The power to regulate water rates is a governmental power
continuing in its nature which, if it can be bargained away at all,
can only be by words of positive grant, and if any reasonable doubt
exists in regard thereto, it must be resolved in favor of the
existence of the power.
An ordinance of a city of Kentucky before it became a city of
the third class giving a water company a right to make and enforce,
as part of the conditions upon which it would supply consumers, all
needful rules and regulations not inconsistent with the law must be
construed as to the law as it might be altered, and when the city
becomes a city of the third class, and thus has power under the
general law to provide the city with water by contract or by works
of its own, and to make regulations for the management thereof and
to fix prices to consumers, an ordinance subsequently enacted
during the life of the franchise fixing the price of water is not
void as against the water company under the impairment of contract
clause of the constitution of the United States, and, in the
absence of other grounds, the circuit court of the United States
has no jurisdiction of a suit in equity to restrain the enforcement
of such last enacted ordinance, no question of unreasonableness of
the rates being involved.
This is a bill in equity to enjoin the City of Owensboro,
Kentucky, from regulating the rates of the appellee, the Owensboro
Waterworks Company.
Lawson Reno, Police Judge of the city, was made a party. The
circuit court granted a temporary injunction. Before final hearing,
a motion was made before Circuit Judge Lurton to dissolve the
injunction, the motion was denied on the ground of the seriousness
of the questions involved, and the propriety of following the
previous ruling. On final hearing, the injunction was made
perpetual against the city, and the bill dismissed as to Lawson
Reno. The city then took an appeal to circuit court of appeals. The
appeal was dismissed on the ground that, the jurisdiction of the
circuit court having been invoked
Page 191 U. S. 359
on a constitutional question, the appeal should have been taken
directly to this Court. 115 F. 318. The city then brought the case
here from the circuit court.
The city asserts the right to regulate the rates of the appellee
under a statute of the state. The construction of the statute is
contested by the appellee. The appellee urges, besides, that the
statute, so interpreted, violates its contract with the city, and
that the rates as fixed deprive it (the appellee) of its property
without due process of law. These contentions make the issues
between the parties. The bill is voluminous. The allegations with
which we are concerned are the following: the appellant was created
a city by the General Assembly of Kentucky in 1866. Its charter was
amended in 1882, and it continued under this charter until June,
1893, when it was made a city of the third class under the general
laws of the state. These laws provided that
"the repeal of any law by the provisions of this law [the
charter] shall not in any wise be so construed as to affect any
right or liability acquired or accrued thereunder by or on the part
of the city, or any persons or body corporate. This law shall not
in any manner affect any right, lien, or liability accrued,
established, or subsisting under and by virtue of previous charters
or amendments thereto, or ordinances passed thereunder; but such
right, lien, or liability shall be enforced, and such action or
proceeding shall be carried on in all respects as if this law
[defendant city's present charter] had not taken effect, nor shall
this law be in anywise so construed as to affect the right or
liability acquired or accrued under previous charters or amendments
thereto, or ordinances passed thereunder on the part of the city or
any persons or body corporate."
The Owensboro Water Company was incorporated in 1876, and its
general business was to construct and operate a waterworks plant
for the purpose of supplying the city and its inhabitants with
water, and it constructed and operated such works under the
privilege and authority of an ordinance of the city, passed
September 10, 1889. The ordinance had the usual
Page 191 U. S. 360
provision for the use of the streets, and made the duration of
the grant identical with the duration of the company. It was
provided that the ordinance should be binding upon the city "as a
contract in the event" of its written acceptance within ten days
after its passage, and "be the measure of the rights and
liabilities of the said city and of the water company."
Section 9 of the ordinance was as follows:
"SEC. 9. The said company shall have the power and authority to
make and enforce, as part of the condition upon which it will
supply water to its consumers, all needful rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with the law or provisions of this ordinance."
