Pleadings must be construed reasonably and not with such
strictness as to refuse to adopt the natural construction of the
pleading because a particular fact might have been more distinctly
alleged, although its existence is fairly, naturally and reasonably
to be presumed from the averments actually made.
There is nothing in the intricacy of equity pleading that
prevents plaintiff from obtaining the relief under the general
prayer to which he may be entitled upon the facts plainly stated in
the bill, and the court will not deny the relief if plaintiff is
otherwise entitled thereto because it is asked under the general
relief prayer on a different theory from that which is advanced
under one of the special prayers.
Where the defendants are in possession of a mine, having
obtained title thereto from the government through fraud and
connivance with one who was legally bound to take the title for the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff cannot maintain ejectment, never
having had the legal title, his remedy is by action in equity to
have the defendants declared trustees
ex maleficio for his
benefit, and if it also appears that some of them are insolvent the
defendants will be restrained from further mining
pendente
lite.
The appellant filed his bill in this suit in the proper court of
New Mexico for the purpose of obtaining relief against the
defendants mentioned therein. The defendants demurred on several
grounds, among which was that the complainant's
Page 195 U. S. 428
remedy, if any, was at law, and that the bill did not state a
case for a court of equity. The demurrer was sustained and the bill
dismissed, and the judgment of dismissal was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of New Mexico, and the complainant thereupon appealed
to this Court. Among other things the bill averred that, about May
7, 1893, the complainant and one Johnson and the defendant Pilkey
entered into an agreement in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, by
which they were to become partners in the enterprise mentioned in
the agreement, and that, for the consideration mentioned therein,
Pilkey was to start out to discover, if possible, and to locate for
the purpose of operation by the parties, any mining claim of gold,
silver, or other metal, and that, in order to enable Pilkey to
carry out his portion of the agreement, he was to be furnished
certain tools, etc., and some money. If he discovered any such
mine, it was his duty to locate the same, and to send in to the
other partners specimens of the ore, in order that its value might
be determined. Work was to be begun within twenty days after the
signing of the agreement. Any fraud by Pilkey was to forfeit his
share, which was to be one-third interest in any mine discovered
and worked.
The agreement was to continue for a year, and all discoveries
and locations of any mines during that time by Pilkey were to be
under the agreement mentioned. After the making of this agreement,
Pilkey started out to prospect and to discover, if possible, a
mining claim of the character mentioned. The parties were aware at
the time of the execution of the agreement, of the existence of the
place where Pilkey went for the purpose of prospecting and
discovering a mine, and that there possibly might be a valuable
claim at that place. Accordingly, Pilkey at once went to the spot,
and, on or about the tenth of July, 1893, he discovered the claim
at that place, and it turned out to be a valuable mine. He located
the mine according to the agreement, and posted the notice thereon
provided by the laws of the United States and New Mexico, and
proceeded to do work thereon pursuant to the provisions
Page 195 U. S. 429
of those laws, but did not do all the work made necessary by
them. The bill then alleges that Pilkey commenced to sink a shaft
or cut upon the mineral-bearing lode, and did work enough thereon
to arrive at mineral-bearing ore in place, within less than ninety
days from the time of taking possession of the lode, and it is then
averred that the parties were ready, able, and willing in all
things to comply with the laws spoken of, "and would have so done
except for the wrongful, fraudulent, and unlawful acts of the
defendants hereinafter mentioned." Sometime about the first of
October, 1893, Pilkey, while so in possession of the lode,
wrongfully and fraudulently conspired, combined, and confederated
with the defendants to defraud plaintiff, and they agreed that said
Pilkey, in violation and fraud of the rights of the plaintiff in
and to the mine, should transfer, convey, and deliver possession of
the mine to the defendants, or one of them, without the knowledge
or consent of plaintiff and the said Johnson. This was done. It was
also agreed that they should do all other acts necessary to
transfer the right to defendants. Pilkey was to have a certain
proportion of interest in the mine, and the defendants, the
balance. The defendants also caused and procured the defendant
Pilkey to stop work upon the mine, under the agreement already
referred to, and it was also agreed that Pilkey should fail and
