Complainants, who were heirs at law of an intestate leaving real
estate the undivided interest of each being valued at over $2,000,
and situated within the jurisdiction of the court, filed their bill
in the proper circuit court of the United States against proper
parties, citizens of other states, alleging that defendants had
combined to procure and had fraudulently procured orders of the
probate court allowing their claims against one of the heirs at law
as claims against the intestate whereby such claims became liens
upon the intestate's real estate; the claim of each defendant was
less than $2,000 but the aggregate amount exceeded $2,000. So far
as the allegations of the bill were concerned, if any one of the
claims was good, all were good, and the prosecution of one could
not be enjoined unless all were enjoined. The bill prayed that the
cloud on title of the intestate's real estate be removed by
declaring the claims invalid and enjoining proceedings under the
judgments of the probate court. The defendants were proceeded
against under the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470. The circuit
court dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction.
Held
error, and that
Page 196 U. S. 416
It was competent for the circuit court, upon the case made by
the bill, to deprive defendants acting in combination of the
benefit of the orders made in the probate court allowing their
respective claims. In this case, the jurisdiction of the circuit
court does not depend, within the Judiciary Act of 1887, 1888, on
the value of complainants' interest in the real estate from which
the cloud is sought to be removed, but on the aggregate amount of
the liens of all of the defendants' claims which had been allowed
by the probate court against the intestate's estate pursuant to the
alleged combination.
This was a suit in equity, instituted in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas by the
appellants, citizens of Arkansas, against the appellees, more than
thirty in number, and respectively citizens, corporate and
individual, of Tennessee, New York, Missouri, Illinois, New Jersey,
Connecticut, Ohio, and Georgia.
There was a demurrer to the bill by some of the defendants upon
the ground, among others, that the circuit court had no
jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter. The demurrer was
sustained, and the bill dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The question of jurisdiction depends, of course, upon the
allegations of the bill. The case made by the bill is this:
On the thirteenth day of April, 1891, Hiram Evans, a resident of
St. Francis County, Arkansas, died intestate and possessed of
personal property exceeding $12,000 in value.
He was also seised in fee of 760 acres of land of the value of
about $16,000, and left surviving him as his only heirs at law the
three appellants, and three sons, James Evans, William E. Evans,
and John Evans.
By an order made April 21, 1891, in the probate court of the
county, James Evans was appointed administrator of the estate of
the intestate. Having duly qualified as such, he took possession of
all the assets of the estate, and acted as such administrator until
his death.
Among the assets that came to his hands as administrator was a
drug store, which, with its stock of goods, fixtures, book
accounts, and other things therein contained, was sold and
delivered by him to John Evans on the first day of May 1891.
Page 196 U. S. 417
The latter conducted the business in his own name, and while
doing so incurred debts and obligations to the defendants in this
suit, aggregating $3,000, as well as debts and obligations to other
persons; but no single one of his debts exceeded $2,000.
John Evans became insolvent, and on May 27, 1892, transferred
and delivered to James Evans, administrator of Hiram Evans, the
drug store and all that remained of the stock of goods, fixtures,
and book accounts.
Thereupon, the bill alleged, the defendants herein "conspired,
colluded, and confederated" together and with John Evans and with
James Evans, administrator, to secure the payment of their claims
and demands against John Evans out of the assets of the estate of
Hiram Evans, deceased, and, "so conspiring and confederating," they
presented to the probate court their several claims and demands --
and James Evans, administrator, fraudulently and illegally approved
them -- for allowance against the estate of Hiram Evans.
The bill also alleged that the defendants and the administrator
of Hiram Evans, still conspiring and confederating together,
procured the judgment of the probate court establishing their
claims against the estate of Hiram Evans by concealing from the
court the fact that they were debts and obligations of John Evans,
and cloaking them under the name of expenses of administration of
the said estate,
"all of which transactions were part of the same scheme, and
were participated in by each and all of the said defendants, and by
said John Evans and said James Evans, administrator."