In June, 1889, the appellee began negotiations with the
Owensboro Water Company for the purchase of its franchise and
plant, and of all of its contracts with the city, but did not and
would not consummate said purchase until the city agreed to grant
it (appellee) a franchise and license to maintain a system of
waterworks in the city for a period of twenty-five years, and issue
and grant to it in its own right all of the rights and privileges
which had theretofore been granted to the water company by the
ordinance and contracts of September 10, 1878. On the 3d of June,
1889, the city passed an ordinance approving such purchase, and
granted a franchise and license to the appellee to maintain and
operate a waterworks plant for supplying the city and its
inhabitants with water, and accepted the appellee as the successor
of the water company to the contracts between the latter and the
city. The ordinance was expressed to be in consideration "of the
purchase, by the Owensboro Waterworks Company of Owensboro,
Kentucky, of the waterworks of the Owensboro Water Company."
On the 10th of June, 1889, relying upon the ordinance of the 3d,
the appellee consummated the purchase from the water company of its
works, franchises, and contracts, and received them from that
company, and it "has ever since then under the orders and
direction" of the city, maintained and extended its system, on
account of which it has expended large
Page 191 U. S. 361
sums of money, and its plant is now reasonably worth not less
than $250,000, and could not be constructed for less than that
sum.
On the 19th of March, 1900, the city passed an ordinance
providing
"that hereafter, every person, firm, company, and corporation,
engaged in the business of furnishing water to consumers thereof in
the City of Owensboro shall furnish the same to consumers thereof
for domestic and manufacturing purposes and uses, and for all other
purposes and uses at rates and prices not exceeding the rates and
prices herein named fixed, which rates and prices are deemed
reasonable and just -- that is to say, water shall be furnished to
all mills, laundries, saloons, distilleries, breweries, livery
stables, ice factories, and manufacturing establishments, hotels,
street railway companies, and all factories of every kind at the
following named rates."
Then followed a statement of the rates fixed, graduated
according to the amount of water consumed or kind or purpose of
use. And it was provided (sec. 8)
"that, if any person, firm, company, or corporation engaged in
the business of furnishing water to consumers thereof in said City
of Owensboro shall demand, charge, exact, or receive, directly or
indirectly, of or from any consumer or consumers of water in said
city, as consideration or compensation for water furnished or
supplied to such consumer, any money, property, or other thing of
value over and above or in excess of the rates and prices for water
herein named and prescribed, or shall fail or refuse for ten days,
without reasonable excuse, to supply water as prescribed and
required in and by section seven (7) of this ordinance, or shall
fail or refuse to keep the accounts or the books required to be
kept at Owensboro, or make the reports in writing to the common
council, as required by section sixth (6th) of this ordinance, such
person, firm, company, or corporation so offending shall be fined,
upon conviction, in a sum not less than ten, and not exceeding
fifty, dollars for each offense. "
Page 191 U. S. 362
The ordinance in full is inserted in the margin.
*
It is alleged that the enforcement of the ordinance will cause
appellee irreparable injury, and in what manner that will be
Page 191 U. S. 363
done is detailed, and that appellee "could not, under the most
prudent management, earn any percent upon its investment, but would
be compelled to operate its plant at an actual loss."
Page 191 U. S. 364
For the reasons alleged, the ordinance of March 19 violates the
Constitution of the State of Kentucky, and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution of the United
Page 191 U. S. 365
States. It is also alleged with much amplification that the
passage of the ordinance was "
ex parte and partisan,"
without deliberation or investigation or knowledge, and, besides,
the
Page 191 U. S. 366
city had no power to pass the ordinance, and that the latter
violates the contract existing between appellee and the city. It is
also alleged that financial injury will result to appellee from the
enforcement of the ordinance in regard to meters (sec. 2), and from
the prohibition to collect rates in advance, "except by voluntary
consent of the consumer." (Sec. 3.) Prosecutions are threatened
under the ordinance which will result, it is alleged, in
irreparable injury to appellee, and an injunction is hence prayed
against the city.
