of dower, and to be disposed of by her by deed, will, or otherwise,
as she pleased; he devised to her his then present residence and
the property adjoining, being square 765 in the City of Washington;
he then bequeathed all the rest and residue of his real estate,
wherever situated, and all the real estate of which he might die
seized and possessed, other than
Page 197 U. S. 42
that already devised, to his two daughters, Mamie Norment and
Rosa Taylor, as tenants in common, share and share alike; he
appointed his wife sole executrix of his will, and revoked all
other wills theretofore made by him; he suggested that, as he had
no debts, and his personal estate was to go to his wife, a very
moderate bond should be required of her as executrix.
After the death of his grandfather, the plaintiff was present at
his late residence and heard this will read.
Immediately after the reading of the will, he left the house,
but Mrs. Taylor, one of his aunts, as he was leaving, asked him to
come over the next day, which he did. He testified on this trial
that he arrived at the house and went into the dining room, and
Mrs. Taylor, Mrs. Norment, and his grandmother were there. Mrs.
Taylor did the talking, and started the conversation by stating to
the plaintiff in error that the will had virtually cut him off, and
that, if it had not been for her and the Doctor (her husband), the
plaintiff in error would not have been left the property called the
Young Law Building; but that they had had his grandfather paint it
up and put it in repair, so that, when it came into his possession
it would not be any expense to him to put it in condition at the
time. She further said that his grandmother was left all the
personal property, which amounted to almost, if not quite as much,
as that which they (his aunts) would receive under the will, and
that, when his grandmother died she proposed to make him right --
to make him equal with them by equalizing his share; that his
grandmother wanted to know what the mortgage on his farm was, as
she understood that there was a mortgage; that she wanted to pay it
off; that she wanted to start him off without any debts on him. His
grandmother was sitting there at the time, but said nothing. He was
asked what the mortgage was on his farm. He told them $11,500. The
only remarks made were those between Mrs. Taylor (his aunt) and
himself, and the only statement he made was what the mortgage on
the farm was. He also testified on the trial
Page 197 U. S. 43
below that he believed what was then promised him, as to what
his grandmother would do when she made her will; that he had no
doubt whatever that she would fulfill her promise. His grandmother
told him at that interview she would give him a check for the
mortgage in a few days, and he then went home. Subsequently, and on
the twenty-sixth day of April, 1889, he signed the consent to the
probate of the will. He did it in reliance, as he said, upon the
promise above mentioned.
From the time of the probate of his grandfather's will up to the
time of the death of his grandmother, he did nothing to attack the
will of his grandfather, but relied upon the promise made by or on
the part of his grandmother, the day after the funeral. After the
probate of his grandfather's will, he received from his
grandmother, as the executrix, the legacy spoken of therein, and
gave receipt therefor; he also took possession of the real estate
given him by the will, called Young's Law Building, and received
the rents therefor for nearly two years, and (on March 24, 1891)
sold it for $20,000, and kept the proceeds. The sisters took the
real estate devised to them by the will. They commenced an action
of partition, and the real estate was partitioned between them, and
each thereafter treated the real estate set off to her under the
partition as her own absolute property. Some of it they conveyed
and disposed of so that it passed beyond their control. They
assumed and supposed that the real estate given to them in the will
was their own, as the plaintiff in error had consented to the
probate of the will, and had made no objections whatever since that
time to its validity, or questioned it in any way.
On the thirteenth of March, 1893, the grandmother died, leaving
a will dated July 5, 1889, less than three months after the promise
alleged to have been made by her, or in her behalf, to the
plaintiff in error immediately after the funeral of his
grandfather. The will of the grandmother was admitted to probate,
by the consent of all the parties interested, on the
Page 197 U. S. 44
seventeenth day of March, 1893. The two daughters were
executrices under the will, but, on objection being made by the
plaintiff in error to their receiving commissions, they waived
their right to them, and performed the services without pay. By the
terms of this will, the two aunts and the plaintiff in error were
made to share equally in the estate of the grandmother, which
turned out to amount to something over $200,000, the grandmother
having, during her lifetime, as is stated, disposed of a large
amount of the personal property bequeathed to her under the will of
her husband, in charities. When the terms of the will of the
grandmother were read to the plaintiff in error, he testified on
the trial below that he then said,
"So far as I am concerned I have got the worst of and I have got
to stand it. I never made but one mistake in my life, and that was
when I held still once before, and now I have to stand still."
