An action upon the official bond of a Superintendent of the Mint
at New Orleans, conditioned, among other things, that he would
"faithfully and diligently perform, execute and discharge all and
singular the duties of said office according to the laws of the
United States" and "receive and safely keep, until legally
withdrawn, all moneys or bullion which shall be for the use.or
expenses of the Mint." The claim was that the defendant had
received and not paid over to the United States $25,000 in treasury
notes which had come to his hands. The defense was that the
treasury notes had been totally destroyed by fire, without any
negligence on the part of the Superintendent, except that $1,182 of
such notes had been recovered in a charred condition and turned
over to the United States, being in such condition that they could
be identified as to amount and date of issue.
Held:
(1) That the obligations of the Superintendent were not
determinable by the law of bailment, but by the terms of his bond,
and he could not escape responsibility for treasury notes that came
to his hands and which were lost unless such loss was attributable
to overruling necessity or the public enemy; that their loss by
reason of fire constituted no defense.
(2) No deduction could be allowed on account of the $1,182 of
charred notes, because no previous application had been made to the
proper accounting officers for the allowance of such a credit.
(3) The Superintendent was liable on his bond for interest at
six percent from the date on which his accounts were stated at the
Treasury Department.
This was an action upon the official bond of Andrew W. Smythe as
Superintendent of the Mint of the United States at
Page 188 U. S. 157
New Orleans to recover the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars
with six percent interest from April 1, 1893, until paid -- that
being the amount found due to the United States at the date of the
examination, adjustment, and statement of his accounts by the
proper officers of the Treasury. The sureties on the bond were
Edward Conery and David Chambers McCan.
The bond was conditioned that the Superintendent should
"faithfully and diligently perform, execute, and discharge, all
and singular, the duties of said office according to the laws of
the United States, then this obligation to be void and of no
effect, otherwise to remain in full force and value."
When this bond was executed, it was provided by section 3500
that every officer of the Mint, before entering upon the duties of
his office, should take an oath faithfully and diligently to
perform the duties thereof; by section 3501, that the
Superintendent, before entering upon his office, should become
bound to the United States, with one or more sureties, in a named
sum, "with condition for the faithful and diligent performance of
the duties of his office;" by section 3503, that the Superintendent
of each Mint
"shall have the control thereof, the superintendence of the
officers and persons employed therein, and the supervision of the
business thereof, subject to the approval of the director of the
Mint;"
by section 3504, that
"he shall keep and render quarter-yearly to the Director of the
Mint, for the purpose of adjustment according to such forms as may
be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, regular and
faithful accounts of the transactions with the other officers of
the Mint and the depositors,"
and by section 3506 that
"the Superintendent, of each Mint shall receive and safely keep,
until legally withdrawn, all moneys or bullion which shall be for
the use or the expenses of the Mint."
It appeared in the evidence that the defendant Smythe, as
Superintendent of the Mint, received various sums of money in
United States Treasury notes, and that, upon a statement of his
accounts by the proper officers of the Treasury, there was a
deficit of $25,000.
The defense was that the $25,000 of Treasury notes was placed by
the Superintendent in a tin box in the steel vault
Page 188 U. S. 158
provided by the government for the safekeeping of public funds
in his custody, and that the notes, while in that box, were
charred, burnt, and destroyed by fire that occurred in the vault
without any negligence on the part of the Superintendent or his
agents or employees.
The government insisted at the trial that, even if the Treasury
notes were destroyed in the manner and to the amount claimed,
without negligence on the part of the Superintendent, nevertheless
he was liable on his bond -- its contention being that he was under
the obligations, practically, of an insurer in respect of all
public funds coming to his hands, and could not be relieved unless
the loss occurred by the act of God or the public enemy. This view
was approved by the circuit court, which, at the conclusion of the
evidence, directed a verdict against the defendants, and judgment
was accordingly rendered for the full amount claimed by the United
States. The court added the following words to its memorandum of
reasons for that direction:
"In this cause, there has been no charge or intimation that Dr.
Smythe was personally at fault or blameable in any way. Such fault
or negligence as may have been shown in the cause is attributable
to his subordinates, and in no manner to him."
The circuit court of appeals approved the view taken by the
circuit court and affirmed the judgment. The opinion of the former
court is reported in 107 F. 376.
Page 188 U. S. 163
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
As the circuit court and the circuit court of appeals both held
that the question of the liability of Smythe was determined for the
government by the decisions of this Court -- which view the
defendants controverted -- we must ascertain the import of those
decisions. This course is made necessary by the contention of the
defendants that the latest decision of this Court, to which
reference will be presently made, modified the earlier decisions
upon which the government relies.
The first case is that of
United States v.
Prescott, 3 How. 578,
44 U. S. 587.
That was an action on the bond of a receiver of public moneys,
conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties, and that
he
"shall well, truly, and faithfully, keep safely, without loaning
or using, all the public moneys collected by him, or otherwise at
any time placed in his possession and custody, till the same had
been, or should be, ordered by the proper department or officer of
the government to be transferred or paid out,"
etc.
The defense was that the money for the nonpayment of which the
United States sued had been feloniously stolen, taken, and carried
away from his possession by some unknown person or persons without
fault or negligence on his part, and notwithstanding he had used
ordinary care and diligence in keeping it. The receiver contended
that he was liable only as a depositary for hire, unless his
liability was enlarged by the special contract to keep safely,
which he insisted was not the case.