A demurrer to the bill was overruled. An answer was then filed
which denied the allegations of the bill and justified the action
of the city.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
By the Act of the General Assembly of Kentucky, approved June
14, 1893, the appellant was made a city of the third class, and was
given, as a city of that class, the following powers expressed in
§ 3290, Ky.Stat. 1899:
"The common council of each of said cities shall, within the
limitations of the Constitution of the state and this act, have
power by ordinance . . . 5th, to provide
Page 191 U. S. 367
the city and the inhabitants thereof with water, light, power,
heat, and telephone service by contract, or by works of its own,
located either within or beyond the boundaries of the city. To make
regulations for the management thereof, and to fix and regulate the
prices to private consumers and customers."
Under this section, the city passed the ordinance which
prescribes the rates and regulations complained of. The circuit
court decided that the city was not given the power to pass the
ordinance, and considered it unnecessary to pass on the other
issues. The court said:
"If the City of Owensboro had no lawful power or authority to
pass the ordinance at all, then the enforcement of it would clearly
be a taking from the complainant of its right to certain property.
First, without compensation; second, without due process of law;
third, without giving to it the equal protection of the law."
"This makes it necessary to inquire whether the city had the
statutory power and authority to pass the ordinance complained of.
It does not seem to be needful to inquire whether the state
constitution gives the general assembly power to delegate authority
in the premises to the city. The initial proposition is has the
legislature done so in fact, whether it had the power or not? This
must depend upon the proper interpretation and construction of
section 3290 of the Kentucky statutes. . . ."
Interpreting the section, the court held that the word "thereof"
in the last sentence of the section had for its antecedent the
words "works of its own." Substituting these words for the word
"thereof," the sentence would read, and the city's power would be,
"to make regulations for the management of its own works, and to
fix and regulate the prices to consumers and customers." But
another ambiguity appears --
viz., of what is the city to
fix and regulate the prices? Certainly of something, and it would
seem from the context, the same thing of which it was to regulate
the management. But this leads to an absurdity, and we must find a
purpose (antecedent) to which
Page 191 U. S. 368
both powers can refer. The city might indeed make regulations
for the management of its works, but it could not fix and regulate
the prices of them to consumers and customers. Besides, we cannot
conceive that an explicit grant of power was necessary to enable
the city to manage its own works. The power to construct would have
implied the power to manage and operate. It must not be overlooked
that the section was intended to apply to not only to the appellant
city but to all cities of the third class, and confer power not
only to provide water, but other services, and it might have seemed
necessary by the legislature, or at any rate prudent, to reserve to
the cities the power over the management of works constructed by
private persons, and as prudent to reserve a power to fix and
regulate the prices to consumers of the services afforded. It is
certainly not difficult to conceive the necessity of the exercise
of those powers, and if attempted to be exercised without a
reservation, the cities might be met (and there are examples of
this) with the contention that the power had been bartered away,
and was precluded by the obligation of a contract. The construction
urged by appellee must therefore be rejected. There is a more
natural one. The purpose of section 3290 was to provide the
inhabitants of cities of the third class with the services
mentioned -- water, light, power, heat, and telephone. They could
be provided by the cities directly or they could be provided by
private persons; but whatever way provided, the power was given to
regulate the management and fix the rates of the services, and this
was but the endowment of a common governmental power.
It is, however, contended that the ordinance is in violation of
the contracts between the city and appellee, constituted by the
resolutions and ordinance of the 3d of June, 1889. The argument is
that the city had entered into contracts with the Owensboro Water
Company, the predecessor of appellee, to which contracts and their
obligations and rights, it is contended, the appellee succeeded by
assignment from the water company, with the consent and approval of
the city, as expressed
Page 191 U. S. 369
in the resolutions and ordinance of June 3, 1889. To determine
their legal effect, however, it will be necessary to consider the
law which authorized them.
At the time of the passage of the ordinance granting the
Owensboro Water Company the right to construct waterworks, the city
existed and was exercising its powers under the charter of 1878,
and the provision in that for supplying water to the inhabitants of
the city was as follows:
"To make, establish, and regulate wells, cisterns, reservoirs,
and pumps, and to provide for the furnishing of the city and the
inhabitants thereof with water and gas."