It was further alleged:
"That the said judgments of said court, establishing and
allowing the respective claims and demands of the defendants herein
against the said estate, were wholly the result of the conspiracy
and confederation hereinbefore mentioned, and the fraud practiced
in pursuance thereof as aforesaid, and are therefore, in equity and
good conscience, void and ineffectual for any purpose whatsoever,
and ought not to be enforced; but that, nevertheless, the same are
at law liens
Page 196 U. S. 418
upon the real estate hereinbefore described, and charges against
the respective interests"
of the plaintiffs; that, in pursuance of the said conspiracy and
confederation, the defendants and John Evans and James Evans
concealed from plaintiffs the matters and things hereinbefore
complained of, and failed to disclose to them the sale of the drug
store to John Evans, and the fact that the said claims and demands
of defendants were the personal debts and obligations of John
Evans; that it had been determined by the supreme court of the
state in certain proceedings relating to the matters here in
controversy that neither the probate court nor the state circuit
court on appeal had jurisdiction to hear or determine equitable
issues, and that plaintiffs' remedy lay
"in an original proceeding in a court of competent chancery
jurisdiction, and that the said action and ruling of the said
supreme court was without prejudice to your orators' beginning and
maintaining this bill of complaint."
The bill still further alleged that, under the law of Arkansas,
the judgments of the probate court allowing and classifying the
demands of defendants passed beyond the control of that court at
the expiration of the term at which the same were rendered, and
that thereafter it was not within its power to alter, amend, or set
aside the same; that the time within which plaintiffs might have
taken an appeal, or have compelled the administrator to take an
appeal, from the judgment had expired long prior to the time when
they acquired knowledge of the matters and things hereinbefore
complained of; that, by reason thereof, plaintiffs are wholly
without remedy in the premises unless the relief prayed be granted
them; that all the acts and doings of the defendants toward
procuring the said judgments of the probate court were wrongful,
fraudulent, and inequitable, and tended to the manifest wrong,
injury, and oppression of plaintiffs, and that, in equity and good
conscience, the defendants ought not to have or enjoy the benefit
or advantage of the said judgments.
The relief prayed was that the judgments of the probate
Page 196 U. S. 419
court be set aside and held not to be valid or lawful liens upon
or against the real estate herein described, nor upon the right,
title, or interest therein of the plaintiffs; that the defendants
be enjoined from enforcing such judgments or from taking any
benefit, profit, or advantage by them, and that, all the defendants
being without the jurisdiction of the circuit court, an order be
made directing them to be notified of this suit by publication,
according to the provisions of the act of Congress of March 3,
1875, 18 Stat. 470.
By the act just referred to, it was, among other things,
provided:
"SEC. 8. That when, in any suit commenced in any circuit court
of the United States to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon,
or claim to, or to remove any encumbrance or lien or cloud upon,
the title to real or personal property within the district where
such suit is brought, one or more of the defendants therein shall
not be an inhabitant of or found within the said district, or shall
not voluntarily appear thereto, it shall be lawful for the court to
make an order directing such absent defendant or defendants to
appear, plead, answer, or demur by a day certain to be designated,
which order shall be served on such absent defendant or defendants,
if practicable, wherever found, and also upon the person or persons
in possession or charge of said property, if any there be; or,
where such personal service upon such absent defendant or
defendants is not practicable, such order shall be published in
such manner as the court may direct, not less than once a week for
six consecutive weeks, and in case such absent defendant shall not
appear, plead, answer, or demur within the time so limited, or
within some further time, to be allowed by the court, in its
discretion, and upon proof of the service or publication of said
order, and of the performance of the directions contained in the
same, it shall be lawful for the court to entertain jurisdiction,
and proceed to the hearing and adjudication of such suit in the
same manner as if such absent defendant had been served with
process within the said district; but said adjudication shall, as
regards said absent defendant or defendants
Page 196 U. S. 420
without appearance, affect only the property which shall have
been the subject of the suit and under the jurisdiction of the
court therein within such district. . . ."
Rev.Stat.Supp., vol. 1, pp. 84-85; 18 Stat. 470, c. 137.
Upon demurrer to the jurisdiction of the circuit court, that
court dismissed the suit, being of opinion that the value of the
matter in dispute was not sufficient to give jurisdiction.
McDaniel v. Traylor, 123 F. 338.