The Court said:
"This is not a case of bailment, and consequently the law of
bailment does not apply to it. The liability of the defendant
Prescott arises out of his official bond
Page 188 U. S. 164
and principles which are founded upon public policy."
Again:
"The condition of the bond has been broken, as the defendant
Prescott failed to pay over the money received by him when required
to do so, and the question is whether he shall be exonerated from
the condition of his bond on the ground that the money has been
stolen from him. The objection to this defense is that it is not
within the condition of the bond, and this would seem to be
conclusive. The contract was entered into on his part, and there is
no allegation of failure on the part of the government. How, then,
can Prescott be discharged from his bond? He knew the extent of his
obligation when he entered into it, and he has realized the fruits
of this obligation by the enjoyment of the office. Shall he be
discharged from liability, contrary to his own express undertaking?
There is no principle on which such a defense can be sustained. The
obligation to keep safely the public money is absolute, without any
condition, express or implied, and nothing but the payment of it
when required can discharge the bond. . . . Public policy requires
that every depositary of the public money should be held to a
strict accountability; not only that he should exercise the highest
degree of vigilance, but that 'he should keep safely' the moneys
which come to his hands. Any relaxation of this condition would
open a door to frauds, which might be practiced with impunity. A
depositary would have nothing more to do than to lay his plans and
arrange his proofs, so as to establish his loss, without laches on
his part. Let such a principle be applied to our postmasters,
collectors of the customs, receivers of public moneys, and others,
who receive more or less of the public funds, and what losses might
not be anticipated by the public? No such principle has been
recognized or admitted as a legal defense. . . . As every
depositary receives the office with a full knowledge of its
responsibilities, he cannot, in case of loss, complain of hardship.
He must stand by his bond, and meet the hazards which he
voluntarily incurs."
The next case is that of
United States v.
Morgan, 11 How. 154,
52 U. S. 158.
That was an action upon the bond of a collector of customs,
conditioned that he "has truly and faithfully executed and
discharged, and shall continue truly and faithfully to execute
Page 188 U. S. 165
and discharge, all the duties of the said office." The condition
was alleged to have been broken in that the collector had not paid
over large sums of money collected for the United States, and by
not making seasonable returns of his accounts.
The court characterized as an erroneous impression that the
collector
"was acting as a bailee, and under the responsibilities of only
the ordinary diligence of a depositary as to the cancelled notes,
when in truth he was acting under his commission and duties by law,
as collector, and under the conditions of his bond. The collector
is no more to be treated as a bailee in this case than he would be
if the notes were still considered for all purposes as money. He
did not receive them as a bailee, but as a collecting officer. He
is liable for them on his bond, and not on any original bailment or
lending. And if the case can be likened to any species of bailment
in forwarding them, by which they were lost, it is that of a common
carrier to transmit them to the Treasury, and in doing which he is
not exonerated by ordinary diligence, but must answer for losses by
larceny, and even robbery. 2 Salk. 919; 8 Johns. 213; Angell on
Carriers, §§ 1, 9."
In
United States v.
Dashiel, 4 Wall. 182 -- which was an action on the
bond of a paymaster in the army for not paying over or accounting
for public money that came into his hands -- the defense was that
without any want of proper care and vigilance on the part of the
paymaster a certain part of the moneys had been stolen from him.
The trial court held that the theft or robbery, if satisfactorily
proved, was a good defense. But this Court held otherwise upon the
authority of
United States v. Prescott and
United
States v. Morgan, above cited, and reversed the judgment.
Substantially the same question arose in
United
States v. Keehler, 9 Wall. 83, which was an action
upon a bond of a postmaster in North Carolina. The bond was
conditioned, among other things, that the obligor would well and
truly discharge the duties of postmaster, and keep safely, without
lending, using, depositing in banks, or exchanging for other funds
than as allowed by law, all the public money at any time in his
custody, till the same was ordered by the Postmaster General to
be
Page 188 U. S. 166
transferred or paid out. In the spring of 1861, after the Civil
War commenced, the postmaster was still in office, and had in his
hands $330 of post office money belonging to the United States. At
that time, the United States was indebted to one Clemmens, a mail
contractor in that region, for postal service, in a sum exceeding
$300. In August, 1861, the Confederate Congress passed an act
appropriating the balances in the hands of such postmasters of the
United States as at the commencement of the war resided within the
limits of the Confederate states, to the
pro rata payment
of claims against the United States for postal service. The
postmaster paid the $330 in his hands to Clemmens, relying upon the
above act of the Confederate Congress and an official order from
the Confederate Post Office Department directing him to make such
payment. It was admitted in the case that, throughout the year
1862, the Confederate government had force sufficient at its
command to enforce its orders, and did enforce the orders of such
government, in that part of North Carolina in which Salem was
situated, and "that no protection was afforded to the citizens of
that part of the state by the government of the United States
during that term."
After observing that the postmaster had no right to select a
creditor of the United States and pay what he might suppose the
government owed him, the court said that
"the acts of the Confederate Congress can have no force as law
in divesting or transferring rights, or as authority for any act
opposed to the just authority of the federal government."