The same provision was carried into the charter of 1882, and
constituted the authority of the city when the ordinance and
resolutions of June, 1889, were passed. It is contended that this
provision gave the city no power to fix the rates. And counsel
say:
"In such case, and in the absence of an express contract, the
individual or corporation furnishing water for domestic purposes
may charge whatever seems right and reasonable."
But counsel go farther. They deny the right of the city to fix
rates, and yet assert its power to enter into an irrevocable
contract with the water company giving it such power -- that is,
giving it power to fix rates free from any regulation by the city,
not only under any authority the city then possessed, but under any
authority the city might be given by the legislature.
In this contention there are several elements, but we pass their
consideration, and determine what contract, if any, the city
entered into with the water company. Of course it is implied in the
grant to the company that it might charge some rates to consumers,
but the question is were those rates exempt from regulation by the
city under any power it then had or might be given? An affirmative
answer is contended for by the appellee under sections 9, 10, and
14 of the granting ordinance. Section 9 is the pivotal section. The
others are complementary. By it, the company was given
"power and authority to make and enforce
as a part of the
condition [italics
Page 191 U. S. 370
ours] upon which it will supply water to its consumers,
all
needful rules and regulations [italics ours] not inconsistent
with the law or provisions of this ordinance."
The section is concerned with the rules between the company and
consumers alone. The company may enforce all needful rules and
regulations as part of the condition upon which it will supply
water. What is the other part of the condition? It must be the
payment of rates, but to that part of the condition, the power to
make regulations does not apply. It would ignore the distinctions
made by the section, and give, besides, the words "rules and
regulations" too large a meaning to make them include the power of
fixing rates to consumers. They have adequate and useful
signification without that. There were many things in the supply of
water to consumers and in the orderly and prudent conduct of the
business of the company which might need rules and regulations.
And even so construed, the power conferred is not without
limitation. The rules and regulations must not be inconsistent
"with the law," and this means not only as the law was when the
ordinance was passed, but as the law might become.
Ruggles v.
Illinois, 108 U. S. 527;
Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.
S. 307. In the latter cases, a grant of power to the
railroad company was to make and prescribe such bylaws, rules, and
regulations which the directors might deem needful and proper
touching all matters whatsoever which might pertain to the concern
of the company. The company was also given the power
"from time to time to fix, regulate, and receive the toll and
charges by them to be received for transportation of persons or
property on their railroad."
From this grant of power it was claimed that the company had
"the right of managing its own affairs and regulating its charges
for the transportation of persons and property, free of all
legislative control." Mr. Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the
Court, replied:
"This power of regulation is a power of government, continuing
in its nature, and if it can be bargained away at all, it can only
be by words of positive grant, or something
Page 191 U. S. 371
which is in law equivalent. If there is reasonable doubt, it
must be resolved in favor of the existence of the power."
This doctrine has been affirmed numbers of times since.
Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, 180 U.
S. 587;
Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus,
180 U. S. 624;
Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co., 191 U.
S. 43. And the same doctrine prevails in Kentucky.
Winchester &c. Turnpike Road Co. v. Croxton, 98 Ky.
738.
From these views it follows that, if the city had no power under
the charters of 1836 and 1882 to fix rates, and we only assume
this, not decide it, such power was conferred by section 3290 of
the Act of June 14, 1893, and the city is not precluded from the
exercise of that power by sections 9, 10, and 14 of the original
ordinance granting the Owensboro Water Company the right to
construct waterworks, nor by the ordinance of June 3, 1889,
approving the transfer of the rights and contracts of that company
to the Owensboro Water Works Company, the appellee herein. Nor is
the city, by said ordinance, precluded from regulating the business
of the appellee in the manner provided in the ordinance of March
19, 1900, which is the subject of the present controversy. It is
true that it is contended that section 3 of the ordinance forbids
the appellee from collecting rates in advance from all consumers.
