Where the highest court of the state holds that a statute fixing
the liability of common carriers applies to shipments made to
points without the state, this Court must accept that construction
of the statute.
The police power of the state does not give it the right to
violate any provision of the federal Constitution.
The imposition, by a state statute, upon the initial or any
connecting carrier, of the duty of tracing the freight and
informing the shipper, in writing, when, where, how and by which
carrier the freight was lost, damaged or destroyed, and of giving
the names of the parties and their official position, if any, by
whom the truth of the facts set out in the information can be
established, is, when applied to interstate commerce, a violation
of the
Page 196 U. S. 195
commerce clause of the federal Constitution, and §§
2317, 2318 of the Code of Georgia of 1895, imposing such a duty on
common carriers is void as to shipments made from points in Georgia
to other states.
Richmond & Alleghany R. Co. v. Tobacco
Company, 169 U. S. 311
distinguished.
The plaintiff in error brings this case here to review the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia, affirming a judgment of
the trial court, in favor of the defendants in error, for the
damages sustained by them on the shipment of certain grapes, as
hereinafter more particularly stated. (First reported, 113 Ga. 514,
and again, on appeal from judgment on second trial, 116 Ga.
863.)
The trial court gave judgment for the shippers of the grapes,
who were plaintiffs below, for the amount of the difference between
the market price of the grapes as shipped in good order and the
amount they actually received for the same in their damaged
condition, being the sum of $434.55. The action was commenced in
the Pike County Court, in the State of Georgia, and the petition
averred that, on July 31, 1897, the petitioner shipped a carload of
grapes from Barnesville, Georgia, consigned to Rocco Brothers,
Omaha, Nebraska, by way of the Central of Georgia Railway Company.
The freight was to be conveyed by more than two common carriers,
the initial carrier being the Central of Georgia Railway Company,
and the freight was shipped under a contract of shipment in which
it was provided that the responsibility of each carrier should
cease upon delivery to the next "in good order." The grapes were
greatly damaged on the route between Barnesville and Omaha, and the
damage resulted from the negligence of the common carriers on the
route. The petitioners applied to the plaintiff in error, the
initial carrier on the route, and served it with an application in
writing August 20, 1897, in which they requested that the railway
company should trace the freight, and inform the petitioners, in
writing, when, how, and by which carrier the freight was damaged,
and also that the company should furnish the petitioners the names
of the parties and their official position, if any, by whom the
truth of the facts set forth in the
Page 196 U. S. 196
information could be established. The railroad company failed to
trace the freight and give the information in writing within the
thirty days required by law, wherefore the petitioners averred that
the railroad company became indebted to the petitioners to the
amount of the damage to the grapes as stated.
The plaintiff in error demurred to the petition, the demurrer
was overruled, and it then put in an answer denying many of the
allegations of the petition. Upon the trial, it appeared that the
grapes were shipped from Barnesville, Georgia, to Omaha, Nebraska,
and they were "routed" by the shippers over the Central of Georgia,
then the Western & Atlantic, then the Nashville, Chattanooga
& St. Louis, then the Louisville & Nashville, and then the
Wabash Railroads. The initial carrier, the plaintiff in error,
issued to the shippers, A. O. Murphey and Hunt, a bill of lading
for the carload of grapes, which showed the routing as above
stated, and the bill was signed by Murphey and Hunt, as the
contract between the plaintiff in error and themselves. It
contained a promise
"to carry [the grapes] to said destination, if on its road, or
to deliver to another carrier on the route to said destination,
subject, in either instance, to the conditions named below, which
are agreed to in consideration of the rate named."
Omaha, Nebraska, is not on the road of the plaintiff in error.
Paragraph 5 of the bill of lading, under which the shipment of
grapes was made, reads as follows:
"5. That the responsibility, either as common carrier or
warehouseman, of each carrier over whose line the property shipped
hereunder shall be transported, shall cease as soon as delivery is
made to the next carrier or to the consignee, and the liability of
the said lines contracted with is several, and not joint; neither
of the said carriers shall be responsible or liable for any act,
omission, or negligence of the other carriers over whose lines said
property is or is to be transported."
The grapes were carried under the contract contained in the bill
of lading, and arrived at Omaha, in the State of Nebraska, in a
damaged condition.
The law under which the action was brought is found in
Page 196 U. S. 197
sections 2317 and 2318 of the Code of Georgia of 1895. Those
sections are set forth in full in the margin.