Referring to the statement of facts made in the case, and which
were substantially as above recited, it said:
"This statement falls far short of showing the application of
any physical force to compel the defendant to pay the money to
Clemmens. Nor is it in the least inconsistent with the fact that he
might have been desirous and willing to make the payment. It shows
no effort or endeavor to secure the funds in his hands to the
government, to which he owed both the money and his allegiance. Nor
does it prove that he would have suffered any inconvenience, or
been punished by the Confederate authorities, if he had refused to
pay the draft of the insurrectionary Post Office
Page 188 U. S. 167
Department on him. We cannot see that it makes out any such loss
of the money, by inevitable overpowering force, as could, even on
the mere principle of bailment, discharge a bailee. We cannot
concede that a man who, as a citizen, owes allegiance to the United
States, and as an officer of the government holds its money or
property, is at liberty to turn over the latter to an
insurrectionary government, which only demands it by ordinances and
drafts drawn on the bailee, but which exercises no force or threat
of personal violence to himself or property in the enforcement of
its illegal orders."
The court, reaffirming the doctrine of the
Prescott,
Morgan, and
Dashiel cases, held that in an action on
the bond of an officer receiving public funds the right of the
government to recover does not rest on an implied contract of
bailment, but on the express contract in the bond to pay over the
funds.
In
Boyden v. United
States, 13 Wall. 17,
80 U. S. 24,
which was an action upon the bond of a receiver of public moneys --
the defense being that the receiver had been by irresistible force
robbed of the moneys sued for -- the court said:
"Were a receiver of public moneys, who has given bond for the
faithful performance of his duties as required by law, a mere
ordinary bailee, it might be that he would be relieved by proof
that the money had been destroyed by fire, or stolen from him, or
taken by irresistible force. He would then be bound only to the
exercise of ordinary care, even though a bailee for hire. The
contract of bailment implies no more, except in the case of common
carriers, and the duty of a receiver,
virtute officii, is
to bring to the discharge of his trust that prudence, caution, and
attention which careful men usually bring to the conduct of their
own affairs. He is to pay over the money in his hands as required
by law, but he is not an insurer. He may, however, make himself an
insurer by express contract, and this he does when he binds himself
in a penal bond to perform the duties of his office without
exception. There is an established difference between a duty
created merely by law and one to which is added the obligation of
an express undertaking. The law does not compel to impossibilities,
but it is a settled rule that, if performance of an express
engagement becomes impossible
Page 188 U. S. 168
by reason of anything occurring after the contract was made,
though unforeseen by the contracting party and not within his
control, he will not be excused."
Again, in the same case:
"It is true that in
Prescott's case the defense set up
was that the money had been stolen, while the defense set up here
is robbery. But that can make no difference unless it be held that
the receiver is a mere bailee. If, as we have seen, his liability
is to be measured by his bond, and that binds him to pay the money,
then the cause which renders it impossible for him to pay is of no
importance, for he has assumed the risk of it."
At the same term of the court the case of
Bevans v.
United States, 13 Wall. 56,
80 U. S. 60, was
determined. That was a suit upon a bond executed by Bevans, a
receiver of public moneys, in a land district of Arkansas. The
Court reaffirmed the rule announced in the
Prescott case,
and said that
"it is not to be overlooked that Bevans was not an ordinary
bailee of the government. Bailee he was undoubtedly, but by his
bond he had insured the safe keeping and prompt payment of the
public money which came to his hands. His obligation was therefore
not less stringent than that of a common carrier, and, in some
respects, it was greater,"
citing
United States v. Prescott. In the same case, the
Court said, in reference to that part of the defense attributing
the loss of the money in question to the action of the Confederate
power:
"It may be a grave question whether the forcible taking of money
belonging to the United States from the possession of one of her
officers or agents lawfully holding it, by a government of
paramount force, which at the time was usurping the authority of
the rightful government, and compelling obedience to itself
exclusively throughout a state, would not work a discharge of such
officers or agents, if they were entirely free from fault, though
they had given bond to pay the money to the United States. This
question has been thoroughly argued, but we do not propose to
consider it, for its decision is not necessary to the case."
The question thus reserved from decision arose and was decided
in
United States v.
Thomas, 15 Wall. 337,
82 U. S.
341-342,
82 U. S.
346-347,
82 U. S.
350-352. That was an action on the bond of a surveyor
of
Page 188 U. S. 169
customs at Nashville, he being also a depositary of public
moneys at that city. The special defense was that the moneys in
question were seized by the Confederate authorities against the
will and consent of the surveyor, and by the exercise of force
which he was unable to resist, he being a loyal citizen and
endeavoring faithfully to perform his duty. The Court said:
"This case brings up squarely the question whether the forcible
seizure, by the rebel authorities, of public moneys in the hands of
loyal government agents, against their will and without their fault
or negligence, is or is not a sufficient discharge from the
obligations of their official bonds. The precise question has not
as yet been decided by this Court. As the rebellion has been held
to have been a public war, the question may be stated in a more
general form, as follows: is the act of a public enemy, in forcibly
seizing or destroying property of the government in the hands of a
public officer, against his will and without his fault, a discharge
of his obligation to keep such property safely, and of his official
bond, given to secure the faithful performance of that duty and to
have the property forthcoming when required? . . ."