neglect to record, in the proper office, a copy of the location
notice posted by him on the ground. The defendants also covered up
and concealed the work which had been done on the ground by Pilkey,
and they posted another notice thereon, and called the mine the
"Washington" mine, and filed a copy of the same for record,
December 13, 1893, without the knowledge or consent of the
plaintiff or his copartner, Johnson, and they made the location for
the benefit of themselves as locators, under the mining laws of the
United States. For the purpose of concealing the interest of Pilkey
in such pretended location, it was agreed that each of the four
defendants named should be entitled to a fifth interest, and that
Pilkey should be entitled to the remaining fifth, which last-named
interest should
Page 195 U. S. 430
be claimed and held by Walker in trust for Pilkey. Johnson
subsequently transferred all his interest, under the agreement of
copartnership between plaintiff, Johnson, and Pilkey, to the
complainant, who was at the time of the commencement of the suit,
the owner of Johnson's interest under the assignment. The bill
further states that, after the removal by the defendants of the
original location notice posted by Pilkey, as already stated, the
complainant procured a copy thereof, and had the same recorded in
the office of the recorder of the county on December 9, 1893. The
complainant averred that, by virtue of the premises, he became and
was at the commencement of the suit, the equitable owner of said
mine, and of the gold and silver ores therein contained, so
discovered and located by Pilkey under the agreement, and that he
was equitably entitled, as against the defendants, to the
possession and enjoyment of the same, and to the preferential right
to acquire the legal title from the United States, and that the
pretended location of the mine under the name of the Washington
mine, by and in the names of the defendants named, was wholly
inoperative and void, and that Pilkey, by reason of his
participation in a fraudulent conspiracy with the defendants,
forfeited all right or interest in the said mine pursuant to the
agreement made by Pilkey with complainant and Johnson, and
complainant averred that he was equitably the owner of and entitled
to such interest. He further averred that the defendants refused to
permit complainant to enter upon the property or to work the same,
and that the defendants claim title to the mining property under
and by virtue of their agreement with Pilkey, and their pretended
location of the same as the Washington lode. It is further averred
that the defendants were engaged in mining, extracting, and
converting to their own use, the ores and minerals contained in the
mine, and had mined and removed ores and minerals of great value
therefrom, and had converted to their own use all such mineral, and
that, unless enjoined, they would remove all the ores and minerals,
and thereby the entire substance
Page 195 U. S. 431
and value of the property would be destroyed, and the
complainant would sustain irreparable injury, as the defendants, or
some of them, were wholly insolvent. To this bill the defendants
demurred, as already stated.
Page 195 U. S. 432
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
One phase of this controversy has already been before this Court
in
Lockhart v. Johnson, 181 U. S. 516,
which was an action
Page 195 U. S. 433
of ejectment brought by the plaintiff (who is the complainant
herein) to recover possession of the mine above mentioned from the
defendants herein. It was there held that the plaintiff could not
maintain an action, as the facts showed that he had no legal title,
and that the remedy he might have, if any, was in equity.
Upon the trial of the ejectment action, the plaintiff offered to
prove, in substance, the same facts as are set forth in this bill
in regard to Pilkey's action under the agreement with plaintiff and
Johnson, and the fraudulent conspiracy entered into by the
defendants for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff out of his
right to such mine. The evidence was objected to and excluded on
the ground that it did not show any legal title in the plaintiff,
assuming its truth; that, in the courts of the United States, an
action of ejectment was based upon the strict legal title, and if
the plaintiff failed to show that it was in him, he must fail in
such action. The defendants now contend that, if the plaintiff have
any remedy, it is at law, and also that there is no cause of action
stated in the bill. At the time of the trial of this suit, the
ejectment action had not been decided by this Court, the action
having been here decided May 13, 1901. It must be regarded as
determined by the decision in that case that the complainant herein
has no remedy at law, and, if he has none in this suit, he is
without remedy for the gross fraud set out in the bill. All facts
well pleaded in the bill are admitted by the demurrer, and the
question therefore is whether the bill states facts sufficient to
entitle him to relief in a court of equity.