*
On the twentieth day of August, 1897, the shippers availed
themselves of these provisions of the statute, and duly demanded of
the plaintiff in error that it should trace the grapes, and inform
the shippers, in writing, when, how, and by which carrier the
grapes were damaged, and the names of the parties and their
official position, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set out
in the information could be established. They also demanded that
the information should be furnished within thirty days from the
date of the application. The plaintiff in error, although it
endeavored so to do, failed to furnish the information within the
time mentioned in the statute. It offered to prove on the trial
that the car in which the grapes were originally shipped at
Barnesville, on the road of the plaintiff in error, reached
Atlanta, Georgia, the end of the line of the plaintiff in error, in
due time, and that the grapes were then in good order, and the car
was promptly delivered to the next connecting line, that is, the
Western & Atlantic Railroad, and by that road it was delivered
to the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railroad Company at
Nashville, Tennessee, with the grapes in like good order and
condition. The evidence was rejected, the court holding that the
plaintiff
Page 196 U. S. 198
in error had failed to comply with the conditions of the
statute, and that it was therefore liable for the amount of the
damage sustained by the petitioners on whatsoever road the damage
actually occurred.
Page 196 U. S. 202
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of
facts, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has held in this case that the
statute applies to shipments of freight destined to points outside,
as well as to those inside, the state, and we must accept that
construction of the state statute. The question for us to decide is
whether the statute, when applied to an interstate shipment of
freight, is an interference with, or a regulation of, interstate
commerce, and therefore void.
We think the imposition upon the initial or any connecting
carrier of the duty of tracing the freight and informing the
shipper in writing, when, where, how, and by which carrier the
freight was lost, damaged, or destroyed, and of giving the names of
the parties and their official position, if any, by whom the truth
of the facts set out in the information can be established, is,
when applied to interstate commerce, a violation of the commerce
clause of the federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of Georgia
has held that a carrier has, in that state, the right to make a
contract with the shipper to limit its liability, as a carrier, to
damage or loss occurring on its own line.
Central Railroad Co.
v. Avant, 80 Ga.195;
Richmond & Danville Railroad Co.
v. Shomo, 90 Ga. 500.
Whether the state would have the right to prohibit such a
Page 196 U. S. 203
contract with regard to interstate commerce need not therefore
be considered. It has not done so, but, on the contrary, its
highest court has recognized the validity of such a contract.
Without the provisions of the statute in question, the plaintiff in
error would not be liable to the shippers in this case, if, without
negligence, they delivered the consignment in good condition to the
succeeding carrier. This they offered to prove was the case. But if
this statute be valid, this limitation of liability can only be
availed of by the railroad company by complying with its
provisions. In other words, before it can avail itself of the
exemption from liability beyond its own line, provided for by its
valid contract, the initial or any connecting carrier must comply
with the terms of the statute, and must, within thirty days after
notification, obtain and give to the shipper the information
provided for therein. This is certainly a direct burden upon
interstate commerce, for it affects most vitally the law in
relation to that commerce, and prevents the exemption provided by a
legal contract between the parties from taking effect except upon
terms which we hold to be a regulation of interstate commerce. It
is said that the reason for the passage of such an act lies in the
fact that, as a general rule, shippers under such a contract as the
one in question are very much inconvenienced in obtaining evidence
of the loss or damage where it occurred on another road than that
of the initial carrier. It is contended that, under such contracts,
there being great difficulty in identifying the particular carrier
upon whose road the loss occurred, it is reasonable to make the
initial or other connecting carrier liable therefor unless such
carrier furnish the information provided for in the statute.
We can readily see that a provision such as is contained in the
statute in question would be a very convenient one to shippers of
freight through different states. And a provision making the
initial or any connecting carrier liable in any event for any loss
or damage sustained by the shipper on account of the negligence of
any one of the connecting lines would also
Page 196 U. S. 204
be convenient for the shippers; but it would hardly be
maintained, when applied to the interstate shipment of freight,
that a state statute to that effect would not violate the commerce
clause of the federal Constitution. The provision of this statute,
while not quite so onerous, is yet a very plain burden upon
interstate commerce. It is also said that it is so much easier for
the initial or other connecting carrier to obtain the information
provided for in the statute than it is for the shipper, that a
statute requiring such information to be obtained, under the
penalty of such carrier being liable for the damage sustained,
ought to be upheld for that very reason.