"That overruling force arising from inevitable necessity, or the
act of a public enemy, is a sufficient answer for the loss of
public property when the question is considered in reference to an
officer's obligation arising merely from his appointment, and,
aside from such a bond as exists in this case, seems almost
self-evident. . . . These provisions [prescribing the conditions of
the bonds of receivers, etc.] show that it is the manifest policy
of the law to hold all collectors, receivers, and depositaries of
the public money to a very strict accountability. The legislative
anxiety on the subject culminates in requiring them to enter into
bond, with sufficient sureties, for the performance of their
duties, and in imposing criminal sanctions for the unauthorized use
of the moneys. Whatever duty can be inferred from this course of
legislation is justly exacted from the officers. No ordinary excuse
can be allowed for the nonproduction of the money committed to
their hands. Still, they are nothing but bailees. To call them
anything else, when they are expressly forbidden to touch or use
the public money except as
Page 188 U. S. 170
directed, would be an abuse of terms. But they are special
bailees, subject to special obligations. It is evident that the
ordinary law of bailment cannot be invoked to determine the degree
of their responsibility. This is placed on a new basis. To the
extent of the amount of their official bonds, it is fixed by
special contract, and the policy of the law as to their general
responsibility for amounts not covered by such bonds may be fairly
presumed to be the same."
Referring to the adjudged cases, the Court said:
"It appears from them all (except, perhaps, the New York case)
that the official bond is regarded as laying the foundation of a
more stringent responsibility upon collectors and receivers of
public moneys. It is referred to as a special contract by which
they assume additional obligations with regard to the safe keeping
and payment of those moneys and as an indication of the policy of
the law with regard to the nature of their responsibility. But, as
before remarked, the decisions themselves do not go the length of
making them liable in cases of overruling necessity."
The opinion concludes:
"No rule of public policy requires an officer to account for
moneys which have been destroyed by an overruling necessity, or
taken from him by a public enemy without any fault or neglect on
his part."
We think the government is quite correct in its conclusion that
the
Thomas case does not materially modify the decisions
in previous cases. The general rule announced in those cases -- and
the question need not be discussed anew -- is that the obligations
of a public officer, who received public moneys under a bond
conditioned that he would discharge his duties according to law,
and safely keep such moneys as came to his hands, by virtue of his
office, are not to be determined by the principles of the law of
bailment, but by the special contract evidenced by his bond
conditioned as above stated; consequently, it is no defense to a
suit brought by the government upon such a bond that the moneys,
which were in the custody of the officer, had been destroyed by
fire occurring without his fault or negligence. This rule, so far
from being modified by the
Thomas case, is reaffirmed by
it, subject, however, to the exception (which, indeed, some of the
prior cases had, in effect,
Page 188 U. S. 171
intimated) that it was a valid defense that the failure of the
officer to account for public moneys was attributable to overruling
necessity or to the public enemy. The case now before us is not
embraced by either exception. The result is that the special
defense here made cannot, in view of former adjudications, avail
the Superintendent or his sureties.
It is appropriate here to say that the rule established by this
Court in the
Prescott case has been enforced by numerous
decisions in state courts. In
Commonwealth v. Comly, 3
Barr. 372, which was an action on the bond of a collector of tolls,
conditioned that he would "account for and pay over all moneys he
may receive for tolls," and in which the defense was that the
moneys sued for had been stolen from the collector, the court
said:
"The opinion of the Court in the case of the
United States
v. Prescott is founded in sound policy and sound law. The
responsibility of a public receiver is determined, not by the law
of bailment, which is called in to supply the place of a special
agreement where there is none, but by the condition of his bond.
The condition of it in this instance was to account for and pay
over the moneys to be received, and we would look in vain for a
power to relieve him from the performance of it. . . . The keepers
of the public moneys, or their sponsors, are to be held strictly to
their contract, for if they were to be let off on shallow
pretenses, delinquencies, which are fearfully frequent already,
would be incessant. A chancellor is not bound to control the legal
effect of a contract in any case, and his discretion, were he at
liberty to use it, would be influenced by considerations of general
policy."
To the same effect are
Hancock v. Hazzard, 12 Cush.
112;
Inhabitants v. McEachron, 33 N.J.L. 339;
State v.
Harper, 6 Ohio St. 607;
Halbert v. State, 22 Ind.
125;
Morbeck v. State, 28 Ind. 86;
Ross v. Hatch,
5 Ia. 149;
Taylor v. Morton, 37 Ia. 551.
We hold that, as the accounts of the defendant Smythe showed a
deficit of $25,000 in the moneys in his custody as Superintendent
of the Mint, the government was entitled to a judgment for that
amount, unless, as the defendants contend, they were entitled to at
least a credit for $1,182, which, it is alleged, was the amount of
Treasury notes not entirely destroyed
Page 188 U. S. 172
by the fire, but were only charred and were taken possession of
by government agents after the fire, and found to be in condition
to be identified as to amount and date of issue.