Page 196 U. S. 422
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
If, within the meaning of the Judiciary Act of 1887-1888, the
value of the matter in dispute exceeded the sum of $2,000,
exclusive of interest and costs (25 Stat. 433), then there was no
reason for dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction in the
circuit court; for, diversity of citizenship was shown by the bill,
and under the above Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470, it
was competent for the circuit court, by a final decree, to remove
any encumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to real or personal
property within the district, as against persons not inhabitants
thereof and not found therein, or who did not voluntarily appear in
the suit.
The lands of which Hiram Evans died possessed were of the
alleged value of $16,000, and we assume that the plaintiffs jointly
owned one undivided half of them. Was the value of the joint
interest of the plaintiffs in the lands in question to be deemed
the value of the matter in dispute, or was the circuit court
without jurisdiction if no one of the alleged fraudulent claims
held by the defendants exceeded $2,000, exclusive of interest and
costs?
Some light will be thrown upon this question by certain cases in
which this Court held it to be competent for a circuit court, in a
suit in equity, to deprive parties of the benefit of a judgment or
order fraudulently obtained by them in a state court.
In
Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640,
111 U. S. 667,
the question was as to the authority of a circuit court to set
aside as fraudulent and void certain sales made by a testamentary
executor under the orders of a probate court. Conceding that the
administration of the estate there in question properly belonged to
the probate court, and that, in a general sense, its decisions were
conclusive, especially upon parties, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking
for this Court, said:
"But this is not universally true. The most solemn transactions
and judgments may at the
Page 196 U. S. 423
instance of the parties, be set aside or rendered inoperative
for fraud. The fact of being a party does not estop a person from
obtaining in a court of equity relief against fraud. It is
generally parties that are the victims of fraud. The court of
chancery is always open to hear complaints against it, whether
committed
in pais or in or by means of judicial
proceedings. In such cases, the court does not act as a court of
review, nor does it inquire into any irregularities or errors of
proceeding in another court, but it will scrutinize the conduct of
the parties; and, if it finds that they have been guilty of fraud
in obtaining a judgment or decree, it will deprive them of the
benefit of it, and of any inequitable advantage which they have
derived under it."
In
Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S.
86,
129 U. S. 98,
the question was whether the circuit court had jurisdiction by its
decree to set aside a sale of an infant's lands fraudulently made
by his guardian under authority derived from a probate court, and
give such relief as would be consistent with equity. One of the
grounds of demurrer to the bill in that case was that the circuit
court had no authority to set aside and vacate the orders of the
state court. This Court said:
"If by this is meant only that the circuit court cannot, by its
orders act directly upon the probate court, or that the circuit
court cannot compel or require the probate court to set aside or
vacate its own orders, the position of the defendants could not be
disputed. But it does not follow that the right of Harmoning, in
his lifetime, or of his heirs since his death, to hold these lands,
as against the plaintiff, cannot be questioned in a court of
general equitable jurisdiction upon the ground of fraud. If the
case made by the bill is clearly established by proof, it may be
assumed that some state court of superior jurisdiction and equity
powers, and having before it all the parties interested, might
afford the plaintiff relief of a substantial character. But,
whether that be so or not, it is difficult to perceive why the
circuit court is not bound to give relief according to the
recognized rules of equity, as administered in the courts of
the
Page 196 U. S. 424
United States, the plaintiff being a citizen of Nevada, the
defendants citizens of Ohio, and the value of the matter in
dispute, exclusive of interest and costs, being in excess of the
amount required for the original jurisdiction of such courts. . . .
While there are general expressions in some cases apparently
asserting a contrary doctrine, the later decisions of this Court
show that the proper circuit court of the United States may,
without controlling, supervising, or annulling the proceedings of
state courts, give such relief, in a case like the one before us,
as is consistent with the principles of equity."
After citing the case of
Johnson v. Waters, above, the
court referred to
Reigal v. Wood, 1 Johns.Ch. 402, 406, in
which Chancellor Kent said:
"Relief is to be obtained, not only against writings, deeds, and
the most solemn assurances, but against judgments and decrees, if
obtained by fraud and imposition."
It also referred to
Bowen v. Evans, 2 H.L. Cas. 257,
281, in which Lord Chancellor Cottenham said:
"If a case of fraud be established, equity will set aside all
transactions founded upon it, by whatever machinery they may have
been effected, and notwithstanding any contrivances by which it may
have been attempted to protect them. It is immaterial therefore
whether such machinery and contrivances consisted of a decree of a
court of equity and a purchase under it, or of a judgment at law,
or of other transactions between the actors in the fraud."