Assuming the fact that the carrier might more readily obtain the
information than the shipper, we do not think it is material upon
the question under consideration. We are not, however at all clear
in regard to the fact. The loss or damage might occur on the line
of a connecting carrier, outside the state where the shipment was
made (as was the case here), and we do not perceive that the
initial carrier has any means of obtaining the information desired,
not open to the shipper. The railroad company receiving the freight
from the shipper has no means of compelling the servants of any
connecting carrier to answer any question in regard to the
shipment, or to acknowledge its receipt by such carrier, or to
state its condition when received. And when it is known by the
servants of the connecting company that the object of such
questions is to place in the hands of the shipper information upon
which its liability for the loss or damage to the freight is to be
based, it would seem plain that the information would not be very
readily given, and the initial or other carrier could not compel
it. The effect of such a statute is direct and immediate upon
interstate commerce. If directly affects the liability of the
carrier of freight destined to points outside the state, with
regard to the transportation of articles of commerce; it prevents a
valid contract of exemption from taking effect except upon a very
onerous condition, and it is not of that class of state legislation
which has been held to be rather an aid to
Page 196 U. S. 205
than a burden upon such commerce. The statute in question
prevents the carrier from availing itself of a valid contract
unless such carrier comply with the provisions of the statute by
obtaining information which it has no means of compelling another
carrier to give, and yet, if the information is not obtained, the
carrier is to be held liable for the negligence of another carrier
over whose conduct it has no control. This is not a reasonable
regulation in aid of interstate commerce, but a direct and
immediate burden upon it.
The case of
Richmond & Allegheny Railroad v. Patterson
Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 311, is
not an authority against these views, but, on the contrary, it
supports and exemplifies them. Section 1295 of the Virginia Code of
1887 was held not to be a regulation of interstate commerce,
because it simply established a rule of evidence ordaining the
character of proof by which a carrier might show that, although it
received goods for transportation beyond its own line,
nevertheless, by agreement, its liability was limited to its own
line. The statute left the carrier free to make any limitation as
to its liability on an interstate shipment beyond its own line as
it might deem proper, provided only the evidence of the contract
was in writing and signed by the shipper. The provision of the
Virginia statute that, although the contract in writing provided
for therein was made in fact, yet
"if such thing be lost or injured, such common carrier shall
himself be liable therefor, unless, within a reasonable time after
demand made, he shall give satisfactory proof to the consignor that
the loss or injury did not occur while the thing was in his
charge,"
is a materially different provision from the one under
consideration. A provision in a statute may be deemed a reasonable
one, and not a regulation of interstate commerce, where the statute
simply imposes a duty upon the carrier, when the loss has not
happened on the carrier's own line, to inform the shipper of that
fact within a reasonable time, and this Court has said in the above
case that such a provision is manifestly within the power of the
state to adopt. This is very different from the duty imposed
Page 196 U. S. 206
upon the carrier by the statute in question here, which is much
more onerous, and imposes a liability unless the detailed
information provided for in the statute is obtained and given to
the shipper.
The case of
Chicago Milwaukee &c. Railway Company v.
Solan, 169 U. S. 133,
holds the same general principle as that involved in the case just
cited. To the same effect are the cases referred to in the opinion
of Mr. Justice Gray in the
Solan case. It is idle to
attempt to comment upon the various cases decided by this Court
relating to this clause of the federal Constitution. We are
familiar with them, and we are certain that our decision in this
case does not run counter to the principles decided in any of those
cases. The statute here considered we think plainly imposes a
burden upon the carrier of interstate commerce, and is not an aid
to it, but, in its direct and immediate effect, it is quite the
contrary.
The power to regulate the relative rights and duties of all
persons and corporations within the limits of the state cannot
extend so far as to thereby regulate interstate commerce. The
police power of the state does not give it the right to violate any
provision of the federal Constitution. Being of the opinion that
the statute in question, when applied to an interstate shipment, is
a regulation of interstate commerce, we must hold the statute, so
far as it affects such shipments, to be void on that account. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed and the case
remanded for such further proceedings as may be consistent with
this opinion.
Reversed.
*
"SEC. 2317. When any freight that has been shipped, to be
conveyed by two or more common carriers to its destination, where,
under the contract of shipment or by law, the responsibility of
each or either shall cease upon the delivery to the next 'in good
order,' has been lost damaged, or destroyed, it shall be the duty
of the initial or any connecting carrier, upon application by the
shipper, consignee, or their assigns, within thirty days after
application, to trace said freight, and inform said applicant, in
writing, when, where, and how, and by which carrier said freight
was lost, damaged, or destroyed, and the names of the parties and
their official position, if any, by whom the truth of the facts set
out in said information can be established."
"SEC. 2318. If the carrier to which application is made shall
fall to trace said freight and give said information, in writing,
within the time prescribed, then said carrier shall be liable for
the value of the freight lost, damaged, or destroyed, in the same
manner and to the same amount as if said loss, damage, or
destruction occurred on its line."