A complete answer to this suggestion is to be found in sections
951 and 957 of the Revised Statutes -- reproduced from the Act of
March 3, 1797, 1 Stat. 514, c. 20. Those sections are as
follows:
"§ 951. In suits brought by the United States against
individuals, no claim for a credit shall be admitted upon trial
except such as appear to have been presented to the accounting
officers of the Treasury for their examination and to have been by
them disallowed, in whole or in part, unless it is proved to the
satisfaction of the court that the defendant is, at the time of the
trial, in possession of vouchers not before in his power to
procure, and that he was prevented from exhibiting a claim for such
credit at the Treasury by absence from the United States or by some
unavoidable accident."
"§ 957. When suit is brought by the United States against
any revenue officer or other person accountable for public money
who neglects or refuses to pay into the Treasury the sum or balance
reported to be due to the United States, upon the adjustment of his
account, it shall be the duty of the court to grant judgment at the
return term, upon motion, unless the defendant, in open court (the
United States Attorney being present), makes and subscribes an oath
that he is equitably entitled to credits which had been, previous
to the commencement of the suit, submitted to the accounting
officers of the Treasury, and rejected, specifying in the affidavit
each particular claim so rejected and that he cannot then safely
come to trial. If the court, when such oath is made, subscribed,
and filed, is thereupon satisfied, a continuance until the next
succeeding term may be granted. Such continuance may also be
granted when the suit is brought upon a bond or other sealed
instrument, and the defendant pleads
non est factum or
makes a motion to the court verifying such plea or motion by his
oath, and the court thereupon requires the production of the
original bond, contract, or other paper certified in the affidavit.
And no continuance shall be granted except as herein provided.
"
Page 188 U. S. 173
The defendants do not appear to have submitted to the accounting
officers of the Treasury any request or claim for a credit for the
$1,182, and no such claim could be made for the first time at the
trial. Before it could have been made there should have been
affirmative proof by the defendants that it was presented to the
proper accounting officer, and rejected, unless, indeed, such facts
had appeared from the exemplified accounts produced and relied upon
by the government. If such claim had been presented to the proper
officers before suit, and been disallowed, it would still have been
open to the defendants at the trial to insist upon its being
recognized and allowed. These conclusions are unavoidable in view
of the former decisions of this Court.
United
States v. Giles, 9 Cranch 212,
13 U. S. 216;
Thelusson v.
Smith, 2 Wheat. 396;
United
States v. Wilkins, 6 Wheat. 135,
19 U. S. 143;
Walton v. United
States, 9 Wheat. 651;
Cox v.
United States, 6 Pet. 202;
United
States v. Ripley, 7 Pet. 25;
United
States v. Fillebrown, 7 Pet. 48;
United
States v. Robeson, 9 Pet. 319;
United
States v. Hawkins, 10 Pet. 125;
United
States v. Laub, 12 Pet. 1;
United
States v. Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Pet. 377;
Gratiot v. United
States, 4 How. 112;
United
States v. Buchanan, 8 How. 105;
De
Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 431;
United States v.
Eckford, 6 Wall. 484;
United
States v. Gilmore, 7 Wall. 491;
Halliburton
v. United States, 13 Wall. 63.
It is said, however, that the government has not suffered any
substantial damage by the destruction of its own obligations, and
that in no event is it entitled to a judgment for more than nominal
damages, or at most for only such amount in damages as would meet
the cost of reprinting new Treasury notes to take the place of
those destroyed by fire. If this view be sound, a public officer,
receiving United States Treasury notes for the government under a
bond to safely keep them and pay them over to the United States
whenever required by law or ordered to do so could deliberately
destroy or burn them, and then, admitting that he had done so,
could prevent any judgment against him except one that would cover
merely the cost and trouble of printing new notes. Such a
proposition cannot be entertained for a moment. The plea of
non
damnificatus has
Page 188 U. S. 174
no place in such a case as this. The Treasury notes that came to
the hands of Superintendent Smythe was money belonging to the
United States, and could be used, at its pleasure, in the business
of the government. By their destruction, if they were destroyed by
fire in the manner claimed, the United States was deprived of so
much money, and the condition of the officer's bond that he would
safely keep the moneys in his custody and turn them over to the
government when required cannot be met by the suggestion that the
government, if it so elects, can replace the notes destroyed by
other notes, and thus make itself whole, less the cost of printing
new notes. It is for the government, guided by the legislation of
Congress, to determine when it shall or may issue new Treasury
notes, and it cannot be compelled to issue them in order to
reimburse itself for the loss of those in the hands of an officer
who was required, by the terms of his bond, to deliver them to the
Treasury, but did not do so. The government can stand upon the
terms of its special contract with the Superintendent, and insist
that he has not discharged his duties by safely keeping the moneys
that came to his hands, and which he undertook to pay over, when
required. It is sufficient in this case to say that the loss of the
notes here in question cannot be attributed to overruling
necessity, or to any public enemy, and as they came to the hands of
Superintendent Smythe, and as he did not keep the condition of his
bond, the government can look for reimbursement to that bond.
This view, it is contended, is not consistent with what was said
in
United States v.