The opinion of this Court concluded:
"These principles control the present case, which, although
involving rights arising under judicial proceedings in another
jurisdiction, is an original, independent suit for equitable relief
between the parties, such relief being grounded upon a new state of
facts, disclosing, not only imposition upon a court of justice in
procuring from it authority to sell an infant's lands when there
was no necessity therefor, but actual fraud in the exercise, from
time to time, of the authority so obtained. As this case is within
the equity jurisdiction of the circuit court, as defined by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, that court may, by its
decree, lay hold of the parties, and compel
Page 196 U. S. 425
them to do what, according to the principles of equity, they
ought to do, thereby securing and establishing the rights of which
the plaintiff is alleged to have been deprived by fraud and
collusion."
In
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.
S. 589,
141 U. S.
595-596, it appeared that twenty-three judgments for
different amounts were fraudulently procured to be rendered in a
state court against a citizen of another state. Upon learning of
the judgments, the latter brought suit in one of the courts of
Louisiana for a decree avoiding them as obtained upon false
testimony, and thereafter filed a petition and bond for the removal
of the case to the circuit court of the United States. The right of
removal was denied, and the court dissolved the preliminary
injunction which had been granted, and authorized Mayer, who had
become the owner of the judgments, to proceed in their collection.
Upon appeal to a higher state court, the original judgment was
affirmed, and that judgment was brought here for review by writ of
error. This Court sustained the right of removal. After stating
that the judgments aggregated more than $3,000, and were all held
by Mayer and against the plaintiff, we said:
"Their validity depends upon the same facts. If she is entitled
to relief against one of the judgments, she is entitled to relief
against all of them. The cases in which they were rendered were, in
effect, tried as one case, so far as she and Mayer were concerned;
for the parties stipulated that the result in each one not tried
should depend upon the result in the one tried. As all the cases
not tried went to judgment in accordance with the result in the one
tried; as the property of Mrs. Marshall [the plaintiff] was liable
to be taken in execution on all the judgments; as the judgments
were held in the same right, and as their validity depended upon
the same facts, she was entitled, in order to avoid a multiplicity
of actions, and to protect herself against the vexation and cost
that would come from numerous executions and levies, to bring one
suit for a decree finally determining the matter in dispute in all
the cases.
Page 196 U. S. 426
And as, under the rules of equity obtaining in the courts of the
United States, such a suit could be brought, the aggregate amount
of all the judgments against which she sought protection, upon
grounds common to all the actions, is to be deemed, under the act
of Congress, the value of the matter here in dispute."
The question of jurisdiction here presented arises out of facts
not to be found in any case brought to our attention or of which we
have knowledge.
The suit is to remove a cloud on the title to certain lands of
the value of $16,000. The plaintiffs, being three of the six heirs
at law of the intestate, jointly own an undivided interest of
one-half of those lands, but no interest in any particular part of
them. If the value of their joint undivided interest ($8,000), or
the value of the undivided interest of each (one third of $8,000),
is to be taken as the value of the matter in dispute, then the
circuit court had jurisdiction. But we are of opinion that, within
the meaning of the Judiciary Act of 1887-1888, the jurisdiction of
the circuit court in this case depended upon the value in dispute
measured by the aggregate amount of the claims of the
defendants.
It is contended that the jurisdiction of the circuit court must
fail because no one defendant has a claim of the required
jurisdictional amount. In support of this contention, several cases
are cited of the class to which
Walter v. Northeastern Railroad
Co., 147 U. S. 370,
147 U. S. 373,
belongs. That was a suit by a railroad company against the
treasurers and sheriffs of several counties through which its road
passed to enjoin them -- separately, of course -- from issuing
executions against, or seizing the property of, the company for the
purpose of collecting a tax based upon an assessment alleged to be
unconstitutional and void. The Court said:
"It is entirely clear that, had these taxes been paid under
protest, and the plaintiff had sought to recover them back, it
would have been obliged to bring separate actions in each county.