He received under the will of his grandmother $84,256.87, being
the same share as was received by each of his aunts. He received,
under the will of his grandfather and that of his grandmother a
total of between $140,000 and $150,000. After the death of his
grandmother, he took no steps showing an intention to contest the
will of either, until May 19, 1900, which was ten years after the
settlement of the estate of his grandfather, and nearly seven years
after the settlement of the estate of his grandmother. On the date
named, he addressed two letters of the same tenor, one to Mrs.
Taylor and the other to Mrs. Norment, in which he states that he
had been under a misapprehension and was ignorant regarding his
rights at the time his grandfather died, and that
misrepresentations had been made to him from those interested,
touching his rights and interest in his grandfather's estate, and
he therefore notified them that he denied the validity of the paper
writing alleged to be the last will and testament of his
grandfather, which had been admitted to probate as a will of
personal property, and stated that he contended that the alleged
will had never been operative in connection with the real
property,
Page 197 U. S. 45
and that his claim to the building and ground known as Young's
Law Building was merely a one-third interest in the property as
tenant in common with the other heirs at law of his deceased
grandfather; he also stated that he held himself ready to account,
upon demand, to his two aunts for the one-third interest to which
each was entitled in that real estate, as two of the heirs at law
of his grandfather, in both the property and the rents and profits
from the same, from his grandfather's death; that he held himself
as ready, upon demand, to make proper settlement with both of his
aunts for the $750 note, with the accrued interest thereon, which
had been all paid, and was pretended to have been bequeathed to him
under the will of his grandfather. Plaintiff in error testified
that he did not receive any answer to either letter, nor any
communication from either of his aunts, and soon thereafter he
instituted a suit in ejectment, and on June 9, 1900, filed a caveat
in the probate court against the validity of the will, as a will of
personalty. The plaintiff in error there charged that the will was
procured by the fraud, undue influence, and duress of Mrs. Taylor
and her husband, and that the testator had no testamentary capacity
when the paper was signed by him. Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Norment
answered this caveat, and at the same time filed a petition asking
for probate of the will of their father, of December 7, 1887, as a
will of real estate, under the act of Congress of June 8, 1898,
above mentioned. To this petition the plaintiff in error made
answer.
Pending proceedings in the probate court on this caveat of the
plaintiff in error, and the petition for the probate of the will as
one of real estate, Mrs. Taylor, one of the aunts, died, January
22, 1901, leaving a will by which she devised all of her estate and
property to her husband, subject to the annuity to her son, and
nominated her husband as executor. This will was duly admitted to
probate on the eighteenth day of March, 1901, and letters
testamentary were issued to Dr. Taylor (the husband). Thereupon he
filed his petition in these
Page 197 U. S. 46
proceedings, wherein he stated that the property devised and
bequeathed to him by his wife was in fact to be held in trust by
him for the benefit of his son and his children, with the
reservation of certain rights and powers for himself, and he asked
that the parties named by him be made parties to the present
proceedings in place of Mrs. Taylor, and they were accordingly made
such.
The court then determined that issues should be formulated
between the parties to be tried in the probate court with a jury,
under the Act of June 8, 1898, and there were six issues thus
drawn. The first was in regard to the question whether the
plaintiff in error was estopped to deny the validity of his
grandfather's will as a will of personal property; the second,
whether he was estopped to deny its validity as one disposing of
real property; third, was a question as to the testamentary
capacity of the grandfather; the fourth, whether there was undue
influence; fifth, whether there was fraud in obtaining the will
from the grandfather, and sixth, whether there was duress.