Morgan, 11 How. 154,
52 U. S. 158,
above cited. It appeared in evidence in that case that the
collector received nearly $100,000 for duties in Treasury notes,
and cancelled them. The notes were then put up in a bundle to be
sent to the Treasury Department, through the post office, and
orders were given to the servant accustomed to deliver packages
there to deliver those. But the bundle was stolen or lost. It
appeared, also, that two of the notes for $500 each were altered
and soon afterwards presented to the collector in payment of other
duties, and were received by him as genuine. The court, in that
case, as already shown, reaffirmed the principle announced in
United
Page 188 U. S. 175
States v. Prescott. After observing that the duty of
the collector was to return the cancelled notes to the Treasury
Department, and that he was technically liable for not having done
so, the Court said:
"The rule of damage would be the amount of the notes, unless it
appeared, as here that they had been cancelled, and unless it was
shown that the government had suffered, or was likely to suffer,
damage less than their amount. How much is the real damage, under
all the circumstances, is a question of fact for the jury, and
should be passed on by them at another trial. Only that amount,
rather than the whole bond, need, in a liberal view of the law and
of his bond, be exacted, and that amount neither he nor his
sureties can reasonably object to paying when he, by the neglect of
himself or his agent, has caused all the injury which he is in the
end required to reimburse. And if any equities exist to relieve him
from that, none of which are seen by us, it must be done by
Congress, and not the courts of law. Anything less than this -- any
less strict rule in the public administration of the finances --
would leave everything loose or unsettled, and cause infinite
embarrassments in the accounting offices, and numerous losses to
the government. . . . Finally, we decide on this last question as a
matter of law this and this only -- namely that the collector is
liable for all the actual damages sustained by his not returning
the notes as required by law and official circulars; or for not
putting them in the post office so as to be returned. 5 Stat. 203.
But how much this damage was is a matter of proof before the jury,
fixing the real amount likely to happen from their getting into
circulation again, as two of them did here, from delay and
inconvenience in obtaining the proper vouchers to settle accounts,
from the want of evidence at the Department that the notes had been
redeemed, or from any other direct consequence of the breach of the
condition of his bond and of his instructions under it."
The Court had previously said in its opinion:
"We doubt whether, under all the circumstances, after cancelled,
they [the Treasury notes] can be regarded as money or money's worth
for the purpose of sustaining this action; yet it is clear that
they still possess some value as vouchers, and as evidence for the
Treasury Department
Page 188 U. S. 176
that they have been redeemed. It is still clear also that,
though cancelled, the Treasury Department, unless having possession
of them, is exposed to expense and loss by their being altered, and
the cancellation removed or extracted, and their getting again into
circulation, as two did here, and being twice paid by the
government."
The injury that might probably have come to the government by
reason of the neglect of the collector in the
Morgan case
was such that the Court could not, as in the present case, give any
peremptory instruction to the jury. It could not have said, in the
former case, that cancelled Treasury notes were to be regarded as
money, or that the government was entitled to judgment for the face
amount of those notes, prior to their being cancelled. Nor could it
say, as matter of law, that the government was, in fact damaged by
not having the cancelled Treasury notes as vouchers. Such being the
case, it was held that it was for the jury, under such evidence as
might be adduced, to say what actual injury, if any, accrued to the
United States by reason of the nondelivery of the cancelled
Treasury notes.
The present case cannot be controlled by the rule laid down in
the
Morgan case. Here, the Treasury notes received by
Smythe were not cancelled, and could be used as money. They were
not safely kept, nor were they destroyed through overruling
necessity or by the public enemy. Hence, there was a breach of his
bond, and as the amount of the Treasury notes which he failed to
deliver to the government was clearly shown, there was nothing in
this case to refer to the jury. There was no question of damage to
be ascertained by a jury; for if under the circumstances disclosed
the defendants were liable at all, the government, as matter of
law, was entitled to a judgment for the full amount shown to have
been received by the Superintendent and not paid over by him, as
required by his bond.
It remains to consider some minor objections to the judgment. It
is contended that it was error to give interest on the amount of
the judgment from April 1, 1893, the date from which the accounts
of the Superintendent were stated at the Treasury Department.
Page 188 U. S. 177
The alleged fire occurred June 24, 1893, and on February 9,
1894, notice of the deficiency in the Superintendent's account was
given to his sureties, as required by the Act of August 8, 1888, 25
Stat. 387, c. 787. And this action was brought August 7, 1894.
Interest, it is insisted, was recoverable at most, only from the
date of the notice to the sureties. This objection is met by
section 3624 of the Revised Statutes, which provides:
"Whenever any person accountable for public money neglects or
refuses to pay into the Treasury the sum or balance reported to be
due to the United States, upon the adjustment of his account, the
First Comptroller of the Treasury shall institute suit for the
recovery of the same, adding to the sum stated to be due on such
account the commissions of the delinquent, which shall be forfeited
in every instance where suit is commenced and judgment obtained
thereon, and an interest of six percentum per annum, from the time
of receiving the money until it shall be repaid into the
Treasury."
This statute is mandatory, and the sureties on the bond of
Superintendent Smythe must be held to have signed it in view of the
requirement as to the date from which interest should be computed.
It is not denied that the Treasury notes in question were received
at least as early as April 1, 1893.
It is also said that it was error, under the law of Louisiana,
to have rendered an absolute judgment against Byrnes, the
administrator of the succession of Conery, deceased; that, if any
judgment was rendered it should have been against the
administrator, payable only in due course of administration. This
objection is quite technical. If, by the law of Louisiana, the
judgment is so payable, it will be thus interpreted and enforced,
subject, of course, to the priority given to the government in the
distribution of the proceeds of the estate of any person indebted
to the United States whose estate is insufficient to pay all debts
against it. Rev.Stat. sections 3466, 3467.