But the city does not contend for that construction. It claims only
that the provision in regard to the collection of rates in advance
applies only to consumers using meters, and even as to those
consumers appellee can make reasonable regulations to secure the
payment of rates. The ordinance is not absolutely clear, and we may
resolve its ambiguities in accordance with the concession of the
city. It may be presumed that there was no intention to enact
unreasonable and oppressive regulations.
Two other contentions remain to be considered -- one made by
appellant, and the other made by the appellee. It is difficult to
assign a place or purpose in the discussion of the issues to that
made by the appellant. The contention is that the Owensboro Water
Company had no power to transfer its property
Page 191 U. S. 372
and rights and franchises to the appellee. To what consequence
is the contention directed? Surely the city wants an object for its
regulation. The appellee is in possession of the waterworks, and is
supplying the inhabitants of the city with water. It is that
service which the city desires to regulate, and it is to "every
person, firm, company, and corporation" engaged in that service the
ordinance of March 21, 1900, is addressed. No other person, firm,
or corporation than the appellee is so engaged in Owensboro, or has
been so engaged for some years. We do not think that the legality
of the ordinance can be questioned or measured by either the
company or the city by the defects or perfections of the title of
the company to its franchises or property. It may be, however, that
it is not intended to press the contention so far, but to confine
it to the denial of the exemption claimed by appellee as successor
of the Owensboro Water Company. But, as we hold that the Owensboro
Water Company had no such exemption, the contention becomes
unimportant.
The other contention made by appellee is that the rates fixed by
the city are unreasonable. Upon this contention we shall not pass.
It depends upon many questions of fact and of values to which the
circuit court gave no attention, and on which it expressed no
judgment. It is better for a trial court to determine such
questions in the first instance.
Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Ry.
v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167,
176 U. S.
179.
Decree of the circuit court is reversed, and the case
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
*
"
An Ordinance to Fix and Regulate Rates Prices, and Charges
for Water"
"
Furnished Consumers in the City of Owensboro, and for Other
Purposes"
"Be it ordained by the common council of the City of
Owensboro:"
"SEC. 1. That hereafter, every person, firm, company, and
corporation engaged in the business of furnishing water to
consumers thereof in the City of Owensboro shall furnish the same
to such consumers thereof for domestic and manufacturing purposes
and uses and for all other purposes and uses at rates and prices
not exceeding the rates and prices herein named and fixed, which
rates and prices are deemed reasonable and just -- that is to say,
water shall be furnished to all mills, laundries, saloons,
distilleries, breweries, livery stables, ice factories, hotels,
street railway companies, and all factories and manufacturing
establishments of every kind at the following-named rates, subject
to the exceptions contained in section two (2) of this ordinance,
to-wit:"
"(1) In all cases where the amount of water consumed averages
two thousand gallons per day, or less, estimated by the month, ten
cents per thousand gallons; (2) where the daily consumption of
water averages two thousand gallons, or more, and less than four
thousand gallons, estimated by the month, nine cents per thousand
gallons; (3) where the daily consumption of water averages four
thousand gallons, or more, and less than ten thousand gallons,
estimated by the month, eight cents per thousand gallons; (4) where
the daily consumption of water averages ten thousand gallons, or
more, and less than fifteen thousand gallons, estimated by the
month, seven cents per thousand gallons; (5) where the daily
consumption of water averages fifteen thousand gallons, or more,
and less than twenty-five thousand gallons, estimated by the month,
five cents per thousand gallons; (6) where the daily consumption of
water averages twenty-five thousand gallons gallons, or more, and
less than forty thousand gallons, estimated by the month, four
cents per thousand gallons; (7) where the daily consumption of
water averages forty thousand gallons, or more, estimated by the
month, three and one-half cents per thousand gallons."
"That, for the purpose of ascertaining and estimating accurately
the quantity of water consumed by consumers in the classification
of this section and the compensation to be paid therefor, it is
hereby made the duty of the persons, firms, companies, and
corporations, and they shall, on request made in writing, and
within thirty days after such request is made, place a water meter,
in good condition and repair, in connection with the pipe or main
leading into and supplying water to such consumers, and the said
meter shall be kept in good repair by the person, firms, company,
and corporation furnishing or supplying the water to such
consumers, and the said meters shall be examined and read monthly,
for the purpose of ascertaining its condition and the quantity of
water consumed."