It was stipulated that the question of the application of the
statute of limitations, which was raised by the caveats and
petitions, and all other questions, should be reserved for future
determination by the court. Charles H. Utermehle was made plaintiff
for the purpose of the trial, and all the other parties were made
defendants. On March 17, 1902, a jury was impaneled and the trial
commenced. The plaintiff proceeded to give his testimony, addressed
to the question of estoppel and to an explanation of his delay in
asserting his alleged rights. When the counsel for plaintiff in
error announced their testimony on the question of estoppel closed,
they were about to proceed with their testimony on the other
issues, but counsel for the defendants objected, and asked the
court to direct a verdict against the plaintiff on the issue of
estoppel, and against the plaintiff upon all the other issues.
After consideration, the court instructed the jury to render a
verdict against the plaintiff on each and all the issues, and a
verdict
Page 197 U. S. 47
was thus rendered and recorded. Thereupon an order or decree was
rendered affirming the decree of April 26, 1889, admitting the
grandfather's will to probate as and for a will of personalty, and
also admitting it now to probate as and for a will of real estate,
under the act of Congress of 1898. The Court of Appeals having
affirmed this decree, the case has come to us by writ of error on
the part of the plaintiff.
Page 197 U. S. 52
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is true that the plaintiff in error has received out of the
estates of his grandfather and grandmother only between the sum of
$140,000 and $150,000, while an equal division of the estate of his
grandfather, between himself and his aunts would have given him a
much larger sum. What was the reason, if any, for this
discrimination, the record does not show.
When the will of his grandfather was read, the plaintiff in
error was perfectly aware of its contents. He was a young man,
nearly twenty-four years of age, married, and there is no proof
that he was not of ordinary intelligence and capacity. There is no
pretense in the evidence that there was any fraud or
misrepresentation connected with obtaining his consent to the
probate of the will, without opposition or contest on his part. By
his own statement, he understood distinctly from one of his aunts,
after the reading of the will, that it substantially cut him off;
that he would receive under the will a devise of the Young Law
Building, worth about $20,000, and a bequest of the note of $750
and accrued interest, amounting to not quite $3,000, and that that
was all that was given him under the will. He knew it when the will
was read. There is not a particle of evidence that he did not know
that, if there had been fraud or undue influence or duress in
obtaining the alleged will from his grandfather, or if the latter
was without testamentary capacity, such will would be void. The
trial court, indeed, observed that he admitted he knew what his
legal rights were at the time of the death of his grandfather, if
there were no will. He was ignorant only of any evidence on which
to base a contest against the proof of the will. He says he did not
know at that time that fraud or undue influence or duress had been
exercised in order to obtain the will, nor did he know that his
grandfather lacked testamentary capacity to execute a will, but
there is no evidence whatever
Page 197 U. S. 53
that any means were used or representation made to prevent him
from ascertaining what the facts really were. The reason for his
not contesting was, as he said, his reliance on the promise alleged
to have been made by or on behalf of his grandmother to make him
equal by her own will. On account of this promise, he did not
contest the will. By reason of his consent, his aunts, the other
heirs at law of his grandfather, proceeded to make partition of the
real estate given to them by the will, and to use, convey, and
dispose of it as if it were absolutely their own property. His
grandmother received the personal property bequeathed to her by the
will, and disposed of large amounts of it prior to her death by
gifts to charity and otherwise. It would be impossible to place the
other heirs in the same position that they were in at the time of
the death of the grandfather. The two aunts, if that will had not
been proved, would have received their share of the personalty
instead of almost the whole of it going to the mother. Under the
will, however, the mother took the personalty and spent or disposed
of large portions of it, so that she died possessed of only about
$200,000, and the two aunts and the plaintiff in error have
received an equal share of that sum. The aunts would have received
a much larger share of the personalty had it not been for the will
of their father. As is stated by the Court of Appeals in the
opinion delivered in this case:
"It is impossible to tell from the record before us whether they
(the aunts of the plaintiff in error) fared any better with the
will than they would have fared without it; but is is very evident
that, by the bequest of the entire personalty by the will to their
mother, they lost a valuable interest to which they cannot now be
restored. It is impossible to restore the original situation, and
the attempt to do so would be wantonly to question titles that have
long since accrued, including the very title which the caveator has
himself disposed of to the Young Law Building."