The judgment of the circuit court of appeals, affirming the
judgment of the Circuit Court, is
Affirmed.
Page 188 U. S. 178
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, dissenting:
I dissent from the conclusion arrived at in the opinion of the
Court, and from the judgment thereon. I agree as to the general
character and extent of the liability of an officer entrusted with
the care and custody of public moneys, as stated in the cases cited
in the opinion upon that subject. But those cases do not touch the
question involved. It is undisputed that the property, for the loss
of which the defendants have been held, consisted of $25,000 of
Treasury notes of the government of the United States; in other
words, it consisted of the written promise of the government to pay
money upon presentation of the notes. There was evidence also, at
least sufficient to go to the jury, to prove that most of these
notes were wholly destroyed by fire, so that there was no
possibility of their being thereafter presented for payment or
redemption. Treasury notes amounting to about $1,100 were not so
far destroyed as to be incapable of identification or presentation
for payment, and they were taken possession of and retained by the
government, and yet the government also recovered judgment for
their amount. Assuming the liability of the obligors in the bond to
respond for all the damage sustained by the government by reason of
this destruction by fire, the question is what damage has the
government suffered?
Within the case of
United States v.
Morgan, 11 How. 154, cited in the opinion of the
Court, that question should have been submitted to the jury under
instructions that the defendant was not liable for the amount of
the face of the notes in case they had been totally destroyed by
the fire, but only for such cost and expense as the government
might incur by reason of the replacing of the notes destroyed,
including cost of paper, printing, engraving, and the trouble and
inconvenience caused the government, etc., together with the cost,
if necessary or more convenient to the government, of the
transportation of other notes to take the place of those
destroyed.
This suit is upon the bond, which, as it seems to me, is plainly
one of indemnity. The legal purport of such a bond is to indemnify
the government from any loss occasioned by any
Page 188 U. S. 179
dereliction of the obligor. In case of a breach of the bond, the
amount which the government would be entitled to recover would be
measured by the loss incurred. If the loss were shown to have been
the sum of five dollars or merely nominal, the plaintiff could not
recover a thousand dollars, or the penalty of the bond. It is
conceded in the present case that what the defendant and his
sureties have been adjudged to answer for, as a breach of the bond,
was because $25,000 (less about eleven hundred dollars) of Treasury
notes of the United States, in the custody of the Superintendent,
had been burnt and destroyed by fire. I concede that the bondsmen
would be responsible for any loss thereby occasioned to the United
States, even though without negligence on the part of the officer
in whose custody the money had been placed.
In
Morgan's case,
supra, there was a suit by
the United States against a collector of revenue. It appeared in
evidence that the collector had collected about $100,000 for duties
in Treasury notes, and had cancelled them. The notes were then put
in a bundle and sent to the Treasury Department through the post
office, but the bundle was lost or stolen. The circuit court gave
judgment to the government in the amount of the penalty of the
bond, which judgment this Court reversed, and in its opinion
said:
"The rule of damage would be the amount of the notes, unless it
appeared, as here, that they had been cancelled, and unless it was
shown that the government had suffered, or was likely to suffer,
damage less than their amount. How much is the real damage, under
all the circumstances, is a question of fact for the jury, and
should be passed on by them at another trial. Only that amount,
rather than the whole bond, need, in a liberal view of the law, and
of his bond, be exacted, and that amount neither he nor his
sureties can reasonably object to paying when he, by the neglect of
himself or his agent, has caused all the injury which he is in the
end required to reimburse. . . . Finally, we decide on this last
question as a matter of law this, and this only -- namely that the
collector is liable for all the actual damages sustained by his not
returning the notes as required by law and official circulars, or
for not putting
Page 188 U. S. 180
them in the post office so as to be returned. 5 Stat. 203. But
how much this damage was is a matter of proof before the jury,
fixing the real amount likely to happen from their getting into
circulation again, as two of them did here, from delay and
inconvenience in obtaining the proper vouchers to settle accounts,
from the want of evidence at the department that the notes had been
redeemed, or from any other direct consequence of the breach of the
condition of his bond, and of his instructions under it."
The attempt made to distinguish the present case from that of
United States v. Morgan does not seem to me to be
successful. Indeed, the case before us presents a stronger case of
a substantial defense than that of Morgan's.
To refuse this defense of a burning and total destruction of the
notes leaves the strange and anomalous spectacle of a recovery by
the government on account of a damage which in fact and in law it
has not sustained. The recovery must be upon the contract,
evidenced by the bond, to safely keep and pay over, and in default
to pay the damage up to the penalty of the bond. This is the
contract, and that there has been a breach may be admitted at once,
but the question on the part of the obligors in the bond then comes
back, what damage has the government suffered by reason of the
failure to keep the contract?, for it is only the damage which the
government in fact has sustained that we have contracted to pay.
How can it be said, with the slightest reference to fact, that the
damage amounts to the face of the notes when those notes are simply
the promise of the government to pay upon their presentation, and
the possibility of such presentation has ceased to exist?