"Provided, that the minimum annual rate to be paid by all
consumers of water described in the classifications thereof in this
section, per annum, shall be twenty-four (24) dollars, and in no
case shall the consumer of water who uses or consumes, annually,
two hundred forty thousand gallons of water, or less, be charged or
pay more or less than twenty-four (24) dollars per annum."
"SEC. 2. That water furnished by said persons, firms, companies,
and corporations to consumers thereof for domestic purposes and
uses where no meter has been put in or attached for ascertaining
the quantity of water used shall be furnished at rates and charges
not exceeding or above the following-named rates and charges, per
year, to-wit:"
"(1) for each wash stand wherein warm and cold water or either
is used, two dollars; (2) for each kitchen sink wherein warm and
cold water or either is used, two dollars; (3) for each bathtub
wherein warm and cold water or either,is used, two dollars; (4) for
each water closet and urinal, two dollars; for sprinkling premises,
lawn, pavement, and street in front of or adjacent to the premises,
per annum, two dollars and fifty cents for the first two hundred
square yards or less, one cent for each additional square yard; (6)
for private dwelling per annum where only one tap or faucet is
used, containing four rooms or less, excluding hallways, garrets,
bathrooms, water closets, two dollars, and for each additional
room, fifty cents; (7) for each cow, one dollar, for each horse,
one dollar, and for each carriage, buggy, and spring wagon, one
dollar; (8) for filling cisterns, twenty cents each thousand
gallons."
"SUB. SEC. 2. And for furnishing water for offices, banks,
stores, and other places than residences (above specified in this
section), the rates and charges therefor shall be at rates not
exceeding or above the following rates and charges, per pear,
to-wit:"
"For each wash stand wherein warm and cold water, or either, is
used, three dollars; (2) for each water closet and urinal, three
dollars; (3) for hydrant, three dollars; (4) for barbershops, for
first chair, three dollars, for each additional chair, one dollar;
(5) for blacksmiths, for first forge, two dollars, and for each
additional forge, one dollar; (6) for plasterers, one-fourth of one
cent per square yard; (7) for bricklayers, six cents per one
thousand brick, sprinkling and laying."
"Provided, that any of the consumers embraced in the
classification of this section may, in lieu of the above rates,
require the person, firm, company, or corporation furnishing the
water to the consumer to attach to the pipe leading into the
premises of the consumer a water meter, and it shall be the duty of
the person, firm, company, or corporation furnishing the water to
attach the said meter within thirty days after said request is made
therefor in writing, and thereafter the said consumer shall be
charged, and shall pay for the water furnished at the minimum rate
of twelve dollars per annum, and for all water consumed in excess
of one hundred and twenty thousand gallons per annum there shall be
paid ten cents for each thousand gallons, but such meters shall not
be attached except by the written request of the consumer."
"And provided further that, before meters are attached to or
connected with the pipes or mains leading into the premises of any
consumer described in the classification of this section by the
person, firm, company, or corporation supplying the water, consent
of such consumer shall be first obtained, and if objection shall be
made by the consumer, the mayor of the city, upon complaint by the
person, firm, company, or corporation furnishing the water shall
summon the consumer to appear before him and shall hear and
determine the matter and decide whether the meter shall be
attached, and his decision shall be final."
"If said persons, firms, companies, or corporations furnishing
water shall attach a meter in any case to the pipe leading into any
consumer's premises without his consent or against his objection,
and the water annually consumed shall not be as much as one hundred
twenty gallons, the consumer shall pay for the water actually
consumed at the rate of ten cents per thousand gallons, and no
more."
"SEC. 3. That water rates may be collected by said persons,
firms, companies, and corporations from all consumers falling
within the provisions of sections one and two of this ordinance who
have water meters attached, monthly, quarterly, or semiannually at
the election of said persons, firms, companies, or corporations
furnishing the water, but water rates shall not be collected in
advance except by voluntary consent of the consumer."