Of the witnesses to the grandfather's will, two are dead
Page 197 U. S. 54
and the third paralyzed. From the date of the probate of the
grandfather's will in April, 1889, down to the nineteenth of May,
1900, the plaintiff in error took no steps towards a contest. On
that date, he wrote the letters to his aunts, above referred to,
and therein he says that misrepresentations were made to him as to
rights and interest in the estate. We find a total absence of all
proof as to any such misrepresentations, either as to his rights or
his interest in the estate of his grandfather. The trial court also
found that the plaintiff in error had not exhibited even reasonable
diligence to learn any facts as to the will of his grandfather, and
that his alleged ignorance of the law was the only excuse which had
the semblance of sufficiency.
We have, therefore, his consent given in April, 1889, to the
probate of the will of his grandfather; his taking the legacy
provided for under that will; his taking possession of the real
estate devised to him by that will; his receipts of its rents and
profits, and his subsequent sale thereof for $20,000, and the
retention of that sum for his own purposes; his consent to the
probate of his grandmother's will, although it clearly does not
fulfill the promise he alleges was made on her behalf after the
death and funeral of his grandfather; no movement is made on his
part or sign of discontent given for about seven years thereafter,
and then he writes letters and files his caveat and proceeds, as
already stated. We have the total lack of diligence in the attempt
even to ascertain facts. After his grandmother's death, he says
that he was still ignorant of the facts which he alleges he has
since discovered of the existence of fraud in obtaining the will
from his grandfather, and of the latter's lack of testamentary
capacity, and the existence of duress and undue influence under
which the will was obtained, and he also avers that he was ignorant
of the law at the time that he consented to the probate of his
grandfather's will, that he could not take a devise or bequest
under that will, and at the same time seek to prevent its probate,
or to set it aside as an invalid instrument. The trial court found
that right after
Page 197 U. S. 55
the death of his grandmother he had the advice of counsel, and
if he had been ignorant of any rights, he would have been informed
of the same.
The plaintiff in error asserts that he gave consent to the
probate of his grandfather's will because of the promise of his
grandmother to rectify, by her will, the injustice resulting from
the will of his grandfather, and when he found that the promise was
broken, on reading the will of his grandmother, after her decease,
he then waited seven years before proceeding to attack the will of
his grandfather, admitted to probate in 1889. The Court of Appeals
doubted the existence of the promise, and said it was probably only
a promise that he should share equally in his grandmother's estate,
which his grandmother fully performed. He says that, after the
death of his grandmother, he was very ill for six weeks, and that
for two years he was not in good health, and that he remained
ignorant of the fraud and undue influence and duress and mental
incapacity of his grandfather until a short time before the filing
of the caveat or the writing of the letters. He does not contend
that, if these facts existed, he did not know that, if proved, they
would avoid the will.
He insists, however, that the law pertaining to the taking of
the legacy or devise under a will, which prevents the assertion of
the invalidity of the same will, ought not to bind him, because he
was ignorant that such was the law -- in other words, the law
should not cover his case because he was ignorant that it was the
law.
We know of no case where mere ignorance of the law, standing
alone, constitutes any excuse or defense against its enforcement.