As the amount recoverable from each county would be different, no
joint
Page 196 U. S. 427
judgment could possibly be rendered. So, had a bill for
injunction been filed in a state court, and the practice had
permitted, as in some states, a chancery subpoena to be served in
any county of the state, these defendants could not have been
joined in one bill, but a separate bill would have had to be filed
in each county. . . . It is well settled in this Court that, when
two or more plaintiffs, having several interests, unite for the
convenience of litigation in a single suit, it can only be
sustained in the court of original jurisdiction, or on an appeal in
this Court, as to those whose claims exceed the jurisdictional
amount, and that when two or more defendants are sued by the same
plaintiff in one suit, the test of jurisdiction is the joint or
several character of the liability to the plaintiff."
The case before us, however, is presented by the bill in an
entirely different aspect. The case may be regarded as exceptional
in its facts, and may be disposed of without affecting former
decisions. There is no dispute as to the amount of any particular
claim. So far as the bill is concerned, if any one of the specified
claims is good against the estate of Hiram Evans, then all are
good; if the lands in question, or any interest in them, can be
sold to pay one claim, they must be sold to pay all. The court
could not, under the bill, enjoin the prosecution of one claim and
leave the others untouched. The matter in dispute is whether the
lands in which the plaintiffs have a joint, undivided interest of
one-half can be sold to pay all the claims, in the aggregate, which
the defendants, by combination and conspiracy, procured the probate
court to allow against the estate of Hiram Evans. The essence of
the suit is the alleged fraudulent combination and conspiracy to
fasten upon that estate a liability for debts of John Evans, which
were held by the defendants, and which they, acting in combination,
procured, in cooperation with James Evans, to be allowed as claims
against the estate of Hiram Evans. By reason of that combination,
resulting in the allowance of all those claims in the probate
court, as expenses of administering the estate of
Page 196 U. S. 428
Hiram Evans, the defendants have so tied their respective claims
together as to make them, so far as the plaintiffs and the relief
sought by them are concerned, one claim. The validity of all the
claims depends upon the same facts. The lien on the lands which is
asserted by each defendant has its origin as well in the
combination to which all were parties as in the orders of the
probate court, which, in furtherance of that combination, were
procured by their joint action. Those orders were conclusive
against the plaintiffs, as to all the claims, if the claims could
be allowed at all against the estate of Hiram Evans. A
comprehensive decree by which the plaintiffs can be protected
against those orders will avoid a multiplicity of suits, save great
expense, and do justice. If the plaintiffs do not prove such a
combination and conspiracy, in respect at least, of so many of the
specified claims as in the aggregate will be of the required
amount, then their suit must fail for want of jurisdiction in the
circuit court; for, in the absence of the alleged combination, the
claim of each defendant must, according to our decisions, be
regarded, for purposes of jurisdiction, as separate from all the
others.
An instructive case on the general subject is
Shields v.
Thomas, 17 How. 3. That was a suit in equity in a
Kentucky state court in which the plaintiffs, as the legal
representatives of an intestate, sought a decree for certain
proportionate amounts alleged to be due them respectively from the
defendant, who had married the widow and thereby obtained
possession of the property of the deceased. The defendant was
charged with having converted to his own use a large amount of the
intestate's property to which the legal representatives of the
intestate, plaintiffs in the suit, were entitled. In that suit, a
decree was rendered against the defendant for a large sum of money,
"the shares of the respective complainants being apportioned to
them in the decree," and the defendant being required by the decree
to pay to each of the plaintiffs the specific sum to which he was
entitled as his portion of the property misappropriated by him.
Subsequently a suit was
Page 196 U. S. 429
brought in a circuit court of the United States (jurisdiction
being based on diversity of citizenship) to enforce the decree
rendered in the Kentucky state court, and to compel the defendant
to pay to the plaintiffs, respectively, the several sums which had
been decreed in their favor. A decree to that effect was rendered.
The whole amount which the defendant was required by the decree to
pay was large enough to give this Court jurisdiction on appeal,
although the specific sum awarded to each plaintiff was less than
the jurisdictional sum. The defendant appealed to this Court, and a
motion was made to dismiss the appeal on the ground
"that the sum due to each complainant is severally and
specifically decreed to him, and that the amount thus decreed is
the sum in controversy between each representative and the
appellant, and not the whole amount for which he has been held
liable."
