The placing on board vessels in the United States and bound for
foreign ports of lubricating oils manufactured from imported rape
seed on which duty has been paid and which oils are for use in, and
to be consumed by the vessels is not such an exportation of the
oils as entitles the sellers to drawbacks under § 22 of the
Act of August 28, 1894, reenacted as § 30 of the Act of July
27, 1897.
This has been the uniform construction of the department charged
with the execution of the statute.
Where the burden is placed upon the citizen, if there be a doubt
it must be resolved in favor of the citizen; but as the right to
drawbacks is a privilege granted by the government any doubt as to
the construction of the statute must be resolved in favor of the
government.
Section 22 of the Act of August 27, 1894, 28 Stat. 509, 551,
reenacted as section 30 of the Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 211,
is as follows:
"SEC. 22. That where imported materials on which duties have
been paid are used in the manufacture of articles manufactured or
produced in the United States, there shall be allowed on the
exportation of such articles a drawback equal in amount to the
duties paid on the materials used, less one percentum of such
duties:
Provided, That when the articles exported are made
in part from domestic materials the imported materials, or the
parts of the articles made from such materials, shall so appear in
the completed articles that the quantity or measure thereof may be
ascertained:
And provided further, That the drawback on
any article allowed under existing law shall be continued at the
rate herein provided. That the imported materials used in the
manufacture or production of articles entitled to drawback of
customs duties when exported shall, in all cases where drawback of
duties paid on such materials is claimed, be identified, the
quantity of such materials used and the amount of duties paid
thereon shall be ascertained, the facts of the manufacture or
production of such articles in
Page 190 U. S. 144
the United States and their exportation therefrom shall be
determined, and the drawback due thereon shall be paid to the
manufacturer, producer, or exporter, to the agent of either, or to
the person to whom such manufacturer, producer, exporter, or agent
shall in writing order such drawback paid, under such regulations
as the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe."
During the years 1895, 1896, 1897, the appellant, a corporation
engaged in business as importer, manufacturer, and exporter of oils
at New York City and elsewhere in the United States, having used in
the manufacture of certain kinds of lubricating oils imported rape
seed oil on which duties had been paid, placed on board of vessels
bound for foreign ports, lubricating oils so manufactured, and
claimed a drawback of the duties paid on the imported rape seed oil
used therein. The Treasury Department allowed and paid the drawback
on such manufactured oils as were shipped to foreign countries and
there relanded, but refused to pay any on such as were placed on
board for use and consumed in use on the vessels. The appellant
brought this suit in the Court of Claims to recover the drawbacks
on the last-named oils. That court decided against it, 37 Ct.Cl.
101, and from such decision, this appeal was taken.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The statute allows the drawback "on the exportation," and the
question is whether goods placed on board a vessel bound for a
foreign port, to be used and consumed on board the vessel during
its voyage, and in fact so used and consumed, are exported.
The careful opinion of the Court of Claims, which in general we
approve and to which we refer, relieves us from the necessity of an
extended discussion. Whatever primary meaning
Page 190 U. S. 145
be indicated by its derivation, the word "export," as used in
the Constitution and laws of the United States, generally means the
transportation of goods from this to a foreign country.
"As the legal notion of emigration is a going abroad with an
intention of not returning, so that of exportation is a severance
of goods from the mass of things belonging to this country with an
intention of uniting them to the mass of things belonging to some
foreign country or other."
17 Ops.Atty.Gen. 583.
True, the context may sometimes give to the word a narrower
meaning, and in the execution of the administrative affairs of
government it may have been applied to cases in which there was not
in the full sense of the term an exportation, yet these are
exceptions and do not destroy its general signification. It cannot
mean simply a carrying out of the country, for no one would speak
of goods shipped by water from San Francisco to San Diego as
"exported," although in the voyage they are carried out of the
country. Nor would the mere fact that there was no purpose of
return justify the use of the word "export." Coal placed on a
steamer in San Francisco to be consumed in propelling that steamer
to San Diego would never be so designated. Another country or state
as the intended destination of the goods is essential to the idea
of exportation.
Counsel for appellant, after quoting from several dictionaries,
say:
"These definitions show that the word has two meanings:"
"(1) Its primary, general or essential meaning -- to carry or
send out of a place; and"
"(2) Its secondary, specific or especial meaning -- to send out
from one country to another."
"Of all goods sent out of this country but a small proportion
fails to reach a foreign country; the amount consumed or lost at
sea is minute in comparison. In ordinary use therefore the foreign
destination is implied. We claim that, however usual, it is not
essential, and that here the original and primary definition of the
word should be applied to goods carried out of the country on
vessels in the foreign trade, although they never reach a foreign
country."
To this we are unable to yield our assent:
Page 190 U. S. 146
First. The fact that the words "export" and "exportation" are,
as we have indicated, generally used in the sense of transportation
from this to a foreign country, makes against the contention that
it is here used in a different sense.
Second. The purpose with which the drawback statute was enacted
is against it. In
Campbell v. United States, 107 U.
S. 407,
107 U. S. 413,
we said:
"The purpose of the drawback provision is to make duty free,
imports which are manufactured here and then returned whence they
came or to some other foreign country -- articles which are not
sold or consumed in the United States."
So also, in
Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States,
171 U. S. 210,
171 U. S.
216:
"The object of the section was evidently, not only to build up
an export trade, but to encourage manufactures in this country,
where such manufactures are intended for exportation, by granting a
rebate of duties upon the raw or prepared materials imported, and
thus enabling the manufacturer to compete in foreign markets with
the same articles manufactured in other countries."
Third. The uniform construction placed by the department charged
with the execution of the statute has been against it.
Fourth. Being a governmental grant of a privilege or benefit, it
is to be construed in favor of the government and against the party
claiming the grant. Where the burden is placed upon a citizen, if
there be a doubt as to the extent of the burden it is resolved in
favor of the citizen, but where a privilege is granted, any doubt
is resolved in favor of the government. In
Hartranft v.
Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609,
121 U. S. 616, the
one rule was thus stated:
"We are of opinion that the decision of the circuit court was
correct. But, if the question were one of doubt, the doubt would be
resolved in favor of the importer 'as duties are never imposed on
the citizen upon vague or doubtful interpretations.'
Powers v.
Barney, 5 Blatch. 202;
United States v. Isham, 17
Wall. 496,
84 U. S. 504;
Gurr v.
Scudds, 11 Exch.190, 191;
Adams v. Bancroft, 3 Sumner
384."
See also American Net & Twine Company v.
Worthington, 141 U. S. 468,
141 U. S.
474.
Page 190 U. S. 147
On the other hand, in
Hannibal &c. Railroad Company v.
Packet Company, 125 U. S. 260,
125 U. S. 271,
we said, citing several authorities:
"But if there be any doubt as to the proper construction of this
statute (and we think there is none), then that construction must
be adopted which is most advantageous to the interests of the
government. The statute, being a grant of a privilege, must be
construed most strongly in favor of the grantor."
For these reasons, we think the judgment of the Court of Claims
was correct, and it is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BROWN and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissented.