But the right to set up and prove a defense of this character
seems to be denied on some view of public policy, the propriety of
which I admit I fail to recognize, and I also fail to recognize the
legal power of the court to deny to the obligors the validity of a
defense which shows that no damage, or a less amount than claimed,
has been sustained, because of any assumed public policy. It is a
case of contract, and not of policy.
The denial of the sufficiency of the defense seemingly rests
upon the ground that it is against the interests of the
government,
Page 188 U. S. 181
and therefore is against the public policy of the United States,
to permit any defense to be interposed in an action upon this kind
of a bond; that, no matter how clearly it may be proved that no
damage has been sustained by the government, and therefore there is
nothing which the obligors have contracted to pay, still the full
amount of the face of the notes must be paid to the government in
order to reimburse it for a loss it has never in fact sustained.
And it is proof of this very fact which is refused on the ground of
public policy. Can the government maintain the proposition that, if
it has suffered in truth no loss it can nevertheless recover either
the penalty of the bond or any less sum? This is to change the
legal import of the bond. But it is nevertheless maintained that it
is against public policy to permit proof of a fact which if it
really existed would undoubtedly constitute a defense to the claim
made by the government. That kind of a public policy which prevents
a legal defense I cannot understand. I can and do appreciate a
public policy that refuses to admit the sufficiency of a defense
that the property was lost by or stolen from the officer without
any fault on his part. The officer and his sureties have frequently
endeavored to have the government bear the loss which has actually
been sustained, because it happened without any fault on the part
of the officer; but the courts have held that such defense is
insufficient on the ground that it is against public policy to
recognize it as an answer to defendant's obligation to pay over,
because it would tend to diminish the care which the officer would
otherwise take of the property entrusted to his custody, and would
lead the government into an investigation of the facts surrounding
or causing the loss, under very great disadvantages, and therefore
as the loss had in fact occurred, and one or the other of the
parties must bear it, the courts have said he must bear it in whose
custody it had been placed by the government when it was stolen or
destroyed, and the proffered answer has been held to be no defense
to the contract to pay over, existing in the bond, which has
therefore been enforced. The courts simply decided what the
contract between the parties meant, but they did not decide that a
legal defense, showing there was no damage, could not be
interposed.
Page 188 U. S. 182
Here, however, it seems to me plain there is no question of
public policy as to what should constitute a defense. The amount of
damage is what the defendants have promised to pay, and nothing
more. Consequently, what is damage must be shown. Now that is a
question of fact, and if no damage has in fact been sustained, it
is the legal right of the defendant to prove it, and it cannot, as
I think, be denied him on any question of public policy. This is to
me a new application of the doctrine of public policy to a strictly
legal defense to the obligation contained in a contract sued upon,
where both parties acknowledge the validity of such contract, and
the defense is founded upon the terms of the contract about whose
legal meaning there cannot, as it seems to me, be any difference of
opinion.
Upon the other branch of the subject, the case shows that at
least $1,182 in Treasury notes were saved, although charred, and
were taken possession of by the agents of the government, and were
identified as to the amount and date of issue. The defendants
insisted there could be no recovery for this sum, as the government
already had the notes in its possession, but this objection was
overruled. The sections of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, §§ 951, 957, set forth in the opinion, are said
to render this defense insufficient, for the reason that the
defendants had not submitted their claim for audit to the
accounting officers of the Treasury. These sections are, as stated,
simply reproductions of the act of 1797, which was in force when
the
Morgan case,
52 U. S. 11 How.
154,
supra, was decided, and it is not mentioned therein
as an answer to the defense set up by defendants. Probably the
provision was not regarded as applicable, although it must be
admitted the record does not affirmatively show the nonpresentation
of the matter to the Treasury officials. But, in my judgment, the
sections have no application to this case. The defendants are not
seeking a claim or credit against the government, and the provision
applies to such a case, while here the question is as to how much
the government has been damaged, and when it is shown that, in any
event, it has in fact received $1,182 of the $25,000 it claimed, it
seems to me that, upon any basis of liability, such fact reduces
the claim on the part of the government not by reason
Page 188 U. S. 183
of a credit, but because the defendant never was liable to the
extent claimed, and in proving the facts which show there never was
any such liability, it cannot, as it seems to me, be said that the
defendants thereby claim a credit. They claim no such thing, but
they do claim, first, that the government has failed to prove a
cause of action for any more than a nominal sum, or second, for any
greater sum than $23,818, being the difference between $25,000 and
the $1,182 already received, and this is the extent of the cause of
action proved by the government, after all the facts are in
evidence.
The recovery in this case was not for the whole penalty of the
bond, which was $100,000, but judgment was prayed for and recovered
to the extent of $25,000, the whole amount of the notes, not
deducting the $1,182 already received by the government. This shows
that the recovery was at least based upon the amount of the damage,
and not upon the penalty, and it therefore further shows that it
was indemnity, pure and simple, which the government claimed.
Therefore it was necessary for it to prove the damage, and in
proving the defense at least as to $1,182, the defendants were not
proving a credit, but disproving to that extent the cause of action
of the plaintiff.
For the reasons thus stated, I am in favor of reversing the
judgment of the court below, and I dissent from the opinion of this
Court directing an affirmance.
I am authorized to state that MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS concurs in this
dissent.