"Water may be shut off from any consumer for nonpayment of water
rates, or other sufficient reason, only after ten days' written
notice served upon said consumer or his wife, in his absence from
home, or in case of absence from premises of both husband and wife,
then the said notice shall be delivered by depositing same in the
Owensboro post office, addressed to said water consumer."
"SEC. 4. That if any person, firm, company, or corporation shall
be or become a consumer of water, and shall not be included in the
classification made and contained in the second section of this
ordinance, the quantity of water used or consumed by such consumer
shall be ascertained by meter, and compensation made therefor at
the rates and charges specified in the first section of this
ordinance."
"SEC. 5. That all persons, firms, companies, or corporations
furnishing water to consumers in the City of Owensboro that shall
have mains, pipes, and conduits in the streets, alleys, and public
ways of the city shall hereinafter, during the months of April,
May, June, July, August, September, October, November in each year
cause all water mains of said persons, firms, companies, and
corporations to be washed and cleaned, and for this purpose shall
cause all fire hydrants to be open to their full capacity and water
discharged from each for at least five minutes once in every two
weeks, and during the months of December, January, February, and
March shall, for said purpose, cause all fire hydrants to be open
to their full capacity for at least five minutes once in each and
every of said months last mentioned."
"SEC. 6. That hereafter all persons, firms, companies, and
corporations engaged in the business of furnishing water to
consumers shall keep an exact, complete, and true account of all
its incomes, gains, and receipts from all and every source
whatever, in detail, giving all the items thereof, and date of
receipt of the same, and an exact, complete, and true account of
all expenditures, showing date and amount of each and every item of
expense, costs and expenditure and the whole thereof, and the books
containing said accounts shall be kept at Owensboro, and shall be
open at any time to inspection and examination by the common
council or a committee thereof appointed for that purpose, and
shall make and return to the common council at the end of each six
months hereafter, on the first day of January and July of each
year, a true and complete summary of the same, which shall be
verified by the oath of the president, secretary, or treasurer of
said persons, firms, companies, or corporations furnishing water,
and the said report shall be spread on the journal and filed and
preserved by the city clerk in his office."
"SEC. 7. That it shall be the duty of any person, firm, company,
or corporation engaged in the business of furnishing water to
consumers thereof in the City of Owensboro, through pipes, mains,
or conduits laid in the streets, alleys, and ways of said city, to
furnish water to all persons who may make application therefor in
writing, and within ten days after the date fixed in such written
application, and who desire the same furnished in houses or places
situated on any of the streets, alleys, or ways or places in the
city wherein any of the said mains, pipes, or conduits are located
or laid, and the said person, firm, company, or corporation shall
put down all necessary pipes therefor at the expense of the person,
firm, company, or corporation furnishing the water to the boundary
line of the lot or premises of the applicant for water or consumer,
and the remainder of the pipes, machinery, or appliances necessary
for conveying the water into the houses or upon the premises shall
be borne by the said applicant or consumer of water."
"SEC. 8. That if any person, firm, company, or corporation
engaged in the business of furnishing water to consumers thereof in
said City of Owensboro shall demand, charge, exact, or receive,
directly or indirectly, of or from any consumer or consumers of
water in said city, as consideration or compensation for water
furnished or supplied to such consumer, any money, property, or
other thing of value over and above, or in excess of the rates and
prices for water herein named and prescribed, or shall fail or
refuse for ten days, without reasonable excuse, to supply water as
prescribed and required, in and by section seven (7) of this
ordinance, or shall fail or refuse to keep the accounts, or the
books required to be kept at Owensboro, or make the reports in
writing to the common council, as required by section six (6) of
this ordinance, such person, firm, company, or corporation so
offending shall be fined, upon conviction, in a sum not less than
ten dollars and not exceeding fifty dollars for each offense."
"SEC. 9. This ordinance shall go into full force and effect on
and after the first day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred."
"Approved, March 21st, 1900."