The court below has held that the bill does not state with
sufficient certainty the time when plaintiff discovered the alleged
fraud set forth in the bill, in that it does not appear by any
certain averment that the plaintiff did not discover such fraud
before the expiration of the ninety days after the discovery of the
lode, in which to file a copy of the notice of location in the
recorder's office, which, if he had done, he might, by himself
filing the copy, have thereby fulfilled all the provisions
Page 195 U. S. 434
of the statute relating to the location and recording of the
notice of claim. We entirely agree with the court below that the
facts constituting the cause of action in equity must be distinctly
alleged, so that the defendant may know what he has to meet, and so
that he may, if he choose, put them in the issue. The rule must
receive a reasonable interpretation, and must be so enforced as to
further, and not obstruct, the administration of justice. We think
the court below erred in holding that there was no sufficient
averment as to the time of the discovery by plaintiff of the
alleged fraud set forth in the bill, assuming such averment to have
been necessary. He averred that Pilkey, acting under the agreement
with plaintiff and Johnson, discovered the mine, and located the
same by posting the requisite notice on the ground on the tenth of
July, 1893. He also averred that, sometime about the first of
October (the exact time, however, he could not state) the
defendants entered into the conspiracy and combination referred to.
This was but a few days before the expiration of the statutory time
in which to file a copy of the notice of claim in the recorder's
office of the county. He averred that the conspiracy and
combination was secret, and that, while the plaintiff and his
copartner Johnson were able and willing to comply with all the laws
of the United States and territory, they failed to do so because of
the wrongful, fraudulent, and unlawful acts of the defendants
thereinafter mentioned. Those acts were a secret effacement of the
work done by Pilkey, the taking down of the notice of claim posted
on the ground by him, the failure to file a copy thereof, the
posting of a claim on the part of the defendants, and the filing of
a copy of such notice in the recorder's office on December 13,
1893.
We think the plain import of these averments is that the
conspiracy and combination did not become known to the plaintiff
until after the expiration of the ninety days from the discovery of
the mine, in which to file a copy of the notice posted on the
ground, in the recorder's office of the proper county. That is a
sufficiently definite averment of time, and
Page 195 U. S. 435
it is enough to show that the failure to file a copy of the
notice within the necessary time was owing to the action of the
defendants.
Under the agreement first mentioned between plaintiff, Johnson,
and Pilkey, as copartners, it became the duty of Pilkey, in order
to complete the location it was his duty to make, to file a copy of
the notice in the recorder's office, and the parties to the
agreement had the right to rely upon Pilkey to file the necessary
copy for record, and it is plain that the failure to file on the
part of the plaintiff was because of his ignorance of such failure
on the part of Pilkey, consequent upon Pilkey's fraudulent
conspiracy and agreement with the other defendants not to file it.
After the discovery of the conspiracy, the plaintiff did procure a
copy of the original notice posted by Pilkey on the ground, and
filed the same in the office of the recorder on the ninth of
December, 1893. Taking these allegations together, we think it
hypercritical to hold that the bill does not, with sufficient
distinctness, allege the fact that the plaintiff did not discover
the fraud until after the expiration of the ninety days mentioned,
and hence did not himself file the copy of the notice within that
time.
All pleadings must be construed reasonably, and not with such
strictness as to refuse to adopt the natural construction of the
pleading because a particular fact might have been more distinctly
alleged, although its existence is fairly, naturally, and
reasonably to be presumed from the averments made in the
pleading.
The agreement between the plaintiff, Pilkey, and Johnson shows
it to have been the duty of Pilkey to make the necessary filing for
record, in order to complete the location of the mine, which he, in
the agreement, was to do. The plaintiff had the right to rely upon
Pilkey carrying out that agreement, and fulfilling his duty
thereunder by making the necessary filing, and plaintiff alleges
that he would have done all things made necessary by law had it not
been for this fraudulent combination and conspiracy on the part of
the defendants. We
Page 195 U. S. 436
regard the allegations of the bill as sufficient in these
particulars.