It would be impossible to administer the law if ignorance of its
provisions were a defense thereto. There are cases, undoubtedly,
where ignorance of the law, united with fraudulent conduct on the
part of others, or mistakes of fact relating thereto, will be
regarded as a defense, but there must be some element, other than a
mere mistake of law, which will afford an excuse. In addition,
there ought to be no negligence
Page 197 U. S. 56
in attempting to discover the facts. The ignorance of the
plaintiff in error as to his alleged rights, it would seem, was an
ignorance of the existence of alleged facts regarding the
procurement of the will of his grandfather; but he does not pretend
that, had he known of their existence, he was ignorant of their
effect as a ground for refusing probate of the alleged will. The
ignorance of evidence to substantiate what he knew were his rights
is a very different thing from ignorance of the rights themselves,
as is stated so clearly by the Court of Appeals, and so it rests in
this case that the only obstacle to the enforcement of the rule of
estoppel rests in the alleged ignorance of the plaintiff in error
that such a rule existed. Although his action in consenting to the
probate of the will of his grandfather was not the result of fraud
or misrepresentation, and the other parties to this litigation
cannot be placed back in the position they occupied when the will
was admitted to probate, and this condition is the result of the
action of the plaintiff in error in consenting to the probate of
the will, yet he now contends, notwithstanding all this, that he
must be permitted, after the lapse of eleven years, to attempt to
defeat the will of his grandfather because he did not know the law
applicable to the case in hand. This is a totally inadmissible
proposition.
It has been held from the earliest days, in both the federal and
state courts, that a mistake of law, pure and simple, without the
addition of any circumstances of fraud or misrepresentation,
constitutes no basis for relief at law or in equity, and forms no
excuse in favor of the party asserting that he made such mistake.
Hunt v.
Rousmaniere, 1 Pet. 1,
26 U. S. 15;
Bank of United States v.
Daniel, 12 Pet. 32,
37 U. S. 55;
United States v.
Hodson, 10 Wall. 395,
77 U. S. 409;
Lamborn v. Dickinson County, 97 U. S.
181,
97 U. S. 185;
Snell v. Insurance Co., 98 U. S. 85,
98 U. S. 92;
Allen v. Galloway, 30 F. 466, where Hammond, J., in
reviewing the decisions of this Court, says: "Whatever rule may
prevail elsewhere, there can be in the equity courts of the United
States no relief from a mistake of law."
Drake v. Wild, 70
Vt. 52, 59; in that case the court said
Page 197 U. S. 57
(p. 59):
"That ignorance of the law does not excuse a wrong done or a
right withheld. That relief from liabilities under the law, arising
from a known state of facts, will be denied. But to these general
rules there are exceptions, as where there is a mistake of law
caused by fraud, imposition, or misrepresentation. We think it will
be found that, in most of the cases cited in these notes and in
Pomeroy, the party seeking relief was led into error by the action
of the other party to a transaction, as in contracts and
releases."
Light v. Light, 21 Pa. 407, 412;
Storrs v.
Barker, 6 Johns.Ch. 166;
Whitwell v. Winslow, 134
Mass. 343, 345;
Alabama &c. Railway v. Jones, 73 Miss.
110, note.
Exceptional cases where relief has been given have been, as
stated, where there was fraud or imposition upon the individual by
the person seeking to avail himself of the contract of the other
party. In this case, there was, as we have said, neither fraud nor
imposition, nor misrepresentation; plaintiff in error was not
advised that, although he took under the will, he could attack it.
It is a simple, bald case of an alleged mistake or misapprehension,
on the part of plaintiff, of what the law was under certain
circumstances, with no representation or persuasion on the part of
others to cause him to act upon such mistaken assumption.
As to what is the law relating to a party taking the benefit of
a provision in his favor under a will, there is really no
foundation to dispute the proposition that he thereby is precluded
from at the same time, attacking the validity of the very
instrument under which he received the benefit.
In
Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 Pick. 303, 308, it was held that
one who accepted the beneficial interest under a will was thereby
barred from setting up any claim which would defeat the full
operation of the will.