After observing that, if that view of the matter in controversy
was correct, this Court was without jurisdiction, Chief Justice
Taney, speaking for the Court, said:
"But the Court think the matter in controversy in the Kentucky
court was the sum due to the representatives of the deceased
collectively, and not the particular sum to which each was entitled
when the amount due was distributed among them according to the
laws of the state. They all claimed under one and the same title.
They had a common and undivided interest in the claim, and it was
perfectly immaterial to the appellant how it was to be shared among
them. He had no controversy with either of them on that point, and
if there was any difficulty as to the proportions in which they
were to share, the dispute was among themselves, and not with him.
It is like a contract with several to pay a sum of money. It may be
that the money, when recovered, is to be divided between them in
equal or unequal proportions. Yet if a controversy arises on the
contract and the sum in dispute upon it exceeds $2,000, an appeal
would clearly lie to this Court although the interest of each
individual was less than that sum. "
Page 196 U. S. 430
"This being the controversy in Kentucky, the decree of that
court apportioning the sum recovered among the several
representatives does not alter its character when renewed in Iowa.
So far as the appellant is concerned, the entire sum found due by
the Kentucky court is in dispute. He disputes the validity of that
decree, and denies his obligation to pay any part of the money. And
if the appellees maintain their bill, he will be made liable to pay
the whole amount decreed to them. This is the controversy on his
part, and the amount exceeds $2,000. We think the court therefore
has jurisdiction on the appeal."
The doctrines of
Shields v. Thomas have been frequently
recognized by this Court. In the recent case of
Overby v.
Gordon, 177 U. S. 214,
177 U. S. 218,
the Court, interpreting the decision in that case, said:
"It was held that, where the representatives of a deceased
intestate recovered a judgment against an administrator for an
amount in excess of the sum necessary to confer jurisdiction to
review, and such recovery was had under the same title and for a
common and undivided interest, this Court had jurisdiction,
although the amount decreed to be distributed to each
representative was less than the jurisdictional sum."
See also The Connemara, 103 U.
S. 756;
Handley v. Stutz, 137
U. S. 369;
New Orleans Pacific Ry. v. Parker,
143 U. S. 51;
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Gentry, 163
U. S. 361;
Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U.
S. 631,
155 U. S.
647.
It is said that as to any single one of the claims in question,
the plaintiffs in the present case could have released the lands in
which they had an undivided interest by paying that particular
claim; therefore, it is argued, the value of the matter in dispute,
as between the plaintiffs and such defendant, was the amount of the
latter's claim. And so as to each separate claim. But that same
thing could have been said as to the respective claims involved in
Shields v. Thomas. The defendant there could have paid off
any of the respective claims involved. This Court, however, held
that fact to be immaterial because the defendant disputed the
validity of the
Page 196 U. S. 431
original decree holding him liable for all the claims, and had
no concern as to how the whole amount decreed against him was to be
distributed. So here, the plaintiffs, suing to protect their common
undivided interest in lands put in peril by fraudulent orders
obtained by the defendants acting in combination to obtain such
orders for their benefit, are only concerned in preventing the
defendants from proceeding under the orders of the probate court,
which they procured for their benefit equally, and under which they
all now equally claim. The plaintiffs made no contest as to
particular claims. They dispute all of them as claims against Hiram
Evans' estate. If the orders of the probate court stand for the
benefit of the respective defendants, then the plaintiff's
interests in the lands are liable for all the claims asserted by
the defendants, for there is no dispute here as to the amount of
any particular claim. Hence, as we have said, the value of the
matter in dispute is the aggregate amount of the claims
fraudulently procured by the defendants acting in combination to be
allowed in the probate court as claims against the estate of Hiram
Evans.
For the reasons stated, we hold: 1. that it was competent for
the circuit court, upon the case made by the bill, to deprive the
defendants, acting in combination and claiming the benefit of the
orders made in the probate allowing their respective claims; 2.
that the value of the matter in dispute in the circuit court was
the aggregate amount of all the claims so allowed against the
estate of Hiram Evans.
The decree is reversed with directions to set aside the order
dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction, to overrule the
demurrer, and for further proceedings as may be consistent with
this opinion and with the law.
Reversed.
