A question of fact under the forty-sixth section of the
collection law of 2 March 1799, c. 128, exempting from duty the
wearing apparel and other personal baggage of persons arriving in
the United States.
Where the
res gestae in a revenue cause are incapable
of explanation consistently with the innocence of the party,
condemnation follows although there be no positive testimony of the
offense's having been committed.
Circumstances are sometimes more convincing than the most
positive evidence.
Although a mere intention to evade the payment of duties be not
per se a cause of forfeiture, yet when a question arises
whether an act has been committed which draws after it that
consequence, such intention will justify the court in not putting
on the conduct of the party in respect to the act in question an
interpretation as favorable as under other circumstances it would
be disposed to do.
Page 19 U. S. 188
MR. JUSTICE LIVINGSTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a libel for an alleged forfeiture under the 46th section
of the Collection Law passed the second of March, 1799.
This section exempts from duty the wearing apparel and other
personal baggage of those persons who arrive in the United States,
and to ascertain what articles are to be exempted it is directed
that due entry thereof, as of other goods, but separate, and
distinct therefrom, shall be made with the collector, by the owner
or his agent, verified by oath, stating, among other things, that
the packages mentioned in such entry contain no goods whatever
except the wearing apparel and other personal baggage of the person
to whom they belong. And it is provided that whenever any articles
subject to duty shall be found among such baggage which shall not
be mentioned to the collector at the time such entry is made, they
shall be forfeited and the person in
Page 19 U. S. 189
whose baggage they shall be found shall moreover forfeit and pay
treble the value of such articles.
These proceedings commenced in the District Court of the
District of South Carolina, and after sentences of condemnation in
that court and in the circuit court of the United States for that
district, the claimant has appealed to this Court.
The only question we have to decide is whether the goods libeled
and which are admitted to be subject to duty were entered as
baggage or not. If they were, they must be condemned; if not, the
claimant is entitled to restitution.
The claimant insists that the trunks seized were not included in
her baggage entry, and that no act of hers, prior or subsequent to
the entry, shows that it was her intention to cover them by it. Her
baggage entry comprised "seven trunks wearing apparel, sundry band
boxed and bedding, for Mrs. Savage and family, passengers in the
ship
Robert Edwards." Under this entry and a permit given
in conformity with it, the claimant took away several trunks and
band boxes, the contents of some of which do not appear, but she
alleges that they contained only baggage, and no dutiable article,
and that she never demanded the trunks in question as part of those
mentioned in the entry of her baggage. Some reliance is also placed
on the fact that before any seizure, these trunks were regularly
entered by the master and the duties on them secured or paid.
Whether they were thus entered or not can have no influence on the
present question, which is confined to the single inquiry whether
they had previous
Page 19 U. S. 190
to such act on the part of the master, been entered by the owner
as part of her baggage. For no act of the master subsequent to such
entry could relieve them from the forfeiture which in that case had
previously attached.
It will be sufficient to advert to a few of the prominent facts
to ascertain the real character of this transaction. The Court has
been reminded that it ought not, without the most satisfactory and
positive proof, in a case so highly penal, to decide that a
violation of law has been committed. Although such proof may
generally be desirable, we are not to shut our eyes on
circumstances which sometimes carry with them a conviction which
the most positive testimony will sometimes fail to produce. And if
such circumstances cannot well consist with the innocence of the
party, and arise out of her own conduct and remain unexplained, she
cannot complain if she be the victim of them. No extraordinary
prudence or circumspection on the part of the claimant was
necessary to have avoided the unpleasant predicament in which she
is placed. If she had brought these goods on board in London as
cargo; if she had paid freight for them as such; if she had desired
them to be placed on the manifest of the cargo, which she was most
probably apprised was necessary; if, when she entered her other
merchandise imported in the same vessel, she had also entered
these; if, after making her baggage entry she had distinguished or
informed the inspector which of the trunks contained her baggage,
and which were filled with merchandise, the whole
Page 19 U. S. 191
of the present difficulty would have been avoided. The claimant
neglecting to take any one of these precautions, which could not
have been the effect of ignorance, as it appears she is
occasionally engaged in the importation of goods in the line of her
business, leads irresistibly to the conclusion, that she intended
to land these trunks without the payment of duties and that this
end was to be effected under the disguise of entering them as
baggage and wearing apparel. Although a mere intention to evade
such payment be no cause of forfeiture, yet when a question arises
whether an act has been committed which draws after it this
consequence, such intention will assist in dispelling some of the
doubts in which the act itself might otherwise be involved, and
will justify a court in not putting on the conduct of the party in
relation to the act in question an interpretation as favorable as
under other circumstances it would feel disposed to do. Thus, in
the case before us, the claimant wishes us to believe that the
seven trunks of wearing apparel and the band boxes which were
included in her baggage entry were all of them actually landed
under her permit, and that therefore the five trunks which remained
on board and were seized as composing part of her baggage entry
were not comprised in it. But is this made out with any reasonable
certainty? On the contrary, is there any evidence whatever on which
we can come to a satisfactory conclusion that seven trunks, which
was the number entered by her as baggage, were actually landed
before the seizure? What the
Page 19 U. S. 192
claimant herself considered as band boxes and actually
represented as such to the inspector she now desires may be
converted into trunks. Unless this can be done, which would be to
disbelieve the whole evidence in the cause, there is no pretense
for saying that all the trunks entered by her as baggage had been
landed. The marks on the trunks do not furnish even a presumption
in her favor, for on those landed and on those seized we find the
same inscription -- that is, "Mrs. Savage's baggage, apparel, and
haberdashery." In this uncertainty and confusion, which is the
result of her own irregular conduct and which it was her business,
and not that of the court, to remove, she has exposed her case to
very unfavorable inferences. One of the trunks landed was empty, or
contained only a few books and loose papers, and yet it appears by
a cocket produced before the circuit court, that this very trunk,
when taken board, was valued in London at 115 pounds sterling. What
became of the goods which it then contained is left without
explanation. This forms a part of the
res gestae, and is a
circumstance, if not of strong suspicion, at any rate but little
calculated to evince the integrity of the transaction.
Without, therefore, entering into a more minute detail of the
circumstances of this case, the Court is well satisfied from the
whole of the evidence, notwithstanding some little obscurity in
which it is involved, that the trunks in question formed a part of
the baggage entry of the claimant, and, therefore
Affirms the sentence of the circuit court with
costs.