Drake v. Wild, 70 Vt. 52, holds the
same doctrine. In that case, a party was held to be estopped from
asserting her title to a trust fund disposed of by the will,
because she had accepted the provisions of the will in her own
favor. In
Branson v. Watkins, 96 Ga. 55, it
Page 197 U. S. 58
was held that one who took an estate under a will was thereby
estopped from at the same time, denying its validity as a will, or
from questioning the jurisdiction of the court admitting it to
probate, or the regularity of the probate proceedings. In
Smith
v. Smith, 14 Gray 532, it was held that the acceptance of a
devise estops the devisee to set up a title in opposition to the
will at law as well as in equity. In
Fry v. Morrison, 159
Ill. 244, it was held that one who took a beneficial interest under
a will was thereby estopped to set up any right or claim of his
own, though otherwise well founded, which would bar or defeat the
effect of any part of the will. And in
Madison v. Larmon,
170 Ill. 65, 82, it was again held that one who takes under a will
cannot contest it as an heir at law of the devised property. So, in
Fisher v. Boyce, 81 Md. 46, 53, the court said: "It is a
maxim in a court of equity not to permit the same person to hold
under and against a will." This maxim was equally appropriate to
the jurisdiction and practice of courts of law, and where one
claimed under a will he must give it effect as far as he can, and
he will be estopped from denying its validity and genuineness.
Waters' Appeal, 35 Pa. 523;
Thrower v. Wood, 53
Ga. 458.
When, in addition to the fact that he took a benefit under the
will, a party has acquiesced in its validity for many years, and
the opposing party in interest has acted upon such consent and
acquiescence, and has so changed his position on that account that
he cannot be restored to it, and where witnesses have, in the
meantime, died, the reason for the rule upon which an estoppel is
founded is thereby greatly strengthened.
Two cases, among others, were cited by counsel for plaintiff in
error, in the court below, and are referred to in the opinion of
the Court of Appeals, and they are also cited here for the purpose
of showing his right to maintain these proceedings to set aside the
will of his grandfather. They are
Spread v. Morgan, 11
H.L. Cases 587, decided in 1864;
Watson v. Watson, 128
Mass. 152, decided in 1880.
Page 197 U. S. 59
In the English case, it was held that one remaining in
possession to two estates, under titles not consistent with each
other, thereby afforded no decisive proof of an election under
which title to take. It was there held that the rule was
"that, if a party being bound to elect between two properties,
not being called upon so to elect, continues in the receipt of the
rents and profits of both, such receipt affording no proof of
preference cannot be an election to take the one and reject the
other."
We think the case has no application to the one at bar, and is
well distinguished in the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this
case.
In
Watson v. Watson, 128 Mass. 152, the general
doctrine that any person taking a beneficial interest under a will
thereby confirmed it, and could not set up any right or claim of
his own which would defeat or in any way prevent the full operation
of every part of the will, was recognized and affirmed, but it was
said (page 155):
"An election made in ignorance of material facts is, of course,
not binding, when no other person's rights have been affected
thereby. So, if a person, though knowing the facts, has acted in
misapprehension of his legal rights, and in ignorance of his
obligation to make an election, no intention to elect, and
consequently no election, is to be presumed."
Regarding the legatee who took a legacy under the will, the
court continued (at p. 157) as follows:
"But, as to Edward, the case stands differently. Immediately
upon being informed of the rule of law, little more than a year
after the probate of the will, and before the executor had settled
any account in the probate court, or the position of any other
person had been changed, he returned his legacy to the executor,
and gave him notice that he elected not to take it. He cannot
therefore be held to have made such an election as should deprive
him of the right, under his independent title, to partition of the
whole estate, not excepting the parcel claimed by the respondent.
"
Page 197 U. S. 60
In this case, the position of other parties to this litigation
has most materially changed, as has already been shown (the
particulars of which need not be repeated), while the plaintiff in
error has been also guilty of extreme negligence even in attempting
to discover what he alleges are facts. We are satisfied that the
plaintiff in error is estopped from now contesting the will, and
that great injustice would result from the overturning of the
principle adjudged in so may cases.
We are of opinion the case has been rightly decided, and the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is
Affirmed.