Again, it is alleged that the bill prays that the location of
what is called the Washington lode by the defendants be declared
void, and that the plaintiff may have the possession of the claim,
while the plaintiff now asks to have the defendants treated as
constructive trustees, etc., which is inconsistent, as alleged,
with the former prayer for relief. The bill contains a prayer for
general relief in addition to the prayer for special relief, and
under such prayer, this relief may be given. It is objected that,
under the prayer for general relief, no relief of that nature can
be granted, inasmuch as it is opposed to the special relief asked
for by the bill, and also because the general allegations in the
bill do not justify such relief. All the facts upon which the
plaintiff seeks relief from a court of equity are clearly stated in
the bill. The facts constituting the fraud are set forth, and it is
alleged that the parties doing the acts mentioned concealed them
from the plaintiff for the purpose of defrauding plaintiff out of
his interest and ownership in the mine. Having set out all the
facts upon which the right to relief is based, the plaintiff asks
specially for the possession, and also for the proceeds, of the
mine, because, by reason of the facts, the location made by the
defendants was a void location. Whether it was a void location or
not was matter of law, arising from the facts appearing in the
bill. Those facts were not changed in the slightest degree, nor
were any inconsistent facts set up thereafter. The plaintiff now,
under his prayer for general relief, contends that, although the
location of the Washington lode by the defendants may have been so
far valid as to create a title in the defendants, yet that, by
reason of the fraud already distinctly set forth in the bill, the
plaintiff was entitled to avail himself of that title, and to hold
them as trustees
ex maleficio for his benefit.
There is nothing in the intricacy of equity pleading that
prevents the plaintiff from obtaining the relief under the general
prayer, to which he may be entitled upon the facts plainly
Page 195 U. S. 437
stated in the bill. There is no reason for denying his right to
relief, if the plaintiff is otherwise entitled to it, simply
because it is asked under the prayer for general relief, and upon a
somewhat different theory from that which is advanced under one of
the special prayers. The cases of
English v.
Foxall, 2 Pet. 595;
Boone v.
Chiles, 10 Pet. 177;
Hobson v.
McArthur, 16 Pet. 182;
Hayward v. National
Bank, 96 U. S. 611;
Georgia v.
Stanton, 6 Wall. 50, are not opposed to the views
just stated.
We agree that the relief granted under the prayer for general
relief must be agreeable to the case made by the bill, and that, in
substance, is what is held by the above cases. The case made by the
bill consists of the material facts therein stated, and where all
the facts are stated, it is no reason for denying relief under a
general prayer, because it may differ from the theory of the law
upon which the special prayer for relief is based, where both
prayers are based upon the same facts, clearly set forth in the
bill.
The defendants contend that, if Pilkey, under the fraudulent
agreement alleged, and pursuant thereto, surrendered possession to
the defendants, the latter became cotenants with the plaintiff, and
he could maintain an action at law to recover possession from his
cotenants. We have already held that the plaintiff could not, upon
the facts, maintain ejectment. When Pilkey surrendered possession
to defendants under this fraudulent agreement, and they entered and
posted the notice and filed the copy, they did not enable plaintiff
to maintain ejectment against them as upon his ouster of possession
by defendants.
Neither plaintiff nor Johnson had ever had anything but a
constructive possession through the possession of Pilkey, and when
he fraudulently surrendered it to the other defendants, and they
entered and completed their location, the plaintiff could not then
sustain ejectment, as we have already held. This is not in
opposition to the case of
Erhardt v. Boaro, 113
U. S. 528. The question whether the relief should be at
law or in equity was not there raised. The action was commenced
Page 195 U. S. 438
in Colorado, and was in accordance with the usual form in
actions for mining claims under the procedure in Colorado, and was
brought to recover possession of a mine. There was no discussion as
to the forum. The complaint simply followed the usual practice.
Here, we have already held, in the ejectment suit (181 U.S.
supra,), that the relief is not to be had by ejectment,
but must be obtained in equity, if at all. Under the circumstances,
we think it immaterial whether Pilkey surrendered possession before
or after the expiration of ninety days from the discovery of the
mine, July 10, 1893. All the acts of fraud set up in the bill,
committed by the defendants, are, if proved, sufficient to entitle
the plaintiff to treat them as trustees
ex maleficio, and
to recover from them, as such trustees, all the materials taken
from the mine.
See Saunders v. Mackey, 5 Mont. 523;
Doherty v. Morris, 11 Colo. 12. Upon the case made by the
bill, some of the defendants being insolvent, we think the
plaintiff entitled to an injunction restraining the defendants from
further mining during the pendency of the suit, an injunction to
issue upon such security as may seem appropriate to the court
below.
We decide this case solely upon the questions raised by the
demurrer.
The judgments of the Supreme Court of New Mexico and of the
trial court must be reversed, and the case remanded to the Supreme
Court with directions to remand it to the District Court for the
Second Judicial District of the Territory of New Mexico, within and
for the County of Bernalillo, with directions to overrule the
defendants' demurrer, and with leave to answer upon such terms as
may seem proper to that court.
So ordered.
